Week 11 - Surveillance Technologies and Digital Transnational Repression

Gorokhovskaia and Vaughan 2025 - Overview of Canada and Transnational Repression

The core argument is that while the government was initially slow to focus on transnational repression, recent work including new legislation, international leadership, and community engagement show promising progress.

However, the framing of transnational repression as merely foreign interference in elections limits the scope of the government's response, leaving individuals vulnerable to the "everyday threats".

Gorokhovskaia and Vaughan 2025 - Key Observations on Transnational Repression in Canada

1. It is an everyday threat impacting diaspora communities, not just an electoral concern.

2. Canada has become the first government in the world to acknowledge the danger of extraterritorial intimidation to voters and candidates.

3. Direct diaspora engagement and providing practical information are among the most important policy responses.

4. More work is needed, particularly direct financial support for diaspora groups to build resilience and address the social and psychological consequences.

Gorokhovskaia and Vaughan 2025 - Top Sources of Transnational Repression

The governments of China, India, and Iran were identified as the top three sources of transnational repression in Canada by the Hogue inquiry.

Other governments include Egypt, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Rwanda, and Syria.

Gorokhovskaia and Vaughan 2025 - Canada's 2025 Federal Election

Transnational repression unexpectedly became an important issue, with candidates from the Liberal and Conservative parties leaving the race after reports of comments allegedly encouraging intimidation of dissidents from China and India.

The Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force issued a public warning about a foreign-based smear effort targeting a candidate critical of the CCP.

Gorokhovskaia and Vaughan 2025 - Hardeep Singh Nijjar Assassination

The murder of this Sikh activist in June 2023 was allegedly linked to agents of the government of India.

Canada's response included the expulsion of Indian diplomats and public disclosure by the RCMP of criminal activity orchestrated by agents of the Indian government.

Gorokhovskaia and Vaughan 2025 - Chinese Overseas Police Stations

Mounting media attention to the presence of these stations in Canadian cities spurred government action.

Gorokhovskaia and Vaughan 2025 - Immigration Issues

False accusations of criminal activity or terrorism are a common form of transnational repression, sometimes impeding immigration and refugee cases.

Gorokhovskaia and Vaughan 2025 - Countering Foreign Interference Act

Bill C-70 (June 2024) introduced criminal penalties for acts of harassment and intimidation on behalf of a foreign entity.

It also mandated the establishment of a foreign influence registry and directed increased information sharing by security agencies with the public.

Gorokhovskaia and Vaughan 2025 - Public (Hogue) Inquiry

This inquiry into foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections ultimately limited its focus to election interference, but still included people targeting by transnational repression in hearings.

Recommended to include establishing a single point of contact/hotline for reporting, developing a "Duty to Warn" policy, engaging with foreign consulates, and training the RCMP on recognizing and responding to these issues.

Gorokhovskaia and Vaighan 2025 - Canada and the G7

Canada has taken a prominent role in seeking accountability for and spreading global awareness of transnational repression.

Since assuming the presidency, Canada has made transnational repression a priority of the G7. Currently operating through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) Transnational Repression Working Group.

Gorokhovskaia and Vaughan 2025 - Canadian Migration Policy

Canadian authorities continue the best practice of carefully vetting INTERPOL Red Notices and extradition requests to filter out politically motivated ones.

Canada continues to resettle human rights defenders annually through the Government-Assisted Refugee program.

Gorokhovskaia and Vaughan 2025 - Community Outreach

Government departments (Public Safety Canada, RCMP< Justice, CSIS) began holding by-invitation meetings with diaspora groups in early 2025.

These meetings provide information on reporting transnational repression and mitigating digital threats and allow diaspora members to provide information to local law enforcement.

Anstis and LaFleche 2025 - GBDTR as Sabotage of Accountability

The defining feature of the issue is that it is a tool to sabotage accountability, achieved by weaponizing gender to silence dissent, disable the voice of critics, and impair access to information from them.

This differentiates it from illiberal practices that merely seek to assert control over women to maintain a gendered social order.

Anstis and LaFleche 2025 - Disproportionate and Unique Impact

GBDTR deserves greater attention because of its unique and disproportionate impacts on women compared to male targets.

The harms are significantly worse on women, particularly those with intersectional identities, as the attacks exploit pre-existing patriarchal structures and social vulnerability.

Anstis and LaFleche 2025 - Mechanism of Attack

Attacks on women tend to bypass substantive political or social arguments and instead focus on a women's body, appearance, sexuality, social status, or family, with the goal of denigrating, delegitimizing, and discrediting the target.

Anstis and LaFleche 2025 - Chinese-Born Journalists Vicky Xu and Jiayang Fan

Online harassment campaign accused them of being traitors and included sexist, misogynistic, and racist attacks that targeted their physical appearance and credibility.

Anstis and LaFleche 2025 - Syrian Journalist

Fled to the UK but continued to receive numerous online threats, was repeatedly called a misogynistic slurs, and shamed for not wearing a headscarf.

She stated being scared of expressing her opinion was the main cause of trauma. She stopped writing about the Syrian regime to protect herself (self-censorship).

Anstis and LaFleche 2025 - Yemeni Activist

Her device was hacked and her wedding photos, in which she was not wearing a hijab, were leaked.

This was an act of social shaming in her conservative society.

Anstis and LaFleche 2025 - Azerbaijani Journalist

Blackmailed with intimate photos and a warning of defamation. An intimate video of her which had been recorded in secret was released online.

The tactic was highly affective as this area is prone to enforcing severe repercussions, including the possibility of an honour killing.

Anstis and LaFleche 2025 - General Impacts and Evidence

The digital abuse leads to serious consequences including self-censorship, social isolation, and constant fear and anxiety.

For women, a key outcome is having their voice disabled as they either withdraw from social media, suffer employment consequences, or cease advocacy altogether.

Psychological harms are similarly profound.

Anstis and LaFleche 2025 - Threat to Democracy and Human Rights

As women play a central role in advancing human rights and democracy in authoritarian contexts, their silencing presents a direct threat to state accountability and progress.

Anstis and LaFleche 2025 - Eroding Gender Equality

The reduced participation of women in activist and media spaces due to GBDTR has broader societal ramifications regarding gender equality.

Anstis and LaFleche 2025 - Tailored Policy Responses

Identifying GBDTR as a specific authoritarian practice allows for gathering more complex and empirical data, which provides a bases for crafting effective, tailored policy responses that prioritize the most vulnerable targets.

Anstis and LaFleche 2025 - Addressing Institutional Gaps

The failure of host states and social media companies to meet their human rights obligations is currently compounding the vulnerability of targeted women.

Host states often show a lack of understanding, technical capacity, and gender sensitivity, while social media companies have a climate of impunity for state actors operating on their platforms.