CJ Admin Exam 3

organizational deviance

• event, activity, and/or circumstance occurring in and/or produced by a formal org. that deviates from the organization’s formal design goals and normative standards/expectations, either in the fact of its occurrence/its consequences, and produces suboptimal outcomes

• cj system application:

  • life and death problem in the system

  • people’s lives/freedoms are in jeopardy

administrative breakdown

• theory of organizational deviance

  • when managers fail to adequately implement and enforce administrative principles (top-down problem)

    • used a lot to explain breakdowns in secure facilities (like prisons)

    • ex: uvalde shooting

structural secrecy

• theory of organizational deviance (alongside knowledge conflicts)

  • organizations not designed to share information among personnel/units

    • poor decision-making is made b/c of incomplete information

knowledge conflict

• theory of organizational deviance (alongside structural secrecy)

  • management’s understanding of events is incompatible w/ line-level workers’ understanding of the same events

    • not in tune w/ day-to-day work

    • relatively rare and easiest to remedy out of all of them

      • either train the manager to get in tune or fire them and replace them w/ someone who will

normal accidents

• theory of organizational deviance

  • inevitable problems that happen in some organizations

  • the more complex/tightly coupled systems are at greater risk of experiencing a frequent accident

  • likelihood of occurrence 

    • does NOT mean appropriate/acceptable

crisis (mis)management

• theory of organizational deviance

  • preparing for, responding to, addressing the aftermath of organizational deviance

  • proper handling of incidents can mitigate the harm caused by them

  • usually in conjunction w/ one of the other organizational deviance theories

  • not rare in cj system

high-reliability organizations

• some organizations, despite risky structures/other factors that contribute to organizational deviance, avoid significant failures

• they do experience challenges, but they don’t get to the point of failure

• important to study because we can learn from them

  • how they successfully handled challenges, implemented their structures, etc.

    • adopt these practices into other organizations

• 5 characteristics:

  • preoccupation w/ failure

  • reluctance to simplify interpretations

  • sensitivity to operations

  • commitment to anticipate/respond to the unexpected

  • deference to expertise

organizational termination

• the death or disbanding of an organization (definitional challenges remain)

  • may include situations where organizations cease to exist or are subsumed by other organizations

resilience of public organizations

• why some public organizations can survive:

  • many created through statue/executive order

    • ex: law enforcement task forces (deal w/ specific issues)

  • budget discussions usually don’t talk about disbanding an organization, rather just increasing or decreasing budget

  • powerful interests resist agency termination

    • this power could also be the power of the public, not just governing bodies/politicians/special interests, etc.

decline of public organizations

• why some public organizations can cease to exist:

  • US political system makes it common for candidates to emphasize heir support or opposition to government programs/initiatives

  • organizations may be created for symbolic purposes and no longer needed as time passes

    • ex: TSA discussion in class

collaborative advantage

• when collaboration allows an organization to produce outcomes superior to those possible if they had acted alone

  • share expertise, information/intelligence, resources

  • enhances effectiveness, increasing the viability of the organization addressing societal problems

    • synergy

risks of individuals action

• what may happen:

  • repetition → each duplicates the effort of another

    • happens a lot when investigating the same person/group

  • omission → certain tasks are ignored b/c they haven’t been identified as important, they haven’t come into an organization’s remit, or b/c they’re the responsibility of multiple orgs., so they think the other is doing it

    • happens a lot w/ courts/corrections when they don’t communicate w/ each other

      • ex: judge order defendant to drug treatment in prison but that prison eliminated it due to budget constraints → judge didn’t know this b/c they didn’t communicate w/ each other, and the defendant ends up just serving time instead of getting help

  • divergence → organizations pursue individual rather than common system goals

    • budget being spent on many different things

  • counter-production → one organization’s activity can result in a “kind-of canceling out” of the efforts of each organization involved, or may even negate the results, making both orgs. worse of than before

