Moral Philosophy: Meta-ethics

AQA A-level Philosophy Paper 1: Moral Philosophy, Meta-ethics: Moral Anti-Realism

Define Meta-Ethics

-Asking what morality is to start with and how we are using language in moral statements

• What does it mean to call something right or wrong?

• What is the origin of our ideas about ethics?

Define Moral Anti-Realism

-The view that moral properties do not exist in the world (the concept of right and wrong exist within our mind). When using moral terms we are referring to something else entirely

Define Non-cognitivism

-The view that moral judgements do not express propositions that are truth-apt (they cannot be true or false)

Define Realism

The view that moral properties are objectively real in the world (the concept of right and wrong exist within reality and are independent from our mind)

When we use moral terms we refer to these properties, such as wrong or right.

Define Cognitivism

The view that moral judgements are propositions which are fact stating, or truth-apt (these are statements that can be considered true or false)

Give three reasons why people would believe moral realism

1: It allows for mistakes

• We often observe children as making moral mistakes

• If there is no facts about morality , it is not possible to make mistakes

• We are unable to learn right and wrong

2: It provides a demand from outside

• Makes us feel answerable to a standard of behaviour that is seperate from our feelings

• Meaning that morality is not determined by how we feel.

3: Allows us to make moral progress

• The idea that over time our morals have progressed (e.g. women’s rights)

• Without moral facts, there is no way to say on way of doing things is better than the other.

• This would mean that the way women are treated now is not better than how they were treated before, but just different.

ADDITIONAL NOTE: Realist theories are cognitivist (moral judgements are propositions that are fact-stating or truth apt (is either true or false)

Define and Describe Moral Naturalism

-The realist cognitivist theory that there is a relationship between moral properties and natural properties (these properties can be identified through sense experience and science)

• For example: The sense experience of the natural property of happiness has a relationship with the moral property of goodness

-According to ethical naturalists, the statement ‘murder is wrong’ expresses a cognitive belief that murder is wrong, where wrong refers to a natural property.

Realism: the view that moral properties are objectively real in the world (the concept of right and wrong exist within reality and are independent from our minds), when we use moral language we refer to these properties, such as wrong or right.

Congnitivim: Moral judgements are propositions that are fact-stating or truth-apt (these statements can be considered true or false)

What is reductionism?

A sub-section of ethical naturalism (realist and cognitivist)

-The theory that moral properties can be reduced to natural properties (e.g.: Wrong can be reduced to pain, so wrong=pain)

EXAMPLE OF REDUCTIONIST ETHICAL THEORY: UTILITARIANISM

-Pain is seen as a natural property (can be examined through science) , and since pain is the same as wrongness , wrongness is also a natural property

-We can scientifically investigate pain, so therefore, we can scientifically investigate wrongness.

-Pain tells use what we ought not to do, and what we will avoid doing, the same as pleasure tells us what we ought to do, and what we will do (motivating factor)

-Mills Greatest happiness principle creates a link between the moral concept of good and the natural fact of happiness

• P1: We know something is visible if we see it. Similarly, we know something is audible if people hear it.

• P2: So we know thats something is desirable if people desire it

• P3: Each person desires their own happiness

• C1: Each persons happiness is desirable

• C2: Therefore, the general happiness is desirable for the aggregate of all persons.

What is non-reductionism

-The theory that moral properties cannot be reduced to natural properties (still realist and cognitivist)

-EXAMPLE OF A NON-REDUCTIONIST ETHICAL THEORY: VIRTUE ETHICS

• Goodness cannot simply be reduced to facts

• Goodness is not the same as virtues or rationality

• Instead, it is the sum of all the constituent parts (which are discerned via practical wisdom)

What is the naturalistic fallacy and how does it affect Naturalism

-According to Moore, the mistake of identifying ‘moral good’ with any natural property because it is false reason to move from ho something ‘is’ (natural property) to how it ‘ought’ to be (a moral property)

-We cannot infer from a description of how the world is to how the world ought to be

• It used to be acceptable to have slaves, just because this was the case, does not mean it ought to have been the case

POSSIBLE RESPONSE FROM A NATURALIST:

• We commonly move from is to ought without fallacy

• It is a normal part of our moral system

• The idea of telos means that the statement ‘this is a promise’ already contains the expectation that ‘you ought to keep this promise’

• Exception to the rule, so therefore the argument fails.

What is the Open Question argument and how does it effect Naturalism

-An open question has an unfixed, opinion based answer

-When a definition becomes a question, it is a closed question (can be answered: yes or no)

STANDARD FORM:

• P1: If good was really a natural property like pleasure, then it would make sense to ask whether pleasure was really good, this would be a close question (yes or no answer)

• P2: It does not make sense to ask whether pleasure is really good (it is an open question that is subject to opinion)

• C1: Therefore, good is not the same as pleasure

• P3: The same is true for any definition we give for good

• C2: Therefore, good is indefinable

-Attacks reductionism as it attempts to prove that moral properties are not the same as natural properties

POSSIBLE RESPONSE:

• Just because it is an open question does not mean it cannot be the same thing

• The question, is water H2O is an open question, but we know that water and H2O are the same thing.

