Trusts Cases

Morice v Bishop of Durham (1804) 9 Ves 399; (1805) 10 Ves 522 POINT OF LAW

A valid trust has to be administrable by the court, or the administration must be overseeable by the court. For this, there must be definite objects (beneficiaries). However, that does not apply to charitable trusts.

Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115 POINT OF LAW

The beneficiaries of a trust, if of full age (18), sound mind, between them wholly entitled to the trust property, and in agreement, may direct the trustees to end the trust and transfer the trust property to themselves as beneficiaries absolutely. There must be an absolute indefeasible interest.

Pilcher v Rawlins (1871) 7 Ch App 259 POINT OF LAW

A bona fide purchaser for value who acquires trust property without notice of the trust has a better right to the property than the trustees. However, an equitable interest is not defeated if the property is transferred in breach of trust to a volunteer, or to a purchaser who has notice of that equitable interest.

Re Smith [1928] Ch 915 POINT OF LAW

Where trustees are directed to apply at their discretion the whole or any part of a fund to A and the remainder to B, A and B are together the sole objects of the discretionary trust and are entitled between them to have the whole fund applied to or for their benefit.

Re Manisty's Settlement Trust's [1974] Ch 17 POINT OF LAW

Attempted trust creation invalid if it is so capricious as to negative any sensible intention on the part of the settlor as to the core class (Templeman J)

Parker-Tweedale v Dunbar Bank plc (No 1) [1991] Ch 12 POINT OF LAW

There are only very narrow exceptions where the beneficiary is allowed to sue on behalf of the trust: where the trustee has unreasonably refused to sue on behalf of the trust or has committed some other breach of his duties to the beneficiaries.

Re Hay's Settlement Trusts [1982] 1 WLR 202 POINT OF LAW

If there are real problems of administration or execution, the court can hold a power invalid, but the court should be slow to do this. Dispositions ought if possible to be upheld, and the court ought not to be astute to find grounds upon which a power can be invalidated.

Shell UK Ltd v Total UK Ltd [2011] QB 86 PONT OF LAW

A trustee owes a duty of care to a beneficial owner of property, and will be liable for damage to that property as well as any foreseeable consequences, such as loss of profit.

Libertarian Investment Ltd v Hall (2013) 16 HKCFAR 68 POINT OF LAW

Account and equitable compensation are not inconsistent remedies (for breach of trust) and do not need to be chosen between. In an appropriate case D will be charged with the highest value of the property from when it ought to have been acquired to when the account is taken.

*Akers v Samba [2017] UKSC 6 POINTS OF LAW

A trust can be split into the legal interests and beneficial interests. The transfer of the legal interest by a trustee does not transfer the beneficial interest, which means that property has not been transferred.

Carter Holt Harvey v Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20 (Australian High Court ) POINT OF LAW

A trust is not a separate legal entity and has no independent solvency; the trustee alone has legal personality, holding the trust property subject to equitable interests that are engrafted onto, rather than severed from, the trustee’s legal estate.

*Milroy v Lord (1862) 4 De GF & J 264 POINT OF LAW

In order to render a voluntary settlement valid and effectual, the settler must have done everything which was necessary to be done to transfer the property and render the settlement binding upon him. There is no equity to perfect an imperfect gift.

*Jones v Lock (1865) LR 1 Ch App 25 POINT OF LAW

To discover whether an imperfect gift was intended to be a trust there is a question of fact: was there a gift or not. This will be less likely to be decided when there are casual conversations about important transactions.

*Richards v Delbridge (1874) LR 18 Eq 11 POINT OF LAW

The court will not imply a trust to rectify an imperfect gift.

Paul v Constance [1977] 1 WLR 527 POINT OF LAW.

to create a trust by express declaration, disponent's words and actions had to show clear intention to dispose of property or funds so that another party should acquire a beneficial interest. It is not necessary that these words be explicit or that the specific legal institution of the trust was even known of.

