Poli129 midterm summmary of readings

Staffan Lindberg. 2010.  It’s Our Time to Chop: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-Patrimonialism rather than Counter-Act It?” Question

The central inquiry is whether multiparty elections in Africa, using Ghana as a case study, successfully counteract neo-patrimonialism or if they actually feed and reproduce these systems of patronage.

Staffan Lindberg. 2010.  It’s Our Time to Chop: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-Patrimonialism rather than Counter-Act It? Others Say

Scholarly views are divided: Diamond categorized Ghana as a "pseudo-democracy" due to flawed elections, while Sandbrook argued that neo-patrimonial traditions are more deeply rooted in the culture than liberal ones. Conversely, Nugent and Gyimah-Boadi viewed the 2001 turnover of power as an epochal step toward democratic consolidation, though Gyimah-Boadi later noted that the culture of patronage was setting its roots "ever more deeply".

Staffan Lindberg. 2010.  It’s Our Time to Chop: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-Patrimonialism rather than Counter-Act It?He says

Staffan I. Lindberg argues that elections alone do not tell the whole story and that patronage politics has actually increased during Ghana's democratic period. He contends that this persistent pattern of patron-client relationships threatens the heart of democratic consolidation by replacing public policy accountability with personal loyalty pacts.

Staffan Lindberg. 2010.  It’s Our Time to Chop: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-Patrimonialism rather than Counter-Act It? Theory

The research is framed by the theory of neo-patrimonialism, an informal political system based on personalized rule and clientelistic networks. In this system, "vertical accountability" is not about political programs but about providing personal favors (like "chop-money," funeral expenses, or school fees) in exchange for political loyalty and votes.

Staffan Lindberg. 2010.  It’s Our Time to Chop: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-Patrimonialism rather than Counter-Act It?Hypothesis-

 Lindberg operates on the premise that as political competition increases in a "winner-takes-all" game, the "bids" for loyalty get higher. He suggests that candidates must extract more resources to sustain patronage networks, leading them to prioritize personal

Staffan Lindberg. 2010.  It’s Our Time to Chop: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-Patrimonialism rather than Counter-Act It?Data and Tests-

The study utilized a survey of 76 Members of Parliament (MPs) in Ghana, covering their campaign experiences in 1992, 1996, and 2000. This was supplemented by 34 semi-structured interviews and two years of field observations of MP behavior in Parliament and on the campaign trail.

Staffan Lindberg. 2010.  It’s Our Time to Chop: Do Elections in Africa Feed Neo-Patrimonialism rather than Counter-Act It? Results

• Explosion in Spending: Campaign costs skyrocketed; by 2000, 46% of MPs spent at least two annual salaries on their campaigns, compared to 0% in 1992.

• Rise in Patronage: The share of funds spent on personalized benefits increased, with 57% of MPs spending more than 25% of their budget on patronage in 2000.

• Eroded Accountability: Increased patronage has weakened horizontal accountability, as MPs allocate less time to monitoring the government because they are preoccupied with solving the personal problems of their constituents.

• Funding Shifts: While NDC MPs relied heavily on party funds, NPP MPs relied more on private donations and salaries, creating a risk that private backers will claim returns on their social investment once the party is in power.

Barbara Geddes “Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?” Department of Political Science UCLA, manuscript March 2006.Question

 If authoritarian elections do not allow citizens to "throw the bums out" or choose government policies, why do dictators invest scarce resources in creating parties and holding elections?, Since these institutions are more easily changed in authoritarian regimes than in democracies, their prevalence suggests they must provide specific benefits to the incumbents,.

Barbara Geddes “Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?” Department of Political Science UCLA, manuscript March 2006.Others say

• Standard Democratic Theory: Parties are created primarily to compete effectively and win elections.

• Co-optation Theory: Scholars like Przeworski and Gandhi argue that legislatures and parties are used to co-opt the opposition by offering them limited control over policy,.

• Distributional Theory: Lust-Okar notes that deputies in authoritarian legislatures do not see their job as policy-making, but rather as delivering "pork" and benefits to local constituents.

• Signaling Satisfaction: Magaloni argues (specifically regarding Mexico) that supermajorities are intended to demonstrate that citizens are satisfied, thereby deterring potential rivals from breaking away to form an opposition,.

Barbara Geddes “Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?” Department of Political Science UCLA, manuscript March 2006. she says

Barbara Geddes, argues that parties and elections are personal survival strategies for dictators. While they may serve other purposes, their primary function during "normal" authoritarian times is to solve intra-regime conflicts and deter challenges from elite rivals, particularly the military,.

