Mind-Body Problem

three basic metaphysical positions

• monistic materialism

• monistic idealism

• substance dualism/dualistic interactionism

monism

everything in the universe is composed of a single substance

• monistic materialism (physicalism) - everything is made of one material substance

• monistic idealism - everything is made of mind

substance dualism/dualistic interactionism

• There are two different ontologically basic substances in the universe.

• In human beings, these two substances causally interact.

Soul argument in favor of dualistic interactionism

the spirit implies existence without the body, therefore mind and body must be different substances

Conceivability Argument in favor of dualistic interactionism

1. I can conceive that I exist without a body.

2. I cannot conceive that I exist without a mind.

3. My mind is more intimately connected with me than my body, and thus my mind has a property (the property of being essentially connected with me) that my body lacks.

4. If my mind has at least one different property than my body, then by Leibniz’s Law my mind cannot be identical with my body.

Leibniz’s Law

For any two entities x and y, if they really are the same, then if x has property P, y must also have it and vice versa.

If X and Y have different defining properties, they must be different things.

disparate properties of Mind and Body

• physical/material - solid, extended in three-dimensional space, measurable, capable of causing things to happen in accordance with the laws of mechanics, publicly observable

• mental/non-material - not solid or material, not extended in three-dimensional space, occupies no space, cannot be measured, seems to be unable to make things happen in accord with invariant laws of mechanics, is not observable (epistemic privilege)

Argument from Intentionality in favor of Dualistic Interactionism

• Nothing material can express intentions or a will. The mind can express intentions or will.

• There are disparate properties/qualitative differences between mind and body.

• Mind and body are distinct entities by Leibniz’s Law.

Problem of Interaction as an argument against Substance Dualism

• Assume that substance dualism is true.

• If substance dualism is true, then the mind is an immaterial, non-extended thinking substance and the body is an extended physical substance.

• Immaterial non-extended substances cannot interact with extended physical substances.

• Mind and body interact with each other.

• Therefore: Substance Dualism is false.

Materialist interpretation of the universe/physicalist response against Substance Dualism

• the overwhelming weight of current scientific evidence supports a materialist interpretation of the universe

• MRIs, injuries, anecdotal evidence aggregated into a data set

physicalist perspectives against Dualism

• evidence from introspection is faulty - people cannot be trusted with their own perception/understanding of “mind”, cannot be vetted (epistemic privilege) and generalized to the entirety of humanity

• there is no need to refer to a mind or to make use of the concept to make sense of supposed “mind states”

• Logical Behaviorism

• Mind-Brain Identity Theory (Identity Theory)

Logical Behaviorism as physicalist perspective against Dualistic Interactionism

• all mental phenomena like beliefs and sensations can be adequately understood as dispositions to behave in certain ways

• minds are not fundamental substances/entities in the worlds

• human behavior can be understood in terms of stimuli, conditioning, and responses

• counter argument: a certain type of behavior is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for being in a certain mental states (ex. bad date)

the mind as a category mistake as a physicalist perspective against Dualistic Interactionism

taking a term or phrase that belongs in one logical or grammatical category and erroneously placing it in another category, then drawing wrong or inaccurate conclusions on this basis

• we hypostatize the mind through language when there is no mind substance entity at all

hypostatize

to construe an abstraction or concept as something real, universal, a substance, etc.

Ghost in the Machine

presumed mental and physical existence of Dualist perspective

Eliminative Materialism as a physicalist perspective against Dualistic Interactionism

• the elimination of the need for psychological terms justifies a corresponding elimination of psychological or mental entities

• explanatory argument - we need not refer to mental entities when we give explanations or accurate predictions of human behavior, so we are fully justified in eliminating mental terms

Folk Psychology Argument as a physicalist perspective against Dualistic Interactionism

references to pains, beliefs, desires should be rejected as folk psychological language and should be replaced with neurological language - all “mind states” are brain states

necessary and sufficient conditions

if X is a necessary condition of Y: without X, Y does not obtain

if X is a sufficient condition for Y: to have X will result in Y, X may not be necessary for Y and Y may be caused by other factors

The Mind-Brain Identity Theory as physicalist perspective against Dualistic Interactionism

• mental states are ultimately brain states

• words referring to mental events name real entities unfolding as neurological events

• the mind is not a substance

Qualia

the subjective point of experience, inner and qualitative

“Hard Problem” of consciousness/Qualia

the existence of an explanatory gap where no neuroscientist can provide a truly satisfying or conclusive explanation to how mental experience arises from physical processes/states; the appearance of a neurological event is utterly different from the experience of having a thought or a pain

Problem of mere correlation as a challenge to the Physicalist interpretations of the Mind-Body Problem

reductive materialism proves that mental states are correlated to brain states, not that they are identical

problem of non-falsifiability as a challenge to the Physicalist interpretations fo the Mind-Body Problem

claiming that neuroscience will, at some point in the future, prove Mind-Brain Identity true is not an argument