Administrative Law - Cases' POINTs OF LAW only

Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 (HL) POINT OF LAW

You can judicially review despite an ouster clause where there is an error of law which means the administrative body was acting beyond their powers.

R. v. Lord Chancellor ex parte Page [1993] AC 682 POINT OF LAW

Applied the principle from Anisminic to university visitors: if a decision is not ultra vires, it cannot be subject to judicial review. This is because the domestic law of the uni is within their jurisdiction. More likely: there is a single category of errors of law, all of which render a decision ultra vires and jurisdictional.

R. v. Monopolies and Mergers Commission ex parte South Yorkshire Transport Ltd.

[1993] 1 WLR 23 HL POINT OF LAW

Even where a question relates to jurisdiction, if the statutory language involves a broad, evaluative judgment, the court will not intervene simply because it would have reached a different conclusion. Judicial review for error of law will only succeed if the decision is irrational or based on a clear misdirection of law.

R (Cart) v The Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28 POINT OF LAW

UK admin law has moved away from the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional when looking at whether the courts can review decisions for error of law. The Upper Tribunal, despite being a 'superior court of record' like the High Court, can be subject to judicial review, subject to restrictions that it should only be available where an important point of practice or principle is raised or there is some other compelling reason for the court to hear the case (the second-appeals criteria). Parliament can exclude judicial review, but only with clear and explicit words.

R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22 POINT OF LAW

Judicial review can only be excluded by clear and explicit terms, even for tribunals which are on par with the EWHC. Clauses purporting wholly to exclude the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court to review a decision of an inferior court or tribunal may be ineffectual.

*E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49, [2004] QB 1044 POINT OF LAW

A mistake in finding facts may make a decision illegal if (1) an administrator (or an administrative tribunal) makes a mistake about the existence or non-existence of a fact, including a mistake about the availability of evidence to support a finding of fact; (2) the fact, or the evidence, is 'uncontentious and objectively verifiable'; (3) neither the appellant nor his advisors were responsible for the mistake; and (4) the mistake played a material (but not necessarily decisive) part in the reasoning leading to the making of the decision or rule.

*R (A) v Croydon LBC [2009] UKSC 8; [2009] 1 WLR 2557 POINT OF LAW

Where there is a question of objective fact, rather than one which requires a value judgment, it is within the competency of the court to decide, as it is a jurisdictional or precedent fact.

Edwards v. Bairstow [1956] AC 14 HL POINT OF LAW

When there is some differing of opinion, and different authorities could have reached different results acting rationally, the court is only entitled to substitute its own judgment if the decision is so aberrant that it cannot be classed as rational.

Moyna v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2003] UKHL 44, [2003] 1 WLR 1929 POINT OF LAW

The difference between questions of fact and questions of law can be more clearly expressed as a distinction between what should be decided by appellate courts and what should not. This means there are things that seem like questions of fact that are complicated enough that judges should decide them and are thus questions of law, and questions of law that are simple or mundane enough that it would be silly to make appellate courts keep deciding them.

*Jones v First Tier Tribunal [2013] UKSC 19 POINT OF LAW

The law/fact distinction is not purely objective, but must take account of factors of "expediency" or "policy". This means that where Parliament has established a specialist appellate tribunal, its expertise should be used to direct the development of law and practice in its field. The deference of the reviewing court to the UT in light of its experience may be heightened by the reviewing court's characterising a given matter as a question of fact (so as to shield it from the rigours of error-of-law review) even if the same matter would be characterised by the UT as a question of law.

R (Oceana) v Upper Tribunal [2023] EWHC 791 (Admin), [2023] ACD 72 POINT OF LAW

The courts always have to be authoritative interpreters of Parliament's intention, even ouster clauses. This means that they can be effective if they are explicit and clear.

R (LA (Albania)) v Upper Tribunal [2023] EWCA Civ 1337, [2024] 1 WLR 1673 POINT OF LAW

Affirmed Oceana: it is possible for Parliament to exclude the possibility of judicial review, if it is clear enough. For example, s11A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

* Carltona v Commrs of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560 POINT OF LAW

A Minister can delegate their powers to any official within the relevant department.

