Problems for Dualism

Interactionism

The physical and mental cause each other. They interact.

Epiphenomenalism

The physical causes the mental. The mental has no causal role.

Property dualism

The view that there is one kind of substance (physical), but it has both physical and non-physical (mental) properties that are not reducible.

Substance dualism

The view that there are two distinct substances, physical (body) and non-physical (mind), which exist independently.

Problem of other minds

Dualism claims mental states are private and not directly observable, so we only see behaviour. Therefore we cannot be certain others have minds, leading to solipsism.

Argument from analogy

We know our own mental states cause our behaviour, and others behave similarly so we infer by analogy that they have similar mental states.

Best hypothesis response

Dualists can claim the best explanation of behaviour is that others have minds like ours. Alternative explanations fail, but this is not logically provable.

Category mistake

Substance dualism claims the mind is a separate substance alongside the body. Ryle argues this is a category mistake, as the mind is just behaviour and dispositions.

Conceptual interaction problem

Interactionist substance dualism claims the non-physical mind causally interacts with the body. But a non-extended mind cannot make contact, so interaction seems impossible.

Empirical interaction problem

Interactionist dualism claims mental events can cause physical events. But a non-physical mind cannot transfer energy, so this conflicts with conservation of energy.

Introspective self-knowledge

Epiphenomenalism claims mental states have no causal power, yet we voice them. This suggests mental states cause behaviour, so self-knowledge of mental states doesn’t make sense.

Phenomenology of mental life

Epiphenomenalism claims mental states do not cause anything. But our experience suggests mental states cause actions and other mental states.

Natural selection and evolution

Epiphenomenalism claims mental states have no causal role. But evolution only selects traits that affect behaviour, so consciousness becomes hard to explain.