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3 types of social dilemmas
externalities
coordination problems
commitment problems
what are two types of problems related to incomplete information?
Agency problems
strategic adjustment
consequentialism
assessing the rightness of a policy based on its consequences; if the policy leads to a good outcome, then it is the right thing to do.
Utilitarianism
3 components of classical utilitarianism. Explain each.
Hedonism: an individual has greater welfare if they have more pleasure/less pain
Welfarism: a state of the world is better if it has more aggregate welfare
Consequentialism: an action is right if it leads to a better state of the world
Benefits of utilitarianism
easier to compare trade-offs
transforms philosophical inquiries into empirical questions
treats everyone in a population equally and supports equity enhancing policies that maximize aggregate welfare
Challenges of utilitarianism
deciding whose utility matters most
aggregate utility is not always the right outcome
not all preferences are legitimate
Deontology
assessing the rightness of a policy based on its conformity to a moral norm or duty, not based on its consequences, whether an act is right has priority over whether it has a good outcome
Kant’s categorical imperatives
Only do what is “right” for everyone else to do
We should never treat another persons humanity as a means to an end, but as the end itself
benefits of Kantian ethics
we cannot make selfish decisions
it accommodates special human relationships
challenges of Kantian ethics
suggests not to lie, even when necessary
its hard to weigh trade-offs
Libertarianism
a deontological framework that evaluates policy based on its respect for self ownership, emphasizes consent
casual effects
change in outcomes attributed solely to a policy
3 modes of statistical inference
descriptive inference: summarizing relationships
predictive forecasting
causal inference
what is the difference between a descriptive and causal claim?
what happened vs what would have happened
what is the fundamental problem of causal inference
we cannot observe the same unit, in the same moment, with or without the treatment and control
What is a counterfactual?
What the outcome would have looked like in the absence of the intervention
selection bias
errors due to systematically different relevant characteristics between those who are in the study and those who are not, data does not reflect target population
what is the difference between correlation and causation?
correlation indicated a pattern between two variables. Causation indicated one variable directly causes the other to change.
What are the components of a game (game theory)?
actors'
payoffs'
information
strategies
outcome
strategic interaction
situations in which others choices directly affect your well being
interdependence
The costs and benefits associated with a particular choice depends on what others do
non strategic interaction
situations where ones pay offs do not depend on what others do
What is the difference between a matrix and decision game theory game
In decision tree, one player can see the other players strategy before making their decision. This is not possible in a matrix game.
Nash Equilibrium:
a situation in which a player will continue with their chosen strategy after taking into consideration their opponents strategy
What is the value of models?
they simplify data to focus on essential features of a problem
policy 1 Pareto dominates policy 2 if…
nobody strictly prefers policy 2 to 1
at least one person strictly prefers 1 to 2
Pareto dominant
if shifting from one policy to another makes at least one person better off and nobody worse off
If a policy pareto dominates another policy, it is a Pareto improvement
when is a policy Pareto efficient?
When is a policy Pareto inefficient?
social dilemma
situation in which everyone behaves in a self-interested manner because they anticipate everyone to do so, and that leads to a Pareto inefficient outcome.
If you are in a game where the Nash equilibrium is Pareto inefficient, that is a ___
social dilemma
problem with social dilemmas
requires people to act in a manner that’s not for their self interest (not likely)
benefit of social dilemma
pareto improvements are possible
externalities
a spillover effect on the welfare of others
positive externality
the spillover effect enhances the wellbeing of others
public goods
non-excludable and non rivalrous goods
policy solutions to encourage contributions to public goods
persuasion
reduce individual cost
boost individual benefit
subsidize contributions
punish inaction
negative externality
negative spillover effect
policy solutions for affecting public goods
impose taxes
regulate/punish violators
__ are oversupplied. Why?
negative externalities because actor does not internalize all of the costs associated with this behavior.
__ are undersupplied. Why?
positive externalities because people are less likely to engage in behavior that is in the best interest g
Commons
a set of common pool resources which yield infinite flows of benefits, where it is difficult and costly to exclude potential users.
2 features of commons
rivalrous and non excludable
What conditions invite tragedy?
settings where there is a large group, nobody communicates, and where no rights to the resources exist.
why do the conditions of tragedy make the problem worse?
hard to police behavior
hard to define a set of legitimate users
hard to establish rules
What policy solutions exist for tragedy of the commons?
privatization
taxation
subsidies
regulation
self-organization
self organization
The resource users establish basic rules- which actions are permitted and by whom
tragedy of the commons
individual overuse of a shared resource that causes collective detriment
Agglomeration
clustering of economic activity (industries) in a particular location
Why does agglomeration happen?
one firm’s payoff can be higher if they locate in a particular city if another firm is also in that city and vice versa
strategic complementaries
the benefit of taking an action is larger when other actors also take that action.