Re Snowden [1979] Ch 528 POINT OF LAW

In order to establish a secret trust where no question of fraud arises, the standard of proof is the ordinary civil standard of proof necessary for establishing an ordinary trust.

*Palmer v Simmonds (1854) 2 Drew 221 POINT OF LAW

There must be sufficient certainty and clarity to create a trust.

*Re Sanderson's Trust (1857) 3 K & J 497 POINT OF LAW

If under a trust, the whole of the funds are to be used for a purpose that benefits the beneficiary, but the purpose, once completed or is no longer possible to complete, does not exhaust the fund, the beneficiary will take the entire fund absolutely. If however, only part of the funds are to be used for such purpose, the beneficiary does not take the remainder absolutely.

*Re Ellenbrough [1903] 1 Ch 697 POINT OF LAW

A mere expectation cannot be the subject of a trust unless there is a contractual obligation or consideration involved.

*Re Osoba [1979] 1 WLR 247 POINT OF LAW

A gift of a fund for a purpose without more confers upon A an absolute beneficial interest in the whole. The purpose is just treated as the motive for giving the gift, so is not binding.

Re London Wine Co [1986] PCC 121 POINT OF LAW

Segregation of chattels from a bulk is required for the subject matter of a trust to be certain.

*Hunter v Moss [1994] 1 WLR 452 ((1994) 110 LQR 335) POINT OF LAW

A declaration of trust does not necessarily entail a segregation of property when all of the property is indistinguishable.

Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] 1 AC 74 POINT OF LAW

Even homogenous chattels must be specifically ascertained for there to be a trust. This is because a title could not transfer until it was known to what goods that title related. Restitutionary proprietary interest = remedial constructive trust.

Re Harvard Securities, Holland v Newbury [1997] 2 BCLC 369 POINT OF LAW

With shares, so long as the number and type (ie what company they're in) of shares are identified, that is enough to meet the requirement of certainty. This marks the distinction between tangible and intangible fungibles; shares are a legal abstraction.

*Pearson v Lehman Bros [2010] EWHC 2914 (Ch) POINT OF LAW

Factors that can influence the certainty of intention include the language used, the relationship between S and B, and the commercial purpose. Rights in intangibles cannot be altered because once they are, they become new rights altogether (being legal abstractions as they are).

Re Coxen [1948] Ch 747 POINT OF LAW

Opinion clause cures evidential uncertainty but not conceptual uncertainty. It is the opinion of the trustees in these cases that decide whether a relevant event has happened, but that event must be sufficiently defined that the trustees or the court can make that decision.

Re Allen [1953] Ch 810 POINT OF LAW

Where there is a condition precedent regarding the objects of the trust, all that C had to show was that he, at least, was within the requirement.

*IRC v Broadway Cottages [1955] Ch 20 POINT OF LAW

The accepted test of the validity of a trust was that it must be such as the court can control. A trust for such members of a given class of objects as the trustees should select was void for uncertainty, unless the whole range of objects eligible for selection was ascertained or ascertainable.

*Re Gulbenkian's ST [1970] AC 508 POINT OF LAW

Held, that a mere or bare power of appointment among a class (taken in McPhail v Doulton to include a trust) was valid if it could be said with certainty whether any given individual was/not a member of the class, and did not fail simply because it was impossible to ascertain every member of the class. Where the language of the doc was ambiguous it was up to the court to ascertain, if that could be done without doing complete violence to the parties' language, the settlor's or parties' expressed intentions.

*McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424 POINT OF LAW

the test to be applied in determining the validity of trust powers was or was similar to that in re Gulbenkian's Settlements, namely that the trust was valid if it could be said with certainty that any given individual was or was not a member of the class. It is possible to declare a trust over assets that do not yet exist, provided it is clear whether they will be subject to the trust at the point they come into existence.

