Comparative Politics Final

3 definitions of comparative politics

3 definitions of comparative politics

1) the study of political phenomena in every country except the one in which the student resides

2) the study of political phenomena through the comparative method (1950s-1990s)

3) the study of political phenomena that are predominantly within country relationships; international politics (between nations) v. comparative politics (within nations)

necessary vs sufficient conditions vs necessary and sufficient condition

necessary: effect cannot occur w/o condition = if there is a cause, we know there is a specific consequence associated w/ it = is the condition required for a conclusion to be true
sufficient: condition implies effect must occur = if there is a fire, there will be smoke = lack of smoke means conclusion is unlikely = is it enough evidence to make the conclusion true?
necessary and sufficient: condition is both necessary and sufficient for the effect = when the effect occurs, the condition must be present and when the condition is present, the effect must occur

method of agreement (MoA) vs method of difference (MoD)

MoA: study similar situations to see what they have in common to produce the same outcome
MoD: compare countries which were different in the first place and produced different outcomes

weaknesses of the comparative method (John Stuart Mill)

for it to work, 6 conditions must be met:

1. The causal process must be deterministic (= the relationship between the variables is known in advance, there is no chance factor), not probabilistic (= room for newness and “surprise”). Yet, in social sciences, we believe that everything is probabilistic -a case that implies finding more cases.

2. no measurement error: if we say yes instead of no and vice-versa, the result of the analysis is all falsified. Yet, the results/statistics depend on our research… uncertain.

3. there can be no interaction effects: if we have wealth and parliamentary effects on democracy, we can’t determine which of them influences what. 

4. there can be only one cause of the outcome

5. all of the possible causes must be identified

6. All the instances of the phenomena that could ever occur have been observed by us or all the unobserved instances (including future instances) must be just like the instances we have observed.

Skocpol’s theory of revolutions

compared revolutions of FR, Russia & China, found 3 conditions:
1. village autonomy (to give them the freedom to revolt, e.g. end of serfdom)
2. dominant class has independent economic base and shares power (e.g. through decentralization)
3. external military threat —> State needs reforms to increase efficiency —> elites oppose and conflict among themselves —> peasants join the battle —> revolution

conditional probability

is A conditional upon B, i.e. does B increase the probability of A occurring

causal effect vs causal mechanism

causal effect: the difference between probability of having outcome w/ this condition minus the probability of having outcome w/o this condition
causal mechanism: the process through which a cause leads to the effect

counterfactual

a causal statement that cannot be observed as it can’t happen at the same time as the current causal statement, i.e. if this other condition occurred, this would happen = e.g. if kangaroos didn’t have tails, they would topple over

fundamental problem of causal inference

missing data as it is impossible to observe the same unit of analysis both being exposed and not exposed to condition at the same time

what are politics fundamentally about?

conflicts of preferences (who gets what, when, how) and their resolutions (mostly occur reasonably peacefully, ideally justly)

why is going to war a puzzle?

if people are rational, they should want to avoid the costs of war, however actors believe the gains of war outweigh the costs
= war is a failure of negotiation as whatever settlement is reached at the end, could have in principle been reached before w/o the costs of war

5 explanations for why war occurs

1. commitment problems: an actor has incentives to renege on their commitment

2. asymmetric information: you don’t know how powerful your opponent is = shorter wars bc once you start fighting unknown info is revealed

3. unchecked elites: elites who send a country to war do not bear the costs & may benefit more than main population (solved thru democracy! elite accountability)

4. violent preferences: humans rationally get emotional rewards from fighting: moral beliefs, vengeance, parochial altruism (yay my group is great and your group is punished)

5. systematic mistakes: overconfidence bias, projection bias (project onto other party other, poss. your own, needs/wants)

was the Revolutionary war due to a commitment problem?

tax disputes, solution: England can continue taxing colonists if they give them representation in Parliament

BUT elites in GB feared colonists in Parliament would team up w/ English minority, then elites would lose majority

colonists can’t credibly commit they won’t team up w/ English minority as they share interests

elites decide the costs of war are less than the outcome if not (i.e. better to risk losing the colony than risk a powerful coalition in GB which would push for reforms)

what is the nature of war?

stemming from explanations… war may economically be irrational, but there are rational arguments for causes

minimal def of democracy

free and competitive legislative elections, elected executive either directly (freely) or indirectly by the legislature

democracy-dictatorship measure + difficulty

4 dimensions: Democracy if ALL hold, if ANY fail = dictatorship

1. chief exec is elected (directly or indirectly)