Barbara Geddes “Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?” Department of Political Science UCLA, manuscript March 2006. Theory

• Vested Interests: Parties create a class of militants who owe their wealth, jobs, and social mobility to the leader,. This creates a group with a strong stake in the regime's survival.

• Mobilization as Deterrence: These parties provide an organizational network that can mobilize mass demonstrations to support the leader on short notice,. This deters military plotters, who generally avoid interventions that might lead to civil war or require them to fire on civilians, which could cause the military to fracture,.

• Costly Signaling: Elections act as a "costly signal" of the incumbent's overwhelming resource advantage. By achieving supermajorities, the regime demonstrates that it is "the only game in town," making it clear to elite rivals that organizing an opposition is futile,.

Barbara Geddes “Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?” Department of Political Science UCLA, manuscript March 2006. Hypothesis

 Geddes hypothesizes that dictators invest in these institutions because they help to solve intra-regime conflicts that might otherwise end their rule,. Specifically, they serve as a counterbalance to the military and help to deter elite rivals from going into the opposition,.

Barbara Geddes “Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?” Department of Political Science UCLA, manuscript March 2006. Data and Tests

• The Dataset: Information was collected on approximately 170 modern authoritarian regimes from 1946 onwards, excluding monarchies and very small countries,.

• The Unit of Analysis: The "regime"—defined as a set of rules for choosing leaders—rather than individual dictators.

• Regime Categorization: Regimes were classified as military, personalist, single-party, or hybrids.

• Methodology: The study compared the average survival time of regimes that hold regular elections against those that do not,.

• Game Theory: The author used a strategic game model to show how the creation of a support party alters the "expected pay-off" for a faction considering a coup attempt,,.

Barbara Geddes “Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?” Department of Political Science UCLA, manuscript March 2006.Results

• Increased Longevity: Authoritarian regimes with regular elections last significantly longer than those without,.

    ◦ Military regimes with regular elections last an average of 20 years, compared to 6 years for those without.

    ◦ Personalist regimes with regular elections last 21 years, compared to 12 years for those without.

• Party Impact: Regimes initiated by a coup that created or co-opted a party survived more than twice as long (16.6 years) as those that remained partyless (6.7 years).

• Origins and Durability: Regimes that achieved power through insurgency or civil war (which are usually party-led) are the most durable, lasting an average of 29.7 years,.

• Strategic Deterrence: The game theory model suggests that parties reduce the probability of a successful coup by increasing the risk of reversal through mobilization, thereby forcing plotters to require a much higher level of dissatisfaction before attempting an ouster

Lisa Blaydes “Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management:  Theory and Evidence from Egypt” Princeton U. Conference on Dictatorships, manuscript, April 2008.-Question

How do authoritarian regimes use competitive parliamentary elections as a tool for elite management, and why do political entrepreneurs spend massive sums of money to win seats in a legislature that lacks real policy-making power?

Lisa Blaydes “Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management:  Theory and Evidence from Egypt” Princeton U. Conference on Dictatorships, manuscript, April 2008.-Others say

• Legitimacy: Conventional wisdom suggests elections are held to create an aura of legitimacy for domestic audiences and the international community to secure aid or trade benefits.

• Military Counterbalance: Some scholars, like Geddes, argue that parties and elections are used to counterbalance the threat of the military or factions within it.

• Policy Concessions: Gandhi and Przeworski suggest that legislatures are forums for co-opting the opposition through policy compromises.

• Symbolic Power: Wedeen argues that elections in autocracies are symbolic acts used to perpetuate "national fictions" of regime popularity, serving as a mechanism of coercion.

• Citizen-Focused Distribution: Lust-Okar posits that elections stabilize regimes by providing an arena for citizens to compete for state resources and services via candidates.

Lisa Blaydes “Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management:  Theory and Evidence from Egypt” Princeton U. Conference on Dictatorships, manuscript, April 2008.-She says

Author Lisa Blaydes argues that competitive elections in Egypt serve as the regime’s primary device for distributing rents and promotions to the politically influential upper class, including family heads, businessmen, and party apparatchik. For the elite, elections are a market mechanism to select those who will extract state rents; for the regime, they provide a way to manage distributive expectations and gather information on the competence and loyalty of its agents.

Lisa Blaydes “Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management:  Theory and Evidence from Egypt” Princeton U. Conference on Dictatorships, manuscript, April 2008.--Theory

The research builds on the idea that elections act as a contract or powersharing arrangement between the dictator and the elite coalition.

• Market for Rents: Elections function as an "auction" for the right to parliamentary immunity, which allows elites to engage in corruption and graft with little fear of prosecution.

