Japanese Political Institutions: Koenkai, Corruption, and Machine Politics

Kōenkai

-personal political support organizations built around individual candidates, separate from their official party or faction

-serve as local networks that maintain close, reciprocal relationships between the candidate and constituents through favors, gifts, and social activities

-During elections, kōenkai mobilize loyal supporters, raise funds, and help secure votes by emphasizing personal ties rather than party platforms.

How do koenkai's raise money?

STEEL AND RICE (big businesses provide money while interest groups (farmers) provide votes)

Note one thing that distinguishes formal institutions from informal institutions.

Formal institutions are enforced through official laws or regulations that mandate certain behaviors, whereas informal institutions rely on social norms, customs, or peer pressure to encourage or discourage behavior.

What does "institutional thinking" mean, according to Hugh Heclo? my answer (claim + evidence)

According to Hugh Heclo, institutional thinking means seeing oneself as part of a larger moral community working toward a shared good, rather than as an isolated individual. He explains that "to think institutionally is to be a trustee of inherited practices," meaning people sustain and pass on the values that shape their society. This kind of thinking involves a sense of trust and obligation toward those before and after us, rather than constant skepticism about the institution's purpose.

why corruption in Japan is "structural", not just a matter of greedy individuals.

When a government bureaucracy is very large, powerful, and controls most major decisions, people and companies naturally have to find ways to get access to it — and those ways often involve money or favors.

Johnson's main point in "Structural Corruption"

corruption in Japan is systemic because the bureaucracy is so widespread (pervasive) and so insulated from public access that money and patronage naturally become the main ways to navigate it.

Johnson's use of machine politics & distinction pre & post-Tanaka

Before Tanaka: elite, policy-centered, bureaucrat-led politics.

After Tanaka: mass-based, money-driven, faction-backed machine politics, where leaders control access to bureaucratic decisions and redistribute state resources to maintain loyalty.

Maruyama identified a psychological need underlying ultranationalism:

a desire to escape personal responsibility by dissolving oneself into a larger whole (the state, the Emperor, the army).

How did ultranationalism function

ultranationalism functioned as a kind of collective moral anesthesia, replacing self-reflection with obedience

Nature of Ultranationalism

• Bureaucrats deferred to “the Emperor’s will.”

• Military officers claimed they acted for “national defense.”

• Politicians obeyed “the people’s wishes.”

• Citizens obeyed the “national spirit” (kokutai).

everyone acted, but no one decided — power existed without accountability.

self-reinforcing political system — a “system of irresponsibility” 

Legacy of Abe Shinzo

stronger executive authority

normalization of constitutional debate

economic rejuvenation

strong foreign defense

nationalism

Abe Shinzō’s nationalism reflected Japan’s postwar tradition of moral rehabilitation, but his leadership marked a break by reasserting executive authority and normalizing constitutional revision—changes made possible by the institutional centralization of power after the 1990s electoral reforms

modernization of Japan, in Maruyama’s terms (ultranationalism)

“surface-level” — industrial progress without democratic subjectivity.

Maruyama argued that Japan modernized economically and institutionally, but not psychologically or morally.

Lessons for post-war Japan according to Maruyama (ultranationalism)

• Citizens had to replace obedience to authority with personal responsibility and critical thought.

• Democracy, for Maruyama, was not just institutional but ethical — a way of being.

What are institutions?

rules of the game that both restricts and promotes certain behaviors. (channels & limits)

• Japanese institutions balance constraint and enablement by providing stability and predictability while limiting rapid or individual-driven change

• As Heclo argues, institutions are not only rules that restrict; they also carry values that shape and sustain collective behavior. Japan’s formal and informal institutions exemplify this balance — they preserve order but can also inhibit adaptation.

From Heclo, example of institutionally thinking

A public, civil servant such as a teacher, who “thinks institutionally” doesn’t ask, “What do I get?” but “What do I owe?”
That’s his model of moral citizenship — duty to something larger than the self.

