Institutional Approach (Congress)

What is “new institutionalism” and how does it differ from a more standard approach to institutions (Class lecture)?

Institutions are not static they’re fluid and evolve over time. Operate in a broader environment and are influenced accordingly. Institutions aren’t empty vessels but are filled with political actions with unique political interests. Thus, institutions and their associated outcomes are partially influenced by the actors who operate within the institution. Institutions may serve as an instrument for political actors, and this are shaped to constrain/empower particular actors and bring about predictable outcomes.

The House (Institutions and Behaviors)

Size: Large in size (435 members), Proportional Representation (population) Executive Formal Powers: Initiate Revenue bills, Impeachment

Elections: Every 2 yrs, All members are up for office each election, localized constituency

Specialization: Limited choice (placed on committee by party leadership), Increased choice and power with seniority, High degree of socialization

National Visibility: Relatively low except leadership

Floor Action: Debate is closed, shorter and more focused, The House is like a “bus line”

The Senate (Institutions and Behaviors)

Size: Smaller in size, equal representation (2 per state)

Executive Formal Powers: Try impeachments, Advise and consent on presidential appointments, approval for treaties

Elections: Every 6 yrs, elections are staggered, statewide constituency

Specialization: Far greater autonomy, placement still determined by leadership, broader interests and seeking broader constituency

How has the senate changed over time— both in terms of the rules and the behavior of Senators? What factors help explain these changes?

In what ways is Sinclair’s description of the evolution of the Senate an example of “new institutionalism”?

Sinclair’s description highlights how the changes in Senate rules and behaviors reflect adaptive strategies influenced by political context, public opinion, and internal dynamics. This evolution exemplifies "new institutionalism" by demonstrating how institutions shape and are shaped by the interplay of established practices and contemporary political realities.

Sinclair

The New World of U.S. Senators is a comprehensive examination of the changing roles, behaviors, and rules governing U.S. Senators, emphasizing the impact of institutional dynamics on the legislative process.

Fenno

Homestyle Abstract develops the concept of how members of Congress engage with their constituents and cultivate relationships with them to ensure electoral support.

Mayhew

Congress The Electoral Connection Abstractby David Mayhew, the work analyzes how members of Congress prioritize re-election and engage with constituents to achieve electoral success.

What is the “electoral connection”? How does it help us better understand and redict eleite behavior (particularly members of Congress)?

Electoral connection is the idea that members of Congress are primarily motivated by the goal of reelection. Mayhew argues that understanding the desire to win reelection helps explain much of the behavior of members of Congress.

In what ways is the electoral connection theory explaining elite behavior similar to prior theories of American politics discussed in class?

The electoral connection helps to explain how elites go about advertising, credit claiming, and position takingto influence public opinion and secure voter support. This theory aligns with earlier models that emphasize the role of self-interest and responsiveness in democratic governance.

In what ways, are Mayhew and Fenno’s conception of members of Congress similar? How are they different? Hoe does each help us explain different forms of elite behavior?

Both Mayhew and Fenno argue that members of Congress are motivated by maintaining support from constituents and winning reelection. However, Mayhew focuses on the electoral incentives that shape behavior, arguing that members seek reelection through advertising, credit claiming, and position taking. Fenno focuses on how representatives build trust with constituents through their "home style," including personal connections, constituency service, and district visits. Mayhew explains why members engage in certain behaviors (to get reelected), while Fenno explains how they build the relationships that help them stay in office.

Are Fenno and Mayhew’s conceptions complimentary or competitive theories of elite behavior?

Mayhew and Fenno offer complementary explanations of elite behavior. Mayhew argues that members of Congress are motivated by reelection, while Fenno shows how they build constituent trust and support through their home style and constituency service. Mayhew explains the goal; Fenno explains the strategy.

How does Kings article “Running Scared” illustrate the electoral connection? In what ways do elections alter the behavior of elites in Congress?

David C. King’s “Running Scared” illustrates Mayhew’s electoral connection by showing that members of Congress shape their behavior based on reelection risk. When elections are competitive or uncertain, legislators become more responsive to constituents, increase visibility, and focus on constituency service and credit claiming. Even in safer districts, members still act strategically, but electoral vulnerability makes them “run scared” and adjust behavior more intensely to avoid losing office.

