Metaphysics of mind

The Mind-Body Problem

The problem of describing and explaining the relationship between our mental states and our physical states.

• e.g. beliefs, emotions, sensations.

The Hard Problem of Consciousness

The problem of analysing and explaining the phenomenal properties of consciousness, what it is like to undergo a conscious experience.

Phenomenal Consciousness

A form of consciousness with a subjective, experiential quality, as involved for example in perception sensation, emotion. Awareness of ‘what it is like’ to experience such mental phenomena.

• e.g. there is a distinctive ‘what-it’s-like-ness’ to see the colour red, to smell coffee, to taste salt.

Intentionality

The property of mental states whereby they are directed towards an intentional object - they are ‘about’ something.

• e.g. a belief that Paris is the capital of France is about Paris and the desire for chocolate is about chocolate.

intentional content

Intentional object + aspectual shape.

intentional object

What an intentional mental state represents.

• e.g. Paris, or chocolate.

Aspectual shape

The way the intentional object is represented.

• e.g. hot and humid.

Phenomenal properties

The properties of an experience which gives it its distinctive experiential quality, and which are apprehended in phenomenal consciousness.

• e.g. what it is like to feel angry, or smell a rose.

Qualia

Phenomenal properties understood as intrinsic, non-intentional and introspectively accessible properties of mental states.

Substance

An entity which does not depend upon another entity for its continued existence - they have ontological independence - and are the bearer of properties.

Properties

Properties are ontologically dependent on substances, and substances can persist through changes in properties.

• e.g. a growing tree loses the property of being 1m high.

Non-intentional property

A non-relational property.

Substance dualism

The view that the mind and the body are separate substances.

Cartesian substance dualism

The two sorts of substance are mind (soul) and matter.

• minds can exist independent of bodies.

• mind and body have different essential properties.

Essential property of mind: thought.

Essential property of body: extension.

The indivisibility argument (Descartes)

1) My mind is essentially unified and so indivisible; mind can’t be divided into further parts - it is not extended so doesn’t have physical parts.

2) Matter is not essentially unified and is divisible; matter is extended, and so it can be physically divided.

3) Therefore, mind and matter are non-identical, distinct substances.

Descartes: if mind and body were the same thing, they would have the same essential properties.

• draws on Leibniz’s law of indiscernability of identicals: if X and Y are identical, then they have all their properties in common.

Objection against indivisibility: is the mind really indivisible?

Case of mental illness, e,g. multiple personality syndrome might suggest the mind can be divided - certain ‘parts’ can’t communicate with your other ‘parts’.

Theories of unconsciousness may also suggest that the mind has ‘parts’, e.g. desiring one thing consciously, but unconsciously desiring something different.

Potential Descartes reply: bodies are spacially divisible, minds are only functionally divisible.

Objection against indivisibility: is everything that is physical divisible?

If, for example, the smallest physical particles are best understood as packets of energy or force fields, then we can’t further divide these - divisibility is not an essential property of physical substances, therefore the mind not being divisible does not entail that it is not physical.

Objection against indivisibility: is the mind a substance?

The argument assumes that minds exist as substances, and then argues that they are not physical substances. What if minds are not substances at all; then minds are not divisible or indivisible - they simply don’t exist. Instead, there are only mental properties - thoughts, desires etc.

• mental properties are properties of the brain - physical substance.

Clear ideas (Descartes)

You understand and grasp all of the information contained within the concept or proposition and how the different bits of information within the concept or proposition relate to each other.

Clear ideas (Descartes)

You understand and grasp all of the information contained within the concept or proposition and how the different bits of information within the concept or proposition relate to each other.

The conceivability argument (Descartes)

P1) It is conceivable that the mind can exist without the body.

C1) Therefore, it is metaphysically possible that the mind can exist without the body.

C2) Therefore, mind and body are distinct substances.

• Descartes uses his clear and distinct ideas to conceive of his mind without extension and having the essential property of thought.

• then has clear and distinct idea of the body having the essential property of extension, but lacking the property of thought.

Conceivability/logical possibility

If a proposition is conceivable, it is logically possible.

It is a matter of the proposition not seeming to you, given your concepts, to contain a logical contradiction.

Metaphysical possibility

If a proposition is metaphysically possible, this is a matter of that proposition really not containing a contradiction.

Challenging inference 1 of Descartes’ Conceivability: can we really move from conceivability to metaphysical possibility?

1) Maybe we don’t have clear and distinct ideas of mind and body?

• we might be confused about our concepts.

• how can we be sure we have a clear and distinct idea of something.

2) We need to buy the arguments for God’s existence.

