BOP, Polarity & Security Dilemma

BOP - 3 Definitions

(1) Descriptive: a situation with a balanced distribution of power;

(2) Structural (neorealists): an inherent systemic tendency toward balance, driven by anarchy and self-help;

(3) Normative (English School): a primary institution — it is not accepted that one state becomes dominant.

BOP ≠ stability or peace; a balanced situation can still be fragile.

Internal vs External balancing

Internal balancing: a state builds up its own military capabilities (armament).

External balancing: forming alliances and coalitions against a rising power.

Waltz: under bipolarity, internal balancing is dominant; external balancing (alliances) is less important. Under multipolarity, external balancing is more important but also harder.

Bandwagoning

Joining a rising or aggressive state rather than opposing it. Three motives: (1) avoiding attack, (2) gaining profit or advantage, (3) preferring the rising state's political model.

Less important for neorealists (balancing is the dominant logic).

Walt: states balance against threat, not just raw power.

Hards vs Soft Balancing

Hard balancing = military forms of counterbalancing (the traditional, expensive form).

Soft balancing = non-military counterbalancing, used against US dominance after the Cold War.

Examples: economic build-up (China), diplomatic coordination, withholding legitimacy, using the UNSC veto.

Institutional balancing

Creating a counterweight within or through international organisations. Three forms:

(1) Encapsulation — incorporating/tying a threatening state into an organisation to constrain it (e.g. integrating Germany into NATO and the EC);

(2) Exclusion — excluding states from an organisation;

(3) Inter-institutional balancing — establishing a rival new organisation.

Hedging Strategy

A set of strategies aimed at avoiding a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning or neutrality. Instead they cultivate a middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense of another." Typical of small Asian states navigating between China and the US.

Polarity vs Polarization

Polarity = number of superpowers (e.g. Cold War was bipolar: US + USSR).

Polarisation = clustering of states into fixed blocs around a superpower (e.g. Cold War was bipolarised: NATO vs. Warsaw Pact).

Europe before WWI: power multipolar (5–6 great powers), cluster bipolar (Triple Entente vs. Triple Alliance).

Waltz: only power polarity matters for theory.

Polarity and Stability

Waltz: bipolarity is less likely to lead to war — fewer potential conflicts, more clarity, less uncertainty.

Morgenthau and Deutsch & Singer: multipolarity leads to less war — more players means more caution and more mediation opportunities.

Mearsheimer: multipolarity is unstable when there is a potential hegemon; bipolarity and balanced multipolarity are stable.

Empirical evidence is largely inconclusive.

Security Dilemma (Herz/Jervis)

An increase in one state's security makes others less secure not because of misperception or imagined hostility, but because of the anarchic context of international relations." (Jervis 1976).

Even two purely defensive states risk spiralling into war. The dilemma is structural, not psychological — rooted in anarchy, not bad intentions.

Spiral Model vs Deterrence Model

Spiral model: armament and threats provoke counter-armament → arms race → increased chance of war. Solution: rapprochement and negotiation (the carrot).

Deterrence model: weakness invites aggression — "si vis pacem para bellum." Solution: arm up to prevent war (the stick). Which applies depends on whether the adversary is a revisionist or status quo state.

Jervis Offense-Defense model

Four worlds based on two variables:

(1) whether offense or defense has the advantage, and (2) whether offensive and defensive postures are distinguishable.

Most dangerous: offense has advantage AND postures are indistinguishable — security dilemma fully active, preventive war possible, arms race likely.

Most stable: defense has advantage AND postures are distinguishable — no security dilemma, no security problem.

How to Solve the Security Dilemma

(1) Exchange of information and confidence-building measures (e.g. NATO–Warsaw Pact arms control arrangements);

(2) Defensive weapons — but the distinction between offensive and defensive is often unclear in practice;

(3) Controlled balance of power through disarmament or arms control agreements;

(4) Unilateral steps (e.g. Gorbachev stopping nuclear tests and withdrawing troops).

Hiding

Neutrality, isolation

Transcending

Adopt international norms

Grouping/Encapsulation

embed hostile state in institutions (e.g. Germany in European

Community and NATO)

Walt Refinement

States balance against threat, not just power → perception and behavior

matter, not only material capabilities.

Multipolarity-specific risks

Buck-passing: states pass the burden of balancing to others, hoping others will bear the cost → delays, instability, dangerous in crises

Chain-ganging: being dragged into war for fear of losing an ally; coalitions can change; result: less stable (in the sense of peaceful)