philosophy midterm 1

What is an amoralist? What challenge does the amoralist pose to morality?

- Someone who has no concern for moral standards and values. They are indifferent with regards to morality. Their main concern is one of self-interest and what benefits them.

- They would not lie, not because it is morally "wrong," but because being honest in that scenario would benefit them in some way.

- Morality is essential to the basic functioning of society at large. Trust among each other enables cooperation. But the amoralist doesn't care for why they ought to be moral. They suppose other people trusting one another should be sufficient, so they do not need to be moral themselves.

- The big challenge is giving an amoralist a reason "why" they should be moral

- Because the amoralist thinks this way, they can manipulate trust for their own benefit, and exploit the morality of others (scams).

Why can't amoralists experience resentment, or take pride in how courageous they are?

- Williams believes amoralists aren't entitled to feeling resentment.

- Resentment can only exist under the presumption that it is objectively morally wrong to treat people unfairly or exploit others, and that these behaviors being wrong is reason enough to not do them.

- If someone resents another person for treating them unfairly, that acknowledges they believe it is wrong to begin with and we ought to respect moral standards.

- An amoralist would not have any regard for how they are perceived by others, thereby making them not subject to feelings of being "prideful" and "courageous" as that would suggest they care about how they are admired by others

Williams thinks that, if amoralists are all psychopaths, that wouldn't pose much of a challenge to morality. Explain this suggestion.

Williams thinks that, if amoralists are all psychopaths, that wouldn't pose much of a challenge to morality. Explain this suggestion.

- To live as a psychopath is lonely and unattractive

- Psychopaths lack significant relationships and the feeling of real joy

- They have no achievements worthy of admiration

- Williams suggests that no sane person would willingly want to live as a psychopath, and an amoralist interested in self-gain and able to manipulate others must be rational to a certain extent, so amoralists living as psychopaths wouldn't threaten the moral standards of other people since they would live a more isolated life

How is Williams's amoralist gangster different from his amoralist psychopath? Does this difference make the gangster a more attractive alternative to the moral agent? Why or why not?

- The gangster, unlike the psychopath, is capable of having meaningful relationships and concern for others, rather than living a solely selfish life

- Gangsters can still be amoral, seeing as they don't care for the morality of everyone (only specific people), so they still choose to be ruthless and even cruel towards others whom they don't love

- This makes gangsters more attractive than psychopaths since the few valued relationships a gangster has can add meaning to their life, and they can experience genuine love, whereas a psychopath leads a desolate life

Explain the difference between partial altruism, and the kind of impartial concern for others characteristic of morality.

- Partial altruism implies that there is a bias to have altruistic concern only for the people the individual already cares about or is related to

- Impartial concern means some degree of care is given for the interest of anybody, even if you don't have a personal relationship with them

- It is required by morality because impartial concern suggests that abusing the trust of anyone for gain, even if they are a total stranger, is wrong

What is the Euthyphro problem? Relate this problem to Kretzmann's distinction between Theological Subjectivism (TS) and Theological Objectivism (TO).

- Plato's Euthyphro essentially creates the dilemma of, "Do the gods love piety because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it?"

- "Does god command morally right actions because they are morally right (T.O.); or are they morally right because god commands them (T.S.)?"

- Does something exist as such prior to god acknowledging it, or is it created once god states so

- Theological Objectivism: assumes that actions are morally right or morally wrong, independent of whether god commands it; objective moral standards (they do not change); presupposes moral standards

- Theological Subjectivism: moral standards depend on god's will or attitude of approval; moral standards DEPEND on god's opinion (subjective opinion)

What is Theological Subjectivism (TS)? Why does Kretzmann think that (TS) leads to the "destruction of the basis of morality" (5)?

What is Theological Subjectivism (TS)? Why does Kretzmann think that (TS) leads to the "destruction of the basis of morality" (5)?

- Theological Subjectivism is the perspective that god's will or attitude is what makes something morally right or wrong. If god commands it, then it must be morally right because he said so. Moral standards are entirely dependent on whether or not it is approved or rejected by god himself, making it a subjective opinion.

- T.S. denies the existence of moral standards outside of what god commands, but in doing so, makes moral standards objective to us, since they are independent of our beliefs and attitudes. So long as god commands something as right or wrong, it will exist as such, regardless if we believe it to be right or wrong.

- T.S. makes the content of morality to be arbitrary

- Kretzmann argues that to believe T.S. would then be to believe in the idea that literally any action can be deemed morally correct, so long as god commands or approves it

- T.S. would then be morally accepting of a father to sacrifice his son if god commanded int, like in Abraham and Isaac; or for rich people to scam the vulnerable for profit

- Because of the way T.S. allows for the distortion of moral standards, by simply excusing behaviors as "god's will," Kretzmann argues that T.S. leads to the "destruction of the basis of morality

Kretzmann writes (6): "if (TO) is right, the answer to the question 'What does God have to do with morality?' is 'Nothing essential'." Explain this claim.