• clear and distinct ideas might require a divine guarantee, e.g. that God would not deceive us.

3) The mind might depend upon the body in some way we’re unaware of.

• the mind is not ontologically independent.

• it is not a separate substance from the body.

Challenging inference 1 of Descartes’ Conceivability: the Masked Man fallacy

• I think the masked man robbed the bank and I don’t think my father robbed the bank; therefore, the my father is not the masked man.

• it is logically possible that my father is not the masked man - I can conceive of this.

• If, unknown to me, my father is the masked man, then it is metaphysically impossible that my father is not the masked man - they are one and the same.

• from conceiving that ‘two’ people are distinct, we can’t infer that they are distinct.

Descartes’ (potential) reply to the Masked Man fallacy

In general, we cannot imfer metaphysical possibility from conceivability, BUT, in the case of clear and distinct ideas, the inference is justified.

The concepts in the masked man fallacy are not clear and distinct, whereas, Descartes could argue, his concepts of mind and body as separate substances are clear and distinct - disanalogy.

The problem of other minds

The question of how we can know that there are minds other than our own, given that our experience of other minds (if they exist) is through behaviour.

Argument for existence of other minds: analogy 1

P1) I have a mind.

P2) I know from my experience that my mental states cause my behaviour.

P3) Other people have bodies similar to mine and behavie similarly to me in similar situations.

C1) Therefore, by analogy, their behaviour has the same cause as my behaviour, which is mental states.

C2) Therefore, other people have minds.

Argument for existence of other minds: analogy 1 - OBJECTION

The line the argument follows would be like saying ‘this dog has 3 legs, therefore all dogs have 3 legs.’

I having a mind could be a special case - perhaps I am the only person with a mind.

• can’t base a conclusion on a single case.

• problem still stands.

Argument for existence of other minds: analogy 2

P1) This behaviour has a mental cause.

P2) That behaviour has a mentalk cause.

P3) The third behaviour (etc.) has a mental cause.

C1) Therefore, many behaviours have a mental cause (I know this from my own experience).

P4) Other people exhibit the same types of behaviour as cited above.

C2) Therefore, those behaviours also have mental causes.

C3) Therefore, other people have minds.

Argument for existence of other minds: analogy 2 - OBJECTION

The argument relies on the similarity principle: similar effects imply similar causes.

• Suppose an AI could almost flawlessly replicate the ‘effects’ (behaviours) - using the similarity principle in this way this argument would claim that this AI had mental states.

The existence of other minds is the best hypothesis

The best explanation for explaining human behaviour is that people have minds, and that their mental states cause them to behave as they do, and if people in general have minds, then obviously people other than me have minds.

Objections to the best hypothesis argument for the problem of the existence of other minds

1) The view depends on this theory being the right account of what mental states are.

2) If we understand the mind in terms of its causal reactions to behaviour, then we need to solve the problem of how the mind can cause physical effects.

3) The belief that people have minds is not a hypothesis, as we don’t infer, on the basis of evidence, that they have minds.

The problem of mental causation

Could the mind/mental states causally effect the body, and vice-versa, and if so, how?

The conceptual interaction problem

How is it that a mental substance which is not in space and has no physical force can interact with a physical substance which is in space and moved by physical forces?

• question arises when we think about the concepts of mind and body in substance dualsim

The empirical interaction problem

Can the claim that the mind causes physical changes be made compatible with what we know empircally? - considers what we know about physics.

Elizabeth of Bohemia: Conceptual interaction problem

P1) Things only move when they are pushed.

P2) Only something that is extended and can touch the thing that is moved can exert such a force.

P3) The mind has no extension, so it cannot touch the body.

C1) Therefore, the mind cannot move the body.

Descartes original response to Elizabeth of Bohemia

Not an accurate account of why things move.

Objects fall due to gravity; gravity is a force of attraction that operates without needing conact between the two physical objects.

Elizabeth of Bohemia’s amended argument

P1) The movement of a physical object is only initiated by some physical force, exerted at some point in space.

P2) If dualism is true, then the mind is not in space and cannot exert any physical force.

C1) Therefore, if dualism is true, the mind cannot cause the body to move.

C2) Therefore, either dualism is false or the mind cannot cause the body to move.

P3) The mind can cause the body to move.

C3) Therefore, dualism is false.

The empirical interaction problem: physics

Interactionist substance dualism is incompatible with the law of conservation of energy - a fundamental principle physics.

The physical universe is a closed system (a system with well-defined physical boundaries).

• the law of conservation of energy: in a closed system, the total amount of energy stays the same - energy is only transferred between physical causes and effects.

