MOCK Case Law 08/27/26

Benetti v. Duffy

Negligence refers to a failure to behave with the level of care that someone of ordinary prudence would have exercised under the same circumstances that directly and proximately causes harm to another. Negligence usually consists of actions but can also involve the failure to act when there is some duty to act.

Lynch v. Miller

The elements of negligence are: (i) the existence of a legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff(s); (ii) the defendant’s breach of that duty; (iii) harm suffered by the plaintiff(s); and (iv) proof that the defendant’s breach was the direct and proximate cause of the harm that the plaintiff suffered.

Savage v. Jones

In a negligence case, a duty of care can arise in several circumstances. There is no exhaustive list, but the most common situations in which a defendant has a duty to act include: (i) the defendant created the risk which resulted in the plaintiff’s harm; (ii) the defendant volunteered to protect the plaintiff from harm; (iii) the defendant knew or should have known that their conduct would cause harm to the plaintiff; and (iv) the business or voluntary relationship between the plaintiff and defendant creates a duty.

Silberman v. Satterfield

The Midlands Electric Reliability Code provides the duty a public utility owes to the public, but it does not relieve a plaintiff of proving that the utility breached that duty and thereby caused the harm. Because Section 1.4 requires service and facilities that are “adequate” and “reasonable,” it codifies a standard of reasonable care measured against the danger present. It does not impose liability without fault. Whether a utility met that standard… is ordinarily a question for the jury.

Terry v. Ko

Proving that the defendant owed a duty, or an admission from defendant that it owed a duty, is not enough to prevail in a negligence case. The plaintiff must also prove that the defendant breached their duty to the plaintiff. A defendant breaches a duty by failing to act reasonably in fulfilling or attempting to fulfill the duty.

Leander v. Minzer

A defendant “fails to act reasonably”… if they have departed from the conduct expected of a reasonably prudent person acting under similar circumstances. The reasonableness test is an objective test—the specific abilities or traits of the defendant are irrelevant. Thus, even a person with low intelligence or who is chronically careless is held to the same standard as a more careful person or a person of higher intelligence.

Faris v. Steinhauer

The test for whether a given precaution is required… involves comparing the burden of taking the precaution (B) against the probability that harm will occur absent the precaution (P) and the nature and extent of foreseeable damage or injury… (L). A defendant who fails to take a given precaution has violated its duty of care in any situation where B < P x L.

Kim v. French

In deciding whether a defendant acted reasonably, the jury may take into consideration whether… the defendant followed standards prevailing in the industry or complied with customs prevailing in the community. Although such industry standards and community customs are relevant, they are not necessarily dispositive.

Iacomini v. Chapman

In assessing the relevance of a defendant’s compliance with industry standards or community customs… the jury should consider whether it was clear or should have been clear to the defendant that the defendant’s conduct or the particular situation was not contemplated by those standards or customs. Compliance is not necessarily dispositive, and a defendant is not absolved from liability where the standards or customs did not contemplate the conduct or situation at issue.

Pandya v. Schumock

A defendant’s failure to follow its own internal policies and procedures may be used to support a claim for negligence. However, such evidence, although relevant, is not necessarily dispositive. Similarly, evidence that a defendant acted in accordance with its internal policies and procedures… may be relevant, but not necessarily dispositive, evidence that a defendant acted reasonably.

Adediji v. Adeite

In determining whether an actor is to be excused for an error of judgment that occurs during a sudden emergency, the trier of fact must consider whether the emergency was of the sort that was predictable and thus could or should have been addressed by appropriate procedures or training. [Many activities involve certain predictable risks likely to arise during those activities.]

Hopson v. Dawson

Under rare circumstances, it is reasonable to take actions that involve a high degree of risk of serious harm to others. [Otherwise dangerous conduct may be reasonable in an emergency, or dangerous action may be better than no action at all.] The fact that an actor’s conduct was not negligent after an emergency has arisen, however, does not preclude liability if the actor’s own tortious conduct itself produced the emergency.

