All Secondary Historiography

Wienhofer, ‘tLSNE’

‘The Late Sasanian Near East’, 2010

W: p.98: S,UAaA’A’TuMAG,PA,aPA,iDaFS

Sasanians, unlike Arsacids and Achaemenid ‘ancestors’, tell us much about government, public appearances, and political aspirations in domestic and foreign spheres.

W p.99: iiNCtSht’AoHD’(T)PotKZaNR

‘It is no coincidence that Shapur had the ‘account of his deeds’ (Tatenbericht) placed on the Kaqba-i Zardusht at Naqsh-i Rustam.’

Wp.103 about The Book of Lords: ‘aSo’INH’’

‘A sort of ‘Iranian national history’

W p.104: P-AH…OiKoSItSLMPT

Persian–Arabic historiography… owes its knowledge of Sasanian Iran to such late Middle Persian traditions

W p.105: CSoSIaKII - BREoSS

Colossal statues of Shapur I and Khusrau II - both rare examples of Sasanian sculpture

W p.143: IwMtStIttRaHISStSD…SR…I…SRaP…IMPaM

Institutions were meant to strengthen the idea that the ruler and his Iranian subjects shared the same destiny…symbolic references…iconography…special rites and practises…important memorial places and monuments

Donner, MAtEIH

Modern Approaches to Early Islamic History

D: PaSaTAoaSPoMtUIoE

‘Periodisation and spatialisation are two aspects of a single problem of managing the unmanageable interconnectedness of everything’

As Braudel says, through D: WBcbMwDNWPoA,RaC,bM,WNBoFcS

What boundaries can be marked when dealing not with plants or animals relief and climate, but men, whom no barriers or frontiers can stop?

D p.24: [Periodisation and strict lines] AoSBBDPdVttNRoHL

assumption of strict borders between different periods does violence to the normal realities of human life’

Zaman, ‘tC,tU,atL’

The Caliphs, the Ulama, and the Law

Z: argued that… btTACtP, tU,wtCoISbtPwtCtbtSI,wotWtTtCRA

by the time Abbasids come to power, the ulama, with the concept of immutable sunna by the prophet which they claimed to be the sole interpreters, were on their way to terminating the caliph’s religious authority

Z; Abu Yusuf…NosO, AYEWtC, cLNOttRotCbAtHOP

‘Neglect of such obligations, Ab Yusuf emphatically warns the caliph, can lead not only to the ruin of the community but also to his own perdition.’

Z: btMwNaIE. iwPbO,I,C,ttNSRE, satCPttFUC,M,wNtbFM

‘But the Mihna was not an isolated event. It was preceded by other, implicit, challenges to the nascent Sunni religious elite, such as the caliph's proclamations that the first Umayyad caliph, Mu'dwiya, was not to be favourably mentioned.’

Hughes, ‘ESatFoS’

Early Sectarianism and the Formation of Shi’ism

H p.119: [distinctions between Sunni and Shii] DNB’DTSoD’ut 8thC Eit’SCaPI’

do not become ‘distinct theological sets of doctrines’ until the 8^th century even if they ‘slowly coalesce as political ideologies’

Warburg, ‘FStF’

From Sufism to Fundamentalism

W p.661: MShNBRbSI

Moderate Sufism has never been rejected by Sunni Islam

Warburg p.661 ‘Wa’A-M’wNSiS,UM’

Wahhabism also ‘anti-mystical’ with no source in Sufism, unlike Mahdiyya

W p.661: [FMiIwRN, aDFECE]

[Fundamentalist movements in Islam were relatively new, and derived from earlier Christian equivalents]

Magdalin, ‘tME’

The Medieval Empire

M p.171: tMRo Ha-RaC wtSfB. iSttCotREiCwNLtSFotOGPotP-RW,bwFBtSaWotT

‘The mutual recognition of Harun al-Rashid and Charlemagne was thus significant for Byzantium. It signified that the continuation of the Roman empire in Constantinople was no longer the sole focus of the other great powers of the post-Roman world, but was fast becoming the smallest and weakest of the three.’

M p.171: NAtbHaCwtBIiLaL,WNCBRLARfG,AftPRttEIRftRoI

no accident that both Harun and Charlemagne were to become immortalized in literature and legend, whereas no contemporary Byzantine ruler left any reputation for greatness, apart from the partisan recognition that the empress Irene received for the restoration of icons.’