* R v Adams [2020] UKSC 19 POINT OF LAW

Even if there is a presumption that the Carltona principle applies, it can be displaced by statute. Relevant factors for determining this include the significance of the consequences and the burden on the Minister.

*British Oxygen v. Minister of Technology [1971] AC 610 POINT OF LAW

A person or agency exercising discretion as to how to use a statutory power may devise a policy to guide him in its use. He may formulate a policy or make a limiting rule as to the future exercise of his discretion, if he thinks that good administration requires it, provided he listens to any applicant who has something new to say.

R (Corner House Research) v Director of Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60 POINT OF LAW

Whether an external factor can be taken into account when a minister exercises their discretion depends on the public interest (as in what is in their best interest).

*R. (Sandiford) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2014] UKSC 44 POINT OF LAW

Judicial review for illegality due to fettering of discretion does not apply to common law/prerogative powers. This means they can be subject to a blanket exclusion policy.

* R (A) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 37 POINT OF LAW

Policies can be unlawful in 3 situations: the guidance included a positive incorrect statement of the law; the authority breached their duty to provide accurate legal advice; the authority promulgated a policy purporting to give a full account of the legal position but failed to do that.

R (BF (Eritrea)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 38 POINT OF LAW

A person promulgating policy guidance had a duty not to direct recipients to breach legal duties, but there was no general duty to promulgate a policy removing the risk of possible misapplication of the law by those subject to a legal duty.

R (Bracking) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWCA Civ 1345 POINT OF LAW

The public sector equality duty requires active, personal, and rigorous consideration of equality impacts by the actual decision maker, which must happen before the decision is made. It must be specific, documented, and conscientious.

R (Hurley and Moore) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills [2012] EWHC 201 (Admin) POINT OF LAW

Due regard requires the court to ensure that there has been a proper and conscientious focus on the statutory criteria, but if that's done the court can't interfere just because it would have weighted it differently. There is a duty to take steps to gather information so that the equality requirement can be met.

R (Sheakh) v Lambeth LBC [2022] EWCA Civ 457 POINT OF LAW

The "due regard" duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 is context-sensitive: its intensity varies with the facts and stage of the decision-making process. Where a decision is early, experimental, time-limited, and part of an evolving policy framework (such as in a public emergency), the standard for compliance may be less demanding. Courts should not apply an overly strict standard in such contexts, especially where equality impacts will be assessed further down the line and there is clear evidence that the duty was considered, even without a completed equality impact assessment at the time.

*Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture [1968] AC 997 POINT OF LAW

Ministers given discretion must exercise it in line with the overall aim of the Act.

Wheeler. v. Leicester CC [1985] AC 1054 POINT OF LAW

Use of a public power to punish acts of private individuals that are otherwise reasonable and lawful will be quashed for improper purposes.

R. v. Lewisham LBC ex parte Shell [1988] 1 All ER 938 POINT OF LAW

A decision will be ultra vires if a substantial influence is outside of the scope conferred by statute, even if that is not the only reason for the decision, unless the same decision would have been made without considering the unlawful considerations.

Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 POINT OF LAW

The test for whether a decision is void for bias is whether the fair-minded observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased. Powers conferred on a public authority may only be exercised for the purpose for which those powers were conferred and not otherwise. Article 6(1) ECHR is made of several separate rights; a complaint that one of them was breached cannot be answered by showing that the others were not.

*R (Palestine Solidarity Campaign Ltd) v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government [2020] UKSC 16; [2020] 1 WLR 1774 POINT OF LAW

Confirmed and applied the Padfield principle: an unfettered statutory power could only be exercised to "promote the policy and objectives of the Act".

Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside MBC [1977] AC 1014 POINT OF LAW

To be 'unreasonable,' a decision by a public authority must be such that no sensible authority acting with due appreciation of its responsibilities would have decided to adopt. It is for the court to determine whether he had directed himself properly and had taken into consideration the matters which he ought to have considered and excluded from his consideration irrelevant matters.

