Metaphysics of Mind

category mistake

Treating a concept as belonging to a logical category that it doesn't belong to, e.g. 'this number is heavy' commits a category mistake as numbers are not the sorts of things that can have a weight.

behaviourism, hard

Hempel's version of philosophical behaviourism that claims that statements containing mental concepts can be reduced or translated into statements about behaviour and physical states containing no mental concepts, only physical ones. Also known as 'analytical' behaviourism or 'logical' behaviourism.

ability knowledge

Knowing 'how' to do something, e.g. 'I know how to ride a bike', 'I can imagine seeing the colour red'.

analogy, argument from

The argument that we can use the behaviour of other people to infer that they have minds because they behave as I do, and I have a mind.

aquaintance knowledge

Knowledge of someone or something gained by direct experience (not description). For example, 'I know the manager of the restaurant', or 'I know the colour red'.

causal closure

Another term for the completeness of physics.

China thought experiment

A thought experiment by Block, presented as an objection to functionalism. If the population of China, using radios, duplicated the functioning of your brain, would this create conscious experiences (just as your brain does)? If not, functionalism (about consciousness) is false.

compatibilism

The theory that the causal determination of human conduct is consistent with the freedom required for responsible moral agency.

completeness of physics

The thesis that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause that brings it about in accordance with the laws of physics. Also known as causal closure.

conceivability argument

Arguments for dualism from the conceivability of mind and body being distinct. Descartes argues that 1) it is conceivable that the mind can exist without the body; 2) conceivability entails possibility; so 3) it is possible that the mind can exist without the body. Therefore the mind and body are distinct substances. The zombie argument is a form of conceivability argument for property dualism.

conceivable

Capable of being imagined or grasped mentally without incoherence or contradiction.

consciousness

The subjective phenomenon of awareness of the world and/or of one's mental states.

consciousness, easy problem of

The problem of analysing and explaining the functions of consciousness, e.g. the facts that we can consciously control our behaviour, report on our mental states, and focus our attention. According to Chalmers, it is 'easy' to provide a successful analysis in physical and/or functional terms.

consciousness, hard problem of

The problem of analysing and explaining the phenomenal properties of consciousness, what it is like to undergo conscious experiences. According to Chalmers, it is 'hard' to provide a successful analysis in physical and/or functional terms.

correlation

A relationship between two things whereby one always accompanies the other, e.g. the properties of size and shape are correlated. Correlation should be distinguished from identity.

disposition

How something or someone will or is likely to behave under certain circumstances: what it or they would do, could do, or are liable to do, in particular situations or under particular conditions, including conditions that they are not in at the moment. For example, sugar is soluble (it tends to dissolve when placed in water) while someone who has a friendly disposition tends to smile when they are smiled at.

dualism, interactionist

The theory that mental and physical events can cause one another even though the mind and body are distinct substances (interactionist substance dualism) or mental and physical properties are distinct fundamental properties (interactionist property dualism).

dualism, property

The theory that there is only one kind of substance, physical substance, but two ontologically fundamental kinds of property - mental properties and physical properties.

dualism, substance

The theory that two kinds of substance exist, mental and physical substance.

elimination

Ceasing to use a concept on the grounds that what it refers does not exist, e.g. the idea of 'caloric fluid' was eliminated by a new theory of heat in molecular motion.

eliminative materialism

The theory that at least some of our basic mental concepts, such as consciousness or Intentionality, are fundamentally mistaken and should be abandoned, as they don't refer to anything that exists.

epiphenomenalism

The theory that mental states and events are epiphenomena, by-products, the effects of some physical process, but with no causal influence of their own. Often combined with property dualism.

folk psychology

A body of knowledge or theory regarding the prediction and explanation of people's behaviour constituted by the platitudes about the mind ordinary people are inclined to endorse, e.g. 'if someone is thirsty, they will normally try to find something to drink'.

free will

The capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives.

function

A mapping from each of the possible inputs to some state to its output. The description of a state's function describes what that state does.

functionalism

The theory that mental states are (can be reduced to) functional states, i.e. what it is to be a mental state is just to be a state with certain input and output relations to stimuli, behaviour and other mental states.

functionalism, causal role

The version of functionalism that interprets the function of mental states in terms the role they play in a network of causes and effects. A mental state can be 'realised' by any state that plays that causal role.