- Theological Objectivism is the stance that moral standards are objective, in that what is right and wrong exists independently of whether god says so or not

- So this claim is merely stating that God does not influence morality, according to T.O.

- "Nothing essential", as in God is not the essential component in dictating what is moral or immoral
God is the messenger of morality, but is not the determinant behind morality

If god commands that we comply with moral standards, does that give everyone a good reason for complying with them?

- God's commands are backed by the threat of divine punishment, which does give some kind of reason for people to care about morality (assuming they subscribe to the idea of god)

- E.g. going to hell if diverging from what god's will or intention commanded to be morally right or wrong

- However, the threat of punishment is a prudential, or self-interested, reason to behave a certain way

- So while god's commands might come with a reason for some people to behave a certain way, this would constitute Kretzmann's idea of prudent behavior as opposed to truly moral behavior

- In short, yes god's commands gives a certain reason, but should we follow that reason, it basically cancels out the morality of the action

- Not the RIGHT kind of reason, so not a GOOD reason

What is "veneer theory"? What is de Waal's basic objection to this way of thinking about morality and human nature?

- The idea that humanity is inherently "selfish and brutish [in] nature," and any observable moral conduct we see among each other in society is merely a thin "veneer" of civilization that is actually resting on and masking our true nature

- States that we are egoistic animals at our core, but unlike other animals in the animal kingdom, we exhibit "cultural overlay" of cooperative conduct so that we may get along with each other

- De Waal's basic objection lies in his belief that humanity is not inherently egoistic

- He thinks it's in human nature to have "pro-social tendencies" which we display via our social emotions (empathy, sympathy, reciprocity, retribution)

- He sees these pro-social emotions as the source of morality

- Cites primate relative behavior like in chimps

How does sympathy differ from empathy, in de Waal's account? Is sympathy a form of altruistic concern? Why or why not?

- Empathy is a "more cognitively structured emotional tendency," in which one is self-aware that they themselves are not suffering, but when observing someone who is suffering, one can put themselves emotionally in that position, and feel what the one is suffering is feeling— to a certain extent

- One can feel the same emotional suffering as another, despite not being in the same position, simply because they can emotionally connect themselves there

- Sympathy is different, in that someone can feel sorrow or concern for another who is suffering, but they do not necessarily feel the same negative emotions themselves

- One can feel concern for another's suffering, without suffering themselves

- Altruism is the self-less concern for the welfare of others, so doing something purely because it benefits someone else rather than for self-motivated interests

- Sympathy, then, would be considered a form of altruistic concern, since there is no personal suffering that would also be subsided by helping someone else

- An empath would also be feeling negative feelings, so helping one person can also resolve their own discomfort

What is the distinguishing mark of reciprocity or gratitude? What are the limits of reciprocity when it comes to explaining altruistic regard for strangers?

What is the distinguishing mark of reciprocity or gratitude? What are the limits of reciprocity when it comes to explaining altruistic regard for strangers?

- The idea behind reciprocity or gratitude is that we are inclined to advance the interests or benefit others who have done something for us previously

- We will feel positive emotions towards them and will thus exhibit gratitude
This requires us, however, to keep track of individuals who have given us something or performed a service for us

- Cognitively requires us to bond emotionally with them, similar to how someone does with their relatives

- While reciprocity can explain concern for others who are not our relatives, it is limited in altruistically explaining humans' moral tendencies

- Impartial vs. partial altruism (reciprocity would not be genuinely impartial concern)

- E.g. we don't think it would be morally okay to scam an elderly person, even though that person has never done anything for us in the past, and despite us having no expectation for them to reciprocate that kindness to us in the future

- De Waal suggests this is because humans consider the greater good and extend our concern as such.
Humans develop a sense of belonging and "Community concern," which is promoted when we "band together against adversaries"

- Consistent with evolutionary perspective that states social animals depend on flourishing in their communities for their own survival and to thrive

De Waal writes that "our noblest achievement—morality—has evolutionary ties to our basest behavior—warfare" (55). Explain this suggestion.

- De Waal makes this remark, noting its ironic meaning

- Due to evolutionary pressures, humans have developed a tendency of negative group identity formation

- We identify an "Other," and we band together to oppose the Other as a united front (primitive and powerful) so our community can both survive and flourish

- Unity!