*Re Baden (No 2) [1973] Ch 9 POINT OF LAW

Three different tests of how to deal with evidentiary uncertainty: SACHS LJ said that if it cannot be proved that X is within the class, X is not in it. MEGAW LJ said that there must be a substantial number of objects that certainly fell within the trust, even if for a substantial number of others the answer would be unclear. STAMP LJ said that it must be possible to tell any given person whether she is or is not in the class. If X cannot be put in the "yes" box or the "no" box, the trust is invalid for uncertainty.

Re Barlow's WT [1979] 1 WLR 278 POINT OF LAW

If a gift relies on the whole class being identifiable, then it is not valid if the whole class cannot be identified (eg £1000 to be split evenly between my friends). If, however, the gift is a series of individual gifts to persons answering the description, then it only needs to be determinable whether each person who comes forward is within that category.

Forster v Hale (1798) 3 Ves Jun 696 POINT OF LAW

Statute of Frauds requires not that a trust be created by writing, but that it shall be proved by writing, which may be subsequent to its creation.

Gardner v Rowe (1828) 5 Russ 258 POINT OF LAW

the written and signed evidence of the trust can be provided at a later date. Hence there is a gap between validity and enforceability.

Bannister v Bannister [1948] 2 All ER 133 POINT OF LAW

s53(1)(b) LPA 1925 cannot be relied upon to advance a fraud in the form of insisting on the written agreement when it was really agreed that the innocent party will have an interest in the land

Hodgson v Marks [1971] Ch 892 POINT OF LAW

"If an attempted express trust fails, that seems to me just the occasion for implication of a resulting trust, whether the failure be due to uncertainty, or perpetuity, or lack of form." An automatic resulting trust arises where an express trust fails for lack of formality.

Rochefoucauld v Boustead [1897] 1 Ch 196 POINT OF LAW

The Statute of Frauds cannot be used to prove a fraud, so when an express trust is being denied fraudulently but can be proved by oral evidence, then it is proved that it is conveyed on trust.

Dillwyn v Llewelyn (1862) 4 De GF & J 517 POINT OF LAW

Proprietary estoppel can perfect an imperfect gift

Re Rose [1952] Ch 499 POINT OF LAW

A gift can be perfected when the donor has done everything in his power to make the transfer. "everything necessary to enable the donee to enforce a beneficial claim without further assistance from the donor"

Pascoe v Turner [1979] 1 WLR 431 POINT OF LAW

the court must decide what is the minimum equity to do justice to her having regard to the way in which she changed her position for the worse (detrimental reliance) by reason of the acquiescence and encouragement of the legal owner.

Mascall v Mascall (1985) 50 P & CR 119 POINT OF LAW

Equity regarded a gift as completed where the donor had done everything that he had to do and the donee had within his control everything necessary to constitute his title completely without any further assistance from the donor.

Choithram International SA v Pagarani POINT OF LAW

Where the only legal option from a prima facie imperfect declaration of gift is a declaration of trust, and it is clear that that is the intention of the settlor, that will be made valid.

Pennington v Waine [2002] 1 WLR 2075 POINT OF LAW

A donor need not do everything in their power for equity to perfect an imperfect gift if it would be unconscionable to rescind it.

Curtis v Pulbrook [2011] 1 BCLC 638 POINT OF LAW

Three routes which, in the context of a defective voluntarily transfer of shares, the court might avoid the rigorous application of the principle that equity will not compel the completion of an imperfect gift, in the absence of a valid declaration of trust.

Where the donor has done everything necessary to enable the donee to enforce a beneficial claim without further assistance from the donor.

Where some detrimental reliance by donee upon upon an apparent although ineffective gift may so bind the conscience of the donor to justify the imposition of a constructive trust.

Where by a benevolent construction an effective gift or implied declaration of trust may be teased out of the words used. These these rules don't serve "any clearly identifiable or rational policy objective."