• Information Revelation: Elections serve as a highly competitive market that reveals the competence and loyalty of party cadre and bureaucratic officials, removing the need for the central government to "pick winners" arbitrarily.

Lisa Blaydes “Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management:  Theory and Evidence from Egypt” Princeton U. Conference on Dictatorships, manuscript, April 2008.--Hypothesis

1. Low Incumbency: If elections are a mechanism for distributing spoils to a broad coalition, there should be relatively high turnover (low incumbency rates) so that benefits are not monopolized by a permanent group.

2. Economic Influence: As economic liberalization increases the value of a seat (via graft opportunities), incumbency rates should decline further as more candidates compete to "capture" these benefits.

3. Performance-Based Sacking: Regime-appointed officials (governors and party secretaries) will be promoted or demoted based on their ability to limit opposition voteshare, which serves as a signal of their competence and loyalty.

Lisa Blaydes “Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management:  Theory and Evidence from Egypt” Princeton U. Conference on Dictatorships, manuscript, April 2008.-Data and Tests

• Incumbency Analysis: Blaydes collected parliamentary lists from 1984 to the present to calculate reelection rates across various cycles.

• Regression Model: She used a probit model to analyze the turnover of governors and provincial secretaries in Egypt’s 26 governorates following the 2005 elections. The model controlled for the "difficulty" of the district (the inherent support for the opposition in that area).

Lisa Blaydes “Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management:  Theory and Evidence from Egypt” Princeton U. Conference on Dictatorships, manuscript, April 2008.-Results

Incumbency Trends: Reelection rates were consistently low, ranging from a high of 42% in 1995 to a low of 19% in 2005. Rates have generally dropped over time as structural adjustment intensified, making parliamentary seats more valuable.

• Agent Accountability: The statistical analysis confirmed that officials were significantly less likely to retain their posts if the Muslim Brotherhood saw large voteshare increases in their districts.

• Probability of Retention: For example, governors who saw no increase in opposition seats had a 75% chance of keeping their jobs, while those who witnessed a 50

Andreas Schedler “The Menu of Manipulation” Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, Number 2, April 2002: 36-50.Question

How can political scientists conceptually define and categorize the "foggy zone" of regimes that inhabit the space between liberal democracy and closed authoritarianism?

Andreas Schedler “The Menu of Manipulation” Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, Number 2, April 2002: 36-50.Others say

Scholars have long debated whether democracy is a matter of degrees ("more or less") or a qualitative difference (either/or). Existing literature uses various labels for ambiguous regimes, such as "democratizing regimes," "semidemocracies," or "diminished subtypes" like "illiberal" or "delegative" democracy. Some, like Fareed Zakaria, argue these regimes are "illiberal democracies" because they hold elections but ignore constitutional limits on power. Others define democracy simply as a system where "parties lose elections.

Andreas Schedler “The Menu of Manipulation” Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, Number 2, April 2002: 36-50.He says-

 Schedler argues that these regimes are not deficient forms of democracy but are instances of authoritarian rule. He proposes filling the conceptual space between poles with two symmetrical categories: electoral democracy (which "gets elections right" but fails other constitutional dimensions) and electoral authoritarianism (which organizes periodic elections but places them under tight control to cement power). He asserts that the time has come to take their nondemocratic nature seriously rather than using misleading democratic labels.

Andreas Schedler “The Menu of Manipulation” Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, Number 2, April 2002: 36-50. Theory-

The author develops the "Chain of Democratic Choice," a metaphorical framework where democratic elections must satisfy seven interdependent conditions to ensure an effective choice among free and equal citizens. These links include:

1. Empowerment: Elections must delegate real decision-making authority.

2. Free supply: Citizens must be free to form and support conflicting parties/candidates.

3. Free demand: Citizens must have access to alternative information sources to form preferences.

4. Inclusion: Universal suffrage must be granted to all adult members of the community.

5. Insulation: Voters must be able to express preferences via a secret ballot without coercion or bribery.

6. Integrity: One person, one vote; votes must be counted honestly.

7. Irreversibility: Winners must be able to take office and exercise power.

Schedler posits that this chain follows a logic of "multiplication by zero"; if any single link is broken, the entire process becomes undemocratic.

Andreas Schedler “The Menu of Manipulation” Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, Number 2, April 2002: 36-50.Hypothesis

 Authoritarian incumbents maintain power by picking from a "menu of manipulation" to break specific links in the chain of choice. These strategies include creating "reserved positions" to limit elective scope, excluding or fragmenting opposition forces, restricting civil liberties ("illiberalism"), and using informal disenfranchisement or electoral fraud. Schedler suggests there may be a strategic sequence of manipulation; for example, a regime might move from blatant fraud to exploiting state resources and media as opposition grows stronger.