    • this negation could lead to failures in both organizations

    • it’s not that they’re failing at doing what they’re supposed to, it’s just the lack of communication can cause them to have extreme problems

    • seen in courts/law enforcement agencies

      • ex: feds investigating big drug crime organization, state arrests a middle person in there, feds come in and tell them not to arrest them b/c it could blow their investigation

synergy

• combination of expertise, historical knowledge, perspectives, skills, and human, material, and financial resources generated through collaboration

• necessary for collaboration + generated from collaboration

  • all organizations working together towards a common goal

  • need intent in order for this to properly work

    • people have to want to work together, otherwise it won’t work

collaboration impediments

• organizations lose some degree of control and flexibility over operations

  • to prevent powerlessness, dispersing power between collaborators is important so it’s not relied on just one person/org.

• considerable resources are likely expended, often w/ little guarantee of success

• individual participants (not org.) are likely to assert turf claims as they stand to benefit in terms of power, prestige, ego, visibility

• organizations must share in the glories of collaboration’s successes/suffer the disappointments of its failures

• organizations have to accept potential risk if they want to collaborate

multi jurisdictional task forces (MJTF)

• type of law enforcement task force/collaborative example (most common)

  • across jurisdictions/geographical boundaries

    • some combination of local, state, and federal law enforcement organizations

  • 80s → they really first began, grew exponentially quickly

    • originally focused on drugs (first ones); drugs didn't respect boundaries

    • began at the federal level → they pushed for collaboration w/ state/local level

      • top-down

  • now → all different types of MJTF

    • gangs, cybercrime, etc.

police-corrections partnerships

• type of collaborative example

  • categories

    • enhanced supervision

    • fugitive apprehension

    • information sharing

    • specialized enforcement

    • interagency problem solving

  • this would be able to increase probationer supervision more than a probation officer could have done by themselves

• not as common but beginning to grow

• usually law enforcement w/ state corrections

  • identifying/tracking gangs/members

    • came at request of law enforcement to track gangs; corrections track everything involving gangs (for own proposes)

  • also done for re-entry

    • police want to know who’s leaving, where they’re going, if they have to be registered anywhere, part of a group, etc.

      • do they need to monitor them?

mission distortion

• occurs as agencies shed their own traditional responsibilities/assume those more consistent w/ their partnering agency

  • especially true for probation officers → shift away from a more rehabilitative sense to a more police punishment/apprehension sense

    • stalking horse → become a surrogate for the police

horizontal collaborations

• type of law enforcement task force/collaborative example

  • drawn from regional/contiguous jurisdictions

vertical collaborations

• type of law enforcement task force/collaborative example

  • drawn from different levels of government (local, state, federal, etc.)

process goals

• factors related to internal operations of task forces that are presumed to be linked w/ outcomes

  • increased collaboration, improved information sharing, enhanced case quality, etc.

output goals

• measure of task force performance based on achievement of stated goals; typically measured via arrest statistics

pulling levers/focused deterrence partnerships

• collaborative example

  • elements

    • quickly and significantly respond to those more chronic/violent offenders

    • select particular crime problem

    • coordinate interagency enforcement group

    • conduct research to identify key offenders/groups of offenders

    • communicate deterrence message to offenders

    • provide services to offenders/communicate voice of community

    • direct special enforcement operation toward identified individuals/groups and use “any/all legal tools (or levers) to sanction groups

  • need to be maintained over a long period of time to continue having those effects

organizational change

• transformation of an organization over two points in time

  • any level of an organization is subject to change

• two forms: (based on depth of change)

  • evolutionary

  • revolutionary

• changes happen because:

  • reaction (loss of performance, court decision, etc.)