3 types of coordination problems. Describe them.
pure coordination: equally advantageous equilibria
distributional: players favor different equilibria
coordination traps: one equilibrium Pareto dominates another
only __ can generate a social dilemma
coordination traps
coordination trap
when there are multiple equilibria but one Pareto dominates the other
“trap” part of coordination trap
neither actor want to deviate from the inefficient Nash equilibrium, but would both be better off with the other equilibrium
possible policy solutions for coordination problems
communication, leadership, insurance
why are short term interventions sufficient for coordination problems?
it is self reinforcing because neither player wants to deviate from the new, better equilibrium
commitment problems
when one or both parties have the incentive to renege on an agreement
hold up problems
a lack of commitment leads to inefficiently low levels of investment
fundamental problem of exchange
one party may have the opportunity to cheat the other
what was the silk road and how did solve the fundamental problem of exchange?
escrow, rating systems, banning traders
State
entity with a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.
How do states solve commitment problems?
punishes predatory behavior
fear of prosecution leads to optimal behavior
all individuals benefit from how state constrains choice
Wars are an example of what social dilemma and why?
commitment problems because was is a failure of bargaining, an inefficient outcome that a parties would avoid in the absence of bargaining imperfections.
political commitment problems
Political elites may oppose policies that generate Pareto improvements, because they fear that those policies may erode their future power.
How do commitment problems get in the way of autocrats stepping down?
the next regime cannot assure the autocrat of immunity. fear of prosecution abroad or at home
Anarchy
a state or society with government or formal authority
Asymmetric Information
In games of incomplete information, an actor (or actors) may not their counterparts payoffs or choices.
Principal
person hiring
Agent
person being hired
principal agent problems
When a principal offers a contract to an agent and there are conflicting interests or asymmetric information
Hidden type
agent’s traits
Hidden actions
agents choices
adverse selection
hidden type problem, how can principal recruit an agent who works to advance principals interests?
moral hazard
hidden action problem, how can principal control agents behavior after being hired
how to address adverse selection
collect information on type
amplify benefits that appeal to good types
ask agents for warranties and guarantees
How can we address moral hazard?
monitoring agents
modifying incentives of agent to align interests
stipulate a code of ethics, in which agents commit t serving their principals.
The Alignment problem
how do you ensure AI systems pursue the user’s goals, protect human values, misalignment.
Two goals as policymakers:
use policy to help solve principal agent problems that arise in other sectors
try to eliminate agency problems that leads public officials to act to voter’s interest.
Why aren’t agency problems social dilemmas
there may not be solutions that promise pareto improvements
How do we avoid adverse selection when voting for elected officials?
vetting parties- debates, primaries, opposition research
media- fact checking, investigative journalism
ethics investigations
Why DO institutions and the desire to win re-election keep polls in line?
leaders are limited by history and must choose from a historically determined set of choices.
leaders are limited by institutions
leaders are given too much credit because we have a psychological need to attribute change to a higher power.
Why WONT institutions and the desire to win re-election keep polls in line?
institutions are limited and provide only limited restraints
identity shapes policy priorities
Attractiveness Ratio:
A= rents + wages/public service motivation + wages
wages
formal compensation
rents
informal benefits from holding office
Public service motivations
ethic of serving others
What happens when the attractiveness ratio A appears large to many people?
more bad types are more likely to run for office
How might we reduce the attractiveness ratio?
checks and balances that limit rent (informal benefits)
free press/ investigative journalism
enforced ethics rules
opposition research, electoral competition
Instilling a public service ethos
national service requirements
conferring status to public officials
Success Ratio
S = probability of electing bad/ probability of electing good
why would success ratio S not likely to ever be zero?
in some cases, voters prefer a low quality candidate that shares their own policy preferences to a high quality candidate from the other group
How might we reduce the success ratio?
free press
electoral competition
primary elections
limited polarization
Opportunity Cost Ratio
O=outside option of bad/ outside option of good
how to lower opportunity cost ratio
not permitting lobbying and campaign contributions
suppressing a private sector
Accountability Ratio
R = probability of re-electing bad/ probability of re-electing good
What is the accountability ratio related to?
moral hazard
how to limit moral hazard in relation to elected officials
monitoring
media
ethics inquiries
oversight from other branches of government
Performance incentives
re-election
impeachment
campaign contributions
civil disobedience
Ethics
oath of office
pledges to never do a certain act
What is public corruption?
abuse of power for private benefit
What is correlated with corruption?
low income/ education
less open to trade
greater regulation to entry
less press freedom
lack of democracy