CrimPro Themis Questions

The defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute drugs for his alleged involvement in a major drug-trafficking ring.  The evidence tying the defendant to the drug-trafficking ring was obtained from a warrantless search of the home of a business partner.  The defendant had been living with his business partner but recently moved out, leaving a bag filled with cocaine and his identification in the business partner's home.  The bag was discovered by police during a search of the home with the business partner's consent.  Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine.

How should the court rule on the defendant's motion to suppress?

Answer: Deny the motion, because the defendant does not have a privacy interest in the home.

To prevail on a motion to suppress, the defendant must first establish that he has standing to contest the allegedly unlawful Fourth Amendment search.  Standing exists when the defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy (or an ownership/possessory interest) in the area or item searched at the time of the search.  Therefore, a defendant cannot challenge an unlawful search of a third party's premises because it infringed upon the third party's right to privacy—not the defendant's.

Here, the police discovered the bag filled with cocaine along with the defendant's identification during a search of the business partner's home.  Although the defendant once had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home, the search was conducted after the defendant had moved out and lost that privacy interest (Choice C).*  Therefore, the defendant does not have standing to challenge the search, and the court should deny his motion to suppress.

Two officers went to a man's home to serve an arrest warrant, but no one answered the door.  As they walked around the man's house, the officers looked into his next door neighbor's window and saw the man inside the neighbor's kitchen drinking coffee.  The officers knocked on the neighbor's door, and when the neighbor answered, the officers informed the neighbor that they had a warrant to arrest the man.  The officers pushed past the neighbor into the kitchen and arrested the man.  While they were in the kitchen, the officers saw a bag of cocaine on the neighbor's counter.  The officers arrested the neighbor, and he was subsequently charged with possession of narcotics.  The neighbor moved to suppress evidence of the drugs, and the prosecution argued that the evidence was admissible under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.

Answer: No, because the officers could not lawfully enter the neighbor's home without his consent.

Under the Fourth Amendment, an unreasonable search or seizure typically occurs when the government acts without a warrant based on probable cause.  An arrest warrant implicitly authorizes entry into the arrestee's home to serve the warrant if police have reason to believe that the arrestee is present (Choice C).  But police may only search for an arrestee in a third party's home when they have:

• a warrant authorizing the search

• exigent circumstances or

• the third party's consent to enter the home.

If none of the above requirements are met, then the exclusionary rule requires the suppression of any evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful search.

Here, the officers entered the neighbor's home to serve an arrest warrant on the man.  However, they did not have a search warrant to enter the home and the neighbor did not consent to their entry.  Additionally, when the officers unlawfully pushed past the neighbor to arrest the man, there were no exigent circumstances to justify that entry (e.g., no one cried out for help).  Therefore, the officers' entry into the neighbor's home was unlawful, and the cocaine seized therein is inadmissible against the neighbor.

A police officer received an anonymous tip that the defendant was manufacturing methamphetamine in his basement.  Based solely on the tip, the officer obtained a warrant to search the defendant's basement for drugs and related manufacturing equipment.  The officer and his partner went to the defendant's home to execute the warrant.  Believing the defendant was not home, the officers did not knock on the door, but simply opened the unlocked door.  In searching the defendant's basement, the officers found large quantities of methamphetamine, related manufacturing equipment, and a notebook that said "Ledger" across the cover.  The notebook contained a ledger, with the names of the defendant's clients and statements of their accounts.  The officers seized all these items.  The defendant seeks to suppress the evidence seized by the officers.

Answer: The warrant was invalid

To be valid, a search warrant must be based on probable cause.  Probable cause exists when there is a reasonable belief (more than mere suspicion) that evidence of a crime is located in the place to be searched.  Facts supporting probable cause may come from several sources, including information from a reliable, known informant.  However, information from an unknown informant must be independently verified by police.

Here, the police made no attempt to verify the tip from an unknown informant, so probable cause was not established.  As a result, the defendant's best argument in favor of suppressing the notebook is that the warrant was invalid.

Two undercover police officers, with probable cause to believe that the defendant was a drug dealer, entered the living room of the defendant's apartment, at the defendant's invitation, to buy cocaine.  Before the transaction could take place, the defendant shot and killed one of the officers.  After a brief struggle, the defendant was subdued by the other officer and placed under arrest for murder.  Responding to the officer's request for assistance, uniformed police officers came to the apartment, conducted a protective sweep, and took the defendant to jail.  Then the uniformed officers conducted a thorough warrantless search of the apartment, during which they uncovered a large quantity of cocaine in the mattress in the defendant's bedroom.  Based on the amount of cocaine seized, the defendant was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to deal in addition to murder.  The defendant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine as having been unconstitutionally seized.