Corin v Patton (1990) 169 CLR 540 POINT OF LAW

There is a distinction between the enforcement of a voluntary covenant to create a trust and the enforcement of a transfer by way of intended gift when the donor has done all that was in his power. In the first case, equity will not compel specific performance, there being no completely constituted trust; in the second case, as the transaction is complete as far as the donor is concerned, no question of withholding specific performance can arise and equity will hold the donor to the specific performance of the transaction on the footing that title has been divested.

Bridge v Campbell Discount Co Ltd [1962] AC 600 POINT OF LAW

Not sure.

Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315, [20] (HCA) POINT OF LAW

breaches of trust and abuses of fiduciary position manifest unconscientious conduct; but whether a particular case amounts to a breach of trust or abuse of fiduciary duty is determined by reference to well developed principles, both specific and flexible in character. It is to those principles that the court has first regard.

Zeital v Kaye [2010] EWCA Civ 159 POINT OF LAW

In this case, the method of purportedly transferring the share fell "so far short of the formalities required" that the gift failed as imperfect.

Khan v Mahmood [2021] EWHC 597 (Ch) POINT OF LAW

Post Pennington v Waine [2002] EWCA Civ 227, the test for whether a court will perfect an imperfect gift was that it should at least be unconscionable for the transferor to change their mind.

*Pullan v Koe [1913] 1 Ch 9 POINT OF LAW

Raised doubts as to whether if there exists a completely constituted trust of the benefit of the covenant this can be enforced by the trustees on behalf of the beneficiaries or by the beneficiaries themselves even if volunteers in the case of after-acquired property.

Cannon v Hartley [1949] Ch 213 POINT OF LAW

A covenantee who is party to a deed is entitled to damages for breach of covenant despite being a volunteer (i.e., one who has not offered consideration).

Davenport v Bishopp (1843) 2 Y & C Ch 451 POINT OF LAW

A covenant to pay a sum to be ascertained in the future is just as good as a chose in action as a covenant to pay a specified sum, and it creates legal property of value. The subject matter of the trust is the benefit of the covenant, the chose in action; not the property which will be obtained by its performance.

Fletcher v Fletcher (1844) 4 Hare 67 POINT OF LAW

A covenant to settle (i.e. to pay over a sum into a trust) can be held on trust by the trustees (who are the covenantees) for the intended beneficiary of the covenant

Lloyds v Harper (1880) 16 Ch D 290 POINT OF LAW

A contractual guarantee can be the subject of a trust

Re Plumptre's Marriage Settlement [1910] 1 Ch 609 POINT OF LAW

The intention to include gifts in an after-acquired property clause does not go against the motives underlying the execution of the settlement. "equity looks on that as done which ought to be done"

Re Kay's Settlement [1939] Ch 329 POINT OF LAW

Trustees of a covenant to settle can neither recover in equity or law if the covenant is breached assuming the beneficiaries are volunteers.

Re Cook's Settlement Trusts [1965] Ch 902 POINT OF LAW

the normal rule that only parties to a contract or their successors in title could sue on it applied, so as the beneficiaries were not parties and were not to be treated as if they were, had given no consideration, and did not have to be treated as though they had given consideration, (as in the case of issue of a marriage) the covenant was unenforceable by them, nor were they entitled to require the trustees to take proceedings to enforce it

Paul v Paul (1882) 20 Ch D 742 POINT OF LAW

Settlors cannot generally revoke trusts, even though the beneficiaries are volunteers.

McCormick v Grogan (1869) LR 4 HL 82 POINT OF LAW

Secret trusts are only enabled to circumvent the legitimacy of a will under the Wills Act, when there is evidence that a fraud had occurred, or was likely to occur, on the basis that equity will not allow a statute as an instrument of fraud.

Blackwell v Blackwell [1929] AC 318 POINT OF LAW

The three elements necessary for the creation of a trust are the intention of the donor, communication of that intention to the donee, and acceptance or acquiescence by the donee. A half secret trust can be valid if communication is made, and parol evidence is admissible to establish this.