Substance dualism: the mind (mental cause) moves the body (physical effect); non-physical cause would transfer energy into a physically closes system.

• i.e. there would be an increase in the total amount of energy.

Epiphenomenalism

The theory that mental states and events are epiphenomena (bi-products) of some physical processes, but with no causal influence of their own.

Mental states are causally inert - they do not causes physical effects or other mental effects.

Epiphenomenalism objections: cannot explian self-knowledge

If epiphenomenalism is true, then my belief that I am in pain will not be caused by a sensation of pain; I could have the sensation of pain without the belief and vice versa.

• threatens a natural account of our knowledge of our mental states

• whatever causes me to have the belief that I am in pain could cause me to have this belief even when I am not in pain

Epiphenomenalism objections: counter-intuitive (doesn’t accord with our experience)

We experience causal connections between our mental states, and between our mental states and behaviour; it is part of my experience that whether I feel pain makes a difference to both what I think (e.g. that I’m in pain) and to what I do (e.g. jump around shouting).

• when I say what I think, it is part of my experience that my thought is the cause of what I say.

Epiphenomenalism has to argue that my experience is completely misleading in this respect, because there are no causal connections between my pain, thoughts and other mental states or events and anything that follows them.

Physicalism

The theory that everything that exists is physical or depends on something that is physical. Everything that is ontologically fundamental is therefore physical and comes under the laws and investigations of physics.

• physicalism is therefore a monist theory - it claims there is only one kind of substance; physical substance.

3 Key claims of physicalism

1) The properties identified by physics form the fundamental nature of the universe.

2) Physical laws govern all objects and events in space-time.

3) The completeness of physics, aka the principle of causal closure; every physical event has a sufficient physical cause.

Elimination

Ceasing to use a concept on the grounds that what it refers to does not exist.

Ontological reduction

Things in one domain are identical with, or can be completely explained in terms of, some things in another domain.

Supervenience

Properties of type A supervene on properties of type B just in case any two things that are exactly alike in their B properties cannot have different A properties.

E.g. The aesthetic properties of a painting (such as being elegant or balanced) supervene on the physical ones (such as the distribution of paint on a canvas) because we cannot change the painting’s being elegant or balanced without changing the distribution of paint on the canvas.

• there can be no change in aesthetic properties without a change in physical properties.

• 2 paintings exactly alike in their physical properties will have the same aesthetic properties.

Mind-brain type-identity theory

The theory that mental properties are identical (ontologically reducible) to physical properties of the brain; thinking a though or feeling an itch is exactly the same thing as neurons firing.

Any particular type of mental state is a particular type of brain state.

Identity claim of MBTIDT

It is a claim about reality, not a claim about language or concepts; e.g. ‘pain is the firing of nociceptors’ - the concepts PAIN and NOCICEPTOR FIRING remain distinct. The firing of nociceptors is what pain is; 2 concepts, one property.

Supported by empirical observation + Ockham’s razor:

• correlation = a relationship between 2 things whereby one accompanies the other; correlation is distinct from identity

• Ockham’s razor = the simplest explanation (least inferences/assumptions) is often the best one - substance dualism makes assumptions/inferences, identity relationship is simplest; explains correlation simpler than supervenience or causation.

Also supported by the principle of causal closure.

Multiple realisability objection to MBTIT (Putnam)

The claim that one and the same mental state can be ‘realised’ (have its function performed) by different physical states. This is presented as an objection to the claim that mental states are identical to physical states.

P1) If mental property type M is identical to human brain property type B, then any instance of M must be an instance of B.

P2) Multiple realisability premise: it is empirically plausible that some instances of M are not instances of B (they are instances of different, non-human brain properties).

C1) Therefore, M-type is not identical to B-type.

E.g. a human and a dog with the same mental state type (pain), but different physical brain state types.

Lewis’ reply to Putnam: MBTIT - multiple realisablity objection

Mental state concepts like pain are relative to species - our everyday concept of pain is actually the concept pain-in-humans; species-relativity is implicitly built in.

When we think about a dog in pain, we implicitly use the concept pain-in-dogs.

Objection to Lewis’ reply to Putnam - intra-species variation

Intra-species variation: individual humans can differ in terms of which brain states correspond to which mental states.

Different individuals from within the same species can have different brain states while experience the same mental state type.

E.g. 2 people with the mental state of pain showing different physical brain state types - brain state A (wincing) and brain state B (jumping and shouting).

Eliminative materialism

The theory that at least some of our basic mental concepts such as consciousness and Intentionality are fundamentally mistaken and should be eliminated as they do not refer to anything that exists.

• conceptual approach.

