MLM Language

Causal-Communicative Model of Reference (Saul Kripke)

The stock of names in a language is similar to a connection of ropes that people accumulate throughout their lives — you are linked by the usage of a name

Descriptive Model of Reference

The stock of names in a language is applied in the sense of their traits, expression are connected to objects through its description

Fregean Theory of Names

every name is associated with a property that are conventionally linked, once this association is formed, the speaker has to acknowledge this when learning the name

Kripke’s Process of Name Referenton

1) the term is introduced as the name of the object

2) the name is spread across the linguistic community; descriptions build up

3) a general account develops of what a name refers to

Examples of names falling under descriptive model

Quantified noun phrases (Every, some, no, the… etc.)

Difference between quantified noun phrases

Transparent characterization, Referential stability, Emptiness & superfluidity, Rigidity

Transparent Characterization (QNP’s)

QNP’s extra description provides a-priori knowledge to the name — names don’t point out any clear descriptions

Referential Stability (QNP’s)

QNPs can be unstable if their description is outdated/non-applicable — names aren’t confined to this problem as stable referential devices

Emptiness & Superfluidity (QNP’s)

QNPs don’t guarantee charity or exclusiveness to the name — names often refer to one object

Rigidity (QNP’s)

The properties used by QNPs are more fluid with time and modality — names are modally and temporally rigid, regards to the same person regardless of the specified period

Semantics

establishment of certain meanings of expressions and explanations as to how they’re combined to make more complex expressions (aggreagate)

Meta Semantics

Explanations as to how our current expressions have gained their meaning (individualized)

Contingent A Priori

Some descriptive names don’t have to be contingent on the truth of the description to the object; a reputation can supersede a (real) name and the name loses its contextual necessity overtime

Necessary A Priori

Some names have to be actively discovered, as it’s not commonly associated with the object — its an active truth, but not one that is naturally known (deductively valid)

How is Kripke’s championing of the causal-communicative model anti-individualistic?

entails that language is used and influenced by factors external to the individual (community, society, etc.); there needs to be others sharing the name in order for it to be chained across multiple people

Rigid Designator

a property that would be associated with an object in every imagined scenario of the object — names are designators, descriptions are not

Sentential Context

occasions where we don’t allow the substitution of names to imply the same reference

Opacity

The value of not being able to substitute a word with one of the same truth value/reference while preserving the truth value of the sentence as a whole

Transparency

being able to substitute a word with one of the same truth value/reference while preserving the truth value of the sentence as a whole

The Error Reply (to sentential context)

even if someone doesn’t understand the qualitative equivalence of two names for the same object, a preposition for either name would reflect the same for the other name (presupposes people are irrational?)

Response to Error Reply

The practice of attributing beliefs to people is intimately tied up to explain and predict their behavior — if we embrace error theory, it can be hard to explain actions towards others based on their current beliefs

Names of Fiction vs. Names of Error

Fiction: a name is introduced with the knowledge that it has no corresponding object

Error: a name is introduced and falsely believed to have a real corresponding object

why do non-names matter

concerns our lack of ability to properly identify aspects which are actually part of this world; makes it easier to access worldly virtues but hinders the legitimacy of our reasoning

Claims that could help solve the puzzle of non-names

In fiction claims, meta-fictional claims, non-existence claims, synonymy claims, cognitive claims

In-fiction Claims of N-Names (creationism)

claims made by the fiction’s creator can be enough to apply it to reality, it can be analyzed in virtue of the activities of the people who use and create it

Meta fictional Claims of N-Names

by adding the context of the character as fictitious, claims applied to the name can be viewed as valid

non-existence claims of N-Names

just the idea they don’t exist

synonymy claim of n-names

if we compare n-names to each other and they don’t mean anything, it would weaken the validity of the name, which is often not the case

cognitive claim to n-names (operative anti-realism)

The additional belief that someone believes in the n-name’s existence can be sufficient to validate their truth usage in language, as its used in opaque contexts

Realist vs. Anti-Realist Theories of N-Names

Realist: N-names do refer, as they have properties that have some truth value

Anti-Realist: N-names don’t refer, and sentence that uses it is meaningless entirely; they have no truth value except for reflecting on the human reasoning and utility behind its use

Gappy preposition

The description about an object can be or seem true, but flawed in the fact that it is objectively false