M p.173 - [Bulgarian conversion to Christianity] aToBD

a ‘triumph of Byzantine diplomacy’

M p.173: BitTCwRtBotUSWihBUitSfSitSaEC,aWMiaMoCaSCwtGwhOii800

‘Byzantium in the tenth century was realizing the benefits of the unglamorous strengths which it had built up in the struggle for survival in the seventh and eighth centuries, and which made it a model of cohesion and stability compared with the giants which had overshadowed it in 800.’

Digression: why does Byzantium survive? TC,NDltA/C,NHTbAW,hMRU,iICaHCwtS,ULCoI

Territorially compact, not dynastic like the Abbasids / Carolingians, not held together by aggressive warfare, had mostly religious unity, its imperial capital and holy city were the same, unlike Latin Christendom or Islam.

Shepard, ‘CV’

Constantine VII

S p.25: itASoLDwDIttEoIIAtEA,iwAtMDttEASbCaL…iBtEIaaHoOaS,’aPBAtE’

if the active support of local dynasts was deemed indispensable to the expansion of imperial influence amongst the eastern approaches, it was all the more desirable that the emperor's actions should be construed as legal…. it burnished the empire's image as a haven of order and stability, 'a protective bastion against the enemies

M pp.25-26: INiKASHOVSot’C’ttE. St…tMbDP,WMOoR,tEhERtPatCoDoGaT

individual notables in key areas sometimes handed over voluntarily strongholds or their 'country' to the empire. Seeing that … this might be done peaceably, without much outlay of resources, the emperor had every reason to pose as the champion of deeds of gift and testaments

Holmes, TBBatIW

Treaties Between Byzantium and the Islamic World

H p.156: sTSAoBDotEFMNOAttEoIAiTbatiAitLFMEAtSSotF

suggests that Shepard’s analysis of Byzantine diplomacy on the eastern frontier may not only apply to the extension of imperial authority into Transcaucasia but also to its articulation in the larger former Muslim emirates along the southern section of the frontier.’

Holmes p.157: aLatTaSitWCoIFoR

‘As long as the treaties are seen in this wider context of immense fluidity of relationships

Cora, GNoOPF

Gendered Narratives of Ottoman Prose Fiction

C p.160: [available Ottoman history sources] PPoOGGtAaC,LEMPaLWootP

 prioritize poetry over other genres given their aims and context, listing elite male poets and leaving women out of the picture

Cora p.163: WoWSCDaGSoWwS(aaSF)DCbS.H,tRoMiSU

‘The wiles of women stories create devious and guileful stereotypes of women whose sexual (and also sometimes financial) desires cannot be satisfied. However, their representation of men is similarly unflattering.’

C p.163: iOW,A,SS,aW,DtVaMoW….tiOS,aWPtboHS(atM)SbPoaHJstScCtPStS

iaCWBWtCoMC

‘In other words, age, social status, and wealth determine the visibility and mobility of women….thus, in one story, a woman pretends to be of higher social (and thus moral) status by putting on all her jewels so that she can convince the police superintendent that she is a chaste woman behaving within the codes of moral conduct.’

Cora p.164: icbSAttSwWbafM

it can be safely assumed that these stories were written by and for men

Gerber, ‘SaEPoWiaOC’

Social and Economic Position of Women in an Ottoman City

G p.232: fO2,000EoMR,iiEtinMtTCdaMhToMW

From over 2,000 estates of males read,5 it is estimated that in no more than twenty cases did a man have two or more wives [IN BURSA].