Should the court grant this motion?

Answer: Yes, because the search was conducted without a warrant.

A motion to suppress should be granted if the contested evidence was seized during an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search.  A search is unreasonable if it was conducted without a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement.

One such exception is a search incident to arrest.  This exception allows police to conduct a warrantless search of a person who has been lawfully arrested and the immediate surrounding areas for concealed weapons or destructible evidence.  Here, after the defendant was lawfully arrested, the police conducted a thorough search of the apartment and found cocaine in his bedroom.  Since the search went beyond areas immediately surrounding the defendant, this exception does not apply.

Another exception applies to exigent circumstances, under which police may act without a warrant when there is an immediate threat of harm to police or the public.  It allows police to conduct a protective sweep to search for injured persons and continued threats.  They also can seize illegal items that are in plain view.  But once the emergency ends, the search must end unless the police obtain a warrant or another exception applies.

Here, the murder of the undercover officer justified the protective sweep of the defendant's apartment.  However, once the emergency ended—i.e., the defendant was restrained and no other threats were located—the police were not justified in continuing the warrantless search (Choice D).  And since no other exception to the warrant requirement applies, the court should grant the defendant's motion to suppress.

While on patrol one night, two officers noticed the car of a known drug dealer in the drive-through lane of a fast-food restaurant.  Based on prior discussions with informants, the officers had probable cause to believe that the drug dealer had drugs in his vehicle since he regularly made drug deliveries from the trunk of his car.  Noticing that the drug dealer's headlight was out, the officers pulled him over once he left the restaurant and searched his car.  The officers did not find any evidence of drugs, but they did find several illegal weapons in the trunk.

Did the officers' seizure of the weapons violate the drug dealer's Fourth Amendment rights?

Answer: No, as a valid application of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.  An unreasonable search occurs when the government acts without a warrant based on probable cause and no exception to the warrant requirement applies.  The automobile exception justifies a warrantless search of a person's vehicle when:

• police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime and

• the search is limited to areas where the evidence might be located.

During an automobile search, police can search any containers inside the vehicle—including the trunk and locked containers—that might contain the illegal evidence.  They can also seize any other illegal items discovered during this search.

Here, the officers had probable cause to believe that the drug dealer had drugs in his vehicle since he regularly made drug deliveries from the trunk of his car.  The trunk was an area where the drugs might be located, so the warrantless search of the trunk was reasonable.  And since the officers could seize other illegal items discovered during the search for drugs (Choice B), their seizure of the weapons did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Exceptions to warrant requirement

Search incident to arrest Administrative search Stop and frisk Plain view Automobile exception Consent Exigent circumstance Special government purpose Mnemonic:  SAD SPACES

A grand jury is investigating a corporation for tax fraud.  The grand jury subpoenaed several types of corporate records, including emails from several of the corporation's officers and other business papers.  The subpoena was served on the corporation's chief operating officer (COO), who acted as the custodian of the corporate records.  The business papers would implicate several members of the corporation, including the COO, in criminal misconduct.  Further, many of the emails written by the COO contained statements about the officers of some of the corporation's competitors; these statements were defamatory and would likely result in civil liability if they were released.  The COO filed a motion to quash the subpoena, arguing that being forced to turn over these corporate records would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

Should the court grant the COO's motion?

Answer: No as to both the emails and the business papers.

The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects suspects in criminal proceedings from being compelled to provide self-incriminating evidence that is testimonial in nature—e.g., via a grand jury subpoena (as seen here).  However, this privilege does not apply to evidence that might subject a person to civil liability.  Therefore, the court should deny the COO's motion to quash as to the emails that would subject the COO to civil liability for defamation (Choices C & D).

Additionally, the privilege against self-incrimination applies only to individuals—not corporations.  This means that when a corporation is the target of an investigation (as seen here), the custodian of corporate records (or other corporate officer) cannot refuse to produce subpoenaed documents by citing this privilege.  This is true even if the documents would incriminate the custodian (or officer) personally.