Bomberger v. Kelly

Individuals having superior skill or knowledge are required to conduct themselves consistent with such superior capacity. In the practice of a trade or profession, the standard of care is the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that trade or profession in good standing in similar communities.

Allen v. Neptune Underwater Expedition

In trades and professions containing both professionals and amateurs, professionals shall be held to a higher standard than amateurs. [The standard of care… is the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that trade or profession in good standing in similar communities.]

Yanka v. Edwards Industries

Causation has two components: cause in fact (or direct cause) and proximate cause. To show cause in fact, the plaintiff must establish either that the plaintiff would not have been harmed “but-for” the defendant’s conduct or that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. Proximate cause requires showing that the particular harm suffered… was both a foreseeable result of the defendant’s wrongful or unlawful conduct and of a type that could reasonably have been anticipated. [The fact finder must identify the particular risks that made the defendant’s actions culpable and determine whether the injury suffered is among those risks.]

Haug v. Kolb

The notion that a risk must be “foreseeable”… does not require that the defendant be able to anticipate the target of the harm or the precise way the harm will occur. Instead, it requires only that the defendant should have foreseen the general type of risk that caused the harm.

Jeff v. Wario’s Toolkit

Absent some special rule to the contrary, a plaintiff in a civil case must establish all the elements of their claim by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e., establish that all elements are more likely than not true).

Guerra v. Guerrini-Maraldi

The fact finder may rely on both direct and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is testimony by a witness about what that witness personally did, saw, or heard. Circumstantial evidence is indirect evidence from which the fact finder may infer that another fact is true. Neither type of evidence should be given categorically more weight than the other.

Clement v. Mason

Although a defendant is not required to present evidence or offer an alternative theory of the case, if a defendant does so, the plaintiff may cross examine defense witnesses on the lack of corroborative evidence or otherwise note the defense’s failure to offer evidence in support of its theory of the case. Such questions and comments do not imply that the burden of proof has shifted to the defense.

Estate of Rory Behm v. Zamborini, Inc.

A citation requires a law enforcement officer’s finding of probable cause. Negligence requires a different burden: preponderance of the evidence. A citation may be relevant as to alleged negligence in certain instances, but a citation does not necessarily equate to negligence.

Bennett v. O’Herin

A defendant pursuing an affirmative defense must establish all of the elements of its affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

Purdue v. Waldie

The intervening and superseding causation doctrine relieves a defendant from liability when an independent and unforeseen event occurs between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the plaintiff’s harm. The doctrine applies only when the intervening act was: (1) sufficient by itself to produce the plaintiff’s harm; (2) not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant; and (3) not itself a direct result of the defendant’s wrongful conduct. When those requirements are satisfied, the chain of proximate cause is broken, and the defendant is relieved of liability. Because intervening and superseding cause is an affirmative defense, the burden of proof is on the defendant who raises it.

Carter v. Meyer

The “unavoidable accident” doctrine is an affirmative defense available to defendants facing a negligence claim. To succeed, the defendant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the harm suffered by the plaintiff would have occurred even if there was zero negligence by the defendant.

Zomerfeld v. Noto

Pursuant to MRE 104(a), when evaluating the admissibility of evidence, a trial court is permitted to rely on both admissible and inadmissible evidence. The use of underlying inadmissible evidence does not make that inadmissible evidence admissible. Instead, the Court may consider it to assess the admissibility of the offered evidence. [In a jury trial, the jury may not always be privy to the underlying facts, but the court may hear them.]

Jung v. Lopez

Pursuant to MRE 104(a), courts may consider custodial documents… when determining the admissibility of other evidence without regard for the admissibility of the custodial document itself. [The custodial document typically addresses preliminary matters and is not entered into evidence.] However, if a party wishes to enter the custodial document itself into evidence, the proper foundation must be laid to establish its admissibility.