Andreas Schedler “The Menu of Manipulation” Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, Number 2, April 2002: 36-50.Data and Tests-

Schedler utilizes Larry Diamond’s 2001 classification of 192 independent states, which combines Freedom House scores, electoral data, and expert judgment. He categorizes these states into four types: liberal democracy, electoral democracy, electoral authoritarianism, and closed authoritarianism. The analysis excludes industrial democracies (Western Europe/Japan) and Pacific island states to focus on the developing world and postcommunist countries.

Andreas Schedler “The Menu of Manipulation” Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, Number 2, April 2002: 36-50.Results

The study finds that electoral authoritarianism (EA) has become the most common regime type, representing 38.4% of all countries in the study. Only 45% of countries outside the Western world qualify as democracies. Geographically, EA is the dominant regime type in Central Asia (87.5%), Sub-Saharan Africa (54.2%), and North Africa/Middle East (52.6%). Schedler further distinguishes between "competitive" EA regimes (where the opposition is a threat) and "hegemonic" EA regimes (where the ruler is invincible), noting that the strategic interaction between incumbents and the opposition determines if these elections sustain or subvert the regime.

Kai Ostwald “How to Win a Lost Election: Malapportionment and Malaysia’s General Election. 2014.  The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs November: 1–12. Question-

Why did the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition win the 2013 election despite losing the popular vote, and what explains the massive size differences between electoral districts?

Kai Ostwald “How to Win a Lost Election: Malapportionment and Malaysia’s General Election. 2014.  The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs November: 1–12.Others say

Observers blamed electoral fraud, while the Malaysian state argued that district size variation is necessary to ensure rural representation and maintain bumiputera political dominance.

Kai Ostwald “How to Win a Lost Election: Malapportionment and Malaysia’s General Election. 2014.  The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs November: 1–12.He says

Author Kai Ostwald argues that electoral institutions, not fraud, were decisive. He asserts that the victory was manufactured by extreme malapportionment driven by partisan manipulation to entrench the incumbent.

Kai Ostwald “How to Win a Lost Election: Malapportionment and Malaysia’s General Election. 2014.  The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs November: 1–12.Theory

In single-member plurality (SMP) systems, malapportionment—varying the number of voters per district—increases the weight of votes in smaller districts, allowing a party to maintain power with diminishing popular support.

Kai Ostwald “How to Win a Lost Election: Malapportionment and Malaysia’s General Election. 2014.  The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs November: 1–12.Hypothesis

If the system is non-partisan, district size should correlate only with voter density and ethnicity. If partisan bias exists, BN-held districts will be significantly smaller than opposition districts even when density and ethnicity are the same

Kai Ostwald “How to Win a Lost Election: Malapportionment and Malaysia’s General Election. 2014.  The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs November: 1–12.Data and Tests

The study compared Malaysia to other nations using the Samuels and Snyder formula and conducted OLS regressions on all 222 districts, testing the impact of voter density, bumiputera percentage, and BN incumbency on district size.

Kai Ostwald “How to Win a Lost Election: Malapportionment and Malaysia’s General Election. 2014.  The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs November: 1–12. Results

Malaysia’s malapportionment is exceptionally high (0.1725). BN won all 37 of the smallest districts, and regression models proved that BN districts have, on average, 20,000 fewer voters than comparable opposition districts, confirming a systematic partisan bias.

Kenneth McElwain “Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 1, January 2008, pp. 32–47.Question:

How did the LDP maintain its parliamentary dominance in postwar Japan for decades despite its declining public popularity?

Kenneth McElwain “Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 1, January 2008, pp. 32–47. Others say

the conventional wisdom in comparative politics is that electoral rules are "sticky" or stable due to high transaction costs, path dependency, and constitutional hurdles. Existing literature also tends to treat political parties as cohesive units, assuming they will always change rules if it benefits the party as a whole

Kenneth McElwain “Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 1, January 2008, pp. 32–47. He says:

Kenneth Mori McElwain argues that the LDP manufactured its dominance by strategically altering "micro-level" campaign regulations. While party leaders were blocked from making "macro-level" changes (like changing the electoral formula) by intraparty incumbents who feared for their own seats, they had the leeway to pass micro-level rules that enhanced the advantage of all incumbents.

Kenneth McElwain “Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 1, January 2008, pp. 32–47. Theory:

The frequency of electoral reform is a function of a party's ability to manage intraparty conflict. Macro-level changes (formula, district magnitude) create distributional asymmetries where some incumbents may lose their seats even if the party wins more overall. Conversely, micro-level rules (campaigning regulations) generate symmetrical benefits for all sitting MPs, making them easier to pass without internal revolt.