Ghost in the Machine

Ryle's name for substance dualism.

idealism

The theory that minds are the only kind of substance. Therefore, all that exists are minds and what depends on them (ideas).

identical, numerically

One and the same thing. Everything is numerically identical to itself, and nothing else.

identical, qualitatively

Two or more things are qualitatively identical if they share their properties in common, for example, two separate copies of the same picture.

indefinitely heterogenous dispositions

Dispositions that can be manifested in many, many different ways. Ryle argued that mental states are indefinitely heterogenous behavioural dispositions, so that while mental concepts can be analysed in terms of behaviour, they cannot be reduced to talk about behaviour. See entry on 'behaviourism, soft'.

indiscernibility of identicals

Leibniz's principle that if two things are identical (i.e. are just one thing), then they share all their properties and so are indiscernible, i.e. you cannot have numerical identity without qualitative identity.

indivisibility argument

Descartes' argument that bodies are divisible into spatial parts, but minds have no such parts. Therefore, the mind is a distinct substance from the body.

intention

A mental state that expresses a person's choice. It specifies the action they choose and often their reason or end in acting.

Intentionality

The property of mental states whereby they are 'directed' towards an 'object', that is they are 'about' something, e.g. the belief that Paris is the capital of France is about Paris and the desire to eat chocolate is about chocolate.

interaction problem, conceptual

The objection to interactionist dualism that mind and body (or mental and physical properties) cannot interact causally, because they are too different in nature, e.g. the mind is outside space while the body is in space.

interaction problem, empirical

The objection to interactionist dualism that the claim that the mind or mental states causes changes to the body or physical states conflicts with scientific theory or evidence, e.g. that the total energy in the universe stays constant.

introspection

Direct, first-personal awareness of one's own mental states.

intuition

Direct non-inferential awareness of truths or abstract objects.

inverted qualia

The thought experiment that supposes that two people experience subjectively different colours when looking at the same object, but otherwise think and behave in identical ways, e.g. they both call the object 'red'. The argument is presented as an objection to a functionalist account of phenomenal consciousness.

knowledge argument

Jackson's argument for property dualism, presenting the thought experiment of Mary, a neuroscientist who has lived her entire life in a black-and-white room, but who knows all the physical information there is to know about what happens when we see a ripe tomato. When she first leaves the room and comes to see something red for the first time, does she learn something new? If so, some properties are not physical properties.

Leibniz's principle of the indiscernibility of identicals

See entry on 'indiscernibility of identicals'.

machine table

A table listing every possible combination of input and output for a machine, describing the operations of its software.

Masked Man fallacy

A fallacious form of argument that uses what one believes about an object to infer whether or not the object is identical with something else, e.g. I believe the Masked Man robbed the bank; I do not believe my father robbed the bank; therefore, the Masked Man is not my father. This is a fallacy, because one's beliefs may be mistaken. More generally, it is said to challenge the use of conceivability to infer what is possible/actual.

materialism

The theory that the only substance is matter (or physical substance). Everything that exists, including the mind, depends on matter (physical substance) to exist.

mental states

Mental phenomena that can endure over time, such as beliefs and desires. The term is sometimes used more broadly to cover mental phenomena or mental properties in general (states, processes and events).

monism

The theory that only one kind of substance exists. Both materialism (physicalism) and idealism are monist theories.

multiple realisability

1) The claim that there are many ways in which one and the same mental state can be expressed in behaviour. This is presented as an objection to the claim that mental states are reducible to behavioural dispositions. 2) The claim that one and the same mental state can have its function performed by different physical states. This is presented as an objection to the claim that mental states are identical to physical states.

ontologically distinct

Two things are ontologically distinct if they are not the same thing, neither is able to be reduced to the other, and the existence of one is not determined by the existence of the other, e.g. substance dualists claim that mind and body are ontologically distinct substances.

ontologically independent

Not depending on anything else for existence. According to traditional metaphysics, only substances can be ontologically independent.

para-mechanical hypothesis

Ryle's name for understanding mental states and processes as akin to physical states and processes, but non-spatial and non-mechanical.

phenomenal concept

A concept by which you recognise something as of a certain kind when experiencing or perceiving it, e.g. a phenomenal concept of red as 'this' colour. Contrasted with theoretical concepts, which describe something in theoretical terms, e.g. a theoretical concept of red as light with a frequency of 600 nanometres.