• Pleasure and good can still mean the same thing.

Define and explain ethical non-naturalism

-The realist cognitive position that claims that there are moral truths to be known, and that moral judgements are capable of being true or false, but we cannot reduce moral terms to natural ones

• Moral properties are real, but they cannot be easily examined through experience and science

• Example: We cannot reduce moral see pain, and see that it is wrong, but these two properties are seperate.

Define and explain intuitionism

-The theory that some moral judgements are self-evident, i.e. their truth can be known just by rational reflection upon the judgement itself. Moral intuitions are a type of synthetic a priori knowledge.

-There are both simple and complex properties that exist

• Simple property: cannot be broken down into constituent parts (example: yellow=yellow)

• Complex property: Can be broken down into constituent parts to better understand them (example: splotchy= patches of different colours)

• Good is a simple property, we cannot define it, but we know what it is (just like yellow, it cannot be define but we can recognise and see it). ‘good is good and that is the end of that’

-As a result of this, moral judgements are known intuitively (self-evident idea incapable of proof, it is not obvious but we can grasp the truth based on senses) , moral properties cannot be discovered, through sense experience and science, instead they are a special non-natural property in their own category.

What is consequentialist intuitionism

-Some things are intrinsically more valuable and we should strive for them

-Love and friendship is important

-These values are known through intuition

-We must consider our actions in terms of consequences, wether or not they promote these more valuable ideas

Deontological non-naturalism

-Moral claims are not about goodness (how good the outcome is)

-But is actually about obligation

-We use our intuitions to work out something we think we should do is our duty or not

-We cannot provide a reason, it simply is our duty because it is our duty (know from seeing and understanding a situation

What is Humes fork and how does it criticise mora realism?

WHAT IS IT?

-Claims that there are only two types of knowledge:

• Matters of fact: Synthetic a posteriori

• Relations of ideas: Analytic a priori

STANDARD FORM:

• P1: There are only two types of judgements of reason, relations of ideas and matters of fact.

• P2: Moral judgements are not relations of ideas

  • Able to deny them without contradiction, e.g. can deny ‘murder is wrong’

  • Unlike other analytic a priori truth

• P3: Moral judgements are not matters of fact

  • Cannot pinpoint the exact thing we call a ‘vice’

  • Cannot point out an objective wrongness

• C1: Therefore moral judgements are not judgements of reason (which means they are not knowledge)

-We cannot know moral truths, and we cannot call them cognitive (they cannot be true or false if we do not know them)

RESPONSE:

• Moral intuitions are not relations of ideas because they are not analytic, they are synthetic and self-evident

• They are established differently then any other empirical matters of fact

• Hume simply does not believe this is possible

What is the argument from motivations and how does it attack moral realism

-Undermines the foundation of moral realism by suggesting that moral judgements stem from desires and emotions, not from truth or reality.

STANDARD FORM

• P1: Moral judgements can motivate actions (for example, ‘helping others is good’ would motivate you to help others)

• P2: Reason or facts cannot motivate actions (for example, the fact that a tomato is red will not motivate you to eat the tomato)

• C1: Therefore, moral judgments are not judgments of reason

-We are motivated by emotion and desire

-Motivations do not tell us facts anything the world, and they are not analytic a priori truths (they just guide our actions)

-Truths do tell us how the world is, but no not carry any motivating value

-Understanding relation of ideas doe not tell us how we should act

-Knowing facts about the world tells us what exists and how to achieve what we want, it guides us, but is not the motivating factor.

What is the is ought gap and how does it attack moral realism?

-It is invalid to derive an evaluative conclusion (ought) from a purely descriptive premises (is)

-If we give a descriptive premise, we can only draw a descriptive conclusion (how something is)

-If we want an evaluative conclusion (how something ought to be), we must give an evaluative premise

-Naturalists move from a descriptive premise to a prescriptive conclusion (is to ought)

-Hume believes there is something missing when this occurs, leading to a lack of understanding why

-EXAMPLE:

• To argue: Stealing causes suffering, therefore we shouldn’t steal, is wrong

• To argue: Stealing causes suffering, suffering is something we wish to avoid, therefore we should not steal , is right as it gives an explanation for the jump between the first premise and the conclusion.

• However, the second premise is not a fact about the world, it is conditional on subjective desires, meaning that moral duties are not derived from fact.

