Q3. philosophy (In what circumstances should we trust assertions made by others?)

Clifford, CS Pierce, Elizabeth Fricker, Miranda Fricker, CT nguyen

WK Clifford - Universal skeptism

We can not be skeptists universally

• It is impossible to personally verify all knowledge that guides daily life. Clifford rehects the idea that we must doubt everything until we have direct experience or proof of every claim

WK Clifford - Stability of well tested beliefs

Clifford claimsthat beliefs about morality and physical nature which guide social behaviour and interactions with the world, have been tested over time with care and honesty.

These beliefs withstand rigourous scrutiny so they can be believed

WK Clifford - Acting on probabilities and developing future evidence

Sometimes we must act on probable beliefs when full evidence is lacking, because acting can generate new evidence and justify future beliefs

WK Clifford - Authority as a living tradition

Tradition is not a fixed set of questionable truths but rather an evolving framework - in other words a method for asking and answering questions

WK Clifford - The duty to test and challenge tradition

It is not only possible but morally required to doubt, question, and test tradition itself.

• Using tradition to stifle doubts is a sacrilige against human progress

• Genuine respect for tradition means actively engaging with it, puryfying it, and enlarging it through honest investigation

WK Clifford - Consequences of misuising information

Those who use tradition to avoid inquiry limit human progress and knowledge

• The progress of knowledge is a collective, intergenerational project, and each generation has a responsibility to contribute to it.

• Intellectual honesty and courage in questioning are essential to progress

CS Pierce - Method of authority

Authority fixes belief through institutional force—by controlling discourse, education, and

sanctioned beliefs. Peirce acknowledges its historical success but argues it ultimately falters for

reflective individuals.

CS Pierce - A Priori method (assume from another)

This method attempts to fix belief based on what feels rational, coherent, or harmonious to reason.

Peirce critiques it as being more aesthetic than epistemic—shaped by taste rather than evidence.

CS Pierce - scientific method (assume from another)

Peirce champions this method as the only one that externalizes the fixation of belief. It depends on

the assumption of a mind-independent reality that affects us in consistent ways, discoverable

through empirical inquiry.

Epistemological Implication: Experience, testimony, and expertise all find their place here:

experience is primary data; testimony is acceptable when publicly verifiable; expertise gains its

authority from its disciplined alignment with methodological standards.

E. Fricker - TDAP 1+2

Fricker claims we can trust assertions by others if TDAP 1 and TDAP 2 are followed

• TDAP 1

  • The other person must be in a good enough position to know the truth about it - so that if they believed it, their belief would almost certainly count as knowledge

  • They must be in a better position to know about it than you are

  • You must realise these conditions

• TDAP 2

  • The person is being honest

  • They are in a strong enough position to beleive it

  • You realise their honesty and superior knowledge

  • No significant contrary opinion exists

E. Fricker - Internal and external factors

• External factors: the speaker actually has knowledge and is being honest.

• Internal factors: you (as the listener) must also reasonably believe the speaker knows what they’re talking about.

E. Fricker - differential acceptance

Weak Deferential Acceptance happens when I trust what someone says about something (P) even though I didn’t already have a strong opinion about it — and I wouldn’t have formed one just by thinking it through on my own.

Strong Deferential Acceptance happens when I already had a strong belief (or was ready to form one), but I change my mind and accept what the other person says instead, because I trust them.

E. Fricker - trust should be selective, not blind

Be cautious in who to trust and you wont risk giving up your epistemic autonomy

E. Fricker - When is testimony ultimately trustworthy?

If a person (H) knows something (P) because someone told them and they trusted it, then there must be someone else who knows P in a different way — not just because they were told.

• Testiomy has to start somewhere (from observation or scientific grounds)

• Belief thats passed around without proof is just luck if its true - its not knowledge

E. Fricker - when is truth not risky / risky

Not risky - When it can be easily checked or verified
Risky - when you dont have the knowledge to check it

E. Fricker - Risks when trusting assertions

• Risk of error or deception: People can make mistakes or lie.

• Every transfer of information creates another opportunity for something to go wrong.

• Loss of ability to check our beliefs: We may believe things that we couldn’t evaluate even if we wanted to

CT. Nguyen - Epistemic bubbles

An informational network in which the individual only sees one side of information.

