PA30 Final Review

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Last updated 1:07 AM on 6/11/26
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121 Terms

1
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3 types of social dilemmas

  1. externalities

  2. coordination problems

  3. commitment problems

2
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what are two types of problems related to incomplete information?

  1. Agency problems

  2. strategic adjustment

3
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consequentialism

assessing the rightness of a policy based on its consequences; if the policy leads to a good outcome, then it is the right thing to do.

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Utilitarianism

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3 components of classical utilitarianism. Explain each.

  1. Hedonism: an individual has greater welfare if they have more pleasure/less pain

  2. Welfarism: a state of the world is better if it has more aggregate welfare

  3. Consequentialism: an action is right if it leads to a better state of the world

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Benefits of utilitarianism

  • easier to compare trade-offs

  • transforms philosophical inquiries into empirical questions

  • treats everyone in a population equally and supports equity enhancing policies that maximize aggregate welfare

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Challenges of utilitarianism

  • deciding whose utility matters most

  • aggregate utility is not always the right outcome

  • not all preferences are legitimate

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Deontology

assessing the rightness of a policy based on its conformity to a moral norm or duty, not based on its consequences, whether an act is right has priority over whether it has a good outcome

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Kant’s categorical imperatives

  1. Only do what is “right” for everyone else to do

  2. We should never treat another persons humanity as a means to an end, but as the end itself

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benefits of Kantian ethics

  • we cannot make selfish decisions

  • it accommodates special human relationships

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challenges of Kantian ethics

  • suggests not to lie, even when necessary

  • its hard to weigh trade-offs

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Libertarianism

a deontological framework that evaluates policy based on its respect for self ownership, emphasizes consent

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casual effects

change in outcomes attributed solely to a policy

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3 modes of statistical inference

  1. descriptive inference: summarizing relationships

  2. predictive forecasting

  3. causal inference

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what is the difference between a descriptive and causal claim?

what happened vs what would have happened

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what is the fundamental problem of causal inference

we cannot observe the same unit, in the same moment, with or without the treatment and control

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What is a counterfactual?

What the outcome would have looked like in the absence of the intervention

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selection bias

errors due to systematically different relevant characteristics between those who are in the study and those who are not, data does not reflect target population

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what is the difference between correlation and causation?

correlation indicated a pattern between two variables. Causation indicated one variable directly causes the other to change.

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What are the components of a game (game theory)?

  • actors'

  • payoffs'

  • information

  • strategies

  • outcome

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strategic interaction

situations in which others choices directly affect your well being

22
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interdependence

The costs and benefits associated with a particular choice depends on what others do

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non strategic interaction

situations where ones pay offs do not depend on what others do

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What is the difference between a matrix and decision game theory game

In decision tree, one player can see the other players strategy before making their decision. This is not possible in a matrix game.

25
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Nash Equilibrium:

a situation in which a player will continue with their chosen strategy after taking into consideration their opponents strategy

26
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What is the value of models?

they simplify data to focus on essential features of a problem

27
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policy 1 Pareto dominates policy 2 if…

  • nobody strictly prefers policy 2 to 1

  • at least one person strictly prefers 1 to 2

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Pareto dominant

if shifting from one policy to another makes at least one person better off and nobody worse off

If a policy pareto dominates another policy, it is a Pareto improvement

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when is a policy Pareto efficient?

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When is a policy Pareto inefficient?

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social dilemma

situation in which everyone behaves in a self-interested manner because they anticipate everyone to do so, and that leads to a Pareto inefficient outcome.

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If you are in a game where the Nash equilibrium is Pareto inefficient, that is a ___

social dilemma

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problem with social dilemmas

requires people to act in a manner that’s not for their self interest (not likely)

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benefit of social dilemma

pareto improvements are possible

35
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externalities

a spillover effect on the welfare of others

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positive externality

the spillover effect enhances the wellbeing of others

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public goods

non-excludable and non rivalrous goods

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policy solutions to encourage contributions to public goods

  • persuasion

  • reduce individual cost

  • boost individual benefit

    • subsidize contributions

    • punish inaction

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negative externality

negative spillover effect

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policy solutions for affecting public goods

  • impose taxes

  • regulate/punish violators

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__ are oversupplied. Why?

negative externalities because actor does not internalize all of the costs associated with this behavior.

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__ are undersupplied. Why?

positive externalities because people are less likely to engage in behavior that is in the best interest g

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Commons

a set of common pool resources which yield infinite flows of benefits, where it is difficult and costly to exclude potential users.

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2 features of commons

rivalrous and non excludable

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What conditions invite tragedy?

settings where there is a large group, nobody communicates, and where no rights to the resources exist.

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why do the conditions of tragedy make the problem worse?

  • hard to police behavior

  • hard to define a set of legitimate users

  • hard to establish rules

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What policy solutions exist for tragedy of the commons?

  • privatization

  • taxation

  • subsidies

  • regulation

  • self-organization

48
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self organization

The resource users establish basic rules- which actions are permitted and by whom

49
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tragedy of the commons

individual overuse of a shared resource that causes collective detriment

50
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Agglomeration

clustering of economic activity (industries) in a particular location

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Why does agglomeration happen?

one firm’s payoff can be higher if they locate in a particular city if another firm is also in that city and vice versa

52
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strategic complementaries

the benefit of taking an action is larger when other actors also take that action.