*Bromley LBC v. GLC [1983] 1 AC 768 POINT OF LAW

Manifesto pledges cannot be treated as binding. The interests of the affected public must be considered.

Tesco Stores Ltd. v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 W.L.R. 759 POINT OF LAW

If the authority has regard to all material considerations and does not lapse into Wednesbury irrationality, it can give the considerations whatever weight they think fit or no weight at all. The weight is not a matter for the courts.

R v Home Secretary, ex p Venables and Thompson [1998] AC 40 POINT OF LAW

Public authorities may not consider public opinion when making a decision.

*R (on the application of Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51 POINT OF LAW

Emphasized that common law rights are very important and discretion mustn't restrict them.

* R (Miller) v Prime Minister No 2, Cherry v Advocate General for Scotland [2019] UKSC 41; [2020] AC 373 POINT O' LAW

Fundamental common law constitutional principles must be obeyed when exercising discretion. This includes Parliamentary sovereignty and Parliamentary scrutiny.

*Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA) POINT OF LAW

The court must investigate whether the local authority has taken into account matters which they ought not to take into account, or conversely, have refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which they ought to take into account. Once that it decided, and it is held that the local authority acted within the four corners of the matters which they ought to consider, they have nevertheless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it.

*R. v. Chief Constable of Sussex, ex parte International Trader's Ferry Ltd [1999] 2 AC 418, [1999] 1 All ER 129 POINT OF LAW

The Wednesbury formulation is tautologous and needlessly complex. Instead, the formulation should be: whether the decision in question was one a reasonable authority could reach. The converse is 'conduct which no sensible authority acting with due appreciation of its responsibilities would have decided to adopt.'

*Kennedy v Charity Commissioners [2014] UKSC 20 POINT OF LAW

The intensity of judicial review in administrative law varies according to context, rather than applying a single rigid standard like the traditional Wednesbury unreasonableness test. Courts adopt a more flexible and calibrated approach, applying low-intensity review in cases involving political judgment, and higher-intensity scrutiny where fundamental rights are at stake.

R (Law Society) v Lord Chancellor [2019] 1 WLR 1649 (Divisional Court) POINT OF LAW

"Another, simpler formulation of the [Wednesbury] test which avoids tautology is whether the decision is outside the range of reasonable decisions open to the decision-maker"

Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Johnson [2020] EWCA Civ 778 POINT OF LAW

When considering whether a decision was rational, relevant factors include: the disadvantages of not fixing an issue and of fixing it, whether a solution would be consistent with the nature of the overall regime, and whether the it was possible to say that no reasonable [decision-maker] would have struck the balance in the way that the [decision-maker] had done.

R v Home Secretary, ex p Daly [2001] UKHL 26 POINT OF LAW

This is the first unequivocal adoption of the proportionality test in an HR case at apex court level in the UK. The right-infringing means used to achieve an objective must be proportional to the legitimate public objectives which they aim to achieve.

Miss Behavin' Ltd v Belfast City Council [2007] UKHL 19, [2007] 1 WLR 1420 POINT OF LAW

An authority or official's expertise in matters of discretion is only to be deferred to if they actually use it. If not, the court must strike the balance itself.

* Bank Mellat v Her Majesty's Treasury [2013] UKSC 39 POINT OF LAW

The proportionality test considers whether the objective is sufficiently important to justify the limitation of a fundamental right, whether the measure is rationally connected to that objective, whether a less intrusive measure could have been used, and whether, having regard to these matters and to the severity of the consequences, a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the individual and the interests of the community.

* R (Begum) v Denbigh High School Governors [2006] UKHL 15, [2007] 1 AC 100 POINT OF LAW

When a public authority's decision is challenged under the HRA, the courts must conduct a proportionality review that is more intense than Wednesbury. This does not amount to a full merits review, but the court must examine the practical outcome, not just whether the process was procedurally proper.

