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A posteriori knowledge
Propositional knowledge acquired from/justified by experience
A priori intuition
A belief which is (1) non-inferentially justified and (2) a priori (justified without the need for the experience). Cogito is a priori intuition
A priori knowledge
Propositional knowledge not acquired from/not justified by experience
Ability knowledge
Knowing hoe to perform a task
Acquaintance knowledge
Knowing X by direct contact with X. For example, knowing the taste of pineapple
Analytic truth
A proposition whose truth depends only upon the meanings of its constituent terms. For example, a bachelor is an unmarried man
Berkeley’s idealism
The view that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (caused by God). All that exists in minds and their ideas
Clear and distinct ideas
A concept for which (a) its content is obvious to an attentive mind (clear) and (b) any concepts not belonging to it are excluded from it (distinct)
Cogito
One’s knowledge of one’s own existence. An a priori intuition which is the foundation of one’s other knowledge and is undoubtable
Contingent truth
A proposition that is true in the actual world but false in at least one possible world (it could ha been false)
Descartes’ sceptical arguments
The arguments that Descartes uses as part of his methods of doubt: (1) the illusion argument - illusions show that we cannot trust our experiences (2) the dreaming argument - it is impossible to rule out that i am dreaming now (3) the evil demon argument - that it is impossible to rule out that an evil being has complete control of my thoughts and experiences
Direct realism
The view that the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties. (A) realism - mind-independent objects and their properties exist (b) direct - we perceive these objects as they are
Empiricism
The view that (a) all of our concepts are ultimately caused by experience; there are no innate concepts and (b) all synthetic knowledge is a posteriori; there is no innate knowledge and no synthetic a priori knowledge
Epistemic virtue (response to Gettier)
The view that S knows that p if and only if: (1) p is true, (2) s believes that p, and (3) S arrivied at the truth of p due to the use of their epistemological virtues
Global scepticism
Philosophical scepticism applied to al knowledge claims. The view that we have no knowledge; that (almost) none of our usual forms of justification for our beliefs are adequate
Indirect realism
The view that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (sense data) that are caused by and represent mind-independent objects.
Necessary conditions for knowledge
A condition that is needed for X. A necessary condition for X is one that must be fulfilled in order for something to be X. For example, a necessary condition for being a vixen is being a fox, something must be a fox in order to be a vixen
Infallibilism
The view that S knows that p if and only if: p is true, S believes that p and S has a justification that guarantees the truth of p
Innatism
The view that some rationalists take that (1) our mind has always contained particular truths and concepts which (2) we can discover and which (3) are not from experience. They are a priori, though experience might have some role in triggering our discovery of them. The mind is, therefore, not a tabula rasa as empiricists suggest
Intuition and deduction thesis
The view that all knowledge is either (a) justified non-inferentially by a priori intuition or (b) justified inferentially through a priori deduction. Using these methods, according to Descartes, we can gain knowledge of the self, god and the external world
Jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge
Conditions that, together are enough for X. Jointly sufficient condition for X are conditions that, when al fulfilled guarantee that something is X. For example, being a fox and being female are together jointly sufficient conditions for something being a vixen
Lemma
A proposition that is used by someone as part of their justification of another proposition
Local scepticism
Philosophical scepticism about a specific domain and based on a specific type of justification
No false lemmas theory (response to gettier)
The view that S knows that p is and only if: p is true, S believes that p, S is justified in believing that p and S’s belief that p is not inferred from any false proposition
Primary quality
A power of mind-independent objects to cause an idea in our minds that resembles the actual inherent properties of the object. The primary qualities are number, extension, motion, shape, solidity. They are inseparable from the object
Propositional knowledge
Knowing that a proposition is true that p. For example, knowing that it is raining
Reliabilism (response to gettier)
The view that S knows that p if and only if: p is true, S believes that p, S’s belief that p was caused by a reliable cognitive process
Secondary qualities
A power of a mind-independent objects to cause an idea in our minds that does not resemble the actual inherent properties of the object. The secondary qualities are colour, taste, smell, sound, texture. The object can be conceived of as not having them and they vary from each perceiver
Sense data
Sense data is what we are directly aware of during perception (if not direct realist). They have the properties that they appear to have; properties that are known to us with certainty. They are private as it is only perceived by one person.
Solipsism
The view that my mind is all i can have knowledge of (epistemological solipsism). The view that only my mind exists (metaphysical solipsism)
Synthetic truth
A proposition whose truth depends upon how reality is in addition to the meanings of its constituent concepts
Time lag argument
The fact that the physical processes associated with experience take a finite amount of time no mater how small. This means that at the exact moment that it seems to you as if there is an object with particular properties, it could be the case that the way things are in the external world at that moment are different to how they seem at that moment to you. For example, when it seems to me that there is a star in the sky, t could be the case that the star has already died.
Tripartite view of knowledge
The view that S knows that p if and only if: p is true, S believes that p, S is justified for believing that p