*Ottaway v Norman [1972] Ch 698 POINT OF LAW

To establish a secret trust imposed on a primary donee in favour of a secondary donee it was essential to show that a testator intended to impose an obligation on the primary donee which had been communicated and accepted by them. How the property is transferred does not matter. The standard of proof of a secret trust was not exceptionally high but was analogous to that required before the court would rectify a written instrument. Fraud is not necessary.

Sen v Hedley [1991] Ch 425, [1991] 2 All ER 636 POINT OF LAW

the requirements for a DMC are: Gift must be made in contemplation of impending death. Gift must be made upon the condition that it is to be absolute and perfected only on the donor's death, being revocable until that event and ineffective if it does not. Must be a delivery of the subject matter of the gift, or the essential indicia of title thereto, which amounts to a parting with dominion and not mere physical possession over the subject matter.

*King v Dubrey [2016] Ch 221 POINT OF LAW

A Donatio mortis causa is not only available when the donor is on their deathbed, but it is clear that he must have a good reason to anticcipate death in the near future from an identified cause.

*Strong v Bird (1874) LR 18 Eq 315 POINT OF LAW

The rule is that where a donor A has attempted to make a gift inter vivos to the donee B but the gift is not completed through failure to comply with the necessary formalities then, if B is subsequently appointed as A's executor or administrator, the vesting of the legal title in B is treated as completing the gift.

Timpson's Executors v Yerbury [1936] 1 KB 645 POINT OF LAW

The equitable interest in property in the hands of a trustee can be disposed of by the person entitled to it in favour of a third party in any one of 4 ways. The person entitled to it can:

Assign it to 3p directly

Direct the trustees to hold the property on trust for 3p

Contract for valuable consideration to assign the equitable interest to him, or

Can declare himself to be a trustee for him of such interest.

Vandervell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291 POINT OF LAW

When both the legal and the equitable interest are transferred, there is no requirement of writing under LPA 1925 s 53(1)(c).

Neville v Wilson [1997] Ch 144 POINT OF LAW

contract for the transfer of equitable interests is not the same as a non-contractual disposition of that interest

*Grey v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1958] Ch 375 POINT OF LAW (note this is different from the earlier case)

A direction to trustees to hold property on trust for a donee (creation of a subtrust) can be parol. A direction to trustees to hold equitable interest on trust for someone else is a disposition, and if it's oral then it's void by 53(1)(c).

Nelson v Greening & Sykes (Builders) Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1358 POINT OF LAW

A sub-trust does not dispose of the beneficial interest of the intermediate trustee

Lohia v Lohia [2001] WTLR 101 (EWHC (CH)) POINT OF LAW

Section 60(3) of the LPA 1925 abolishes the presumption that a voluntary conveyance gives rise to a resulting trust.

Re Vandervell's Trusts (No 2)[1974] EWCA Civ 7 POINT OF LAW

Resulting trusts have two species: Presumed Resulting Trusts = a resulting trust in which the fact generating the trust is proved by presumption rather than evidence. Automatic Resulting Trusts = where a transfer to B is made on trusts which leave some or all of the beneficial interest undisposed of, B holds that on trust for A.

National Crime Agency v Dong [2017] EWHC 3116 (Ch) POINT OF LAW

s60(3) LPA 1925 does not abolish the presumption of a resulting trust, merely some technicalities surrounding it.

Ali v Dinc [2020] EWHC 3055 (Ch) POINT OF LAW

The presumption of the resulting trust is not barred by s60(3) of the LPA.

Dyer v Dyer (1788) 2 Cox Eq Cas 92 POINT OF LAW

If you purchase property in the name of another there is a presumption that that property is yours, unless there is a presumption of advancement (gift).

The Venture [1908] P 218 POINT OF LAW

Under the presumption of a resulting trust, if A provides the money for B to purchase property, it is presumed that A has a proportional beneficial interest in the property and any future proceeds from its sale, unless it can be shown that A intended otherwise.