Pham v Home Secretary [2015] UKSC 19 POINT OF LAW

There may be an implied requirement of proportionality when dealing with signifiant interferences with rights.

* Keyu v Foreign Secretary [2015] UKSC 69 POINT OF LAW

Scepticism of the move from rationality to proportionality as it would involve the courts considering the merits of the decision.

Browne v Parole Board [2018] EWCA Civ 2024 POINT OF LAW

Dismissed proportionality as a standard of review in favour of rationality for an assessment of risk.

Cooper. v. Board of Works for the Wandsworth District (1863) 14 CB (NS) 180 POINT OF LAW

There is a right to be heard, which may be dependent on the seriousness of the consequences.

*Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] AC 40 POINT OF LAW

The principles of natural justice and the right to a fair hearing do not just apply to public bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

*Osborn v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 6 POINT OF LAW

A hearing should be granted whenever fairness requires it in the light of the facts of the case and the importance of what is at stake. How much of a difference a hearing is likely to make is not a relevant factor to be considered.

R. (Moseley) v Haringey LBC [2014] UKSC 56 POINT OF LAW

There is a duty to consult. But while Lord Wilson (with whom Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore agreed) thought that it came from the common law requirement of procedural fairness, Lord Reed thought it was a statutory duty only.

*R (Begum) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 7 POINT OF LAW

Fairness and natural justice do not require a right to an appeal.

R (Pathan) v Home Secretary [2020] UKSC 41 POINT OF LAW

Procedural fairness requires that an affected individual be informed promptly of a decision that impacts their legal position, but it does not extend to creating new substantive rights or benefits beyond those conferred by statute.

D4 v Home Secretary [2022] EWCA Civ 33 POINT OF LAW

"Notice" means that it has been received. But that is not a universal rule. Also, receipt does not mean full knowledge. At most, the recipient should have an opportunity to inform themself about the contents of the notice.

* R (Roberts) v Parole Board [2005] UKHL 45, [2005] 2 AC 738 POINT OF LAW

2 principles which should be applied to the use of specially-appointed advocates: First, they should only be appointed to assist the prisoner by providing a degree of protection that would otherwise be unavailable; and second, their role should be tailored so that their use is no more than that which is necessary to mitigate the adverse position of the prisoner.

Home Secretary v MB [2007] UKHL 46, [2008] 1 AC 440 Baroness Hale POINT OF LAW

Doing justice means not only arriving at a just result but arriving at it in a just manner. In the case of closed material proceedings, this means that they should only happen when strictly necessary.

Home Secretary v AF (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28 POINT OF LAW

Requirement of Audi Alteram Partem means that there must be sufficient disclosure to allow the challenge to be met.

* R. v. Gough [1993] AC 646 POINT OF LAW

The test for bias should be: having ascertained the relevant circumstances, the court should ask itself whether, having regard to those circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the part of the relevant member of the tribunal in question, in the sense that he might unfairly regard (or have unfairly regarded) with favour, or disfavour, the case of a party to the issue under consideration by him.

*Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 POINT OF LAW

A moderation of the test from Gough should be approved: "The court must first ascertain all the circumstances which have a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased. It must then ask whether those circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased." [102]

* R (The Good Law Project) v Minister for the Cabinet Office [2022] EWCA Civ 21 POINT OF LAW

With regard to questions of apparent bias, the fair-minded and informed observer is someone who reserves judgment until both sides of the argument are apparent, is not unduly sensitive or suspicious, and is not to be confused with the person raising the complaint. The principles can be applied to extrajudicial decisions, but only if they are sufficiently adjudicative.

R v Amber Valley District Council, ex p Jackson [1985] 1 WLR 298 POINT OF LAW

The principles of natural justice apply to planning decisions, so decision-makers have an obligation to act fairly and consider relevant and timely representations.

R (Lewis) v Redcar and Cleveland [2008] EWCA Civ 746 POINT OF LAW

Councillors who have a personal interest, as defined in the authorities, must not participate in council decisions.

