Studied by 0 people
Looks like no one added any tags here yet for you.
Propositional knowledge
Knowing that (e.g., "I know that 2+2=4").
Ability knowledge
Knowing how to (e.g., "I know how to ride a bike").
Knowledge vs. mere true belief
Knowledge is true belief with justification; mere true belief is true by chance, without justification (e.g., lucky guesses).
Skilled Archer Analogy
Knowledge requires skill, not just luck. An archer who hits the target consistently is skilled, not lucky.
Gettier cases
Gettier cases show situations where a belief is justified and true, but not knowledge due to luck (e.g., stopped clock, Madonna, hologram).
No False Presuppositions condition
Knowledge should not depend on false assumptions (e.g., a clock is assumed to be regularly maintained when it is not).
Perceptual beliefs
Perceptual beliefs (e.g., seeing a dog) don't need presuppositions to be justified.
Regress Argument
It argues that beliefs need justification, but an infinite or circular chain of justifications is impossible, leading to the need for justified basic beliefs.
Justified basic beliefs
Basic beliefs are self-justified (e.g., "I see a tree"); nonbasic beliefs require justification from basic beliefs (e.g., "The sky is blue").
Classical Foundationalism (CF)
CF asserts that knowledge is built on infallible basic beliefs (self-evident truths, mental states) and uses deduction to justify other beliefs.
Modest Foundationalism
Modest Foundationalism allows for fallible basic beliefs (e.g., perception) and justification via induction and abduction, not just deduction.
Value of knowledge
Knowledge is more stable and reliable than mere true belief, making it more useful for practical and long-term goals.
Non-instrumental value of knowledge
Knowledge is intrinsically valuable, as it contributes to wisdom, which is desirable even if it doesn't help us achieve practical goals.
Clifford's Ethics of Belief argument
Clifford argues that it is morally wrong to believe without sufficient evidence, as such beliefs can lead to harmful consequences for individuals and society.
Moral value of justification
Believing without sufficient evidence can make individuals and societies credulous and irresponsible, thus harming both.
Radical skepticism
Radical skepticism challenges the idea that we can know anything of substance, often by invoking skeptical hypotheses like the Matrix or Descartes's evil demon.
Skeptical argument using Modus Ponens
If we can't know the denials of skeptical hypotheses, then we can't know anything substantial about the world, therefore, we can't know anything of substance.
Contextualism in response to skepticism
Contextualism argues that the standards for knowledge can vary depending on the context, allowing us to claim knowledge in everyday situations but acknowledging the skeptic's higher standards.
Zebra Example from Pritchard's Interview
Even if we can't distinguish between normal situations and skeptical scenarios, background information (e.g., knowledge that we're not in the Matrix) justifies our beliefs.
Phenomenal consciousness
Phenomenal consciousness is the subjective experience of what it's like to undergo mental occurrences (e.g., the experience of pain).
Hard problem of consciousness
The hard problem is the challenge of explaining why and how physical processes give rise to subjective experiences.
Reductionist Physicalism about consciousness
It claims that knowing all microphysical facts and using logic would provide a complete explanation of consciousness.
Functionalism
Functionalism defines consciousness in terms of behavior: mental states are identified by their causal effects (e.g., pain causes a withdrawal response).
Non-Reductionist Physicalism
Non-reductionists argue that consciousness supervenes on physical facts but doesn't logically follow from them.
Dualism
Dualism posits that there are two kinds of fundamental properties: physical (e.g., brain activity) and phenomenal (e.g., experiences of pain).
Panpsychism
Panpsychism argues that consciousness is present in everything, even non-living objects.
Mary's Argument against Reductionist Physicalism
Mary knows all physical facts about color, but when she sees color for the first time, she learns something new, showing that physical facts don't fully explain consciousness.
Veridical perception
Veridical perception occurs when our sensory experience correctly represents the external world (e.g., seeing a red apple as red).
Illusory experience
An illusory experience occurs when perception misrepresents the external world (e.g., a straight stick looking bent in water).
Hallucinatory experience
A hallucinatory experience involves perceiving something that is not connected to the external world (e.g., seeing a dragon that isn't there).
Direct Realism
Direct realism asserts that we perceive objects directly, meaning our experience of an object is an immediate connection to that object.
Indirect Realism
Indirect realism holds that we perceive the world through representations (e.g., our sensory experiences are mediated by mental images).
Argument from Illusions
If illusions and veridical perceptions are indistinguishable, then it suggests our perception is not always connected to the external object.
Argument from Hallucinations
Hallucinations and veridical perceptions are indistinguishable, suggesting we may not always be directly connected to external objects when perceiving.
Disjunctivism in response to illusions and hallucinations
Disjunctivism denies that illusory and veridical experiences are of the same kind, arguing that they are fundamentally different experiences.
Transparency of Experience
Not all perceptual experiences are fully transparent; we may not always directly perceive all aspects of an object (e.g., when vision is blurred).