phenomenal consciousness

A form of consciousness with a subjective experiential quality, as involved in perception, sensation, and emotion. Awareness of 'what it is like' to experience such mental phenomena.

phenomenal properties

Properties of an experience that give it its distinctive experiential quality, and which are apprehended in phenomenal consciousness.

physicalism

A modern form of materialism, which claims that everything that exists is physical, or depends upon something that is physical. More precisely, the theory that everything that is ontologically fundamental is physical, that is comes under the laws and investigations of physics, and every physical event has a sufficient physical cause.

physicalism, reductive

A form of physicalism that claims that mental properties are physical properties. See entry on 'type identity theory'.

possible world

A way of talking about how things could be. Saying that something is possible is saying that it is true in some possible world. Saying that something is impossible is saying that it is false in all possible worlds.

private

Capable of being experienced or known by no one other than the subject themselves.

problem of other minds

The question of how we can know that there are minds other than our own, given that our experience of other minds (if they exist) is through behaviour.

property, Intentional

A property of a mental state that enables it to be 'about' something, to represent what it does. It is an extrinsic or relational property (see entries on 'intrinsic/extrinsic' and 'Intentionality').

propositional knowledge

Knowing 'that' some claim - a proposition - is true or false, e.g. 'I know that Paris is the capital of France'.

qualia

Phenomenal properties understood as intrinsic and non-Intentional properties of mental states.

reducible

A phenomenon or property is reducible to another if the first can be completely explained in terms of, or identified with, the second (which is considered more ontologically fundamental), e.g. type identity theory claims that mental properties are reducible (identical) to physical properties.

reduction

The reducing of one thing to another. An analytic reduction claims that one set of concepts can be translated without loss of meaning into another set of concepts, e.g. Hempel's 'hard' behaviourism claims that mental concepts are reducible to behavioural and physical concepts. An ontological reduction claims that the things in one domain are identical with (or can be completely explained in terms of) some of the things in another domain, e.g. type identity theory claims that mental properties are reducible to physical properties.

sensation

Our experience of objects outside the mind, perceived through the senses.

soul

The immortal, non-material part of a person.

subjective

That which depends upon the personal or individual, especially where it is supposed to be an arbitrary expression of preference.

substance

Something that does not depend on another thing in order to exist, which possesses properties and persists through changes.

super-spartans

People (or creatures) in Putnam's thought experiment who so completely disapprove of showing pain that all pain behaviour has been suppressed, and they no longer have any disposition to demonstrate pain in their behaviour. The thought experiment is presented as an objection to behaviourism.

supervenience

A relation between two types of property. Properties of type A supervene on properties of type B just in case any two things that are exactly alike in their B properties cannot have different A properties, e.g. aesthetic properties supervene on physical properties if two paintings that have identical physical properties cannot have different aesthetic properties.

thought experiment

A philosophical method designed to test a hypothesis or philosophical claim through imagining a hypothetical situation and coming to a judgment.

type identity theory

The theory that mental properties are identical (ontologically reducible) to physical properties. Mind-brain type identity theory claims that mental properties are identical to physical properties of the brain.

unconscious

A mental state is unconscious if the subject is not aware of having that mental state.

zombie argument

The argument for property dualism that if consciousness were identical to some physical properties, it would not be metaphysically possible for something to have that physical property without consciousness. However, 1) philosophical zombies are conceivable, and so 2) philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible. Therefore, 3) consciousness is non-physical and physicalism is false.

zombie, philosophical

An exact physical duplicate of a person, existing in another possible world, but without any phenomenal consciousness. It therefore has identical physical properties to the person (and identical functional properties, if these are fixed by physical properties), but different mental properties.

behaviourism, soft

Ryle's version of philosophical behaviourism that claims that our talk of the mind is talk of how someone does or would behave under certain conditions. However, behavioural dispositions are not reducible to a finite set of statements about how someone would behave, nor to a set of statements containing no mental concepts.

behaviourism, methodological

The theory that claims that because science can only investigate what is publicly accessible, psychology is concerned only with the explanation and prediction of behaviour and not with any 'inner' mental states.

behaviourism, philosophical

The family of theories that claim that our talk about the mind can be analysed in terms of talk about behaviour. The meaning of our mental concepts is given by behaviour and behavioural dispositions. Also known as 'logical' behaviourism.