“bureaucratic restoration.”, pyle

• Occupation reforms dismantled prewar ministries in name, but the old bureaucratic elite reemerged by the 1950s.

bureaucrat table

Author	Bureaucracy’s Role	Implication	Connection to Heclo
Johnson	Bureaucrats dominate; corruption becomes structural	Stability but low accountability	Institutions constrain and sustain politics
Pyle	Bureaucrats restored after Occupation	Bureaucratic democracy, not full popular rule	Institutional continuity > reform
Rosenbluth & Thies	Reforms shift power to politicians	More responsive politics, less bureaucratic control	Institutions can evolve to re-balance power
Maruyama	Bureaucrats avoid responsibility through loyalty	Stability without moral agency	Thinking institutionally without reflection = danger

🏛 Institutional Reforms of the 1990s that Empowered Abe

• consolidation of executive power stemmed from the 1990s electoral and administrative reforms, which reduced factional autonomy and strengthened the Prime Minister’s Office

• expands cabinet jurisdiction + establishes national security council which centralized military power over decision making

What are Koenkais? What function do the serve during election season?

Kōenkai are personal political support organizations built around individual candidates rather than parties. They function as networks of loyal voters whom candidates cultivate through personal contact and favors (such as gifts or attending life events). During elections, kōenkai mobilize votes and resources, helping candidates secure reelection even when party loyalty is weak.

Note one thing that distinguishes formal institutions from informal institutions. (2 points)

Formal institutions are enforced through legal or political mechanisms such as laws and the police, while informal institutions rely on unwritten social norms and expectations—like peer pressure—to regulate behavior.

What was the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal? Why does John Dower criticize it? (THINGS I MISSED)

emphasize that the trials embodied victor’s justice and reinforced the occupation’s political goals, not impartial rule of law.

add Dower’s broader point that the tribunal legitimized the occupation and shaped postwar memory by placing all moral blame on wartime leaders rather than Japanese society as a whole.

mention that Dower saw the tribunal as a performative exercise in moral superiority used to justify the U.S. occupation as a mission of democracy.

What was the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal? Why does John Dower criticize it? (FULL ANSWER)

• established by the Allied powers after Japan’s surrender in 1945 to prosecute military and political leaders for wartime atrocities

• criticizes the tribunal as a form of victor’s justice that prioritized the U.S. occupation’s political goals over genuine legal or moral accountability

• judges all came from Allied nations, ensuring a biased court that lacked impartiality

• use of ex post facto charges such as “crimes against peace,” which had no precedent in international law and thus violated basic legal norms.

• While figures like Prime Minister Tojo Hideki were executed, Emperor Hirohito—the central symbol of the wartime state—was exempted entirely, demonstrating selective justice shaped by American interests in stabilizing postwar Japan.

• For Dower, this unevenness revealed how the occupation sought not to pursue truth, but to stage a moral spectacle that legitimized U.S. dominance.

• tribunal failed to promote genuine reflection on Japan’s wartime responsibility,

Thesis of ultranationalism writing

Japan’s ultranationalism arose not simply from ideology, but from a psychological dependence on authority and an absence of responsible individualism.

Lesson for democracy: True democracy requires citizens who think and act responsibly — not as instruments of the state.

Main idea of why children in Japan ride the subway alone

Japan’s social order relies less on fear of punishment and more on a collective moral framework — an informal institutional culture of trust, discipline, and mutual care.

• Informal institutions: Social norms of community responsibility make strangers look out for children.

• Public order: Low crime rates and efficient policing reinforce this trust.

• Collective mindset: Individuals see themselves as part of a cooperative society where safety and courtesy are shared duties.

• Contrast to other societies: Western societies rely more on formal enforcement (laws, surveillance) than internalized norms.

main points of Covid reading

• Informal compliance: Citizens voluntarily wore masks, avoided crowds, and followed guidance.

• Public trust: High trust in government and science reduced need for enforcement.

• Social pressure: Peer expectations and fear of shame (haji) substituted for legal penalties.

• Cultural continuity: Similar mechanisms underlie Japan’s orderly disaster responses and civic behavior.

• Limits: While effective, this reliance on conformity can suppress open debate or innovation.

When was the occupation?

1945-52

pre 1993 electoral system

Member District (MMD) system with SNTV from 1947 to 1993

post 1993 electoral system

SMD (Single Member District) and PR (Proportional Representation) system

Explain one major way Japan’s pre-1994 electoral system (the Single Nontransferable Vote in multimember districts) shaped political behavior within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

• pre-1994 electoral system used Single Nontransferable Vote (SNTV) in multimember districts, meaning that multiple LDP candidates often competed within the same district.

• system fostered intraparty competition, forcing LDP politicians to cultivate personal support networks (kōenkai) and focus on individual rather than party-centered campaigning.