2. legislature is elected

3. more than one party in elections

4. an alternation in power under identical electoral rules has taken place

   difficulty: dichotomous, what about who gets to vote?

polity IV + difficulty

5 dimensions, tally a score from points

1. competitiveness of exec recruitment

2. openness of exec recruitment

3. constraints exist on exec

4. regulation of political participation

5. competitiveness of political participation

   difficulty: where to put distinction on score, countries could have same score but dif details = aggregation makes it imprecise

freedom house + difficulty

2 dimensions: level of political and civil rights established through questioning

1. political rights: e.g. is govt open, accountable and transparent between elections?

2. civil rights: e.g. is the media independent?

   difficulty: can’t use for studies on media bc this aspect is included in their definition of democracy, very substantive so risk of circular reasoning (can’t establish causality)

main argument of modernization theory

as you become richer, you become more democratic = there are prerequisites for democracy, including urbanization, education, literacy, and the media/press (e.g. today we can study bc agriculture is so productive less people have to farm)

conceptual framework of Acemoglu and Robinson

no causality between GDP/democracy so instead lets look to institutions = feedback loop

those w/ power would choose political institutions in the future and now to protect their interests (having de jure + de facto political power). Econ institutions (property rights) would also determine the econ performance & distribution of interests

—> sources of de facto political power: material, military and mobilization resources

mobilization power and the collective action problem (Acemoglu and Robinson)

de facto political power may be transient in nature due to the collective action problem = everyone would benefit from it but no one has the effort to do it

—> can be overcame in mass movements if they create selective incentives (money, status, response to injustice, etc.)

credible commitment problem (Acemoglu and Robinson)

1. those in power cannot commit to not using their power in ways that benefit them in the future (as long as they don’t relinquish it)

2. if the rulers relinquish their power, the citizens cannot commit to making side payments to the ruler in the future bc the ruler no longer possess the political power to enforce this promise

democratization theory of Acemoglu and Robinson

if revolution is costly to the elites, they can choose to democratize. Democracy works as a credible commitment to better economic institutions today and for the future

= elites should want democracy to avoid costly autocracy

why would you expect democracy to cause growth?

because democracy, ceteris paribus, redistributes political power to the masses, who have an interest in creating broad-based economic opportunities

why would a country choose economic institutions that are economically inefficient?

for short run benefits, or in the presence of oil and other natural resources bc they generate large rents w/o necessitating good economic institutions

stationary bandits view of dictatorships + Congo example

stationary bandit: sets up shop and steals from you repeatedly

• dictators have long time horizon, but in order to stay in power they need repression

• might have to set up econ institutions to get better performance, but these could threaten the ruler (e.g. Kim Jong Un has poor economy)

• example from the Congo: coltan taxing vs gold taxing

• coltan: easy to tax at the mine, so warlords establish monopolies of violence around coltan mines, no fiscal/judicial administrations in the village

• gold: hard to tax at the mine, so warlords establish monopolies of violence in the village, w/ more sophisticated taxation systems which need fiscal and judicial institutions to support them —> ppl pay taxes and now want other things, e.g. if a murder happens, need to set up a court = creates state-like institutions

• stationary bandits at least have some interests in keeping you alive, better than roving bandit

problem of authoritarian power-sharing + how dictators solve it

dictators need to protect themselves against challenges from those w/ whom they share power (their inner circle = unstable coalitions) = more common, more coup d’état than popular uprisings (stages from contested to established dictatorship)

solutions? Stalin put his inner circle’s family members in jail, if inner circle didn’t cooperate their family would be killed… OR better solution: create institutions to promote power sharing, such as parties, legislatures = solve monitoring problems (Louis XIV created Versailles)

problem of authoritarian control + how dictators solve it

dictators need to protect themselves from the threat of revolution (the people) BUT difficult due to collective action problem

solutions? repression through the military BUT risk of military takeover = used for moderate inequality, cooptation through buying leaders of the revolution through parties/legislatures = better through an institution, more credible

3 dismal features of authoritarian politics

1. lack of independent authority to enforce agreements

2. violence as the ultimate arbiter of conflicts (credible commitment problems)

3. information is scarce and asymmetric (dictator doesn’t know who truly supports him)

   = similar to reasons for war

informational autocracies + why are they less violent?