Eliminative materialism as a form of physicalism

Eliminative materialism endorses a future picture where mental states are descrived and explained purely in terms of neuroscience; physical properties are metaphysically fundamental.

This implies that mental states either are identical to (identity relationship) or are supervenient upon physical (brain) states.

Folk psychology

A body of knowledge or theory regarding the prediction and explanation of people’s behaviour constitued by the platitudes about the mind ordinary people are inclined to endorse.

E.g. ‘if someone is thirsty, they will normally try to find something to drink.’

Eliminative materialists want to eliminate some folk psychological concepts.

The Churchlands

Patricia Churchland: motivating eliminative materialism and what makes for a good scientific explanation.

Paul Churchland: offers reasons for why folk psychology isn’t a good empirical theory (not all eliminative materialists think folk psychology is an empirical theory).

Elimination

Ceasing to use a concept of the grounds that what it refers to does not exist.

Patricia Churchland on ontological reduction

The ontological reduction of an identity relation offers a more powerful explanatory theory; if identifying two properties enables you to explain something you can’t otherwise explain, that is the best reason for thinking they are the same thing - goes beyond simply offering a simpler (Ockham’s razor) understanding of metaphysics.

Patricia Churchland on ontological reduction - reductive causal explanation

Ontological reduction is part of reductive causal explanation: a reduction has been achieved when the causal powers of the macrophenomenon (e.g. water; why cars skid on it, its transparency) (thought; beliefs, sensations, emotions) are explained as a function of the physical structure and causal powers of the microphenomenon (nature molecules of H2O) (‘neurophysiological firing pattern X’), together with their dynamics and interactions.

• Patricia Churchland calls this a simple reduction.

To ‘reduce’ water/thought to H2O/’neurophysiological firing pattern X’ is just to be able to explain all the causal powers of water/thought - the effects it has on other things and the effects other things have on it - in terms of the causal powers of H2O molecules.

The identity claim doesn’t mean the concepts of the macro-theory mean the same as those referring to the micro-properties; however, when one thoery of offers a reductive explanation of things in another theory, it often happens that the meanings of the concepts change in light of new empirical discoveries.

• e.g. the term atom meant ‘indivisible fundamental particle’, but then physicists became able to split the atom, so the meaning of ‘atom’ chamged.

Patricia Churchland: elimination (example of heat)

Sometimes the empirical discoveries indicate that we should eliminate the concept rather than changing the meaning of it because it refers to nothing that exists.

The example of caloric fluid:

• 18th century of heat; understood heat as caloric fluid passing from hot things to cold things. If hot things have more caloric fluid than cold things, they should weigh more - scientists tested this and found that heating something up doesn’t increase its weight.

• over time, with other scientific developments, we now understand heat as kinetic molecular motion.

• the theory of caloric fluid turned out to be very mistaken in light of new empircal discoveries, so we shouldn’t say that we have reduced caloric fluid to kinetic molecular energy; instead we have eliminated caloric fluid - there is no such thing.

Patricia Churchland on why explanation is more important than one-one identities in reduction (Genes + complex reduction)

A reductive explanation doesn’t have to identfiy one macrolevel thing with one microlevel thing to suceed:

• genes are the fundamental ‘units of heredity’ that give rise to the observable characterstics of living things; biologists talked about gened before they knew about DNA.

• now we are told that genes are ‘in’ our DNA; however, a gene is not necessarily a single stretch of DNA

• what we think of as a ‘single’ gene can involve many distinct segments of DNA + the same DNA segment can contribute to different observable characteristics.

• Patricia calls this a complex reduction; DNA still provides a reductive explanation of genes.

• In the case of reducing mental properties, the reduction may be messy and complex; there may not be just one physical property we can identify with a particular mental property, but this doesn’t mean we can’t reduce the mental property.

Neuroscience will threaten to eliminate some mental concepts (Patricia Churchland)

Not all mental properties may survive the process of reductive explanation; some will be eliminated.

• we aren’t going to get reductive explanations of the mind just working from our everyday psychological concepts of ‘belief’, ‘desire’, ‘emotion’ etc. - these concepts are part of a theory about human behaviour

• an intermediate theory will be needed, e.g. how people process information, how does imagination work, etc.

• the theory will be developed by cognitive science, and will develop side-by-side with neuroscience.

• only after cognitive psychology and neuroscience have ‘co-evolved’ will reductive explanatiosn be possible.

• we can expect that our usual categories for thinking about how the mind works will have changed and neuroscientific reduction will change them further.

Example from will-power:

• some people are more easily addicted to substances than others, to which we might say that they have less ‘will-power’.