Thomas v. Davis

The purpose of the pleadings is to frame the issues for trial and permit the parties to frame their presentations accordingly. [Because Midlands does not permit rebuttal witnesses or a defendant to alter which witnesses it calls after hearing plaintiff’s evidence…] it is highly inappropriate for a party that has alleged or denied something in its complaint or answer to prevent its adversary from presenting otherwise admissible evidence relating to that thing by asserting that it is no longer interested in alleging or contesting it. The time for amending one’s pleadings is well before the court convenes for purposes of trial.

Karan v. Baboons, Inc.

Even where liability and damages phases have been bifurcated, a plaintiff still must establish “harm” to establish the defendant’s liability on a negligence theory. [Because a threshold liability-only phase establishes only the existence, rather than extent, of potential liability,] trial judges should be especially vigilant in applying MRE 401 and 403 to evidence that does not relate or only marginally relates to questions at issue.

Herrera v. Olmsted

A factual allegation in a complaint that is admitted by the defendant in its answer should not be excluded at trial as irrelevant or moot if that information would be useful to the jury in evaluating other aspects of the case that remain in dispute.

Kissner v. Polk Hospital

Stipulations are pretrial agreements between the parties that certain matters cannot be disputed at trial. Stipulations may be procedural or substantive. [If parties stipulate that a light was green, neither party may offer testimony that it was red.] However, parties are only bound to the text of the stipulation. [Pre-admission of an exhibit does not stipulate that its content is correct unless the parties also stipulate that the information is true and accurate.]

Greller v. Harish

Although the Midlands Rules of Evidence (“MRE”) mirror the Federal Rules of Evidence, there are differences. As always, the MRE governs.

Shakur v. Wallace

It is up to the fact finder to determine the credibility of each witness’s testimony. A fact finder… may choose to credit all, some, or none of a witness’s testimony and may credit one part without crediting others. [The fact finder may consider the witness’s interest in the outcome.] It is not appropriate for a testifying witness to determine the credibility or otherwise opine on the credibility of another witness.

Graham v. Duckworth

Shakur v. Wallace should be narrowly construed: it specifically bars asking a testifying witness whether another witness is telling the truth or lying. It does not prevent related inquiries, such as whether another witness’s testimony is inconsistent with the testifying witness’s testimony or whether the witness is aware or unaware of any reason why another witness is telling the truth and/or lying. Nothing bars asking a testifying witness whether they themselves lied or are lying.

Filteau v. Wanek

As long as the proponent of the statement produces evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a given person made a particular statement, the court must assume for purposes of assessing its admissibility that the statement was made by that person.

Ginger v. Heisman

Emails or text messages are properly authenticated when the proponent has produced evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that would allow a reasonable jury to determine the author of the message. The fact that an electronic communication is listed as coming from an address or number known or purporting to belong to a particular person is sufficient foundation… at least absent particularized reasons to believe that the communication may have been sent by someone else.

Simpson v. Rose

A verbal act is a statement offered to establish something of independent legal significance or effect, rather than the truth of the matter asserted. Statements which by their existence impose legal responsibilities and grant legal rights… are verbal acts and are admissible as non-hearsay. [Example: a contract executed by both parties to establish its terms.]

Farrant v. Westaway

Identification is a permissible non-hearsay purpose for a statement. Where a statement is not being used for the truth of the matter asserted but instead to identify a particular object, the statement is being used for identification. [Example: a license plate identifying a particular car.]

McDonald v. Parks

MRE 801(d)(2) governs statements “offered against an opposing party.” This rule does not require the proponent to offer the statement “against the party’s interests” to qualify as an exemption to hearsay. [“Against the party’s interest” language is found in MRE 804(b)(3), not MRE 801(d)(2).]

Dolly v. Ringo

Unlike most other evidentiary rules, MRE 801(d)(2) may be invoked in only one direction. The plaintiff may offer statements by the defendant, and the defendant may offer statements by the plaintiff. But MRE 801(d)(2) does not permit a party to offer that party’s own statements, even if the opposing party has already elicited out-of-court statements by the party during a preceding examination, subject to MRE 106.