  • anticipatory (planning ahead)

evolutionary change

• type of organizational change

  • incremental, continuous, first order

    • subtle/gradual modifications within an organization

    • minor improvements/adjustments that don’t change an organization’s core

      • attempts to build upon work already accomplished

  • 95% of all change is this one

    • not in response to large tragedy

revolutionary change

• type of organizational change

  • episodic, discontinuous, second-order

    • infrequent, but abrupt

    • dramatically transforms organization and replaces many elements

    • sends more shockwaves here

    • paradigm shift

    • completely different ways of thinking, ways it seeks to achieve goals

motors

• these describe the mechanisms through which changes are produced

  • they work alone or together

  • four of them

planned change motor

• repetitive sequence of goal formulation, implementation, evaluation, modification of goals based on what was learned and intended by the entity

  • well thought-out, rational → not caught off guard

  • this happens over an extended period of time; not quickly

• requires consideration of all three notions:

  • recognizing need for change and overcoming resistance

  • implementing change

  • solidifying new state of norm

• satisficing → combining satisfactory and sufficient

  • this is done rather than optimizing outcomes

• limited/bounded rationality → operate within constraints of the organization and their own cognitive limits

• learning organization → organization capable of adjusting goals and structures as new knowledge becomes available

• not good for the cj system → you can’t really plan in these orgs.

  • many outside factors (elections, high-profile cases, tragedies, etc.)

  • can kind of plan around budgets

conflictive change motor

• organizational structures, goals, and operations are seldom permanent

  • not inherently problematic; can be if we’re constantly flip-flopping in the cj system

    • ex: going from rehabilitative to punitive and back and forth

  • upend the status quo

• change occurs when the opposing ideas gain enough momentum to force change into the status quo

• courts can come into conflicts w/ organizations if they order change

• happens a lot b/c of lawsuits (most common form/change motor) → evolutionary

life cycle change motor

• equates organizations to other forms of life; all organizations pass through different stages (like humans)

  • normal growth and development of an organization

  • may or may not become consequential organizations down the line

• life course → one organization may not fully go through a life and revert in some cases

evolution motor

• compares organizations to one another

• only the strongest organizations will survive; some more beneficial than others

• some may stick around for a long time and some won’t

  • ex: private contracts (especially prison) common under this motor

• change as occurring though a process of variation-selection-retention

• organizations whiten a certain population cary in their structures and activities

impediments to organizational change

• restraining forces resist change

  • if these are really powerful, it’s hard to implement change

• three reasons for resistance:

  • barriers to understanding → comfortable w/ the way things have been so they don’t want to change it

  • barriers to accepting → same as above

  • barriers to action → logistics (ex: limited budgets or staffing)

• a lot of this resistance comes from leadership

weakening restraining forces to change

• enhance the driving forces

  • educate and train organizational members

  • socialize members into new practices

  • modify reward systems

  • involving a wider range of employees in the decision-making process

organizational failure

• organizational failures are not unheard of in the cj system

• systems remain rather unchanged despite failures

  • there isn’t really anything that you can replace the cj system with

    • private law enforcement, militias, vigilantes don’t sound appealing

  • cast blame on the individual (“rotten apple” vs. “rotten tree”)

  • offer a quick remedy by replacing the problem personnel

    • shows the public that something was done and provide the illusion that the problem is fixed

    • sometimes it’s the right thing to do, sometimes it’s not

deviance

• label refers to the fact that the situation (disaster, mistake, incident) does not fit the organization’s goals/expectations of performance

  • deviance away from expected goals

preoccupation with failure

• type of characteristic of an HRO

  • understand failures happen and are likely to happen

  • take steps to identify where in their organization failure may be likely to happen

    • get ahead of the potential problem before failure happens

  • ex: risk management sections of organizations

reluctance to simplify interpretations

• type of characteristic of an HRO

  • don’t try to take the easy way out of potential failures → identifying, reacting, etc