• As a result, politics revolved more around personal favors and local ties than national policy platforms.

Describe one major effect of the 1994 electoral reform on Japan’s party system or political behavior.

• reduced intraparty competition and weakened factional influence

• elections shifted toward policy and party-centered appeals rather than personal vote cultivation.

• Campaign funding and control over nominations became centralized under party leaders, diminishing the power of faction heads and the corruption tied to personal political machines.

“An American Revolution in Japan”

How does Pyle interpret the U.S.’s performance during the Occupation of Japan?

examples of imperialst tendency & up down revolution:

• The U.S. rewrote Japan’s constitution, introducing Article 9 (renouncing war) and establishing parliamentary democracy, women’s suffrage, and civil rights.

  • These were radical changes, but externally imposed rather than organically developed — hence “revolution from above.”

• Zaibatsu dissolution: Large industrial conglomerates were dismantled to weaken prewar militarism and concentrated wealth.

“An American Revolution in Japan”

Drawing evidence from both our lectures and Pyle’s analysis of the various reforms introduced between 1945 and 1952, to what extent would you call the Occupation a “revolution”?   

• U.S. aimed to “remake the Japanese mind”

• can be considered a revolution in both scope and ambition, though one imposed from above rather than born from within.

“Victor’s Justice, Loser’s Justice”

Why does Dower refer to the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal as an example of “Victor’s justice”?

• Victor’s justice” = justice defined by the winners.

• Ex post facto laws → people punished for acts that weren’t crimes when committed.

• Unequal treatment → Emperor spared, generals executed.

• Purpose → Legitimize U.S. authority and rewrite Japan’s political order, not just deliver justice.

CFR

How did the status of the emperor, the military, and women in Japan change under Japan’s 1947 constitution?

• the emperor’s symbolic role wasn’t about obedience, but about continuity and unity

• women were granted equal rights more broadly (not just suffrage). Everything else — Article 9, the Self-Defense Forces — is spot-on.

emperor was reduced to a purely symbolic figure who “reigned but did not rule,” serving as a unifying cultural icon rather than a political leader.

Article 9 abolished Japan’s right to wage war or maintain military forces, though later interpretations allowed for Self-Defense Forces. 

Women gained full legal equality, including the right to vote and run for office, marking a major step toward democratization and gender reform.

key people

Figure	Role / Significance	Linked Reading / Theme
Tanaka Kakuei	PM (1972–1974); created machine politics; tied to bribery scandals	Johnson, “Structural Corruption”
Kishi Nobusuke	PM (1957–1960); pushed for U.S.-Japan Security Treaty revision (Anpo); Abe’s grandfather	Anpo protests; conservative nationalism
Yoshida Shigeru	PM during Occupation; architect of “Yoshida Doctrine” (focus on economy, rely on U.S. for defense)	Pyle, “American Revolution in Japan”
Koizumi Junichiro	PM (2001–2006); strong leader; centralized LDP; media-driven	Rosenbluth & Thies, “New Politics”
Abe Shinzo	PM (2006–2007; 2012–2020); nationalism, constitutional revision	Why Abe Matters slides; Kishi legacy
Emperor Hirohito	Wartime emperor; retained postwar as symbolic figure	Dower, “Victor’s Justice”
General MacArthur (SCAP)	Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers; directed Occupation reforms	Pyle, Dower, Occupation lectures