illiberal democracies, no free and fair elections: no checks and balances, often anti-Western resentment, some private media but manipulation of information

why are they less violent? bc violence is hard to hide, also isn’t necessary if the information is well manipulated = censorship is sufficient

how do informational autocrats manipulate information to stay in power?

through the media, propaganda, censorship (of news which has collective action potential, e.g. China censored news on protest in Mongolia… BUT allow some opposition), and also investments in polling & political consultants = most cost-effective

—> if resource poor: freer media, turn to bureaucracy instead however risk of collusion w/ other agencies, leads to uncensored media

how do informational autocrats manipulate elections in order to stay in power?

elections are useful to display popularity & gather information HOWEVER could threaten rule: manipulated through cooptation of elites & opposition groups (even incentivize division within groups), or through having one party (hegemonic) j determine the leader

—> manipulation may deter revolutions… HOWEVER only if fraud in election outcomes is uncertain; if fraud is clear, won’t help

what are the functions of elections? (Persson, Rolland, Tabellini 1997)

1. Aggregate and represent voters’ conflicting preferences

2. Aggregate dispersed information about the correct political decisions

3. Address an adverse selection problem by allowing citizens to select the most competent individual for public office

4. Control moral hazard (acting bad when one isn’t affected by it) by holding elected officials accountable to the citizens

arrows theorem main point

w/ at least 3 alternatives, it is impossible to aggregate conflicting voter preferences without violating at least one condition of fairness… there are always tradeoffs

= difficult to interpret the outcome of a group decision-making process as necessarily reflecting the will of the group: either individual preferences lined up, or some preferences were excluded

arrows theorem conditions

• universal domain: or admissibility, the rule must perform sensibly regardless of what issue comes up = at the universal level

• IIA: it should be impossible to manipulate social preferences just by introducing new alternatives

• non dictatorship: under Arrow’s theorem, a dictator is when the social preference = the individual preference of the dictator regardless of anyone else’s thoughts

• unanimity: if every individual prefers x>y, then the social preference should prefer x>y

• transitivity: if x>y and y>z then x>z (no Condorcet paradox)

Condorcet’s paradox + divide the dollar

rational voters can still cause a non transitive outcome = no clear winner, e.g. cyclical majorities, divide the dollar: for any allocation supported by a majority, there is another allocation supported by a different majority —> no one will ever agree on what share they’ll split, no Condorcet winner in a divide the dollar game w/ 3 players

median voter theorem

when considering an issue described by an ideology, social preferences under majority rule are identical to the preferences of the median voter = parties are drawn towards the center (to aggregate left/right wing voters)
= can cause stability in outcomes …. Because median voter is a dictator

how does manipulating the agenda impact the final outcomes of decision-making processes?

voting agenda: plan that determines the order in which votes occur (e.g. in pair-wise contests) = agenda setter can get her most preferred outcome = a dictator, as can strategically order voting to induce an outcome (ppl can also vote strategically, that is insincerely to ultimately produce their preferred outcome)

single-member district plurality (SMDP)

majoritarian, voters cast a single vote for a candidate in a single-member district = plurality as the candidate who receives the largest NUMBER of votes is elected, even if this number isn’t an absolute majority

single nontransferable vote (SNTV)

majoritarian, plurality, voters cast a single vote for a candidate in a multi member district, the candidates w/ the highest numbers of votes are elected

alternative vote

majoritarian, absolute majority, voters rank order candidates in single-member districts, candidate w/ absolute majority is elected, if none then last candidate eliminated & votes reallocated based on rank orders, process repeated until absolute majority

majority runoff

majoritarian, absolute majority, voters cast a single vote for a candidate in a single-member district, any candidate who wins an absolute majority in 1st round is elected, if no one does then the top 2 winners compete in a runoff in the 2nd round (e.g. FR presidential elections)

list PR

proportional, various types depending on electoral formula & quotas, can be closed (order is determined by party) or open (order is determined by voters)

single transferable vote

like an alternative vote but plurality instead of absolute majoritarian, quite complicated and difficult to organize in large districts

mixed independent

the majoritarian & proportional components are implemented independently of one another (e.g. majoritarian system used at lowest, district level, while proportional system used at upper, regional or national level)

mixed dependent

the application of the proportional formula is dependent on the distribution of seats or votes produced by the majoritarian formula, often individuals have 1 candidate vote and 1 party vote (e.g. Germany)

evil example

w/ this example of ranked voting, depending on what electoral system you apply (e.g. plurality, runoff, Borda count, etc.) you produce a different outcome

