Japanese Political Institutions: Koenkai, Corruption, and Machine Politics

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28 Terms

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Kōenkai

-personal political support organizations built around individual candidates, separate from their official party or faction

-serve as local networks that maintain close, reciprocal relationships between the candidate and constituents through favors, gifts, and social activities

-During elections, kōenkai mobilize loyal supporters, raise funds, and help secure votes by emphasizing personal ties rather than party platforms.

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How do koenkai's raise money?

STEEL AND RICE (big businesses provide money while interest groups (farmers) provide votes)

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Note one thing that distinguishes formal institutions from informal institutions.

Formal institutions are enforced through official laws or regulations that mandate certain behaviors, whereas informal institutions rely on social norms, customs, or peer pressure to encourage or discourage behavior.

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What does "institutional thinking" mean, according to Hugh Heclo? my answer (claim + evidence)

According to Hugh Heclo, institutional thinking means seeing oneself as part of a larger moral community working toward a shared good, rather than as an isolated individual. He explains that "to think institutionally is to be a trustee of inherited practices," meaning people sustain and pass on the values that shape their society. This kind of thinking involves a sense of trust and obligation toward those before and after us, rather than constant skepticism about the institution's purpose.

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why corruption in Japan is "structural", not just a matter of greedy individuals.

When a government bureaucracy is very large, powerful, and controls most major decisions, people and companies naturally have to find ways to get access to it — and those ways often involve money or favors.

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Johnson's main point in "Structural Corruption"

corruption in Japan is systemic because the bureaucracy is so widespread (pervasive) and so insulated from public access that money and patronage naturally become the main ways to navigate it.

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Johnson's use of machine politics & distinction pre & post-Tanaka

Before Tanaka: elite, policy-centered, bureaucrat-led politics.

After Tanaka: mass-based, money-driven, faction-backed machine politics, where leaders control access to bureaucratic decisions and redistribute state resources to maintain loyalty.

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“An American Revolution in Japan”

How does Pyle interpret the U.S.’s performance during the Occupation of Japan?

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“An American Revolution in Japan”

Drawing evidence from both our lectures and Pyle’s analysis of the various reforms introduced between 1945 and 1952, to what extent would you call the Occupation a “revolution”?   

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“Victor’s Justice, Loser’s Justice”

Why does Dower refer to the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal as an example of “Victor’s justice”?

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CFR

How did the status of the emperor, the military, and women in Japan change under Japan’s 1947 constitution?

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“Japan’s Electoral Systems Since 1947” [upper house electoral system NOT on exam :p]

How did the LH electoral system change in 1994? (Be prepared to explain the pre-1994 and post-1994 systems.)

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“The Old Politics, 1955-1993” - Rosenbluth & Thies

Following its formation in 1955, the LDP was sometimes referred to as the party of “peace and prosperity.” What does that mean??

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“The Old Politics, 1955-1993” - Rosenbluth & Thies

What is the “coalition of steel and rice,” and how did it contribute to LDP dominance?  Who was left out of that coalition?  Why, finally, was that coalition more and more difficult for the LDP to maintain over the years?

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“The Old Politics, 1955-1993” - Rosenbluth & Thies

Why were the opposition parties so weak between 1955 and 1993?  Why would voters bother voting for them??

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“The Old Politics, 1955-1993” - Rosenbluth & Thies

 Why did the LDP need so much money to finance electoral campaigns under the old SNTV/MMD system?  (This question is also pertinent to the Johnson reading.)

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“Structural Corruption” - Johnson

·Why is money considered the “mother’s milk” of Japanese politics?!

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“Structural Corruption” - Johnson

How does corruption work in Japan?  Who benefits from it?  And why does Johnson call Japanese corruption “structural”?

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Rosenbluth and Thies (Ch. 6): “Japan’s New Politics”

·       Describe the electoral system introduced in 1994.

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Rosenbluth and Thies (Ch. 6): “Japan’s New Politics”

·       Under post-1994 electoral rules, the LDP has chosen to form coalition governments with the Kōmeitō.  Why?

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Rosenbluth and Thies (Ch. 6): “Japan’s New Politics”

·       What do the authors mean when they say that the LDP has grown more “centralized”? What are the reasons for this?

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Rosenbluth and Thies (Ch. 6): “Japan’s New Politics”

·       How did LDP factions change during the first decade of the 21st century?  How do the authors explain those changes?

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