America’s Best Cookie v. International House of Waffles

In Midlands, the definition of “hearsay” includes out-of-court statements by a witness who is on the stand or by another person who has or will be testifying in a particular trial.

Kaplan v. Sikora

Pursuant to MRE 801(d)(2)(D), a statement that would otherwise be hearsay is admissible against a party if: (1) the declarant is the party’s agent or employee; (2) the statement concerns a matter within the scope of the agency or employment relationship; and (3) the statement was made while the agency or employment relationship existed.

Chambers v. By the Book Publishing, Ltd.

The hearsay rule is only implicated where an out-of-court statement is being used for the truth of the matter asserted. If it only matters whether the out-of-court statement was made, rather than whether it was true, the hearsay rule is not implicated.

State v. B.F. De la Porta

Defendant offered statements of the investigating agent to show bias in the investigation. To be inadmissible as hearsay, an out-of-court statement must be (a) an assertion of fact (b) offered to establish the truth of that asserted fact. No part of the rule against hearsay concerns itself with the “truth value” of an out-of-court statement beyond the fact asserted in the statement. Because the Defense disputed the Agent’s assertions, it could not reasonably be argued that any part of the statement was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. As such, the statement is definitionally not hearsay.

Coburn Camera Crew v. Ellicott City

The MRE regarding character evidence applies equally to companies, corporations, partnerships, and other legal entities. Businesses sued for negligence or recklessness generally may not defend themselves by showing they acted safely in other separate situations; similarly, plaintiffs generally may not introduce prior bad practices to prove bad practice in the case at hand. Nothing prevents parties from offering traits or instances of character for other purposes, such as those listed in MRE 404(b).

Krent v. Lions, Inc.

“Reverse character evidence” is not automatically inadmissible. [Such evidence involves showing a third party’s bad character to establish that another party is to blame.] Because the person whose character is introduced is not a party and is not subject to penalties from the trial, much of the justification behind MRE 404(a) does not apply. Trial courts must resolve admissibility by balancing its relevance against its prejudicial effect.

Donnelly v. Caulder

MRE 609 does not categorically exclude evidence of a witness’s prior criminal conviction punishable by less than one year of imprisonment, especially when the offense was a crime of dishonesty. Such evidence may still be admissible, subject to the MRE, on a case-by-case basis.

Vir v. Londo Manufacturing Co.

A corporation is generally charged with knowledge of any facts learned by its agents within the scope of their employment. This is especially true where, in light of the agent’s role and duties, the agent ought and would reasonably be expected to act upon those facts or communicate them to others. This rule applies regardless of whether the agent did, in fact, communicate the information to others.

McMahon v. Mohan

Pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior, a corporation is legally responsible and liable for all acts of its employees and agents that occur within the scope of their employment.

Davis v. Adams

Trial judges must ensure that any scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant but reliable. In determining reliability, judges should consider only the methods employed and the data relied upon, not the conclusions themselves. The proponent has the burden of proving each section of MRE 702 by a preponderance of the evidence.

Tarot Readers Association of Midlands v. Merrell Dow

In assessing reliability under MRE 702(c), judges should consider whether the theory or technique has been or can be tested, subjected to peer review and publication, has a known error rate, or has gained widespread acceptance within the field. These factors are relevant but not necessarily dispositive. There is no definitive checklist; judges must assess reliability based on the totality of the circumstances.

Richards v. Mississippi BBQ

MRE 703 does not permit experts to testify or present a chart in a manner that simply summarizes inadmissible hearsay without first relating that hearsay to some specialized knowledge on the expert’s part. The Court must distinguish experts relying on otherwise inadmissible hearsay to form scientific conclusions from conduits who merely repeat what they are told. The testimony of the former is admissible; that of the latter is not. Statements otherwise admissible are not inadmissible simply because they are offered by or through an expert witness.

