alastair macintyre

moral goods

For MacIntyre, virtues are acquired human qualities that sustain practices and contribute to the good of a community. A practice is a coherent, complex form of socially established cooperative activity (e.g., architecture, chess, farming) that has internal goods—goals and standards that are only intelligible within that practice.

on aristotle

• Macintyre argued, that Aristotle’s theory is not acceptable as in “After Virtue”- which set out the basic ideas the Macintyre developed for the remainder of his career. He claimed that it must be restated in a way that does not depend on Aristotle’s outdated “metaphysical biology.” He basically equates it w the assertion that the telos of a man is the good life 

• Macintyre also proposes to get rid of the metaphysical aspects of A’s ideas, whilst retaining the idea of accounting for the moral goods in terms of virtuous behaviours 

• We can still think of moral virtues as behaviours that society needs its members to have (i.e. speaking teleologically), but we do so in the context of a naturalistic approach to understanding why some behaviours are virtuous and why others are not, w/o reference to biological essences 

Rejection of Enlightenment Morality

• MacIntyre argues that modern moral philosophy is fragmented and incoherent due to the Enlightenment's failed attempt to create a universal, rational moral framework (e.g. Kantianism, utilitarianism). He claims that without a shared narrative or telos (goal), moral terms like "good" or "ought" become meaningless.

Narrative Unity of Life:

• Human lives must be seen as narratives, with a beginning, middle, and end. Virtues are necessary for living a coherent life narrative that aims at achieving the telos or ultimate good of human life—eudaimonia (flourishing).

WEAKNESS: neglect of universal principles

MacIntyre’s rejection of universal moral principles has been criticized for leaving his virtue ethics vulnerable to moral relativism.  

Critics argue that without universal guidelines, it is difficult to adjudicate between conflicting traditions. 

• Criticism from J.L. Mackie: In Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977), Mackie argues that moral relativism undermines the ability to resolve ethical conflicts between different traditions, a point that applies to MacIntyre’s approach.  

• MacIntyre’s reliance on traditions and narratives in virtue ethics might be seen by Mackie as inherently relativistic. If virtues are tied to specific historical and cultural contexts, Mackie might argue that they lack the universality required for objective moral guidance. 

• From Mackie’s viewpoint, MacIntyre’s appeal to tradition does not resolve the problem of relativism but instead entrenches it, as different traditions may endorse conflicting virtues without a universal standard to arbitrate between them 

• Counterargument: MacIntyre might respond that practical reasoning within traditions allows for moral growth and adaptation. 

WEAKNESS: lack of specificity

MacIntyre’s concept of telos (human flourishing) is central to his virtue ethics, but Norman critiques its lack of specificity. He argues that MacIntyre does not clearly define what constitutes flourishing, leaving the concept open to interpretation. 

• Norman's Argument: Without a clear definition, telos becomes a vague ideal that may vary significantly between traditions, making it difficult to apply MacIntyre’s virtue ethics consistently. 

• One tradition might emphasize individual freedom as essential to flourishing, while another prioritizes communal obligations, creating tension between differing conceptions of the good life. 

• Implication: Norman suggests that MacIntyre’s framework would benefit from a more explicit account of what human flourishing entails. 

Tradition-Based Rationality

• Moral reasoning, for MacIntyre, is embedded in traditions.

• There is no neutral, tradition-free way of evaluating moral claims.

• Traditions provide the framework through which virtues and moral reasoning develop and make sense. 

STRENGTH: restoration of moral coherence

• MacIntyre offers a compelling diagnosis of the moral confusion in contemporary ethical thought. He shows how, without a shared goal or human purpose, ethical language becomes fragmented (e.g., debates over abortion, justice, etc.).

• Charles Taylor supports MacIntyre’s diagnosis, arguing in Sources of the Self (1989) that modern identity is fractured and benefits from a retrieval of moral sources grounded in tradition.

STRENGTH: emphasis on community + traditions

• Unlike abstract moral systems like Kantianism or utilitarianism, MacIntyre's virtue ethics is grounded in real social practices and communities.

• This emphasis resonates with communitarian philosophers like Michael Sandel (Liberalism and the Limits of Justice), who argue that liberal individualism neglects the importance of communal identity in moral reasoning.