= the electoral system matters because the results of the election depend on the electoral rule used, BUT voters can also vote strategically

Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem

equivalent to Arrow’s theorem = there is no voting system that will always encourage people to vote sincerely, instead there will always be a possibility that voters vote strategically (every voting system is manipulable)

Duverger’s law

under majoritarianism, there is a tendency to have only two candidates in each district due to winner takes all

conditions: there is uncertainty about who will win, if candidates prefer C they still ned to care about who wins between A and B, voters car about THIS PARTICULAR election, voters are well informed on positions of candidates (A&B > C)

—> i.e. because of strategic voting, even if you prefer C its better to choose A or B so as not to waste your vote

—> e.g. Germany: Difference between a candidate's own vote total and a candidate’s party’s vote total. → second ballot for the real preferred candidate?

Duverger’s hypothesis

one should expect anywhere from 2 to M+1 serious contenders in a list-PR system (w/ M seats per district)

—> if voters know one candidate will win, bc they are strong (likely to win), we will focus on other candidates (who are serious = likely to be in a close race)

why and how do more proportional electoral systems push political parties to take more extreme policy positions?

because compared to a candidate, a list cannot go out of contention by being too strong, as more votes can always help it win more seats

—> better to appear strong and a serious contender rather than seeming less serious

—> vs majoritarian system: pushes candidates to center

Borda count

voters rank candidates, 1st choice gets the most points then descending to 0 pts for last choice, most points wins

majority judgment

voters grade candidates (e.g. from 0-100 or from poor to excellent) and the candidate w/ the best median grade wins

def of political representation + delegate/trustee

a party (representative) represents another party (constituents) and their opinions/best interests, within a political context, while leaving out other perspectives that are not being voiced
Delegate: representative must implement policies demanded by constituents, even against representative’s own viewpoint = he ia. mere agent
Trustee: representatives follow their own judgment on which policy is best (most modern democracies = FR art 27) BUT implication = politicians don’t have to stay loyal to promises they make during their campaign

2 forms of autonomy at the core of political representation

1. autonomy of the representative: guaranteed by the Constitution, i.e. through an article on the illegality of mandates (Art 27 FR)

2. autonomy of the represented: elections provide them the freedom to evaluate the representative and hold them accountable

responsiveness vs. mandate responsiveness

responsiveness: if the govt adopts policies that citizens signal as preferred (representative can be more or less responsive in both trusteeship or delegate system)
mandate responsiveness: if the public official pursues policies that they advocated for during their campaign (very close to delegate view, tends to be more like daily politics vs. constitution more like trusteeship = tension)

formal accountability vs. real accountability

formal accountability: institutionalized by elections: A is obliged to act on behalf of B, and B is empowered to sanction or reward A for their performance (e.g. through reelection)
real accountability: the interactions between A and B through the institutions of formal accountability ACTUALLY induce A to act on behalf of B (do elections create real accountability too?)

whose preferences do elected representatives take into account? theory + evidence

those of their voters, as rent seeking goes to responsive voters THEORY: politicians pursue policies that benefit citizens whose votes are responsive to policy choice = that is, citizens w/ LOW identity attachments (bc if high attachment, support will remain high regardless, whereas low cares more abt their interests being represented)
EVIDENCE: after women gained the right to vote in the US, politicians implemented more policies on mothers & child health insurance = to win over this new electorate… also after introduction of electronic voting in Brazil, State spent more on health care and education for young women

why do elections tend (on average) to elect more competent leaders and to provide them w/ incentives to work hard on the behalf of citizens? + evidence

voters are more likely to reelect incumbents who generated good policy outcomes, which increases w/ the politician’s effort + with term limits, more incentives to perform well to remain in office EVIDENCE: study from Brazil: found mayors had more success w/ implementing educational programs if they had limited terms than unlimited

pandering + evidence

elections can incentivize politicians to choose a popular but inefficient policy, even when the politician knows another policy is better
EVIDENCE: from the US, found Presidents were more responsive to public opinion closer to elections, and found presidential popularity has non monotonic effects: if popular, will adopt policies congruent w/ public opinion, but if unpopular, more likely to take unpopular opinions

constitutionalism

governments commit to accept the legitimacy & be governed by a set of authoritative rules and principles laid out in a constitution = a limit upon State power

constitution (codified vs uncodified, entrenched vs unentrenched, legislative supremacy vs higher law)

