foreign policy analysis

Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) - intro & main questions

= subfield of IR that tries to explain why different states have different FP, why they change their FP, & who shapes FP decision-making processes - aims to uncover the processes that drive states' decisions on FP issues - decisions in FP can have vital repercussions on societies (eg wars, sanctions, peace treaties)

Key concepts: Foreign policy vs FP behavior vs Domestic policy

Foreign policy = the approach governments take to conduct relations w/ other states & achieve objectives in the INT arena (broad range: security, human rights, migration, energy policy…)

- Foreign policy behavior = the OBSERVABLE actions a S takes towards other countries/the INT milieu -> NB: the decision to do NOTHING, or FP mistakes, are ALSO part of a govt's behavior

- Domestic policy = decisions applied to the internal political system (eg taxes, healthcare, education) vs Foreign = directed at the world outside S borders

- in reality these boundaries are BLURRY (high interdependence) -> ex: a domestic decision to open borders to refugees has relevant external repercussions

- FPA intends to explicitly connect the study of IR w/ domestic politics

FPA's essence: Agent-Centred approach

= unlike structuralist IR theories that treat the S as an abstract 'black box', FPA wants to OPEN this black box

- agent-centred: the S itself has NO agency; the S IS its decision-makers

- policy is explained via theories about the human decision-makers (individuals or groups) who operate within the S -> FPA focuses more on the PROCESSES that lead to an outcome than on the outcomes themselves

- FPA = interdisciplinary (draws on sociology, psychology, anthropology)

FPA vs Realism (& Neoclassical Realism)

Realism: anarchy -> makes FP radically different from domestic politics (no system to control conflicts/enforce rules internationally, unlike domestically)

- S live under constant uncertainty/threat + act as rational, unitary actors -> FP framed strictly in line w/ national interest ('stop partisan politics at the water's edge')

- Neoclassical realism: still sees the INT system's structure as the main explanatory factor, but also acknowledges domestic factors (motives, identity, institutions) act as a FILTER on decisions

- <-> Difference w/ FPA: FPA rejects the idea of the S as a unitary actor; INT factors get NO privileged status in FPA & there is far more attention to psychological processes

FPA vs Liberalism (& Democratic Peace Theory)

Liberalism: rejects that power politics is the only explanation of S behavior - S are interdependent & benefit from cooperation (eg trade/arms control agreements) -> S are constrained by civil society & respond rationally to domestic pressures/institutional incentives - Democratic Peace Theory (DPT): democracies less prone to fight each other, since constrained by a peace-minded public opinion & democratic institutions - <-> Difference w/ FPA: DPT assumes UNIFORMITY within each group (democracies vs non-democracies); FPA shows both types display important variation in behavior & respond differently to constraints - FPA agrees democratic public opinion constrains FP elites, but explains the variation by focusing on the specific AGENTS in charge of making FP decisions

FPA vs Constructivism

Constructivism: ideational/conceptual factors shape IR; the world is socially constructed - anarchy & interests are NOT objectively given but acquire meaning through agents' actions ('anarchy is what states make of it' - Wendt) - analyzes norms, identities & cultures WITHIN the S - <-> Difference w/ FPA: both share a focus on subjective/ideational factors, but FPA scholars criticize constructivists for still focusing too much on STRUCTURE rather than AGENT -> where a constructivist looks at an elite's SHARED cultural representations, an FPA scholar asks how those representations influence DIFFERENT individual decision-makers differently

Levels of analysis in FPA

= FPA uses different levels of analysis to shed light on FP decision-making processes - interested in what happens INSIDE the S: who is in the position of making decisions matters - focus on the PROCESSES that lead to an FP outcome - interdisciplinary (sociology, psychology, anthropology), relies heavily on social psychology - understanding how actors interact w/ their environment