• in an enviroment that lacks coverage reliability

  • this can be due to either

    • Passive mechanisms (algorithms)

    • intentional mechanisms (cognitive dissonance)

• Not considered an error in epistimology as bubbles can be popped easy, and opinions can change once other knowledge is found

C.T. Nguyen - Echo chambers

Involve actively distrusting outside information and deeming external voices illegitimate.

• not from lack of information, but from denying outside opinions

• Undergoes process of evidential preemption

  • Contrary evidence is actively pre-emptively dismissed as trustworthy

C.T nguyen - algorithms / epistemic bubbles

• Personalisation algorithms create self reinforcing information loops, leading to filter bubbles

• Social media purposes friendship into epistemic networks

• Just because you see things more - dosent make them more true

C.T Nguyen - selective exposure, coverage reliability, corroboration

Selective Exposure

• The tendency to seek out information that confirms pre-existing beliefs while avoiding contradictory information.

 

Coverage-Reliability

• The extent to which an informational network provides a representative and sufficiently broad picture of relevant knowledge. (Sanford Goldberg)

 

Corroboration

• The act of confirming or supporting a belief through the agreement of others. Not all corroboration is epistemically meaningful.

M. Fricker - credibility excess + credibility deficit

Fricker distinguishes between two ways our judgement of another person's assertion can be distorted:

• Credibility deficit: giving a speaker less credibility than they deserve, often leading us to unfairly distrust them.

• Credibility excess: giving a speaker more credibility than is warranted, leading to excessive or uncritical trust.

Therefore, we should aim to give assertions an appropriately calibrated level of trust, avoiding both unfair distrust and excessive credulity.

M. Fricker - innocent epistemic error / prejudicial injustice

Not every mistake in judging whether someone is trustworthy constitutes testimonial injustice.

A person may receive too little credibility because of:

• innocent epistemic error, such as ignorance or a factual mistake; or

• prejudice, which systematically and unfairly distorts a person's credibility.

Only credibility deficits caused by prejudice constitute testimonial injustice.

Therefore, when deciding whether to trust someone, we should distinguish between legitimate epistemic reasons for doubt and judgments distorted by prejudice.

M. Fricker - Identity prejudice and systematic testimonial injustice

Our judgments about whether to trust someone can be influenced by identity prejudice: negative stereotypes associated with aspects of a person's social identity, such as race or gender.

This can lead to systematic testimonial injustice, where a person is repeatedly given less credibility across multiple areas of their life.

Therefore, we should be particularly critical of our reasons for distrusting someone when our judgment may be influenced by stereotypes rather than the actual reliability of their assertion.

M. Fricker - Testimonial injustice and trained perception

Fricker argues that prejudice does not always operate consciously. Our social environment can produce a trained perceptual sensibility, causing us to automatically perceive certain people as less credible.

We may not simply think that someone is unreliable—we may automatically see them that way.

This can create a vicious loop:

1. A person is unfairly dismissed because of prejudice.

2. Their frustration or distress increases because they are repeatedly ignored.

3. Their reaction is interpreted as evidence that they are irrational or unreliable.

4. This apparently confirms the original prejudice.

Therefore, our immediate impression that someone does not seem trustworthy should not always be accepted uncritically, as it may itself be shaped by social prejudice.

M. Fricker - Testimonial injustice

(RELATES TO ECHO CHAMBERS)
Fricker proposes the virtue of testimonial justice.

This requires:

• an anti-prejudicial sensibility;

• awareness that prejudice can distort credibility judgments;

• critically interrogating our own perception of whether a speaker is trustworthy;

• attempting to neutralise prejudice when assessing another person's assertion.

Testimonial justice involves both a moral motivation to eliminate prejudice and seek truth and the epistemic ability to reliably correct prejudicial distortions.

Therefore, we should trust others when our assessment of their credibility has been critically examined and is not unfairly distorted by prejudice.

M. Fricker - We might have reasons to trust someone that we fail to recognise

Fricker's discussion of Greenleaf and Marge shows that a hearer may have reason to trust someone but fail to recognize that reason because of social conditioning.

Historical and social circumstances can limit the concepts and critical resources available to a person, making it more difficult for them to recognize prejudice in their own credibility judgments.

Therefore, the circumstances in which we should trust others depend not only on the evidence available to us, but also on our ability to recognize when prejudice may be preventing us from properly responding to that evidence.