Constitution: formal source of state authority = monopoly of violence, establishes govt institutions, and contains list of FR

codified (formal): written in a single document, vs uncodified (material) if several (poss unwritten) resources (UK)
entrenched: can only be modified through special amendment procedure, vs unentrenched if can be modified at any point w/ legislative majority (UK)

legislative supremacy: no C review, no BoR, unentrenched (FR 3rd rep) vs higher law has all of those things

constitutional review (abstract vs concrete, a priori vs a posteriori)

authority to invalidate govt acts that violate the Constitution, usually by a constitutional court
abstract: not in a specific case, just on the legislation itself vs concrete
a priori: before the law goes into force (necessarily abstract) vs a posteriori

judicial review

constitutional review carried out by ordinary judges (not special tribunals like a CC) = US decentralized

new constitutionalism

resulting from globalization, shifts economic aims to global level through constitutional framework to create global supremacy and promote a free capitalist system (e.g. EU, NAFTA = North American free trade agreement)

European vs American model of constitutional review

European: centralized, only one court (France, Spain, Hungary)
American: decentralized = any court can conduct judicial review (US)

direct benefits of judicial review to the ruling coalition (3 types)

1. informational: if the legislature is uncertain about the effects of a policy, and to repeal it would be costly, the judiciary can improve the legislation through a priori judicial review

2. blame-shifting: as court has a legal obligation to decide, in a difficult decision, the legislature can purposely adopt a vague law to shift responsibility (and thus anger) to the courts

3. enforcement of boundaries: both horizontal and vertical SoP (e.g. FR CC 5th Rep, needed to limit Parliament after 4th rep)

indirect benefits: insurance theory of judicial review + empirical evidence

in a competitive political system, judicial review may be negative for the present BUT also constrains policies in the future = will constrain your opposition, acts as an insurance against the opposition getting into power

EVIDENCE: study found as a party had larger % of seats in legislature, less likely to adopt judicial review

is judicial review about coordinating behavior of citizens to protect democracy against power grabs by the rulers? if so, what are the implications?

1. judicial review is valuable to citizens as it has COORDINATING power (tells citizens that boundaries have been transgressed = citizens need to act)

2. the force of judicial decisions derives from their coordinating function

3. this power is independent of the content of their decisions

   = we can expect the judiciary to try to follow public opinion BUT also appear impartial and apolitical (follow the C), otherwise coordinating power is void

do constitutional judges simply follow the law?

no: the judiciary is constrained by other actors, thus they act strategically in order to maintain their authority, taking into account preferences of leg, exec & public
—> E.g. Marbury v Madison, Costa v ENEL (primacy of European law BUT Italian law didn’t violate treaty in this case) = introducing the doctrine gradually, reaffirmed over time to grow to full extent

Shayo’s framework to think about social identity (U = m - d + s)

the utility of identifying with a group = the material payoffs of identifying - the perceived distance from the group (based on their attributes) + the status of the group (based on the intensity of reference group)

—> increase utility by increasing status of identity group (aggression towards out group) or reducing perceived distance from group (conform to group norms and behaviors, punish deviators)

= you choose groups that give you the highest utility = it might be easier for you to be perceived as being part of a certain group (having less distance to) because of your attributes

Their Pain Gives us Pleasure by Cikara et al. (2014)

participants assigned to arbitrary groups, either Eagles or Rattlers, 3 types of relations:

1. competition: didn’t feel bad if something bad happened to other group

2. cooperation: do feel bad if other group loses

3. independence: neutral feeling but do feel bad if you lose, bc could lose prestige

   = you always feel worse if your group is suffering than if the other group is suffering = parochial violence

what lowers inhibition (hesitation) about committing harm to others?

1. considering people as members of a group rather than individuals = easier to throw a grenade at a group than shoot one person (V. Hugo: “assassiner un homme est un crime, assassiner un peuple est une ‘question’”)

2. creating hierarchy between groups = enemies, oppressors

Identity choice by Atkin et al. (2020)

how does the consumption of goods associated w/ identities respond to 1. saliency of identification w/ group, 2. group status, and 3. cost of adhering to group norms/taboos?