  • they will properly do the job that needs to be done

sensitivity to operations

• type of characteristic of an HRO

  • leadership is in tune w/ day-to-day operations of that organization

  • very connected to the work that’s happening

commitment to anticipate/respond to unexpected

• type of characteristic of an HRO

  • always ready to deal w/ something

  • focus on crisis management

  • ex: usually public information officers do this type of job in the CJ system

deference to expertise

• type of characteristic of an HRO

  • committed to hiring and supporting experts in any given area

  • retain these experts

  • understand what they don’t know

    • not hesitant to go find expertise somewhere if needed

failures in cj system

• police

  • excessive force

  • corruption

  • inappropriate search/seizure/arrest

  • response to mass violence events (most recently)

• courts

  • corruption

  • wrongful convictions (could be prosecutor or systemic failure)

• corrections

  • corruption

  • escapes

  • botched executions

• understaffing, training, and budgets are a big part of the problem in the cj system

  • these can all lead to organizational failures

true

• organizations (especially cj system) cannot prepare for everything that can happen

  • crisis management plans need to be made flexible b/c of this

    • mostly at the hands of the leader → need to be flexible in order to tackle a crisis

cj system constantly changing

• why? (in order from most impactful)

  • budgets

  • lawsuits → these force change upon organizations

  • crime

  • public opinion → politics included

model for change

• unfreeze-move-freeze

  • unfreeze → catalyst forces an organization to change

    • catalyst usually outside the organization

  • move → organization restructuring itself

  • freeze → organization freezes itself and carries on normal operations w/ changes made

bureaucracy, management disorganization, administrative breakdown

• dias/vaughn; cj agencies

  • dysfunction in organizations is a result of poor administration

    • management’s inability to effectively implement principles associated w/ classical school of management

  • breakdown

    • inability to clearly deliver organizational goals

    • lack of appropriate division of labor

    • weakness in control/coordination mechanisms (ex: span of control)

    • limited internal organizational accountability

    • poor intra-organizational communication

  • Weberian organizations → mechanistic/formalistic; specialized tasks, divisions of labor that creates narrow range of duties

  • bureaucratic success related to the implementation of efficient/effective organization systems

  • cj agencies remain traditionalistic instead of modern; remain in an hierarchical organization

  • failure of paramilitaristic cj orgs. b/c they fail to implement human relations and/or contingency management perspectives

  • supervisors routinely underestimate their involvement in the breakdown; believe it’s not an admin. breakdown

    • often reject research showing benefits of human relations/situational leadership; stick to traditions

  • conclusions

    • management as key variable in cj scholarship

    • managers who ignore warning signs fail to anticipate risk/demonstrate inability to recover quickly in response to threat

      • played w/ systemic deviance b/c of this

social theory/street cop

• klinger; case of deadly force

  • normal accidents theory

  • sound tactics can minimize complexity/coupling in encounters, reducing likelihood of using deadly force

  • social theory lacking in area of deadly force

  • officers should develop enough knowledge about a situations they’re entering before choosing a course of action

    • concealment; putting barriers between them/suspects so there’s limited exposure/could reduce likelihood of shooting

  • conclusions

    • normal accidents can explain to public that some shooting are unavoidable

    • NAT can show use of force cannot be entirely eliminated

      • individual error may lead to having to use deadly force

      • NAT can show officers to keep things simple to avoid deadly force use; don’t get too close

intelligence fusion process

• Carter/Carter; state, local, tribal

  • concerns over efficiency of fusion centers, effectiveness, whether there’s adequate protections in place to protect privacy/civil rights

  • fusion process → analyzing information from diverse resources

  • three greatest challenges:

    • to develop cooperative/committed relationship among all stakeholders

    • establish policies/processes that support efficient, effective, lawful intelligence operations

    • fusion centers to stay on message as an analytic center

specialized DV courts in SC

• gover et al.

  • effective at enhancing enforcement/improving victim safety

    • significant reductions in rearrests for defendants processed here than in traditional courts

    • could be due to procedural justice principles

  • significant changes to justice system in regard to DV; probably due to societal changes on it

  • discussion

    • collaborations between judge, prosecutor, victim advocate, MH counselor, defendant

    • courts focus on individual needs/desires of victim and defendant

    • perceptions of those involved more important; leads to a more positive outcome

      • defendant thinking they were treated fairly will most likely let them accept punishment/potentially reform

      • victim may think they can go to court if needed

    • high level of commitment to fair/just process by victims/defendant

      • more active approach over passive approach

relations between research/practice

• berman/fox; battle over D.A.R.E.