Following the armed robbery of a local bank, the police identified the defendant as a suspect and brought him to the police station for questioning.  As soon as they sat down in the interrogation room, the police read the defendant his Miranda rights.  The defendant noted that "this seems like the kind of thing where you should have a lawyer."  The police responded that the defendant had that right.  The defendant noted that he "didn't even know a good lawyer" and dropped the issue.  In response to each question, the defendant simply repeated, "I don't know anything about it."  Frustrated, the police discontinued questioning after an hour and left the defendant in the interrogation room alone.  Three hours later, the police returned and, without repeating the Miranda warnings, told the defendant that his best friend, who was also a suspect, had already told them all about the robbery and the defendant's involvement.  In fact, the police were searching for the defendant's best friend to bring him in for questioning but had not been able to locate him.  The defendant immediately blurted out, "It was all his idea.  I didn't even want to rob that bank."

What is the defendant's best argument that his statement was taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights?

Answer: The defendant did not receive fresh Miranda warnings after the break in questioning.

Police must protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by informing the suspect of his/her Miranda rights (e.g., the right to an attorney) prior to a custodial interrogation.  The suspect may then choose to specifically and unambiguously invoke those rights (not seen here) (Choice D).  Alternatively, the suspect who understand his/her Miranda rights may waive those rights by voluntarily speaking to the police (as seen here).

However, when the interrogation of a suspect who has waived his/her Miranda rights is stopped for a long duration, police should re-Mirandize the suspect prior to resuming the interrogation.  That is because the passage of time can possibly invalidate the suspect's earlier waiver, rendering any incriminating information obtained after the break in interrogation inadmissible.  Therefore, the defendant's best argument is that he did not receive fresh Miranda warnings after the break in questioning.

(Choice B)  There is no requirement that a waiver of Miranda rights be in writing.

(Choice C)  Police are allowed to lie to a suspect to obtain incriminating information.  As a result, lying about the best friend's statement did not make the defendant's statement involuntary.

The defendant was the primary suspect in a string of robberies.  At the request of the police, the defendant appeared in a line-up at the police station, and one of the victims identified him as the person who robbed him.  The police then took the defendant into custody and interrogated him, after which the defendant was released without being charged.  The following day, the defendant was arrested and appeared at an arraignment, where he entered a plea of not guilty.  After the arraignment, the defendant was appointed an attorney.  The defendant had not been represented by an attorney at any point before that time, nor had he requested an attorney.  The defendant intends to argue that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

At what point did the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel first attach?

Answer: The defendant's right to counsel first attached at the arraignment.

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel:

• automatically attaches once formal judicial proceedings commence (e.g., indictment, filing of formal charges, preliminary hearing, arraignment) and

• guarantees that criminal defendants will thereafter have the assistance of counsel during all critical stages of prosecution (i.e., any event where the absence of counsel may prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial).

Here, the man was not entitled to legal representation pursuant to the Sixth Amendment when he appeared in the lineup or was subject to police interrogation.*  That is because formal judicial proceedings had not commenced (Choices A & B).

Instead, the man's Sixth Amendment right to counsel automatically attached when he was arraigned because an arraignment often signals the commencement of judicial proceedings.  This event is also considered a critical stage of prosecution because it typically requires that a defendant enter an initial plea and bond is discussed.  Therefore, the man was entitled to legal representation at this point. (Choice D).

A man, who was represented by counsel, was on trial for arson of an office building.  During the trial, the police learned that computers thought to have been destroyed in the fire had instead been stolen.  The police visited the man in jail, read him his Miranda rights, which the man voluntarily waived, and questioned him about the theft.  In response to the questioning, the man confessed to the theft.

After the man was found not guilty of arson, the prosecutor charged the man with theft and informed the defense that he planned to introduce the man's statement to the police while he was in jail.  The man's attorney filed a pretrial motion to suppress the statement on the ground that the man's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated.

How should the court rule on this motion?

Answer: Deny the motion, because theft and arson each require proof of an element that the other does not.

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches to offenses that have been formally charged (e.g., by indictment).  In Texas v. Cobb, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this right also encompasses offenses that—even if not formally charged—would be considered the same offense as a charged offense.  Under the Blockburger test, offenses are not the same if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not.

Here, the man had been formally charged with arson at the time of the interview, so he had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel for that crime.  However, he had not been charged with the theft.  And since arson and theft each require proof of an element that the other crime does not, the man had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the theft.  Accordingly, the court should deny the motion to suppress the man's statement.

(Choice A)  The man voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment right to counsel with respect to the theft after receiving Miranda warnings.  However, he did not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel to waive with regard to the theft at that time.