Cowcher v Cowcher [1972] 1 WLR 425 POINT OF LAW

If land is conveyed to A and the purchase money is provided by A and B, there will be a resulting trust for A and B in those proportions unless a contrary intention is proved so as to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust. Evidence of different proportions only counts at the time of the presumption of resulting trust, not afterwards.

Fowkes v Pascoe (1875) LR 10 Ch App 343 POINT OF LAW

The presumption (of resulting trust) is of very different weight in different cases, eg much stronger where stock is in name of purported settlor and his solicitor vs settlor and best friend. It can be rebutted by an improbability of a trust being intended.

Bennet v Bennet (1879) 10 Ch D 474 POINT OF LAW

The presumption of gift arises when there is a moral obligation to give (ie to provide for the donee). This means that mothers do not raise the presumption of giving because they do not have to provide for their children.

Warren v Gurney [1944] 2 All ER 472 POINT OF LAW

Held, the keeping of the title deeds is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a gift.

Tinsley v Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340 POINT OF LAW

Illegal activities only prevent the establishment of a resulting trust if the activity doer has to rely on it. Thus, where the presumption of advancement does not apply (and there is instead a presumption of resulting trust) it does not matter whether illegal activities lead to the transaction.

Patel v Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 POINT OF LAW

Primarily this is a very lengthy but interesting decision about the illegality principle. It held that there should be a new test for illegality. The rule that a party to an illegal agreement cannot enforce a claim against the other party to the agreement if he has to rely on his own illegal conduct does not satisfy the requirements of coherence and integrity of the legal system and should no longer be followed. Instead, the court should assess whether the public interest would be harmed by enforcement of the illegal agreement, which requires it to consider: the underlying purpose of the prohibition which has been transgressed and whether that purpose will be enhanced by denial of the claim, any other relevant public policy on which the denial of the claim may have an impact, and whether denial of the claim would be a proportionate response, bearing in mind that punishment is a matter for the criminal courts.

Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669 POINT OF LAW

Type B resulting trusts ("automatic") can be rebutted by any intention that contradicts the intention to create a trust; it does not have to be an intention to give a gift. Under an institutional constructive trust, the trust arises by operation of law as from the date of the circumstances which give rise to it: the function of the court is merely to declare that such trust has arisen in the past. The consequences that flow from such trust having arisen (including the possibly unfair consequences to third parties who in the interim have received the trust property) are also determined by rules of law, not under a discretion. A remedial constructive trust ... is different. It is a judicial remedy giving rise to an enforceable equitable obligation: the extent to which it operates retrospectively to the prejudice of third parties lies in the discretion of the court. Stolen money means that the right to the money is held on a constructive trust.

* Re Vandervell's Trust (No 2) [1974] Ch 269 POINT OF LAW

a resulting trust of type (B) does not depend on intention but operates automatically

Air Jamaica Ltd v Charlton [1999] 1 WLR 1399 POINT OF LAW

Like a constructive trust, a resulting trust arises by operation of law, though unlike a constructive trust it gives effect to intention. But it arises whether or not the transferor intended to retain a beneficial interest - he almost always does not since it responds to the absence of any intention on his part to pass a beneficial interest to the recipient. It may even arise when the transferor positively wished to part with the beneficial interest. Thus there must be a doubt whether a type B resulting trust can ever be rebutted.

Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 POINT OF LAW

The doctrine of resulting trust, while still having a function in cases of emotional and commercial partnerships, is no longer a legal presumption and has largely been replaced by the constructive trust.

Jones v Kernott [2012] 1 AC 776 POINT OF LAW

In the case of the purchase of a house or flat in joint names for joint occupation by a married or unmarried couple, where both are responsible for any mortgage, there is no presumption of a resulting trust arising from their having contributed to the deposit in unequal shares. The presumption is that the parties intended a joint tenancy both in law and in equity. But that presumption can of course be rebutted by evidence of a contrary intention, which may more readily be shown where the parties did not share financial resources.