Level 1: the role of individuals - central axiom of political psychology

= the actions taken by a leader are shaped & channeled by their personality, perceptions, memory, judgement, goals, expressions & emotional self-regulation (Winter) - leaders don't just interpret a situation, they also MANIPULATE & frame it for their public - people affect how FP issues are framed, the options considered, the choices made & what is implemented -> studying political leaders' behavior/personality is key to understanding how governments operate - ex: Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022): Rational-choice (costs too high) & Liberalism (why risk sanctions if interdependent & cooperation is beneficial?) find the decision puzzling; Realism explains it as a response to the structural threat of NATO/fear of losing power; FPA instead focuses specifically on the actor Vladimir Putin - his personal motivations, beliefs about the INT system, personality traits, age, time in power & how (in)accessible he was to advice

When is studying individual leaders most relevant? (2 situations)

1. Type of political regime: the MORE power a leader has to make decisions, the more relevant it is to study their individual characteristics/beliefs -> ex: dictatorial/authoritarian regimes (leader has more unconstrained power) vs democracies w/ checks & balances; presidential regimes (eg US, more executive power) > parliamentary systems (eg Germany)

2. Non-routine, uncertain or crisis situations: when info is ambiguous/incomplete, leaders' individual characteristics play a bigger role -> ex: COVID-19 pandemic (some leaders reacted fast, others ignored experts, some risk-averse, others lax) - in ROUTINE situations, the usual bureaucracy is more likely to dominate the decision instead - summary rule: the MORE power the leader has, the more relevant their psychology is

Level 2: Group decision-making - Organizational Process Model (routine decisions)

= in ROUTINE decisions, organizations (eg agencies, ministries of Defense/Foreign Affairs, intelligence services) carry the heavy load - formed by a large number of people bringing their own expertise, leadership, agendas & resources - work strictly on the basis of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) - characterized by organizational INERTIA (rather unresponsive to change) -> may lead to a lack of creativity, flexibility & adaptability to new circumstances - policy is determined by: organizational expertise/interests -> adapt SOP's -> feasibility determines the final policy choice

Level 2: Group decision-making - Bureaucratic Politics Model (non-routine, non-crisis)

= in non-routine, NON-crisis situations, bureaucracies take the lead - decisions usually happen in interagency groups (workgroups between different agencies), who bring their own knowledge/interests/agendas & try to influence the process - Miles's Law: 'where you stand depends on where you sit' -> the position someone occupies in an organization determines their viewpoint - 3 main propositions (Brummer): 1. Stand-sit proposition: an actor's bureaucratic position -> pursues the interest of their OWN organization 2. Bargaining proposition: interaction characterized by 'pulling and hauling' (bureaucrats compete for influence/budget) 3. Resultant position: the final decision is an unintended COMPROMISE that no single actor initially pursued - policy is determined by: complex bargaining among individuals/agencies - key actors: individuals guided by role & self-interest

Level 2: Group decision-making - Crisis situations, Small Groups & 'We-feeling'

= in crisis situations or when stakes are HIGH, small groups take the lead (eg president/PM + their closest advisors) - We-feeling: people tend to try to RETAIN the approval of their group members rather than come up with good/realistic solutions -> belonging to a group is important for self-perception/identity; group cohesiveness = a powerful source of emotional support -> since we don't want to lose this membership, we sometimes make poor decisions to avoid conflict & stay in the group

Groupthink (Janis)

= the deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing & moral judgement that results from PEER PRESSURE - subtle constraints prevent group members from raising criticism -> when a member voices doubt, others try to persuade them; if that fails, communication in the group declines - the greater the cohesion & the more relevant the topic, the greater the inclination to reject dissenters - need for unanimity > motivation to realistically analyze new courses of action - 7 flaws in decision-making caused by groupthink: 1. Decision limited to only a few alternatives 2. Group doesn't discuss the goals/values involved 3. Fails to re-examine the initially chosen course of action 4. Doesn't review courses of action initially assessed as negative 5. Doesn't try to obtain info from experts 6. Selection bias in how the group reacts to info 7. No contingency plans for problems that arise - Caused by (Hudson): 1. Highly coercive leaders 2. Highly charismatic leaders who receive high loyalty 3. Cultural contexts where consensus is highly valued 4. Societies allowing little deviation from what's accepted -> risk increases w/ fear of exclusion (ostracism)