A defendant was arrested and charged with robbery.  While he was awaiting trial, an inmate in the jail in which he was housed was assaulted, and the police suspected that the defendant was involved.  They brought the defendant in for questioning about the assault and provided him with Miranda warnings.  The defendant said that he was willing to talk and did not ask for his attorney.  He proceeded to tell the police that he had provided another inmate with information about how to obtain a weapon and believed that inmate had been involved in the assault.  The defendant was later charged as a co-conspirator in the assault and sought to suppress his statement to the police.  He argued that his attorney should have been present during the interrogation.

Is the defendant's statement likely to be suppressed?

Answer: No, because the defendant did not specifically invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.

The Constitution guarantees the right to counsel in two places—the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment.  The Fifth Amendment right to counsel applies when a suspect is subjected to a custodial interrogation priorto the commencement of judicial proceedings.  However, this right is not automatic.  A suspect must invoke this right by making a specific, unambiguous statement requesting counsel.  If the suspect does not do so and answers questions after being Mirandized, then this right is waived.

In contrast, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches automatically upon the commencement of judicial proceedings and applies at all critical stages of prosecution.  However, this right applies only to the specific offense(s) at issue in those proceedings—not to other crimes in which judicial proceedings have yet to commence.  And though this right can be waived, a waiver cannot occur until the right has attached.

Here, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had automatically attached to the robbery because the defendant was charged with this crime and is awaiting trial.  However, this right has not attached to the subsequent assault because judicial proceedings have not yet commenced.  This means that the defendant could not have waived this right with respect to the assault (Choices B & D).  Therefore, suppression of the statement about the assault depends on whether the defendant was denied counsel under the Fifth Amendment.

The Fifth Amendment right to counsel was implicated because the man was interrogated before the commencement of judicial proceedings for the assault.  However, he never made a statement specifically requesting counsel.  Instead, after he was Mirandized, he said that he was willing to talk and told police about his involvement in the assault.  This amounted to a waiver of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel (Choice C).  Therefore, his statement is not likely to be suppressed.

A defendant was indicted by a grand jury for making false statements to a federally insured bank to obtain a loan in violation of a federal felony statute.  After the defendant was arraigned, the federal district court granted the defendant's request for disclosure of the exculpatory portions of the grand jury transcripts.  When the defendant learned that the prosecutor had failed to present the defendant's federal tax returns in the prosecutor's possession to the grand jury even though the returns contained exculpatory evidence, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment.

How should the court rule on the defendant's motion?

Answer: Deny the motion, because the prosecutor was not required to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.

In United States v. Williams, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a prosecutor is not required to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury.  That is because the grand jury's function is merely to determine whether enough evidence exists to bring a criminal charge—not to determine guilt or innocence.  Accordingly, the grand jury need only hear evidence that supports the prosecutor's side.  Therefore, the prosecutor here was not required to present the defendant's exculpatory tax returns to the grand jury, and the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment should be dismissed.

A defendant on trial for burglary planned to raise in his defense that his arrest was a result of racial profiling.  During voir dire, the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges to exclude all nonwhite jurors, not just those of the defendant's race, from the jury panel.  When the defendant objected to these challenges as discriminatory, the prosecutor responded that he was concerned that nonwhite jurors would unfairly side with the defense's argument that the police unjustly profiled the defendant.

Should the court sustain the defendant's objection?

Answer: Yes, because the prosecution failed to provide a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory strikes.

A peremptory challenge is an objection to a potential juror that can be raised without any reason or explanation during the jury-selection process.  However, the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause prohibits striking potential jurors based solely on their race, ethnicity, or sex.  In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court set forth a three-prong test to determine if the use of a peremptory challenge was discriminatory.  That test employs the following burden-shifting scheme:

• The moving party must establish a prima facie case of discrimination (e.g., the prosecution used peremptory challenges to strike only nonwhite jurors).

• The party who exercised the peremptory challenge must then provide a neutral reason for the peremptory challenge (e.g., the strikes were based on age, not race).

• If it does so, then the burden shifts back to the moving party to prove that the other party's reason was pretextual (e.g., the prosecution struck a 21-year-old black man but not a 21-year-old white man).