Broadview Energy v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2016] EWCA Civ 562 POINT OF LAW

The principles of natural justice are not disregarded when a Minister is lobbied by an MP, provided a fair-minded and informed observer would not think that there was bias.

R (Alconbury) v Secretary of State for the Environment [2001] UKHL 23, [2003] 2 AC 295 POINT OF LAW

The article 6(1) right to a fair trial from an 'independent and impartial tribunal' was not damaged by the executive making decisions delegated to them by Parliament on planning, provided they were subject to review by an independent and impartial tribunal with full jurisdiction to deal with the case.

* R v Anderson [2002] UKHL 46, [2003] 1 AC 837, [2002] 4 All ER 1089 POINT OF LAW

Sentencing is a judicial function which, under art 6(1) ECHR, must be done by an independent and impartial tribunal. It cannot be done by the executive.

* Ali v Birmingham City Council [2010] UKSC 8, [2010] 2 AC 39 POINT OF LAW

Art 6(1) ECHR is not engaged in administrative decisions involving discretion.

Poshteh v Kensington & Chelsea Royal LBC [2017] UKSC 36 POINT OF LAW

The conferring of welfare benefits that require an evaluative judgments are not civil rights for the purposes of Art 6 ECHR, so they do not require an independent and impartial tribunal.

* R v Home Secretary, ex p Doody [1994] AC 531 POINT OF LAW

There is no general duty to give reasons. The question is whether the refusal to give reasons is fair.

R v HEFC, ex p Institute of Dental Surgery [1994] 1 WLR 242, [1994] 1 All ER 651 POINT OF LAW

There is no general duty to give reasons, but there are classes of cases in which there is such a duty. Mostly, though, it depends on whether fairness requires that reasons be given.

R (Hasan) v Trade and Industry Secretary [2008] EWCA Civ 1312, [2009] 3 All ER 539 POINT OF LAW

If there exists a relevant statutory duty to give reasons, this may discourage the court from concluding that any more extensive common law duty applies.

Schmidt v. Home Office [1969] 2 WLR 337 POINT OF LAW

An administrative body may, in a proper case, be bound to give a person who is affected by their decision an opportunity of making representations. It all depends on whether he has some right or interest, or, I would add, some legitimate expectation, of which it would not be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has to say.

*R. v. Liverpool Corp, ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators [1972] 2 QB 299 POINT OF LAW

Where there is a duty to act fairly and a specific undertaking is made by a public authority of a procedural nature, the public authority are bound to honour it so long as it is compatible with their statutory duties.

*R. v. Home Sec, ex parte Khan [1984] 1 WLR 1337 POINT OF LAW

When an authority issues guidance about factors they will consider in their decision-making, that can create a legitimate expectation that those factors will be considered, meaning that without sufficient public interest reasons not to, they must be.

R. v. Secretary of State for Health ex parte US Tobacco International [1992] 1 All ER 212 POINT OF LAW

Where legitimate interest fails, rationality and fairness can still mean that a decision was unlawful.

*R. v. Devon CC ex parte Baker [1995] 1 All ER 73 POINT OF LAW

Set out four categories of legitimate expectation (not exhaustively): To denote a substantive right. C's right will only be found established when there is a clear and unambiguous representation upon which it was reasonable for him to rely. This is akin to estoppel.

More conventionally, C's interest in some ultimate benefit which he hopes to retain. Here, therefore, it is the interest itself rather than the benefit which is the substance of the expectation.

Frequently, it 'legitimate expectation' refers to fair procedure itself. C has a legitimate expectation that the public authority will act fairly towards him.

Finally, those cases in which it is held that a particular procedure must be followed consequent on some specific promise or practice. Fairness requires that the public authority be held to it.

R. v. MAFF ex parte Hamble Fisheries [1995] 2 All ER 714 POINT OF LAW

The real question in legitimate expectation cases is fairness in public administration. There must be an expectation which is worthy of protection. The courts should adopt a rigorous approach, precluding frustration of substantive expectations unless itself satisfied that the public interest in doing so outweighs the unfairness likely to be thereby occasioned to the individual.