-Ontological gap:

• Something different about description and prescription (against reductionism)

• Moral facts cannot be reduced to descriptive facts

-Epistemological gap:

• We cannot know prescriptive facts from descriptive facts

RESPONSE:

-We cannot jump from is to ought without a logical mistake

-When we make promises (is), we should do what it takes to fulfil that promise (ought)

-If this is right, then it means that prescriptive facts are not exclusively moral and can be liked to descriptive facts

Define and explain Error Theory

-The theory that moral judgements make claims about objective moral properties (cognitivist), but that no such properties exist (anti-realism). Thus moral judgements are all cognitive, but are all false. All moral language, as we mean to use it, rests on a mistake

-Moral judgements are truth apt and are just always false.

EXAMPLE:

-Murder is wrong expresses the cognitive belief that murder is wrong (but ‘wrong’ refers to a non-existent property, making the statement false)

• In the same instance: ‘The grass is blellow’ expresses the cognitive belief that the grass is blellow (but ‘blellow’ refers to a non-existance property which makes the statement false)

STANDARD FORM:

• P1: Moral judgements are cognitive (truth-apt) because they are making fact-claims about the world

• P2: Moral properties don’t exist

• C:Therefore, moral judgements are always false

What is cultural relativity?

-The idea that moral values depend of society, place, and time

-Moral values are determined by where and how we were raised than by any external fact.

-Moral judgements really refer to our perception of social norms

-There are no objective moral values, this means that any attempts we make at objective claims are automatically false.

What is the argument from epistemological queerness?

-If moral facts exist, they are not the same as any other fact, then we need a special way of knowing them.

-Ordinary facts can be known through sense experience, scientific investigation, or logical reason

• Whereas moral facts require a unique faculty of moral intuition which allows us to recognise moral truths without our usual way of knowing

-It is highly unlikely we have this mysterious special faculty just to identify moral truths without our

-There is no explanation for how we could access objective moral truths.

What is the argument from metaphysical queerness?

-We are used to desires, wants and needs motivation us to act (personal and subjective)

-We are not motivated by objective facts (there is no intrinsic motivation within them, they just are)

-If morals are both objective facts and motivating factors, they are like nothing else in our universe

-Moral properties would need to be intrinsically prescriptive (Motivate you to act a certain way just because they exist)

-Moral properties are therefore odd as they are unlike anything in the natural world

-We are motivated by moral judgements but this is psychological (we want to be accepted by society and so we follow the moral rules they set)

-They are puzzling and so improbable?

Define and explain Ayers Verification principle

-Aims to seperate meaningful and meaningless statements by verifying whether a statement can be true or false

-Language can only be verified if:

• It is an analytic proposition, where denying it would be a logical contradiction (example: a bachelor is an unmarried man, so it would be illogical to call a married man a bachelor)

• Synthetic proposition, where it can be verified empirically by sense-observation (example: doing an experiment to prove it)

-If there is no way of checking if it is true or false, a statement is factually meaningless

-Any moral statements are therefore factually meaningless as there is no links between definitions in moral judgements such as ‘murder is wrong’, and it cannot be empirically proven

Define and explain emotivism

-The non-cognitivist and anti-realist theory that claims that moral judgements express and emotional reaction or non-cognitive attitude, typically approval or disapproval, and aim to influence the feelings and actions of others.

-Moral statements do not describe facts but instead express feelings

EXAMPLE:

• Saying ‘murder is wrong’ is the same as saying ‘BOO murder’, it is an expression of dissaproval rather than describing an objective truth.

• So moral language functions more as an emotional outburst, rather than a factual claim.

-Just because moral judgements are factually meaningless, does not mean they do not have a purpose though

-Emotions are expressed to arouse/encourage feelings in others and to stimulate action.

Define and explain prescriptivism

-The antirealist and non-cognitivist theory that moral judgements are prescriptive, that is, moral judgements provide commands and reccomendations how to act.

-Moral statements are reccomendations related to our behaviour, not just an expression of emotion

-Hare: ‘The function of moral principles is to guide conduct’

COMMANDING AND COMMENDING:

• Terms like ‘ought’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’ are commands

• Instructing somebody to behave in a particular way (stealing is wrong = don’t steal)

• Terms like ‘good’ and bad’ commend, they identify if somebody is praiseworthy or blameworthy

  • ‘X is a good person’ = ‘you should be like x’

• Our words are intended to guide/prescribe somebodies behaviour

ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARDS:

• A good person is just somebody who is the way we think people ought to be

• They have reached the standard we believe to be important, but there are no absolute, objective, mind-independent standards

  UNIVERSALISABILITY:

• When describing something as good, it is appealing to a certain set of standards

  • It is illogical to have two identical actions and call one ‘good’ and the other ‘bad’

  • Either they both achieve the standards, or neither do

• We must be able to universalise moral judgements and should be consistent in applying moral standards