Here, the defendant objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike all nonwhites from the jury, which provided a prima facie showing of racial discrimination.  The burden then shifted to the prosecutor, who failed to provide a neutral reason for his challenges (Choice A).  Instead, he explained that the challenges were based on his belief that nonwhite jurors would unfairly side with the defense's argument that the police unjustly profiled the defendant.  The court should therefore sustain the defendant's objection.

Two police officers responded to a domestic-disturbance call.  When the officers arrived at the home in question, they found a man and a woman screaming at each other in the front yard.  One officer took the man aside, while the other spoke with the woman.  The woman told the officer that she had a restraining order against the man and that he was a convicted felon who often carried a gun.  The officers confirmed the restraining order and placed the man under arrest, without giving him Miranda warnings.  While the man was in the back of the police car, an officer asked the man if he owned a gun.  The man replied that he always keeps a gun in his car for self-protection.  The officer then retrieved the gun from the man's car, which was parked nearby.

The man was later charged with possession of a firearm as a felon.  At trial, the man moved to suppress his statement about always having a gun and the gun itself, arguing that he did not receive Miranda warnings prior to being questioned by the officer.

Is the man likely to succeed in having the evidence suppressed?

Answer: Yes, as to the statement only.

The Fifth Amendment requires that police provide a suspect with Miranda warnings prior to a custodial interrogation.  A custodial interrogation occurs when a defendant is in custody (e.g., under formal arrest) and subjected to interrogation.  When, as here, the police fail to provide Miranda warnings, an incriminating statement made as the result of the custodial interrogation can be suppressed at a subsequent trial.  Therefore, the man's statement about always having a gun will likely be suppressed (Choice A).

However, in United States v. Patane, the U.S. Supreme Court held that physical evidence obtained as a result of a non-Mirandized statement is admissible so long as that statement was voluntary (i.e., not coerced).  A statement was coerced if it was the product of physical force, threats, or psychological pressure by police.  Here, there is no indication that the man's non-Mirandized statement was coerced, so the gun found because of that statement will likely be admitted—not suppressed (Choices C & D).

In a jury trial, an adult defendant was found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, a capital offense.  During the sentencing phase of the trial, the defense presented evidence of mitigating circumstances, while the prosecution presented evidence of aggravating circumstances.  The jury rendered an advisory sentence of death without specifying the factual basis for its recommendation.  The judge independently found the existence of two aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, weighed the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and, agreeing with the jury's advisory sentence, imposed the death sentence.

On appeal, the defendant has challenged the imposition of the death sentence as unconstitutional.

How should the appellate court rule?

Answer: For the defendant, because the jury did not find a specific aggravating circumstance that justified the imposition of the death penalty.

The due process clause guarantees a criminal defendant's right to have an impartial jury determine whether the defendant is guilty of every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Apprendi v. New Jersey that any fact that exposes a criminal defendant to a greater punishment than authorized by the jury's guilty verdict is an element that must be submitted to and found by the jury.

This holding has been applied to state capital-murder sentencing schemes that require a finding of at least one aggravating circumstance at either the guilt or penalty phase before the death penalty can be imposed.  Therefore, a capital-sentencing scheme (as seen here) violates Apprendi if it:

• allows a jury to render an advisory sentence recommending the death penalty without specifically finding an aggravating circumstance and

• permits the judge to then make that finding independently (Choices C & D).

That is because such a scheme strips the defendant of the right to have the jury make the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty.  For this reason, imposing the death sentence here was unconstitutional and the court of appeals should rule for the defendant.

A defendant was charged with both battery and robbery of a victim.  The defendant was found guilty of battery but acquitted of the robbery charge.  Subsequently, the victim died from the injuries inflicted by the defendant.  The defendant has been charged with felony murder of the victim.  The defendant has moved for dismissal of this charge on double jeopardy grounds.

How is the court likely to rule on this motion?

Answer: Grant the motion, because the defendant was acquitted of robbery.

Felony murder is an unintentional killing during the commission of an inherently dangerous felony.  A proper conviction for felony murder requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant committed the underlying felony.  Robbery—i.e., the unlawful taking and carrying away of personal property from the victim by force or intimidation—is an inherently dangerous felony upon which a felony-murder charge can be based.

However, a felony-murder prosecution predicated upon an underlying felony for which the defendant was acquitted in a previous trial (as seen here) is improper.  That is because such a prosecution would require retrying the underlying felony in violation of the double jeopardy clause—which prohibits multiple prosecutions for the same offense.  Therefore, the court should grant the defendant's motion for dismissal because the defendant was previously acquitted of robbery.