53
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3 types of coordination problems. Describe them.

  1. pure coordination: equally advantageous equilibria

  2. distributional: players favor different equilibria

  3. coordination traps: one equilibrium Pareto dominates another

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only __ can generate a social dilemma

coordination traps

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coordination trap

when there are multiple equilibria but one Pareto dominates the other

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“trap” part of coordination trap

neither actor want to deviate from the inefficient Nash equilibrium, but would both be better off with the other equilibrium

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possible policy solutions for coordination problems

communication, leadership, insurance

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why are short term interventions sufficient for coordination problems?

it is self reinforcing because neither player wants to deviate from the new, better equilibrium

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commitment problems

when one or both parties have the incentive to renege on an agreement

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hold up problems

a lack of commitment leads to inefficiently low levels of investment

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fundamental problem of exchange

one party may have the opportunity to cheat the other

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what was the silk road and how did solve the fundamental problem of exchange?

escrow, rating systems, banning traders

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State

entity with a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.

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How do states solve commitment problems?

  • punishes predatory behavior

  • fear of prosecution leads to optimal behavior

  • all individuals benefit from how state constrains choice

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Wars are an example of what social dilemma and why?

commitment problems because was is a failure of bargaining, an inefficient outcome that a parties would avoid in the absence of bargaining imperfections.

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political commitment problems

Political elites may oppose policies that generate Pareto improvements, because they fear that those policies may erode their future power.

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How do commitment problems get in the way of autocrats stepping down?

the next regime cannot assure the autocrat of immunity. fear of prosecution abroad or at home

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Anarchy

a state or society with government or formal authority

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Asymmetric Information

In games of incomplete information, an actor (or actors) may not their counterparts payoffs or choices.

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Principal

person hiring

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Agent

person being hired

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principal agent problems

When a principal offers a contract to an agent and there are conflicting interests or asymmetric information

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Hidden type

agent’s traits

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Hidden actions

agents choices

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adverse selection

hidden type problem, how can principal recruit an agent who works to advance principals interests?

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moral hazard

hidden action problem, how can principal control agents behavior after being hired

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how to address adverse selection

  • collect information on type

  • amplify benefits that appeal to good types

  • ask agents for warranties and guarantees

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How can we address moral hazard?

  • monitoring agents

  • modifying incentives of agent to align interests

  • stipulate a code of ethics, in which agents commit t serving their principals.

79
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The Alignment problem

how do you ensure AI systems pursue the user’s goals, protect human values, misalignment.

80
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Two goals as policymakers:

  1. use policy to help solve principal agent problems that arise in other sectors

  2. try to eliminate agency problems that leads public officials to act to voter’s interest.

81
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Why aren’t agency problems social dilemmas

there may not be solutions that promise pareto improvements

82
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How do we avoid adverse selection when voting for elected officials?

  • vetting parties- debates, primaries, opposition research

  • media- fact checking, investigative journalism

  • ethics investigations

83
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Why DO institutions and the desire to win re-election keep polls in line?

  • leaders are limited by history and must choose from a historically determined set of choices.

  • leaders are limited by institutions

  • leaders are given too much credit because we have a psychological need to attribute change to a higher power.

84
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Why WONT institutions and the desire to win re-election keep polls in line?

  • institutions are limited and provide only limited restraints

  • identity shapes policy priorities

85
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Attractiveness Ratio:

A= rents + wages/public service motivation + wages

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wages

formal compensation

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rents

informal benefits from holding office

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Public service motivations

ethic of serving others

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What happens when the attractiveness ratio A appears large to many people?

more bad types are more likely to run for office

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How might we reduce the attractiveness ratio?

  • checks and balances that limit rent (informal benefits)

    • free press/ investigative journalism

    • enforced ethics rules

    • opposition research, electoral competition

  • Instilling a public service ethos

    • national service requirements

    • conferring status to public officials

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Success Ratio

S = probability of electing bad/ probability of electing good

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why would success ratio S not likely to ever be zero?

in some cases, voters prefer a low quality candidate that shares their own policy preferences to a high quality candidate from the other group

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How might we reduce the success ratio?

  • free press

  • electoral competition

  • primary elections

  • limited polarization

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Opportunity Cost Ratio

O=outside option of bad/ outside option of good

95
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how to lower opportunity cost ratio

  • not permitting lobbying and campaign contributions

  • suppressing a private sector

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Accountability Ratio

R = probability of re-electing bad/ probability of re-electing good

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What is the accountability ratio related to?

moral hazard

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how to limit moral hazard in relation to elected officials

  • monitoring

    • media

    • ethics inquiries

    • oversight from other branches of government

  • Performance incentives

    • re-election

    • impeachment

    • campaign contributions

    • civil disobedience

  • Ethics

    • oath of office

    • pledges to never do a certain act

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What is public corruption?

abuse of power for private benefit

100
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What is correlated with corruption?

  • low income/ education

  • less open to trade

  • greater regulation to entry

  • less press freedom

  • lack of democracy