• in actuality they have different dopamine systems which determines tendency for addiction; is there really such a thing as ‘will-power’?

3 reasons that folk psychology will be eliminated: Paul Churchland

1) There are many aspects of mental life that folk psychology cannot explain, such as mental illness, the nature of intelligence, sleep, perception and learning; explanation of these phenomena will need concepts that folk psychology lacks.

2) If we look at the history of folk psychology, it reveals no progress since the ancient Greek authors, 2,500 years ago; neuroscientific explanations are constantly growing in scope and power.

3) We cannot make folk psychology coherent with other successful scientific theories; in particular, the central idea of Intentionality is highly problematic.

Intentionality is irreducible: eliminative materialism against folk psychology (Paul Churchland)

Thoughts are ‘about’ something, someone, or somewhere; e.g. I might intend to go to the pub, or be angry at the government. - Intentionality.

However, it seems that physical things are never ‘about’ anything; they are non-Intentional - a particular molecular structure or physical process, described in physical terms, is not ‘about anything’.

• e.g. digestion is a chemical process in which acids in your stomach break down food; what is that process ‘about’ - nothing.

• so how could brain processes or state ever be about anything?; how could Intentional mental states be states of your brain?

Churchland concludes that folk psychology does not fit in with empirically robust theories, such as neuroscience, and so we have reason to abadon it.

Objections to eliminative materialism: the introspective certainty of mental states

Introspection: direct, first-personal awareness of one’s own mental states.

I know, via introspection, that I have beliefs, desires, emotions etc. Nothing could be more certain to me than the fact that I have mental states - it is immediately and directly obvious - and so eliminativism is counter-intuitive.

Eliminative materialist response to objection from introspection

Appeals to what is obvious are problematic in the history of ideas; isn’t it just obvious that the sun moves round the Earth? Yet it is false.

The objection misunderstands the Churchlands’ claim:

• they do not deny the existence of psychological phenomena as such; they accept that the phenomena we conceptualise as ‘thinking’ occur or again that we experience pain - they deny that folk psychology is the correct theory of their nature.

• thinking is not defined by Intentionality as folk psychology claims and pain is not a matter of qualia; neuroscience will provide the correct account of what these are

• as a result, there will be a revolution in our mental concepts; but we won’t cease to feel pain just because we understand what it is in neurophysiological terms.

• the explanation from neuroscience will have no place for concepts like ‘Intentionality’.

Objections to eliminative materialism: folk psychology has good predictive and explanatory power (and so is the best hypothesis)

Folk psychology is not intended to be a theory of mental illness, sleep, learning etc. so its poor explanatory power regarding them is not a criticism; it is only meant to explain human behaviours, or more specifically, human action.

Here, it is incredibly successful; if I know what you want and what you believe, I can predict whether you’ll study hard for your exam + if someone asks me why you went to the cinema last night, I will answer by talking about your love of films.

• by contrast, neuroscience is almost useless at predicting whether you’ll study hard for your exams or explaining why you went to the cinema last night.

Furthermore, folk psychology is the basis for developments in psychology that have extended its predictive and explanatory power; e.g. ideas about unconscious beliefs and desires have become part of folk psychology.

• to eliminate the concepts of beliefs, desires, and other Intentional mental states would do away with much scientific psychology as well as folk psychology.

Eliminative materialist response to objection from folk psychology’s explanatory power

We need to know how human action or behaviour relates to mental life; to have folk psychology and neuroscience - 2 very different sorts of theories - explaining different aspects of the mind is unsatisfactory.

Developments in folk psychology are relatively superficial; our folk psychological explanations of behaviour are far less powerful than an explanation from neuroscience.

The challenge of explaining how physical states and processes can have Intentionality remains.

Objections to eliminative materialism: eliminative materialism as a theory is self-refuting

Eliminative materialism presents arguments, which are expressions of beliefs and rely on beliefs about what words mean and how reasoning works, in order to change our beliefs about folk psychology; yet Paul Churchland believes and claims that there are no beliefs.

If that is true, what does eliminative materialism express and what is it trying to chamge? - if there are no beliefs, including no beliefs about meaning, no beliefs linked by reasoning, then arguments for eliminativism are meaningless.

• an argument for eliminativism redutes itself - it concludes that there are no beliefs but it must presuppose that there are beliefs.

Eliminative materialist response to objection from the theory as self-refuting

This objection begs the questions; it presupposes that the correct theory of meaning and reasoning is the one that folk psychology gives (in terms of Intentionality).

• e.g. compare the 19th c. argument between people who thought that to be alive required some special energy, a ‘vital force’, and those who said there was no such force.