key events/dates

Period	Years	Key Figures / Leaders	Main Events / Characteristics	Why It Matters
Meiji Era	1868–1912	Emperor Meiji	Meiji Restoration; rapid modernization; constitutional monarchy created (1889 Meiji Constitution)	Established Japan’s modern state, centralized bureaucracy, and military tradition
Early Shōwa / Militarist Period	1926–1945	Emperor Hirohito, PM Tojo Hideki	Rise of ultranationalism (Maruyama’s focus), military dominance, WWII aggression	Breakdown of democracy; roots of postwar reform and constitutional pacifism
Occupation Period (U.S. Rule)	1945–1952	Gen. Douglas MacArthur (SCAP), PM Yoshida Shigeru	U.S. “Revolution from Above”; new 1947 Constitution, women’s suffrage, land & education reforms, demilitarization (Article 9)	Critical juncture: introduced democracy, equality, and pacifism under U.S. supervision
1955 System / “Old Politics”	1955–1993	Yoshida Shigeru, Kishi Nobusuke, Tanaka Kakuei	LDP dominance; SNTV multimember districts; factions, koenkai, “iron triangle” (LDP–bureaucrats–business)	Era of structural corruption (Johnson); “coalition of steel and rice”; consumer underrepresentation
Tanaka Era (Machine Politics)	1972–1974	PM Tanaka Kakuei	Patron–client politics; factional power; bribery and Lockheed scandal	Symbol of corruption and how money structured political power
Bubble Economy / Collapse	1980s–1991	PM Nakasone Yasuhiro, PM Takeshita Noboru	Economic boom → 1991 crash; corruption scandals (Recruit); public distrust of LDP	Discredited “money politics,” set stage for 1994 electoral reform
1993–1994 Reforms (“New Politics”)	1993–1994	PM Hosokawa Morihiro	End of LDP monopoly; introduction of mixed-member system (SMD + PR)	Second critical juncture: weakened factions, strengthened party leadership, encouraged policy focus
Koizumi Reforms	2001–2006	PM Koizumi Junichiro	“One-man leadership”; postal privatization; media-savvy populism	Centralized the LDP; strong PM system emerged
Abe Era (“Abe Matters”)	2006–2007; 2012–2020	PM Abe Shinzo	Abenomics; nationalism; push to revise Article 9; historical revisionism	Strengthened executive; revived Kishi’s vision of patriotic, assertive Japan
COVID-19 & Contemporary Japan	2020–present	PM Suga Yoshihide, PM Kishida Fumio	Pandemic subsidies; informal mask culture; declining birthrate & rural votes	Illustrates formal vs. informal institutions and enduring bureaucratic control

“The Old Politics, 1955-1993” - Rosenbluth & Thies

Following its formation in 1955, the LDP was sometimes referred to as the party of “peace and prosperity.” What does that mean??

• maintained Japan’s postwar pacifism under the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty while guiding the country through rapid economic growth.

• policies promoted prosperity through close cooperation with bureaucrats and business, and through subsidies that protected farmers and rural voters.

• By delivering both security and economic success, the LDP became a pragmatic “catch-all” party appealing to most of the electorate.

• dominate elections for decades by uniting diverse groups: farmers, business leaders, and urban middle classes — the famous “coalition of steel and rice.”

“The Old Politics, 1955-1993” - Rosenbluth & Thies

What is the “coalition of steel and rice,” and how did it contribute to LDP dominance?  Who was left out of that coalition?  Why, finally, was that coalition more and more difficult for the LDP to maintain over the years?

• specific policy example — e.g., agricultural subsidies or tariff protections on imported rice.

• As Japan urbanized, this coalition became harder to maintain because the LDP’s core rural base shrank while urban voters grew increasingly underrepresented.

Lockheed Scandal

This case revealed how money flowed through political factions, bureaucratic approvals, and business contracts, sustaining Japan’s “machine politics.”

• The scandal wasn’t an anomaly — it exposed how the system normally worked.

• It demonstrated that corruption was structural, not personal — part of the institutional relationship between government and business, with bureaucrats managing policy and politicians brokering access.

“The Old Politics, 1955-1993” - Rosenbluth & Thies

Why were the opposition parties so weak between 1955 and 1993?  Why would voters bother voting for them??

Protest or “Check” Votes:

• Many voters used opposition votes to express dissatisfaction with corruption or factionalism inside the LDP without necessarily expecting regime change.

• Opposition parties (especially the Japan Socialist Party and Japan Communist Party) were split between moderates and radicals, making cooperation difficult.

• They failed to present a unified alternative to the LDP, particularly on foreign policy (U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, pacifism vs. rearmament).

Institutional Disadvantages

• The SNTV multimember district system favored large, well-organized parties like the LDP.

• Malapportionment overrepresented rural areas—where the LDP’s base was strong

“The Old Politics, 1955-1993” - Rosenbluth & Thies

 Why did the LDP need so much money to finance electoral campaigns under the old SNTV/MMD system?  (This question is also pertinent to the Johnson reading.)

• Because they couldn’t distinguish themselves by party (all were LDP), they had to cultivate personal votes through individualized campaigning.

• (kōenkai) that maintained loyalty through constant contact, gifts, and favors — especially in rural areas.