Marr v Collie [2017] 3 WLR 1507 (PC) POINT OF LAW

where a property was bought in joint names, even as an investment, the parties' respective beneficial interests would depend on their intentions, which could change over time. Thus, save where there was no evidence from which the parties' intentions could be identified, neither the presumption that a conveyance into joint names indicated a legal and beneficial joint tenancy unless the contrary were proved, nor the presumption of a resulting trust where the parties had contributed unequally to the purchase of property in their joint names, would necessarily prevail.

Hussey v Palmer [1972] 1 WLR 1286 POINT OF LAW

Where it would have been quite inequitable for the legal owner to take the property for himself and exclude the other from it, the law imputes or imposes a trust for the other's benefit.

Re Polly Peck International (in administration) (No 4); Marangos Hotel Co Ltd v Stone [1998] 2 BCLC 185 POINT OF LAW

There is no seriously arguable claim for an institutional constructive trust. You cannot grant a proprietary right to A, who has not had one beforehand, without taking some proprietary right away from B.

Crossco No 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd [2012] 2 All ER 754 POINT OF LAW

Although Lord B-W's divide in Westdeutsche is not universally accepted, the current general view is that English law does not at present recognise a remedial constructive trust of the kind he described with its critical features of judicial discretion and retrospectivity.

Bailey v Angove's PTY Limited [2016] UKSC 47 POINT OF LAW

English law has not recognised the remedial constructive trust. There is no intention to transfer due to a void contract, or regardless of intentions, equity dictates that it is unjust to retain the money.

Keech v Sandford 25 ER 223 POINT OF LAW

The rule that a trustee is prevented from retaining the benefit of a lease that is renewed in his own name, the lease having previously been held on trust. A beneficiary can't take advantage of the trust; it must always be for the beneficiaries' benefit.

Pallant v Morgan [1953] Ch 43 POINT OF LAW

The court may give an equitable remedy if specific performance is not available where an agreement has been made that joint interests will be acquired in property and one party fraudulently breaks that agreement to the benefit of one and/or detriment of another. you can't agree with another to purchase property as part of an agreement. Detrimental reliance. Trust arises where one goes back on the agreement following detrimental reliance.

FHR European Ventures LLP v Mankarious [2014] UKSC 45 POINT OF LAW

The remedial constructive trust is not a part of English law. Where an agent acquired a benefit from his fiduciary position, the general equitable rule was that he was to be treated as having acquired the benefit on behalf of his principal who had a proprietary as well as a personal remedy against the agent.

Banner Homes Group plc v Luff Developments Ltd [2000] Ch 372 POINT OF LAW

It is no bar to a claim in Pallant v Morgan equity that the acquisition agreement is too uncertain to be enforced as a contract.

Farrar v Miller [2018] EWCA Civ 172 POINT OF LAW

Pallant v Morgan equity can extend to cases where there was a post-acquisition agreement, ie no contract.

Generator Developments v Lidl UK GmbH [2018] EWCA Civ 396 POINT OF LAW

if parties intend to make a formal agreement for one or more parties to acquire an interest in property, or if further terms for that acquisition remain to be agreed so the interest is not clearly identified, or if the parties did not expect their agreement to be immediately binding, then neither party can rely on constructive trust as a means of enforcing their original agreement.

Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499 POINT OF LAW

the moment you have a valid contract for sale the vendor becomes in equity a trustee for the purchaser of the estate sold, and the beneficial ownership passes to the purchaser, the vendor having a right to the purchase-money, a charge or lien on the state for the security of that purchase-money, and a right to retain possession of the estate until the purchase-money is paid, in the absence of express contract as to the time of delivering possession.

Walsh v Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch D 9 POINT OF LAW

A specifically enforceable contract to grant a lease is treated as creating an equitable lease on the same terms.

Englewood Properties Ltd v Patel [2005] 1 WLR 1961 POINT OF LAW

The duty of a vendor in a vendor-purchaser constructive trust is to protect the interest which the purchaser has acquired under the contract.