Phil 20B

Real distinction / Really distinct

A distinction between two things that exist independently of one another. For Descartes, the mind and body are really distinct because each can exist without the other.

Substance

That which exists in itself and does not depend on another for its existence. For Descartes, there are three substances: God (independent), and mind and body (dependent on God).

Extended vs. Thinking

Extended substance: Characterized by spatial extension (body).

Thinking substance: Characterized by thought and consciousness (mind).

Cartesian dualism

Descartes' theory that reality consists of two fundamentally different kinds of substances: mind (thinking, non-extended) and body (extended, non-thinking). Matter vs Mind

Mind-body union (Descartes)

Despite being really distinct, the mind and body interact closely as a unified whole, particularly through the pineal gland. This union explains sensory experience and voluntary movement.

Interaction problem

The challenge in Cartesian dualism of explaining how two fundamentally different substances (mind and body) can causally interact if one is non-extended (mind) and the other is extended (body).

End / Final cause / Purpose

The reason or goal for which something exists or happens. In Aristotelian thought, the final cause is the ultimate purpose of a thing. Descartes rejects final causes in natural philosophy, focusing instead on mechanical explanations.

Welfare of the body vs. Welfare of the soul (Maimonides)

Welfare of the body: Practical well-being, including health, societal order, and material needs.

Welfare of the soul: The cultivation of wisdom and virtue, leading to knowledge of God. The former supports the latter, but ultimate fulfillment lies in intellectual and moral development.

Perfection of possessions

Material wealth, the lowest form of perfection.

Perfection of health

Physical well-being, necessary but not ultimate.

Moral Perfection

Ethical character, crucial for a virtuous life.

Intellectual perfection

The highest form of perfection, achieved through philosophical and theological knowledge, ultimately leading to understanding God.

Mysticism

A spiritual belief or practice emphasizing direct, personal experience of the divine, often through contemplation, prayer, or visions. Many medieval women mystics, such as Hadewijch and Mechtild, described mystical union with God.

Beguine

A lay religious woman in medieval Europe who lived in a community devoted to piety, charity, and mysticism without taking formal vows like nuns. Many Beguines, such as Hadewijch and Margaret Porete, wrote about divine love and union with God.

Union with God

The mystical state in which a soul becomes intimately connected with or absorbed into God. For mystics like Hadewijch and Mechtild, this union is often described in terms of love, ecstasy, and annihilation of the self.

Highest good

The ultimate goal or fulfillment of human life. Different philosophers define it differently.

For Maimonides, it is intellectual perfection and knowledge of God.

For Christian mystics, it is union with God.

For Descartes, it is linked to virtue and clear rational understanding.

Intention / Consent

In moral philosophy, especially for Abelard, intention refers to the purpose behind an action, while consent is the willful agreement to act. Abelard emphasizes that moral evaluation depends more on intention and consent than on the act itself.

Will (Abelard)

The faculty of the soul responsible for choosing and consenting. For Abelard, morality is rooted in the will's consent to good or evil, rather than in external actions.

Virtue or vice

A disposition toward good or evil.

Pleasure

An emotional response, which is not inherently moral or immoral.

The action itself

Actions alone are morally neutral; their moral weight depends on intention.

Moral relativism

The idea that moral truths are not absolute but depend on cultural, historical, or individual perspectives. Some medieval thinkers, like Maimonides, argue for objective moral truths, while others allow for variations in moral judgment based on knowledge and intention.

Voluntarism

The will is primary over the intellect in moral and theological matters. Duns Scotus is a voluntarist, arguing that the will, not reason, ultimately determines moral goodness.

Intellectualism

The intellect is primary, meaning reason determines moral truth, and the will follows. Thomas Aquinas leans toward intellectualism.

Theological voluntarism

The view that God's will, rather than reason or inherent moral truths, determines what is good and evil. This means moral law is based on divine decree rather than rational necessity.

Divine Command Theory

The idea that moral right and wrong are entirely dependent on God's commands. A strong form of theological voluntarism, it holds that something is good because God wills it, not because it has an independent moral nature.

Euthyphro Problem

A philosophical dilemma from Plato: Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good? This challenges Divine Command Theory by questioning whether morality is arbitrary or independent of God's will.

Natural law

A moral order inherent in nature and accessible through reason, often associated with Aquinas. It suggests that moral truths exist independently of divine commands and can be known by rational beings.

Belonging to the natural law in the strict sense (Duns Scotus)

Moral principles that are absolutely necessary and could not be otherwise (e.g., loving God).

Belonging to the natural law in the broad sense

Moral principles that are generally binding but could be different if God willed otherwise (e.g., specific social laws).

Eudaimonistic ethics

An ethical system based on eudaimonia (flourishing or happiness) as the highest good. Classical thinkers like Aristotle focus on virtue leading to happiness, while Christian adaptations may include union with God as the ultimate form of flourishing.

Affectio commodi / Affection for the advantageous (Duns Scotus)

The will's inclination toward self-interest and personal benefit.

Affectio iustitiae / Affection for justice (Duns Scotus)

The will's capacity to love justice and the good for its own sake, independent of personal gain. For Scotus, true morality requires this second affection.

Desire-willing

Wishing for something primarily because it satisfies one's own needs or desires.

Friendship-willing

Wishing the good of another for their sake, as in true friendship or moral love.