- Can be in big forms, or smaller scales like college rivalries

- Humans are parochial (we care more about members of our own communities than about members of out groups)

- Despite this, morality requires at least some impartial concern for the interests of everyone

- However, morality was used a tool to strengthen social bonds and uniting together during times of warfare in order to flourish as a community

- "[Morality became the tool to strengthen social fabric!!!]"

- "The sense of community required by the former [morality] was provided by the latter [warfare behavior]"

"According to Kant, morality demands that we treat other people as ends in themselves, never merely as means to our own ends" (Korsgaard, 101). Explain this idea in your own words.

- In this quote, Korsgaard is paraphrasing Immanuel Kant's idea on how humanity ought to go about treating one another.

- In this context, treating someone as a means to an end is saying that we are just exclusively using somebody how we see fit in order to achieve our own goals, or "our own ends."

- By treating people as ends, we are discounting the idea of being motivated by using them to our benefit

- To say people are an ends themselves is to say that morality requires we do not behave selfishly, and rather treat people correctly just because we should (objective reasoning), and out of non-selfish, or altruistic, concern, not just because they have something that can benefit us and help us get what we want

- People are not tools or obstacles for us to use and manipulate, whether intentionally or not

What does Korsgaard mean by "normative self-government"? How does it differ from the kind of agency that intelligent animals (such as primates) are capable of?

- Rational autonomy!!!

- People have the capacity to reflect on our desires and instincts

- Korsgaard is referencing how intentional our actions are

- Requires a strong sense of control over our actions

- We CHOSE to behave a certain way on purpose

- We CHOSE to govern ourselves a certain way because we thought about it and intentionally decided to do so

- Intelligent animals, like primates, have enough agency to make decisions based on their instincts and desires, and they even have the capacity to learn from experience

- But they do not have the ability to REASON

- People can reflect on what we ought to do or feel or think

- This requires us to assess the reasons for or against something, which animals cannot do

- E.G. we contemplate whether we should get out of bed or not based on what we have to do like going to class. Animals would wake up because their instincts tell them to or to go hunt for food or the like. People can consider the pros and cons of an action before making their decision.

How does reason differ from intelligence, according to Korsgaard?

- Korsgaard thinks that reason is distinct from intelligence

- Korsgaard acknowledges that animals can be intelligent

- Animals can have the capacity to problem solve and learn from experience

- E.g. a chimp can learn to solve a Rubix cube or other puzzles

- Reason includes reflecting on questions about what we ought or ought not to do, feel, or think

- Reason includes assessing rationality

- Reason gives the "ability to be motivated by an ought"

- Reason also enables people, unlike animals, to be "governed by principles and values"

Why does Korsgaard think that rational autonomy gives us "a deeper level of control over our own movements" than intelligent animals have (112)?

- Intelligent animals have control over their movements, but not to the same degree as humans

- E.g. Apes can choose to swing from tree to tree, as it is not an involuntary movement like simply breathing

- People are capable of normative thoughts and actions, whereas animals are not

- People don't just act from desires given to us by instinct or nature; we can step back from desires and make them objects of reflective scrutiny

- We can reflect on decisions before us and contemplate if there are other considerations we must take into account

- E.g. getting out of our warm bed because of responsibilities we must attend to. We reflect on the decision.
Rational autonomy— or the intentional decision making process of reflecting and contemplating something— enables us to genuinely think about our own movements.

- Animals, on the other hand, give in to their natural tendencies and instincts, rather than undergoing the thought process that humans can.

Korsgaard writes: "The morality of your action is not a function of the content of your intentions. It is a function of the exercise of normative self-government" (112). Explain this passage.

- Korsgaard is saying that morality is not defined by intentions

- Instead, morality is a result of the conscious and deliberate choice made to behave a certain way.

- Morality comes about during the process undergone when contemplating what we "ought to do" and still making the RATIONAL and PURPOSEFUL decision to do something, despite other alternatives

- Not because it is a pro-social emotional tendency, which animals might exhibit

If an ape helps another ape achieve its ends, is it acting morally? Why or why not?

- Not according to Korsgaard

- An ape is not capable of normative self-governance

- They don't have the capacity to reflect on their desires and instincts and contemplate what they ought to do or ought not to do

- Because apes do not undergo this intentional process of rational autonomy, Korsgaard would not regard their actions as moral, even when they help another ape achieve it ends

- The ape would just be following their pro-social emotional tendencies and instincts, as opposed to weighing the pros and cons of helping the ape

- Also, people are morally accountable for their actions in a way that animals are not

- Moral praise and blame does not exist for animals, so much as it does for humans (e.g. we don't blame animals for hunting other animals or asserting their alpha dominance, when that's what their instincts tell them to do in the animal kingdom. But, we would morally blame a human for harming another human in this same sense)