* R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority ex parte Coughlan [2000] 2 WLR 622 POINT OF LAW

Promise or practice can induce a legitimate expectation of a procedural or substantive benefit. The more the decision (not to give effect to the legitimate expectation) lies in the macro-political field, the less intrusive the intensity of review.

R v Department for Education and Employment, ex p. Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 POINT OF LAW

For substantive legitimate expectation, must be a clear representation from which it would be unfair to renege. Detrimental reliance is helpful and normal, but not essential.

R (Bibi) v. Newham LBC [2002]1 WLR 237 POINT OF LAW

Detriment and reliance are not necessary for a successful claim of legitimate expectations; disappointment is enough.

*R. (on the application of Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363 POINT OF LAW

Legitimate expectation should be based on good administration. Accordingly, a public body's promise or practice as to future conduct may only be denied, and thus the standard may only be departed from, in circumstances where to do so is the public body's legal duty or is otherwise "a proportionate response" having regard to a legitimate aim pursued in the public interest.

R. (Niazi) v Secretary of State for Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 755 POINT OF LAW

Three key situations in which legitimate expectations arise, and where failing to meet them may amount to abuse of power: Procedural expectation: If a public authority clearly promises to consult, it must do so. Substantive expectation: If it promises to maintain a policy affecting someone significantly, it should keep that promise. Policy reliance: Even without a promise, if someone reasonably relies on an established policy, the authority must usually consult before changing it.

R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 61; [2008] 4 All ER 1055 POINT OF LAW

in a case such as the present, a claim to a legitimate expectation can be based only on a promise which is 'clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification'. It is not essential that the applicant should have relied on the promise to his detriment, although this is a relevant consideration in deciding whether the adoption of a policy in conflict with the promise would be an abuse of power.

Re Finucane's Application for Judicial Review [2019] UKSC 7 POINT OF LAW

For a legitimate expectation to arise, there must be a clear, unambiguous promise. Detrimental reliance is not necessary. The justification for enforcing legitimate expectations is that it is not conducive the good standards of public administration to do otherwise.

R (Rashid) v Home Secretary [2005] EWCA Civ 744 POINT OF LAW

Just because you don't know of the policy, doesn't mean that there is not a legitimate expectation that the Sec of State will apply it. This includes unpublished policies.

* Mandalia v Home Secretary [2015] UKSC 59 POINT OF LAW

An applicant has the right to the determination of their application in accordance with policy because they have to honour representations of how they will act unless there is good reason not to do so.

R (Lee-Hirons) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] UKSC 46 POINT OF LAW

Where a public authority issues a statement of policy in relation to the exercise of one of its functions, a member of the public to whom it ostensibly applies has a right at common law to require the authority to apply the policy, so long as it is lawful, to himself unless there are good reasons for the authority not to do so.

*Rowland v. Environment Agency [2003] Ch 581 POINT OF LAW

While a legitimate expectation can, under the ECRR, amount to an A1P1 right despite being ultra vires, the remedy is not realisation but compensation.

Stretch v. United Kingdom (2004) 38 EHRR 12 POINT OF LAW

Under the ECHR, a legitimate expectation can be created that something ultra vires will happen. The remedy is compensation.

* R. v. Panel on Take-overs & Mergers, ex parte Datafin [1987] 1 QB 815 POINT OF LAW

The supervisory jurisdiction of the courts extends beyond the control of legal powers. Factors that might make a body's decisions judicially reviewable include, broadly, whether they have a public element/ whether they serve an important governmental function. More narrowly, look at the level of power, whether they have indirect legal support, the source of the body's power, and whether it would be effectively controlled by private law.

* R. v. Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909 POINT OF LAW

For a private body to be judicially reviewable, it is not enough that it exercises powers which affect the public and are exercised in the public interest. It must exercise power that is governmental in nature.