• These networks required enormous financial upkeep (gifts, banquets, travel, event hosting).

money-intensive personal politics rather than cheap, policy-based campaigning.

vote system

Concept	Definition	Example in Japan
Plurality System	The candidate who receives the most votes (not necessarily a majority) wins.	Japan’s single-member districts (SMDs) after 1994 use this — one winner per district.
Majority System	A candidate must receive more than 50% of the votes to win; if not, a runoff may occur.	Japan doesn’t use this system nationally — plurality rules apply instead.
Minority Representation	Systems that allow smaller parties to gain representation even if they don’t win outright majorities.	Japan’s proportional representation (PR) tier, where parties earn seats based on their percentage of votes nationwide.
Mixed-Member System	A combination of SMD (plurality) and PR (proportional) seats.	Japan’s post-1994 reform system — 300 SMD + 200 PR initially (now 289 + 176).
Duverger’s Law	The principle that plurality systems tend to produce two-party competition, since voters avoid “wasting” votes on small parties.	Japan’s SMDs encourage competition between the LDP and the main opposition (e.g., DPJ), though PR keeps smaller parties like Kōmeitō alive.

Critical Juncture

a turning point — a brief period when established political, social, or institutional patterns are disrupted, allowing for major, lasting change in how a system functions

• The U.S. Occupation (1945–1952) is considered one of Japan’s greatest critical junctures.

  • It dismantled militarism, rewrote the constitution, and introduced democracy, women’s suffrage, and pacifism.

kishi noboskue 

PM during anpo protests

• Legacy: The protests reshaped Japan’s postwar political culture — they united leftist opposition temporarily but also solidified conservative dominance by painting the left as chaotic and extreme.

• Long-Term Meaning: For historian Nick Kapur, the Anpo movement marked the birth of contemporary Japanese politics — introducing mass media activism, youth mobilization, and civic engagement that shaped later movements.

“Structural Corruption” - Johnson

·Why is money considered the “mother’s milk” of Japanese politics?!

• because of structural corruption — isn’t about personal immorality but about how the system itself is organized.

• Under the SNTV/MMD system, LDP politicians had to compete against each other for the same voters.

  • To maintain their kōenkai networks, they needed constant cash flow for gifts, favors, and constituency service.

  • Factions and business ties (through the “coalition of steel and rice”) supplied this money in exchange for influence.

• Bureaucrats also controlled the flow of government contracts and public works — politicians used money to gain bureaucratic cooperation.

• So money wasn’t just greed — it was the lifeblood of the system that kept electoral support, bureaucratic coordination, and factional loyalty running.

“Structural Corruption” - Johnson

How does corruption work in Japan?  Who benefits from it?  And why does Johnson call Japanese corruption “structural”?

1.  political power is tied to money & favors a member can provide

2. Corruption in Japan functions through a network linking politicians, bureaucrats, and business interests.

Rosenbluth and Thies (Ch. 6): “Japan’s New Politics”

·       Describe the electoral system introduced in 1994.

• created a mixed-member system combining single-member districts (SMD) with proportional representation (PR).

• SMD tier reduced intraparty competition and weakened factional politics, while PR allowed smaller parties to win seats based on their national vote share.

• Duverger’s Law: the SMD component encourages a two-party dynamic, but the PR tier prevents full consolidation, producing a system with one dominant party and several smaller ones.

Rosenbluth and Thies (Ch. 6): “Japan’s New Politics”

·       Under post-1994 electoral rules, the LDP has chosen to form coalition governments with the Kōmeitō.  Why?

• LDP forms coalitions with Kōmeitō because Kōmeitō’s small but highly disciplined voter base can swing close single-member district races.

• cooperation helps the LDP secure majorities even when its own support declines. In exchange, the LDP offers policy influence and proportional representation seats to Kōmeitō.

• alliance also balances the LDP’s conservative image with Kōmeitō’s more moderate, pacifist stance, creating electoral and political stability.

Rosenbluth and Thies (Ch. 6): “Japan’s New Politics”

·       What do the authors mean when they say that the LDP has grown more “centralized”? What are the reasons for this?

control over campaign funding, nominations, and messaging has shifted from individual politicians and factions to party leaders. The 1994 electoral reforms reduced intraparty competition and made elections more party-centered, weakening the need for personal vote networks. Public funding laws also placed money under the party’s control, giving leaders more authority. As a result, the LDP became less a loose federation of factions and more a unified, leader-driven organization