Kane Software Co. v. Mars Investigations

Expert reports exchanged prior to trial must contain a complete statement of all opinions the expert will testify to and the basis and reasons for them, the facts or data considered in forming the opinions, and the expert’s qualifications. Experts are strictly prohibited from testifying on direct and redirect about opinions or conclusions not stated in their report, and such testimony must be excluded upon timely objection. However, if asked during cross examination about matters not contained in the report, the expert may freely answer as long as the answer is responsive. [When a Kane Software objection is made, the trial court should ask where the proposed testimony is contained or referenced in the expert’s disclosure.]

Yu-Oh Industries v. Beckstein Alekri, Inc.

Experts should not be expected to include in their reports every basic scientific fact known to lay people and known realities that support their conclusion. Nor must they include every underlying fact from a specific document if they explicitly disclosed reliance on that document and it was made available through discovery. However, measurements, equations, and other relevant facts that form the basis for a specific conclusion must be disclosed in the expert’s report.

Diamond Design Productions v. Fountain

Notwithstanding MRE 704, witnesses may not offer legal conclusions or legal interpretations. The determination of whether a person or entity has violated the law is the exclusive province of the fact finder. [An expert may testify to factual and scientific conclusions, such as cause of death, but] may not testify whether the defendant committed “murder” or whether conduct was the “proximate cause” of the victim’s death.

Winn v. Wu

The lack of an expert report does not automatically prohibit an expert from testifying to opinions and conclusions on direct or redirect where the expert prepared an affidavit or other sworn statement in lieu of an expert report. Before trial, the court should determine whether the affidavit contains all opinions, their basis and reasons, facts or data considered, and qualifications. If it meets these requirements, the expert may testify to opinions or conclusions stated or incorporated in the affidavit, subject to Kane Software and Yu-Oh Industries.

Jeffries v. Polk County Police Department

Generally, law enforcement officers are not “experts” subject to MRE 702 or Tarot Readers and its progeny. However, officers may have specialized training, skills, and experience beyond the average citizen as contemplated in MRE 701 and may testify based on such specialized knowledge. An officer’s non-expert opinion is subject to MRE 701 and any other applicable rule of evidence.

Windbigler v. Vithala

Unlike other jurisdictions, Midlands does not require a party to “tender an expert” before eliciting an expert opinion. Whether MRE 702 foundational requirements have been satisfied is an evidentiary determination within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Sheth v. Dean

An expert’s opinion may be sufficiently reliable even if that expert has never testified in court before. Conversely, the fact that an expert has testified many times at trial will not make an unreliable opinion admissible.

Omnidirectional Solutions v. Little Bird Word LLC

Tarot Readers and its progeny were never intended to create a rigid and unyielding standard for expert opinions. So long as the expert can sufficiently explain their expertise, training, and method for review, Tarot Readers shall not prohibit otherwise credible and admissible opinions simply because there is no known error rate or prior peer review. Such challenges to credibility are better left to cross examination.

Moore v. Campbell

If a witness becomes unable or unwilling to respond to otherwise proper questions on cross examination, the trial court must strike the witness’s testimony in its entirety. The reason why the witness failed to respond is immaterial.

Nichols v. Varma

The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protected by both the United States and Midlands Constitutions is inapplicable to civil cases. A person subject to a risk of prosecution may decline to testify, but in a civil case, the fact finder may draw an adverse inference from the decision not to testify or refusal to do so, and the opposing party may comment on such failure.

Davis v. HappyLand Toy Co.

In a wrongful death action, both the deceased and the surviving spouse (or personal representative) are considered “parties” for all evidentiary purposes. Thus, statements of either qualify under MRE 801(d)(2)(A) as an opposing party’s statement. However, a surviving spouse is not a party for purposes of establishing “harm” or “injury.” Therefore, emotional distress, loss of financial support, or loss of companionship is not relevant—and may often be overly prejudicial. Evidence admissible for other purposes is not rendered inadmissible merely because it also provides evidence that the surviving spouse suffered harm or injury.