EMP- Berkeley quotes

quote about possible abstract idea of triangle

‘idea of a triangle, which is, neither oblique, nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once’

quote about denying possibility of abstraction

‘I deny that I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated’

Paragraph on summary of berkeley’s argument for immaterialism

Berkeley’s argument for immaterialism can be summarised through the following premises. Firstly, we only perceive sensible qualities, which are qualities that are experienced through the senses. Sensible qualities depend on minds for their existence, existing when they are perceived by a mind. Sensible objects are collections of these sensible qualities, so they also depend on minds for their existence. Ordinary things are sensible objects as they are perceived by the senses. Therefore, ordinary things depend on the mind for their existence and do not exist unperceived

on EP view what are sensible qualities?

‘essentially and exhaustively an appearance’

In the Dialogues, Berkeley uses Philonous to illustrate the mind-dependence of objects as a response to Hylas’ conviction that……

‘to exist is one thing, and to be perceived is another.’

quote on likeness principles

‘an idea can be like nothing but an idea’

In the First Dialogue, Berkeley highlights the intuition behind this claim (likeness principle) through Philonous, who asks Hylas…

‘can a real thing in itself invisible be like a colour; or a real thing which is not audible, be like a sound?’

quote of example of sensible qualities being essentially perceived

‘there was an odour, that is, it was smelled’

what ’seems perfectly unintelligible’?

‘the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived’

consequence of supposition that material objects do still exist and correspond to ideas

‘it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless’

quote on existence of sensible qualities we no longer perceive

‘they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit’

Berkeley recognises this problem(how objects continue to exist unperceived) in section 45 of the Principles, noting that some will object that…

‘from the foregoing principles it follows, things are every moment annihilated and created anew’

what does Berkeley say he means by ‘wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the mind...’

‘I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever’

In the Dialogues, Philonous seems to reject phenomenalism after Hylas suggests that… simply reaffirming ideas can only exist when perceived in response.

‘the existence of a sensible thing consists in being perceivable’

argument + quote on ideas as inactive

Berkeley argues that all of our ‘ideas, sensations, or the things which we perceive’ are ‘visibly inactive’, holding no power or agency, meaning that ideas cannot cause other ideas

quote where Berkeley denies that God can perceive through sense

‘God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we do, whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted by nothing; it is evident, such a being as this can suffer nothing, nor be affected with any painful sensation or indeed any sensation at all’

quote on spirit and what does he refer to them as

a spirit is ‘one simple, undivided, active being’ and refers to these spirits as substances.

In the 1734 edition of the Principles, Berkeley adds the suggestion that…

we have a ‘notion’ of spirit, in the sense that we understand the meaning of the word, but provides little explanation of how we gain this understanding

In the Dialogues, Philonous suggests that the self is known … unlike our knowledge of a colour, for example, which is known through perception

‘immediately or intuitively’

Lloyd quote

‘there is no cognition without conation’

This objection, known as the Parity Objection, is recognised by Berkeley and voiced through Hylas, who replies to Philonous…

‘you admit… that there is spiritual substance, although you have no idea of it ; while you deny there can be such a thing as material substance, because you have no notion or idea of it’

Hylas suggests that, given the notion of spiritual substance has no meaning… suggesting a rejection of spiritual substance is necessary

‘it should follow that you are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them’

Melissa Frankel suggests that the notion of spiritual substance has meaning because it explains what we observe. For example, Philonous argues that although we have no immediate knowledge of other spirits, by reflection of the…

‘signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves’, we can infer that there is a ‘probability’ that spiritual substance exists

We cannot perceive other spirits, but we may be able to infer them from…

‘the ideas by them excited in us’ section 145

Berkeley explains how i make this inference(of other thinking beings), writing that

‘I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents like myself’