1. if crisis (e.g. India Hindu-Muslim conflicts) = more inclined to follow taboo

2. higher group status (e.g. higher income) = more inclined to follow taboo to adhere to group

3. if the cost of adhering to group taboo increases (e.g. if pork becomes cheaper) = more inclined to break taboo

how did the criteria used by different societies at different time periods to classify ppl in group say skin color evolve? (example of FR)

• 16th: privilège de la terre = as a slave touched the soil of mainland France, he was freed

• 17th: distinction slaves v. free subjects (not defined by skin color: freed slaves had same rights as free people, ie. acquired freedom = natural freedom)

• end 17th: began to collect census data, used term “white” (depends on skin color and status) v. free people of color → until mid 18th, not unusual for free people of color to enter white category bc need for Whites to run the colonies = the lightest Blacks were considered Whites

• 18th: stricter distinction → white is ancestors are white; free people of color faced poll tax, couldn’t hold public office, couldn’t wear luxurious clothing

  • very different from US with ¼, ⅛, 1/16 and then 1 drop rule

  • also, many Brazilians “white” would be considered black in the US

Fear and Loathing Across Party Lines by Iyengar and Westwood (2015)

compared influence of partisan vs racial affiliation in a nonpolitical decision in the US

1. choose between a Democrat and a Republican: strong party affiliation

2. choose between a black and white person: weaker affiliation

   = party affiliation is stronger than race affiliation

historical social cleavage: urban-rural

conflicts between landed elites and bourgeois industrialists, worse living conditions in rural areas, emphasized with industrial revolution

historical social cleavage: confessional

protestants historically believed Catholics were possessed by the devil = 30 years war (war of religion within German-Roman Holy empire in 17th ce)

historical social cleavage: class (labor/capital) and left / right

w/ industrial revolution, appearance of industrial bourgeoisie vs proletariat in industrialized centers = idea that proletariat would overthrow bourgeoisie to establish communist state (Marx and Engels)

historical social cleavage: center/periphery

w/ national revolution, State has to organize the territory through center administration, eradicate local structures

historical social cleavage: secular/clerical

depending on whether your country was protestant or catholic, different relationship church/state

cross cutting cleavages

regions of a country with uncorrelated attributes, no clear reasons for identity category to be activated
—> e.g. north vs south, but French/dutch speakers equally dispersed

reinforcing cleavages

regions of a country have correlated attributes

—> e.g. north vs south, most Dutch speakers live in the north and most French speakers live in the South

why are Chewas and Tumbukas allies in Zambia, but enemies in Malawi?

Malawi: Chewas and Tumbukas make up a big part of the society, large % on their own = incentives to politicize the groups, play on cleavages to gain sufficient votes
Zambia: Chewas and Tumbukas aren’t that big groups, very small % on their own, rather should work together if they want power
= cultural cleavages don’t always become politicized, only if there are political incentives for activation

3 accounts of the second dimension of political conflict

1. materialists vs post materialists (Inglehart): 2 mechanisms: hierarchy of needs & socialization, as societies get richer, no longer have to satisfy basic material needs, now personal freedom and self-expression are more important

2. winners and losers of globalization: winners benefited from and embraced economic integration (transferable skills, cosmopolitan (global, willing to move) VS losers gained little from globalization (work in traditionally protected sectors, nationalist and unwilling to move)

3. green-alternative-liberal and traditional-authoritarian-nationalist: linked w/ EU integration, winners are highly educated young, migrants living in integrated big cities who embrace integration that fits their values VS losers are low-skilled, older, cultural and national traditionalists living in struggling hinterlands who resist integration they see as threatening to tradition & econ. security

5 changes to social structure + how they create the conditions for new dimensions of political conflict

1. expansion of higher education & emergence of ‘graduates’ as a distinct electorate

   1. positive views towards minorities, anti discrimination, less attachment to tradition, more likely to support economic integration, free trade, strong environmentalist values

2. mass immigration & emergence of electorally significant ethnic minority communities

   1. esp in Western Europe, liberalization of citizenship laws, emergence of large 2nd generation communities, gravitate toward center-left = challenge for left parties to not inflame nativist sentiments

3. reactions of socially conservative uneducated white voters to demographic decline and political marginalization

   1. radical right

4. increases in life expectancy = larger older electorate

   1. more likely to hold assets, significant generational differences in value orientations, not exposed to future costs of issues like climate change (BUT age is rarely defining line of ideological conflict)

5. segregation of cosmopolitan cities vs conservative hinterland voters = emergence of geographical cleavages