• the vitalists could argue that if what their opponents said was true, they would all be dead.

• yet now we know there is no special ‘vital force’, that life arises from normal chemical reactions; life just is certain processes.

• eliminativism simply claims that we need a new theory of what it means to assert a claim or argument; what meaning is will turn out to be certain neurological processes.

Folk psychologist counter to eliminative materialists response from the objection from the theory being self-refuting

Eliminativism predicts that Intentional content will be eliminated, which includes ideas of meaning, or ‘making sense’, of ‘true v. false’ belief, or ‘reasoning’ itself, as they all rest on Intentional content; claims and arguments are about something - this idea can’t be eliminated in favour of some alternative.

The analogy from vitalism fails; anti-vitalists accepted that they needed to be alive to make their claims, but offered an alternative account of what ‘life’ is.

• eliminativists claim that they do not need Intentional content to make their claims; without having some alternative account of meaning which doesn’t use Intentional content, this is what is inconceivable.

• we cannot conceive that folk psychology is false, because that very idea presupposes the folk psychological concept of Intentional content.

• until we have another, better theory of meaning, the assertion that eliminativism is true undermines itself.

On this view folk psychology - or at least the centralm concept of Intentionality - is not an empirical theory but a condition of intelligibility, thinking, reasoning and making claims at all.

• so we can’t eliminate it; Intentional mental states must exist.

• they are therefore either reducible or irreducible to neuroscience.

• if Paul Churchland is right that cannot reduce Intentional content to neuroscience, this isn’t an objection to Intentional content.

Philosophical behaviourism

A family of theories that claim that our talk about the mind can be analysed in terms of talk about behaviour. The meaning of our mental concepts is given by behaviour and behavioural dispositions.

• the focus is on language and concepts, rather than what exists.

Hempel’s hard behaviourism

Hempel’s version of philosophical behaviourism that claims that statements containing mental concepts cna be reduced or translated into statements about behaviour and physical states containing no mental concepts, only physical ones.

Also known as ‘analytical’ behaviourism or ‘logical’ behaviourism.

Hempel’s motivation from the verification principle

A statement is only meaningful if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable.

Example: translating ‘Sam has a headache’.

• ‘Sam has a headache’ is a psychological statement.

• psychological statements are translated into bodily behaviour statements which can empirically verify the psychological statements; e.g. ‘Sam clasps his head and closes his eyes.’

• bodily behaviour statements are then translated into neurophysical statements; e.g. ‘Sam’s brain is in x neural state.’

Disjunctive translation

Disjunctive translation: the full list of ‘or’ statements.

Example: the full analysis of ‘Sam has a headache’ would give a list of ‘or’ statements.

• ‘Sam clasps his head and closes his eye’ OR

• ‘Sam takes a painkiller’ OR

• ‘Sam lies down in a dark room’

For Hempel, psychological statements only have meaning if they can be publicly checked otherwise the statement cannot be substantiated - verification principle.

• the disjunctive translation is a series of statements that simply describe the conditions for verification.

• ‘Sam has a headache’ is really just an abbreviation of all the statements about its conditiom of verification.

For hempel, psychological statements can be fully analysed/translated, since the disjunctive translation of bodily behavior ‘or’ statements contains zero mental concepts, and none will remain; ‘Sam has a headache’ can be translatedm without loss of meaning into these claims.

• ‘Sam has a headache’ means these claims.

Ryle’s soft behaviourism

Ryle’s version of behaviourism claims that our talk of the mind is talk of how somoeone does or would behave under certain conditions. However, behavioural dispositions are not reducible to a finite set of statements about how someone would behave, nor to a set of statements containing no mental concepts.

Category mistake

To treat a concept as belonging to a different logical category from the one to which it actually belongs.

University example:

• someone is shown around Oxford University - they see the colleges, the buildings with different faculties and departments, the administrative buildings.

• but then they ask ‘I’ve seen the colleges, the faculties, the administration. But where is the university?’

• they have misunderstood the concept of ‘university’, thinking that the university is another thing alongside the colleges, faculties and administration; the person has made a category mistake - the university is how everything the person has seen is organised.

Substance dualism’s category mistake (Ryle)

Substance dualism makes the category mistake of thinking that the mind is like the body - another ‘thing’; a distinct, complex, organised unit subject to distinct relations of cause and effect.

The mistale is to think that physical and mental concepts operate in the same way, in the same logical framework of ‘things’ and ‘causes’, ‘substances’ and ‘properties’.

To ‘have’ a mind is not to be in possession of a thing, so that if you have a mind and body you have two things.