* R (Tortoise Media) v Conservative and Unionist Party [2023] EWHC 3088 (Admin) POINT OF LAW

Public law is focused on substance and not form, so that is what should be considered when deciding whether a function is of a public nature.

Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v. Donoghue [2002] QB 48 POINT OF LAW

What can make an otherwise private act public is a feature/s which impose a public character or stamp on the act, eg statutory authority for what is done.

R. (Heather) v. Leonard Chesire Foundation [2002] 2 All ER 936 POINT OF LAW

A private body does not perform a public function merely because the same function would be public if carried out by a public body.

*Aston Cantlow PCC v. Wallbank [2003] UKHL 37 POINT OF LAW

Under s6 HRA, there are 2 kinds of public authorities: core ones, who must always comply with the HRA, and hybrid ones, which must only do so if they are exercising a public function. There is no single test for the latter; each act is taken on its own merits, considering the extent to which in carrying out the relevant function the body is publicly funded, or is exercising statutory powers, or is taking the place of central government or local authorities, or is providing a public service.

* YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27 POINT OF LAW

The provision of services pursuant to commercial contractual arguments is generally unlikely to attract the application of the HRA, although that possibility is not ruled out. It depends on the precise nature of the arrangements between the public body and the provider of the service.

R (Weaver) v London and Quadrant Housing [2009] EWCA Civ 587 POINT OF LAW

Just because an act by a hybrid public authority involves the exercise of rights conferred by private law does not mean that it is a private function.

* R v IRC, ex p National Federation of Self-Employed [1982] AC 617 POINT OF LAW

This case was highly significant for a number of reasons:

First, it clearly establishes that standing involves a two-stage process: first, at the permission stage the court will undertake a preliminary assessment, but will only deny standing in obvious cases, this approach in turn facilitating access to the review procedure; second, assuming the case is granted permission an ultimate determination as to standing will be made at the full hearing.

Second, the case effected a liberalisation of the law of standing, marked a shift away from a private law model of standing, and laid the foundations for emergence of a public interest model. A more flexible, less technical approach should be taken. Standing was intimately tied to the MERITS OF THE CASE.

Third, Lord Diplock's views as to the relevance of the old law of standing (that it is irrelevant) provided the impetus for later courts to completely liberate the modern law of standing from the strictures of the past.

* R v Environment Secretary, ex p Rose Theatre Trust [1990] 1 QB 504 POINT OF LAW

A very illiberal application of the principle of standing was applied, whereby the claimant was not itself directly affected by the Minister's decision, nor could it be said to have represented anyone directly affected by the decision.

R v Inspectorate of Pollution, ex p Greenpeace (No 2) [1994] 4 All ER 32 POINT OF LAW

When deciding whether an applicant had a sufficient interests in the matter, the court hearing the substantive application should take into account the nature and reputation of the applicant, the extent of his interest in the issues, the remedy sought, and the nature of the relief sought.

* R v Foreign Secretary, ex p World Development Movement [1995] 1 WLR 386 POINT OF LAW

This decision unequivocally recognised that standing may be conferred upon a claimant because it is in the public interest that the matters it seeks to raise are adjudicated upon by the court, and usefully sets out a series of factors to guide courts in deciding whether to grant public interest standing (.size of membership, whether it represents the interests of people, reputation etc).

R v Somerset CC, ex p Dixon [1998] Env LR 111 POINT OF LAW

Public law primarily addresses wrongs—misuses of public power—rather than individual rights, even though such misuses may affect private rights. Courts recognise that individuals or organisations without a personal stake may still legitimately challenge public power if they raise an arguable case. However, in most cases the applicant must show a greater interest in the alleged breach than the rest of the public in order to guard against the busybody. At the permission stage, the court only checks for improper motive. If the claim proceeds and succeeds, the applicant's standing may then influence the form or grant of relief.

* R (DSD) v Parole Board [2018] EWHC 694 POINT OF LAW

General functions with no relation to the decision-maker will not give someone standing, even if they have a panoply of genuine interests. The exception is where there is nobody better to bring the claim.