   1. increased polarization, people are incentivized to move place where they “fit” better (young, skilled migrants in center, aging in periphery)

dilemmas for center-left parties in the face of evolving social cleavages

seek additional support from middle-class progressive and ethnic minority voters WITHOUT losing support from their traditional working class electorate (risk inflaming nativist sentiments…)

dilemmas for center right parties in the face of evolving social cleavages

cannot ignore the competition from the radical right for socially conservative and nationalist voters, but adopting stronger stances on radical right issues or bringing in radical right parties risks losing moderate voters

lobbying

the attempt of organized interest groups to influence public officials’ decisions
—> Corporations and trade associations = the vast majority of lobbying expenditures by interest groups

—> lobbying increases when issues are considered more relevant/salient, or if there are big stakes for the organized interests
—> what matters is WHO YOU KNOW, not expertise

why is it difficult to study the effects of lobbying

to study the causal effect of the interest group upon the policy chosen, we would have to know

• the policy that would’ve been chosen w/o lobbying (impossible to observe)

• the policy actually chosen

• what the interest group really wants vs positions in public discourse (difficult to observe)

• omitted variable problem: some actors desire to be discrete

• endogenous selection: results will be biased upwards as those who don’t acc expect policy change don’t lobby

why is “why is there so little money in politics” the right question to ask

lobbying is considered buying politicians, but really US budget spends a tiny % on lobbying (10 bill out of ~4,000 bill total) = Tullock’s paradox: rent-seekers seeking political favors can usually bribe politicians to give them favors at a cost much lower than the value of the favor to the rent-seeker

why is there so little money in politics?

• lobbies provide $ contributions AND votes = votes are a better source of influence than money

• politically active firms may obtain policy benefits at the expense of other firms = firms who lobby tend to be bigger than those who don’t

• money doesn’t seem to be the biggest driver of lobbying

what are the sources of influence of interest groups? which matter the most and why?

votes, money, but POLITICAL CONNECTIONS matter the most = businessmen have better chance at entering politics than politicians have at entering business

lobbying as a legislative subsidy

5 assumptions;

1. For a legislator to have much influence on policy, he must work at it. 

2. Legislators’ resources are scarce. 

3. At any given point in time, individual legislators care about influencing more than one policy. 

4. Legislators care about some issues more than others. 

5. Relative to legislators, lobbyists are specialists. 

—> lobbyists make it more worthwhile to the legislator to work on the issue the lobbyists care about
—> legislator’s efforts are more productive with the assistance of lobbyists (in-depth policy analysis, help with speech writing, information concerning other legislators...)

what is informational lobbying? study by Hirsch et al.

politicians are often uncertain about policy effects on econ + political outcomes, so refer to better informed lobbyists either through cheap talk or costly info transmission

Hirsch et al: lobbyist’s value derives from his ability to selectively screen which clients he brings to a politician = earns politician’s trust and preferential treatment for his clients

—> lobbyist receives information from the politician as well, i.e. planned bills by govt (related to economic trends, political ambitions, social consequences, etc.)

media consumption matrix

a matrix identifying the news sources used by subjects the week prior to the survey; a source which some people use EXCLUSIVELY (i.e. in a week ONLY media 1, not media 1 and media 2) might be more impactful

attention share of a media source

for a group of people, equals 1 if only use this source, equals ½ if people use this source AND another, 1/3 if use two other sources as well, etc. = can be used to construct a media power index

media power index (Prat)

constructed from attention share, at which point a media can influence voters (through biased reporting) and make a candidate win instead of another than was supposed to win
= basically what share of votes can this media source control? (but depends on assuming that all voters are naive… not empirically true —> Prat’s worst case scenario: voters don’t realize media is trying to manipulate them and they don’t attempt to undo the bias)

why is platform-centric data not useful to study the power of a media outlet? why do we need individual-level data?

platform-centric show that x ppl consume TV A, y ppl consume newspaper B, z ppl consume radio C = could be overlap

—> needs to be individual centered to see if there is overlap or if ppl consume a certain media source exclusively = will reveal power

how are informational inequality, information poverty and connectedness related to income inequality?

countries w/ high internet penetration: informational & income inequality are strongly positively correlated (same for information poverty)
BUT countries w/ low internet penetration (availability): weaker pos. correlation (same for information poverty)
—> connectedness: the probability that random people use a common source of information
high internet penetration: connectedness & income inequality are strongly negatively correlated (more equal = use the same source)
low internet penetration: no correlation