It talks of mental ‘states’ and ‘processes’ along the lines of physical states and processes; e.g. doing mental arithmetic is not a process in the same sense as the physical process of a log burning.

The para-mechanical hypothesis

The claim that all physical processes could explained in non-rational, mechanical terms; people mistakenly inferred, according to Ryle, that mental concepts, if they don’t characterise physical processes, must refer to non-physical, non-mechanical processes which occur in non-physical substance.

• just as ‘Oxford University’ doesn’t refer to another thing alongside the buildings and faculties, mental concepts aren’t like physical concepts, only applied to a separate thing called ‘the mind’.

Behavioural dispositions

A tendency to behave in certain ways given certain conditions.

Single-track disposition

A disposition which is actualised in only one way.

Example: solubility

• solubility is the disposition to dissolve when placed in water.

• we can describe this disposition with a hypothetical ‘if-then’ statement.

• “If a sugar cube is placed in water, then it will dissolve.”

Multi-track disposition

A disposition which can be actualised in multiple ways.

Example: being worried.

• might go silent.

• might talk at a quick pace.

Ryle thinks that mental concepts refer to complex, multi-track dispositions which are ‘indefinitely heterogenous’.

Advantaged of thinking of mental states as behavioural dispositions

1) We can often control our behaviour, so it’s not plausible that whenever I am in pain, there will be some discernible actual pain behaviour.

2) Many mental states are not time-specific occurences. They are ‘standing states’ - states that continue through time, such as ‘believing’ or ‘knowing’ or ‘hoping’ or ‘expecting’.

Defining behavioural dispositions

Ryle thinks that we can partially define behavioural dispositions; it is only partial since the definition will be an ‘open’ list (not finite + we can’t draw all possible inferences) of hypothetical statements (‘if, then’- some mental concepts will remain in the definition so no full reduction or translation can be made.

• we can’t replace the mental concept by physical ones.

Soft behaviourism and the problem of other minds

Talking about mental states is just talking about acutal behaviour and dispositions to behave in certain ways; from how someone behaves we can infer what behavioural dispositions they have.

But from this we don’t infer that they have a mind; the link between behaviour and minds isn’t based on evidence, it is logical (conceptual).

To say someone behaves in certain ways and has certain behavioural dispositions just is to say that they

Soft behaviourism and thinking

Ryle defines thinking as internal speech.

There isn’t just one kind of ‘thinking’ - thinking is often done in, with and through action; when we act thoughtfully or intelligently, the thinking isn’t a separate process from the doing, so that the thinking takes place in the mind and the doing on the physical world.

There is one process - behaving intelligently - and what makes it an expression of thinking is that it has a certain manner which can be expressed by dispositional statements about we can, could and would do in certain situations.

Ryle on thinking to oneself

Thinking quietly ‘to oneself’ is internalised speaking; speaking is an overt behaviour, we we only aquire the ability to think - to speak silently with ourselves - with effort.

• the silence and the fact that we are speaking only to ourselves are inessential to the nature of thinking.

• whether a process is public or private is irrelevant to whether it is thinking - one can think through a maths problem either with pen and paper or silently ‘in one’s head’.

Behaviourism as a form of physicalism

According to philosophical behaviourism, there is no distinct psychological ‘reality’ - no distinct psychological substances or properties; we need to think of physicalism as a negative thesis - there is no mental reality distinct from physical reality.

Ryle: mental states are dispositions, not ‘things’ like substances or properties; mental states fall under the category of ‘dispositions’, not the catergory of things.

• the only ‘things’ that exist are physical.

Similarites between hard and soft behaviourism

• both calim that we can analyse mental statements and concepts in terms of statements and concepts about behaviour, analytically reducing talk of the mind to talk of behaviour.

• both theories can be understood as physicalist theories if we take physicalism as a negative thesis, i.e. that there is no mental reality distinct from physical reality.

• neither hard nor soft behaviourism make any ontological claims about what the mind is and indeed Ryle claims that attemots to do so result in a category error where the mind is placed in the wrong logical cateogry of ‘substance’.

Differences between hard and soft behaviourism (Hempel)

Differ in terms of how they understand behaviour:

Hempel:

• Hempel’s hard behaviourism is influenced by his verificationism and relies on the verification principle (define).

• given that mental statements can only be verified by observable behaviour, Hempel argues that psychological statements can therefore only be meaningful if they can be translated into behavioural statements describing these observable verification conditions, which are ultimately translated into neurophysical statements describing brain processes.

• this translation is a disjunctive translation involving a finite list of ‘or’ statements containing only physical concepts and can be performed without any loss of meaning - it is a complete translation according to Hempel.