Gerber p.238: [Regarding Silk workers] tWWtCotBotP’tOSbKaii’

The women won their case on the basis of the proverb “the old should be kept as it is”

Rapoport, DatEHiLMC

Divorce and the Elite Household in Late Medieval Cairo

Rapoport p.201: HwbUoPPaUoI

These households were both units of political power and units of intimacy

Dresser, ‘IO’, 2005

Inventing Orthodoxy

D p.151 [Ottomans and Safavids] tRW,S-I,aTWAI

their respective worldviews, self-images, and terminologies were almost identical

Dresser p.152: t’RD’bOaSwaPotO-SRrtiC

the “religious dichotomy” between Ottomans and Safavids was a product of the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry rather than its cause

Dresser p.153: tEoaSEiINoAPtwaSPaTA. tKwNLCBOaS

The establishment of a Safavid Empire in immediate neighborhood of Anatolia provided them with a serious political and territorial alternative. The Kızılbas were now literally caught between Ottomans and Safavids

Dresser p.156: itAotUOHUStRDotK.tAoHSbtEtKRoORatLtP.tSRAitATAoRtECftU

in their accounts of the uprisings Ottoman historiographers usually stressed the religious deviance of the Kızılbas. The accusation of heresy served both to explain the Kızılbas rejection of Ottoman rule and to legitimize their persecution. The second remarkable aspect is the almost total absence of references to economic causes for the uprisings.

Dresser p.159: tCiPaaOoREMiiR,R,aPaWaPCwaRE

The conflict is portrayed as an outgrowth of religious extremism manifesting itself in revolt, rioting, and plunder as well as political conspiracy with a rival empire.

Dresser p.160: tIoSaSDBotGoRLwaPtRIUtLRoSI

The institutionalization of Sunnism as state doctrine based on the grounds of religious law (shari'a) was a process that remained incomplete until the late reign of Süleyman I

Dresser p.163: [taken Mecca and Medina] BtPtAtHotC

began to perceive themselves as the heirs of the caliphate

D p.171: AiEI, OSaSSCaRAtwBoMSaPCrtoR-LG

Articulated in eschatological imagery, Ottoman Sultans and Safavid Shahs claimed a religious authority that was based on mystical speculation and personal charisma rather than on rational-legalistic government

Khafipour, ‘BCA’, 2021

Beyond Charismatic Authority

K p.113: HD…BCttNoSE’sCwITttWSYotM

Highly decentralised…becomes clear that the nature fo Shah Esma’ils charisma was intimately tied to the wider salvational yearnings of the masses

Khafipour pp.115-116 - [Mehmed’s II Tower of Justice] TttEPVoJ

testify to the enduring political value of justice

Anzali, ‘SitSP’ (2021)

‘Sufism in the Safavid Period’

Anzali pp.350-351: SwAtMIMoPAIWtSCtP

Sufism was arguably the most influential mode of piety across Iran when the Safavids came to power

Anzali p.354: atSTtAttMDPoEaNSOwSIaaEaEB,tQMoPGTiaL

as the Safavids turned their attention to the more daunting project of establishing a new sociopolitical order with supporting institutions and an efficient and effective bureaucracy, the Qezelbāsh mode of piety gradually turned into a liability

Anzali p.354: EftoaCaMSMitoaS,D,S/SK

The figurehead of the Safavid dynasty evolved from that of a charismatic and messianic Sufi master into that of a sober, devoutly Shi‘i/Sufi-king

Anzali p.361: AoSPaBwNOPBttS;twAitIotNECCfWIFoHaDwtEMtDO

Attacks on such practices and beliefs were not only politically beneficial to the state; they were also in the interest of the newly emerging clerical class for whom identifying forms of heresy and deviation was the easiest means to define orthodoxy.

Anzali p.362 [Polemics against Sufis] WiPrtiA,tPLoRS

written in Persian rather than in Arabic, the primary language of religious scholarship

Anzali p.364: AoSCEbPaAotRotSDaoRFoG

In the face of this legacy, attacks on Sufism could easily be portrayed as attacks on the roots of the Safavid dynasty and on respected friends of God.

Anzali p.365: GiIaOIaDISwtPCo,atMPTt,tNECCaiRA

Given its intellectual and organizational independence and distinctiveness, institutional Sufism was the primary competitor of, and the most potent threat to, the newly established clerical class and its religious authority

Tucker, ‘SRwMN’ 2021

Safavid Relations with Muslim Neighbours

Tucker: Ottomans, Mughals and Safavids: ABaDSwCAOtWUIN,aTiaLHoPGaAPiAtT-MNoMaSO

all began as dynastic states with Central Asian origins that while upholding Islamic norms, also tapped into a long heritage of Persianate governance and administrative practice in addition to Turco-Mongol norms of military and social organization