Kenneth McElwain “Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 1, January 2008, pp. 32–47.Hypothesis:

Incremental reductions in the legal length of the campaign period (Kōji) significantly increase the reelection rates of incumbents and LDP candidates by making it harder for challengers to attract voters and build name recognition.

Kenneth McElwain “Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 1, January 2008, pp. 32–47.Data and Tests

The author uses a logistic regression model analyzing a dataset of 9,375 candidates who ran in Japanese elections between 1955 and 1990. The model tests the impact of the campaign period length on the probability of victory while controlling for incumbency, party affiliation, district magnitude, urbanization, and past performance.

Kenneth McElwain “Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 1, January 2008, pp. 32–47.Results:

Statistical tests confirm that shorter campaign periods disproportionately benefited LDP incumbents over opposition challengers. Simulations indicate that if the campaign period had remained at its original 25 days, the LDP would have lost its majority at least a decade earlier than it actually did, specifically around 1980.

Fabrice Lehoucq “When Does a Market for Votes Emerge? in Allen Hicken in Frederic C. Shaffer eds. Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying, Lynne Rienner 2007, pp. 23-46.Question

When and how do politicians buy votes, and specifically, under what conditions does a market for votes emerge?

Fabrice Lehoucq “When Does a Market for Votes Emerge? in Allen Hicken in Frederic C. Shaffer eds. Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying, Lynne Rienner 2007, pp. 23-46.Others say

Previous research on electoral fraud is limited, though some scholars suggest an inverse relationship between district size and bribery. Others view vote buying as a symptom of poverty or lack of political self-respect among working men

Fabrice Lehoucq “When Does a Market for Votes Emerge? in Allen Hicken in Frederic C. Shaffer eds. Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying, Lynne Rienner 2007, pp. 23-46.He says

Fabrice Lehoucq argues that vote buying is a strategic choice made by parties when they can effectively monitor voters and when cheaper methods of winning (like coercion or rigging) are unavailable

Fabrice Lehoucq “When Does a Market for Votes Emerge? in Allen Hicken in Frederic C. Shaffer eds. Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying, Lynne Rienner 2007, pp. 23-46.Theory

The political economy of vote buying treats the exchange as a principal-agent problem. Parties (principals) must ensure that voters (agents) do not "take the money and run," a risk known as "slippage"

Fabrice Lehoucq “When Does a Market for Votes Emerge? in Allen Hicken in Frederic C. Shaffer eds. Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying, Lynne Rienner 2007, pp. 23-46.Hypothesis

1. Parties will buy votes if they can solve the principal-agent problem by monitoring behavior (often via public ballots or social networks).

2. Parties will only bid for votes if there are no other cost-efficient ways (like stuffing ballot boxes or intimidating voters) to influence the outcome

Fabrice Lehoucq “When Does a Market for Votes Emerge? in Allen Hicken in Frederic C. Shaffer eds. Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying, Lynne Rienner 2007, pp. 23-46.Data and Tests

Lehoucq reviews historical and qualitative research covering over 150 years across more than half a dozen countries, including England, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Costa Rica, Mexico, the US, Taiwan, and Thailand. He specifically examines fraud petitions, the transition from public to Australian (secret) ballots, and the comparative costs of bribery versus other forms of rigging

Fabrice Lehoucq “When Does a Market for Votes Emerge? in Allen Hicken in Frederic C. Shaffer eds. Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying, Lynne Rienner 2007, pp. 23-46.Results

• Monitoring is key: Vote buying flourished in 19th-century English and Irish boroughs because parties could observe voters; it declined once the secret ballot became truly private.

• Cost-Efficiency: In rural areas or under dominant regimes (like the early PRI in Mexico), parties preferred coercion or tally manipulation because it was cheaper than buying individual votes.

• Decline: Markets for votes disappear when parties can no longer verify trades and when the rising expense of bribery leads parties to collectively legislate against it

Eric Kramon “Electoral Handouts as Information: Explaining Unmonitored Vote Buying” World Politics 68, no. 3 (July 2016), 454–98. Question

Why is unmonitored vote buying effective in contexts where political parties lack the capacity to enforce transactions or monitor how individuals actually vote?