King

Running Scared analyzes how electoral pressures influence Congressional behavior, emphasizing the fear of losing elections prompts legislators to prioritize their constituents' preferences.

How is the “electoral connection” related to representation?

The “electoral connection” links representation to reelection incentives: because members of Congress want to stay in office, they adjust their behavior to appeal to voters. This means representation is largely shaped by what legislators think will help them win elections, leading them to be responsive to constituent preferences—especially visible or politically salient ones—rather than always acting solely on policy expertise or national interests.

How is the electoral connection goof for American representative democracy?

The electoral connection is good for American representative democracy because it makes members of Congress responsive to voters. Since reelection depends on public approval, legislators are incentivized to listen to constituents, provide constituency service, and remain visible and accountable, which strengthens representation and democratic responsiveness.

How is the electoral connection damaging to American representative democracy?

It can also be damaging because it encourages short-term, election-focused behavior rather than long-term policymaking. Members may prioritize credit claiming, symbolic actions, and popular positions over difficult or less visible policy decisions. It can also distort representation if politicians respond more to the most active or advantaged voters rather than the broader public interest.

Can the problems in Congress be resolved by electing new members to Congress? Why or why not?

Generally, no—simply electing new members to Congress does not resolve the underlying problems, because many issues are structural rather than individual. According to the logic of the electoral connection (Mayhew), all members face the same reelection incentives, so even new legislators quickly adapt to the same pressures to advertise, claim credit, and take strategic positions. Additionally, research like Gilens and Page suggests that broader forces—such as interest groups, economic elites, party systems, and campaign finance—shape policy outcomes, meaning individual replacement does not change the system’s incentives. As a result, new members tend to behave similarly to those they replace. In short, changing who is in Congress may change individuals, but it does not fix the institutional incentives that structure congressional behavior.

What are potential institutional reforms that may mitigate some of the current problems?

Potential institutional reforms that could improve Congress and reduce problems include campaign finance reform (limiting the influence of money and interest groups), independent redistricting commissions to reduce gerrymandering, and stronger voting rights protections to increase electoral competition and participation. Other proposals include increasing transparency in lobbying, public financing of elections, and ranked-choice voting or open primaries to reduce polarization and make representatives more responsive to a broader range of voters.

In what ways does an institutional approach help us netter understand U.S. politics?

An institutional approach helps us understand U.S. politics by focusing on how rules, structures, and incentives shape political behavior, rather than just individual choices or personalities. It shows that outcomes like congressional behavior, representation, and policy are influenced by institutions such as elections, Congress, parties, redistricting, and campaign finance systems. This perspective explains why political behavior is often consistent across different individuals, because actors respond to the same institutional constraints and incentives.

To what extent is American democracy pluralistic? In what ways do we fail to meet our normative ideals?

American democracy is partially pluralistic, meaning that many groups—especially organized interest groups—do have access to the policymaking process and can influence outcomes. However, pluralism is limited because influence is unevenly distributed. Research like Gilens and Page shows that economic elites and organized interests have far more influence than average citizens, especially when their preferences conflict. We fail to meet normative democratic ideals of political equality and equal representation because policy outcomes often reflect the preferences of wealthier individuals and powerful groups more than the general public. This challenges the ideal that all citizens have equal voice in government, revealing a gap between democratic theory and actual policy responsiveness.

What are potential institutional reforms that could address shortcomings in American democracy? What are arguments for and against these reforms?

Potential institutional reforms to address shortcomings in American democracy include campaign finance reform (limiting money and increasing public funding), independent redistricting commissions to reduce gerrymandering, expanding voting access (automatic registration, mail voting), and electoral reforms like ranked-choice voting or open primaries to reduce polarization and increase competition.

Arguments for these reforms: They improve political equality, reduce the influence of wealthy donors and interest groups, increase electoral competitiveness, and make representatives more responsive to a broader range of citizens, strengthening democratic legitimacy.

Arguments against these reforms: Critics argue they may reduce state and party control, create unintended consequences (like lower accountability or more fragmented parties), be difficult to implement constitutionally or politically, and may not fully solve deeper structural inequalities such as economic power disparities.