Role of public opinion, interest groups & the media

= politicians want to gain/stay in power -> must appeal to the public; two-way relationship: decision-makers are constrained by domestic pressure (public opinion, interest groups, media) but also try to SET the agenda & influence how people think about FP issues - Authoritarian regimes: leader is LESS constrained by public opinion (lack of free press/speech) -> but that does NOT mean they ignore public opinion entirely: they invest heavily in propaganda & internet censorship to control perceptions - Democracies: more constrained by public opinion; citizens have access to info & can show dissent, BUT FP usually ranks low on the public's priority list (people care more about economy/healthcare) -> FP = a 'thin interest-group environment' (Drezner): FP interest groups are smaller, less wealthy & less influential -> leaders often frame their FP actions as 'essential against an external threat' to generate public support (ex: Bush & Iraq, 2003)

Academic debate on public opinion: Almond-Lippmann Consensus & the post-Vietnam critique

Almond-Lippmann Consensus (post-WWII): literature agreed public opinion on FP is 1. Volatile & provides inadequate foundations for stable/effective FP 2. Lacks coherence & structure 3. Has little to no impact on FP - Post-Vietnam research (FPA perspective): REJECTS this -> after the Vietnam War this consensus was overturned - FPA argues public opinion DOES have real influence, but that influence is always FILTERED through the perception & interpretation of political leaders

Dieck - Anticipation & Framing model

= shows how governments ANTICIPATE public tolerance for military interventions & carefully FRAME them to keep that tolerance - a president's margin for maneuver depends on their ability to frame an intervention as acceptable/justifiable in the public's eyes - public opinion's impact is also crucial for MAINTAINING an intervention over time (not just starting it) -> ex: the shifting public support during the Iraq & Afghanistan wars - public support at the START is important, but sustaining it LONG-TERM is just as crucial

Baum & Potter - Foreign Policy Marketplace model

= approaches FP as a strategic MARKET in which 3 actors interact: 1. Public & 2. Leaders = the 2 primary actors, both interested in creating policy that suits their own interests/preferences 3. Media = 'traders' of information -> accountable to leaders for the CONTENT of their news, accountable to the public as CONSUMERS of that info - the balance of power on this market shifts depending on TIME & information available: in the initial stage of an FP event, elites hold an information monopoly -> public perception is ELASTIC (mouldable), letting leaders dominate the 'framing war' - over time, as the public gains access to more info -> elasticity diminishes -> opens space for the media/others to introduce alternative frames & challenge the leader

Role of culture, socialization & identity - Enduring Rivalries & Bar-Tal

= leaders are part of a culture & have been socialized in specific environments that shape how they perceive the world -> shared beliefs/emotions about 'the other' can bias behavior & decisions made; these can be passed down through generations, reinforcing long-lasting conflicts, & can generate biases/stereotypes/discriminatory behavior - this is the LEAST developed level of analysis within FPA (due to conceptual difficulty) - ex: enduring rivalries (India-Pakistan, Israel-Palestine, Chile-Bolivia) - Bar-Tal's 'Intractable Conflicts': actors perceive their goals as indispensable for group survival AND fundamentally incompatible w/ the rival's -> 'conflicts always begin in our heads' - this learned behavior becomes the NORM when leaders face conflict-related situations -> the incompatibility & conflict itself are not necessarily objective in nature - are rivalries then impossible to solve? NO, but more difficult -> rivalries ≠ static: periods of cooperation/escalation/de-escalation occur because leaders' personal characteristics (more/less distrustful, open/flexible, prone to change) shape the variation

Role Theory (Holsti) - National Role Conceptions & Altercasting

= based on the work of Holsti (1970) on National Role Conceptions (NRC): S tend to have ideas about the role they play in the world (eg 'bearer of democracy' -> more prone to interventions; also eg 'the pacifist', 'the balancer', 'the loyal ally', 'the defender of democracy') - national roles constitute an intellectual setting/framework for everyday decisions - policymakers hold a definition of their S's social position in the world & tend to make decisions based on these roles - roles can be CONTESTED among decision-makers, political parties, cabinet members - roles can CHANGE & ADAPT to new events - policymakers can also manipulate roles to reshape the role of OTHERS (= altercasting)