  • 30+ evaluations of program that documented negligible long-term impacts of teen drug use

    • one long-term study showed small increase in drug use among suburban teens

  • still alive/well → about 75% of school districts across the country teach it

  • shows how programs can still live on despite its failures

  • conclusions

    • some local jurisdictions believed it was still a vital program for their community, still keep it

    • some areas chose to scrap it to replace it w/ another program

    • researched and practitioners may look at things in a different light, but they king of need each other to build some solutions

better decision making

• mears/bacon; medical system lessons

  • calls to check decisions on sanctioning usually go unnoticed

    • performance monitoring occurring rarely involves system-level perspective

  • massive growth on the amount of people getting justice-involved

    • b/c of this, cj system personnel massively grew

  • decision-making increased dramatically +determines effectiveness of system as a whole

  • no systematic attempt to document quality of decisions being made

    • ex: the way people think officers treat people is much more important than the decisions to stop/arrest someone

      • few jurisdictions actually try to study this

  • performance monitoring tends to ignore decision making

    • can also be a problem if it’s wasted monitoring useless/irrelevant things

  • conclusions

    • need to focus on on wealth of decision making made by cj actors

      • what occurs in one part of the cj system can affect another one

      • no systematic foundation exists to monitor polio officer decisions in certain areas (i.e. conducting traffic stops)

  • five important things

    • researchers have to first document which error are most frequent/have most impact

    • improved decision making should be targeted toward system as a whole rather than isolated parts of it

    • focus on ways decision making can be proved at many specific points though cj system

    • establish who’s accountable for specific activities/outcomes + evaluate how well those who are accountable performed

    • identify areas where improvements can be made

    • agencies have to operate independently to the systems they need to monitor

      • ex: US Governmental Accountability Office

    • much of what happens in the cj system is in a “black box”

consent decrees

• intended to remedy conditions that give rise to certain disputes; kind of like a contract and a court order

  • agreement/settlement resolves dispute w/out admission of guilt

  • mostly seen in juvenile justice and prisons/jails

  • conflictive b/c two sides are against each other

• these can be good

  • put spotlight on some problems (routine/normal accidents)

    • producing some kind of norm/enforce change

    • period of time where organization is monitored to see if the changes are implemented

      • hit or miss if these actually stick; after period of observation, organization can choose whether or not they continue implementing the changes they were forced to make

evolutionary change examples

• common in law enforcement and prosecutors office (ex: adding new units)

  • 80s → drugs

  • 90s → gangs

  • 00s → terrorism

  • 10s → cybercrime; really picking up these years

revolutionary change examples

• tragedies (mass), high-profile events

• community-oriented policing

  • adopted very quickly in 90s when first introduced

  • fundamentally changed aspect o policing

    • much more present in communities

• development of specialty courts (ex: drug, DV, etc.)

  • same judge, but they have to be completely different when they are in these specialty courts compared to other courts

    • ex: they’re in regular court 4 days a week, but 1 day they dedicate to just one specialty court (ex: drug) and they have to handle it differently than the other days

driving forces

• forces that promote change in an organization

restraining forces

• forces that resist change in an organization

research-practitioner partnerships

• type of collaboration example

  • universities/other orgs.

    • funded by the federal government; money to both organizations to address common issues

    • these organizations submit a request about why they would want the money, then if they get that money, they buy the equipment needed and get the stuff they need in order to research whatever they need to research

true

• one of best ways to determine success is through collaboration

  • sharing information, backup/support, etc.

  • relatively unique to the cj system → much more common to see this here; significant issues are being tackled

    • ex: two tech companies wouldn’t collab since they’re rivals w/ one another