Differences between hard and soft behaviourism (Ryle)

• Ryle does not base his behaviourism on verificationism and does not believe a complete reduction or translation of mental statements/concepts is possible.

• he argues that the reduction of mental statemetns into behavioural statements containing no mental concepts is not possible.

• Ryle claims that mental concepts refer to complex, multi-track dispositions refer to complex, multi-track behavioural dispositions which are ‘indefinitely heterogeneous’.

• these behavioural dispositions which describe how a person would behave under certain circumstances are partially defined by an ‘open’ list of hypothetical statements.

• Ryle therefore considers statements about hypothetical behaviour as well as actual behaviour, unlike Hempel who focuses on statements only describing actual behaviour.

The multiple realisability objection to behaviourism

The same mental state can be expressed by different behaviours in different situations or even by different behaviours in the same situation by different people.

There are 2 interpretations of this objection:

• A. Incomplete translation.

• B. Individuation of mental concepts.

A. Incomplete translation (MR against behaviourism)

P1) People with the same mental state behave differently, both in different circumstances and even in the same circumstance.

P2) It is not possible to draw up a finite list of hypothetical conditionals (Ryle) or statements of the conditions of verification (Hempel) that describe all the ways someone with that mental state may behave.

C1) Therefore, the claim that mental states can be analysed in terms of behaviour is false.

C2) Therefore, philosophical behaviourism is false.

Incomplete translation is a problem for Hempel, and not Ryle

Hempel claims that the conditions for verification give a complete translation of statements using mental concepts in terms of statements about behaviour; for the translation to be complete, then we need a finite list of the conditions of verification.

• MR claims it is not possible to draw up a finite list of statements of the conditions of verification.

How Hempel could respond:

• he could emphasise the importance of neurophysical statements; while people behave in many different ways in different situations, their physiology and brain processes will be the same.

• it is these, not the many varied statements about how peope might act, which are central to identifying what mental concepts really mean.

Issue with his response:

• this moves his theory closer to a form of type-identity theory, which faces its own objection from multiple realisability.

Why incomplete translation (MR objection) is not a problem for Ryle

Ryle accepts that no full definition of mental state concepts is possible; the definition of behavioural dispositions is an ‘open’ list, and only provides a partial definition, as some mental concepts will remain.

• full analytic reduction is not possible.

B. Individuation of mental concepts (MR objection)

P1) People with the same mental state behave differently, both in different circumstances and even in the same circumstance.

C1) Therefore, what makes it true that two people have the same mental state is not that they have the same behavioural dispositions; e.g. witht the variety of behaviour that expresses fear, what makes fear fear is not identity of behavioural dispositions.

C2) Therefore, philosophical behaviourism is false.

Individuation objection seems like a problem for Ryle…

Ryle says that the mental state of ‘being scared of rats’ is just having a certain behavioural disposition, and this can be partially defined with hypothetical statements.

• but a hypothetical statement that is true of me might be false of someone else.

• E.g. I might believe that rats are scared of silent, immoblie humans, which means that I am disposed to remainnig still and quiet if I see a rat; but someone else might not have this belief.

So being scared of rats will include:

1. If S sees a rat, then S screams and runs away.

2. If S sees a rat, then S stays still and quiet.

1 and 2 look like contradictory hypotheticals.

Why individuation of mental concepts is not a problem for Ryle

Not a problem from a theoretical point of view:

• he is not claiming that a mental state/concept can be defined, even partially, into single hypotheticals.

• instead, he suggests the partial definition will include a very large list of hypotheticals, and it is this list as a whole that gives the partial definition.

Not a problem from a practical point of view:

• in practice, the hypotheticals that are true of us will substantially overlao so that we can individuate a specific mental state.

• e.g. being nervous about exam; many of the hypotheticals that are ture of one person will be true of others - fidgeting, flicking through notes, scribbling ideas down.

The circularity objection to behaviourism

It is difficult to analyse mental states in terms of behaviour and behavioural dispositions because how someone behaves in a particular situation depends not on just one mental state, such as being afraid, but om how this interacts with other mental states.

• Example of ‘fear’: if I’m afraid of dangerous snakes, will I run? Only if I know the snake is there, only if I believe the snake is dangerous.

This means we cannot specify the conditions for verification or set of dispositions for a mental state without mentioning other mental states, leaving us with a circular analysis.

• Example of ‘furniture’: suppose I want to define the concept of ‘furniture’ - I say ‘furniture is tables, chairs, bookcases, and other pieces of furniture.’

• this is a circular definition, because the term ‘furniture’ appears in my definition of what ‘furniture’ means.