Eric Kramon “Electoral Handouts as Information: Explaining Unmonitored Vote Buying” World Politics 68, no. 3 (July 2016), 454–98. Others say

Traditional models of "machine politics" suggest vote buying works because parties monitor and punish voters,. Other theories suggest handouts are used to buy turnout from existing supporters or rely on norms of reciprocity and moral obligation

Eric Kramon “Electoral Handouts as Information: Explaining Unmonitored Vote Buying” World Politics 68, no. 3 (July 2016), 454–98. He says

Eric Kramon argues that vote buying is an informational strategy used by politicians to make their promises about the future provision of resources more credible to voters

Eric Kramon “Electoral Handouts as Information: Explaining Unmonitored Vote Buying” World Politics 68, no. 3 (July 2016), 454–98.• Theory:

Handouts establish a candidate's credibility across three dimensions: competence (demonstrating the personal resources and disposition to deliver), trustworthiness (signaling an understanding of the needs of the poor), and electoral viability (showing the strength needed to win and access state resources)

Eric Kramon “Electoral Handouts as Information: Explaining Unmonitored Vote Buying” World Politics 68, no. 3 (July 2016), 454–98. Hypothesis:

Handouts establish a candidate's credibility across three dimensions: competence (demonstrating the personal resources and disposition to deliver), trustworthiness (signaling an understanding of the needs of the poor), and electoral viability (showing the strength needed to win and access state resources)

Eric Kramon “Electoral Handouts as Information: Explaining Unmonitored Vote Buying” World Politics 68, no. 3 (July 2016), 454–98.Data and Tests

The author conducted two randomized experiments in Kenya involving over 1,000 total participants who listened to simulated radio recordings of a candidate's campaign,,. Participants were categorized by household asset wealth to measure how handouts affected different income groups

Eric Kramon “Electoral Handouts as Information: Explaining Unmonitored Vote Buying” World Politics 68, no. 3 (July 2016), 454–98.Results:

The experiments found that handouts significantly increased support among poor and middle-income voters by improving their perceptions of the candidate's viability and likelihood of delivering future aid,,,. Conversely, information about handouts actually decreased support among high-asset individuals

Simeon Nichter “Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot” American Political Science Review Vol. 102, No. 1 February 2008.Question

The central inquiry is whether political parties distribute particularistic rewards to engage in vote buying (influencing vote choice) or turnout buying (increasing participation)

Simeon Nichter “Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot” American Political Science Review Vol. 102, No. 1 February 2008.Others say

Susan Stokes argues that political machines, such as the Peronist party in Argentina, use rewards for vote buying, specifically targeting weakly opposed voters to convince them to switch their votes. This strategy assumes that parties can effectively monitor secret ballots

Simeon Nichter “Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot” American Political Science Review Vol. 102, No. 1 February 2008.He says

The author (Nichter) argues that parties engage in turnout buying, which involves rewarding their own unmobilized supporters to ensure they show up at the polls. This strategy is more plausible under a secret ballot because it only requires monitoring whether an individual votes, not how they vote

Simeon Nichter “Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot” American Political Science Review Vol. 102, No. 1 February 2008.Theory

The study uses rational choice theory and formal modeling, specifically an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The theory suggests that credible promises and threats of future rewards can sustain cooperation between a party and a voter over time.

Simeon Nichter “Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot” American Political Science Review Vol. 102, No. 1 February 2008.Hypothesis

The primary hypothesis is that turnout buying predicts political machines will target strong supporters (loyalists) who are unlikely to vote without incentives, whereas vote buying predicts machines will target weakly opposed voters.

Simeon Nichter “Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot” American Political Science Review Vol. 102, No. 1 February 2008.Data and Tests

The author re-analyzes Argentine survey data (originally collected by Stokes) using logit model estimations. The tests examine the correlation between receiving rewards and variables like partisan sympathy, income, and the population size of the municipality

Simeon Nichter “Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot” American Political Science Review Vol. 102, No. 1 February 2008.Results

The empirical evidence shows that rewards are disproportionately targeted at strong Peronist supporters, which is highly consistent with turnout buying and contradicts the vote-buying model. Furthermore, rewards are more frequent among lower-income individuals and in smaller communities where monitoring is easier

Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vicente “Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria” The Economic Journal, First published: 24 February 2014.Question

What are the effects of an anti-violence campaign on voter behavior and actual violence in a setting like Nigeria's 2007 election, which was characterized by widespread malfeasance?

Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vicente “Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria” The Economic Journal, First published: 24 February 2014.Others say

Traditional literature often assumes electoral strategies are confined to those in mature, high-income democracies, focusing on pleasing ordinary citizens. However, some studies in North America have tested conventional techniques like canvassing, while research in Colombia found that coercion is used to prevent opposition voters from participating

Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vicente “Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria” The Economic Journal, First published: 24 February 2014.He says

Collier and Vicente contend that in newly democratic, low-income countries lacking checks and balances, elections warrant close attention. They suggest that violence is likely a strategy of weaker political groups to maximize vote share when they cannot afford the electoral cost of intimidation or lack the resources for other illicit strategies like fraud

Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vicente “Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria” The Economic Journal, First published: 24 February 2014.Theory

The study is based on Kuran’s (1989) model of political protest, which posits that a regime's support (or a climate of fear) can crumble if collective action increases the apparent size of the opposition. By lowering the perceived threat to individual voters, the campaign serves as a public call for protest against intimidation

Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vicente “Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria” The Economic Journal, First published: 24 February 2014.Hypothesis

The authors hypothesize that the anti-violence campaign will increase voter turnout and cause supporters of violent candidates to change their preferences. This would ultimately lead to a reduction in the effectiveness and intensity of actual violence and intimidation instigated by politicians

Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vicente “Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria” The Economic Journal, First published: 24 February 2014.Data and Tests

The researchers conducted a nationwide field experiment in Nigeria using randomly selected treatment and control areas. The "treatment" consisted of an anti-violence campaign involving town meetings, popular theater, and door-to-door distribution of materials. Data was collected via:

• Baseline and post-election surveys of 1,200 individuals to measure perceptions and behavior.

• A behavioral measure of empowerment involving a stamped postcard sent by respondents.

• Violence journals maintained by independent local journalists to track actual violent events

Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vicente “Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria” The Economic Journal, First published: 24 February 2014.Results

The campaign led to a 7–11 percentage point increase in voter turnout and a significant rise in feelings of empowerment. These effects were accompanied by a reduction in the intensity of actual violence as recorded by journalists. Interestingly, incumbents (the PDP) were the primary beneficiaries of the increased turnout, supporting the conclusion that intimidation is a strategy used by weaker political groups to keep voters away from the polls

Kjetil Tronvoll “Voting, violence and violations: peasant voices on the flawed elections in Hadiya, Southern Ethiopia” The Journal of Modern African Studies Volume 39 (4) December 2001, pp. 697-716.Question

Were the 2000 elections in Hadiya a move toward democratization, or did they represent a continuation of state suppression and manipulation by the ruling EPRDF?

Kjetil Tronvoll “Voting, violence and violations: peasant voices on the flawed elections in Hadiya, Southern Ethiopia” The Journal of Modern African Studies Volume 39 (4) December 2001, pp. 697-716.Others say:

The ruling EPRDF/TPLF coalition officially promised to democratize the Ethiopian state and respect human rights upon taking power in 1991. Some scholars, like James Scott, argue that power structures often tolerate private nonconformity so long as it does not publicly challenge their hegemony

Kjetil Tronvoll “Voting, violence and violations: peasant voices on the flawed elections in Hadiya, Southern Ethiopia” The Journal of Modern African Studies Volume 39 (4) December 2001, pp. 697-716.• He says

Tronvoll argues that the elections were flawed and characterized by violence, intimidation, and rigging by government cadres. However, he highlights that the Hadiya people managed to break the EPRDF’s political monopoly through a popular protest at the polls

Kjetil Tronvoll “Voting, violence and violations: peasant voices on the flawed elections in Hadiya, Southern Ethiopia” The Journal of Modern African Studies Volume 39 (4) December 2001, pp. 697-716.Theory

The author draws on James Scott’s theoretical framework regarding "everyday forms of resistance" (non-confrontational) versus "public transcripts" of resistance, where citizens openly challenge the legitimacy of the ruling power

Kjetil Tronvoll “Voting, violence and violations: peasant voices on the flawed elections in Hadiya, Southern Ethiopia” The Journal of Modern African Studies Volume 39 (4) December 2001, pp. 697-716.• Hypothesis:

The research investigates whether government agencies were still using fear as an instrument to secure victory (as observed in 1995) and whether an organized opposition could successfully challenge the EPRDF at the grassroots leve

Kjetil Tronvoll “Voting, violence and violations: peasant voices on the flawed elections in Hadiya, Southern Ethiopia” The Journal of Modern African Studies Volume 39 (4) December 2001, pp. 697-716.Data and Tests

Data was gathered through qualitative field research, including personal observations and interviews with Hadiya peasants, opposition candidates, and government officials. The author also reviewed reports from the National Electoral Board (NEB) and diplomatic observers

Kjetil Tronvoll “Voting, violence and violations: peasant voices on the flawed elections in Hadiya, Southern Ethiopia” The Journal of Modern African Studies Volume 39 (4) December 2001, pp. 697-716.Results:

Despite widespread human rights violations, bribery (buying votes with relief grain), and police violence that resulted in several deaths, the opposition party (HNDO) successfully won the majority of votes in Hadiya, securing six of the seven seats during re-elections

Emile Hafner-Burton, Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski "Surviving Elections: Election Violence, Incumbent Victory and Post-Election Repercussions" British Journal of Political Science, 2016, First View:1-30. key aspects

→ Electoral tradeoff

→ Post election consequences

→ Role of Repression against Protesters

→ Inadvertent Liberalization

→ Distinct Phenomenon

Emile Hafner-Burton, Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski “Surviving Elections: Election Violence, Incumbent Victory and Post-Election Repercussions” British Journal of Political Science, 2016, First View:1-30. question

Government-sponsored election violence and how it influences the ability of incumbent leaders to win elections and remain in power.

→ costly tradeoff that using such violence creates for a government

Emile Hafner-Burton, Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski “Surviving Elections: Election Violence, Incumbent Victory and Post-Election Repercussions” British Journal of Political Science, 2016, First View:1-30. What other authors say:

→ Hoglund, K. argues the primary goal of electoral violence is to directly influence the electoral process

→ Schelder, A. categorizes election violence and political repression as part of a “menu electoral manipulation” used by ruling parties to limit democratic uncertainty

→ Wilkinson, S. demonstrates how certain types of violence such as ethnic riots, can be strategically allowed because they provide benefits at the ballot box

→ Boone + Bratton argue similarly abt, how violence can help incumbents win

→ Lindberg, S. found that opposition parties are more likely to stay out of elections when politically motivated violence is systematic or widespread 

→ Harassment of opposition is a significant driver of pre-election boycotts

→ Blaydes, L. hired thugs in Egyptian elections to force citizens to vote for specific candidates or to prevent opposition supporters from voting at all 

→ Gupta, Singh, and Sprague + Cavey S. show gov. repression can provoke various forms of public dissent, including protests, strikes and rebellions

→ Tucker, J. argues that major election fraud and violence can help citizens overcome collective action problems by lowering perceived costs of participating in anti-gov actions.

→ Dahl, R. framed tradeoffs between “costs of repressions” and “costs of toleration” 

→ Huntington , S. observed that major political change almost always involves violence and that tools like harassment and rigged elections are fundamentally incompatible with democracy

→ Davenport + Mason note that governments often respond to citizens uprisings with disproportionate violence, and this reaction typically intensified as the level of public dissent increases

Emile Hafner-Burton, Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski "Surviving Elections: Election Violence, Incumbent Victory and Post-Election Repercussions" British Journal of Political Science, 2016, First View:1-30.What are the author's critiques/arguments:

 Government sponsored violence creates costly tradeoff for incumbent leaders. While using violence in the pre-election period can help officially “win” elections, it simultaneously increase risk of mass post-election protests that can ultimately force the leader from power 

pre -election violence and electoral victory

Opposition boycotts

Voter intimidation

Post-election backlash

Triggering protests

Forcing concessions 

Ineffectiveness of post-election repression 

Because election violence is a risky strat, it can inadvertently facilitate political liberalization. Evidence shows that regimes using election violence are ~3x more likely to move toward democratization and incumbents who resort to using electoral violence are 2x more likely to be forced out of power through irregular means such as, coups, revolutions or assassinations.

Emile Hafner-Burton, Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski "Surviving Elections: Election Violence, Incumbent Victory and Post-Election Repercussions" British Journal of Political Science, 2016, First View:1-30.Theory

Short term benefit: Reducing electoral competition

Opposition boycotts

Voter intimidation

Long-term costs: triggering mass resistance

Post election protests

Political concessions

Ineffectiveness of Post-election repression

Inadvertent liberalization

Emile Hafner-Burton, Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski "Surviving Elections: Election Violence, Incumbent Victory and Post-Election Repercussions" British Journal of Political Science, 2016, First View:1-30.Hypothesis:

pre-election violence helps an incumbent “win” by reducing competition

1.1 Gov. sponsored pre-election violence increases the likelihood that opposition parties  will boycott the election

1.2 Opposition boycotts increase likelihood of incumbent election victory because they remove challengers

1.3 Gov. sponsored pre-election violence influence voter behavior through voter suppression / coercion

The same violence used to secure a win triggers a backlash that can lead to the incumbent’s removal

2.1 Gov. sponsored pre-election violence increases the likelihood of mass post-election protests against the incumbent regime

2.2 These post-election protests increase the incumbent’s likelihood of being forced to make significant political concessions such as resigning or calling for new elections

2.3 Once protests are in motion, violence directed at the protesters does not increase and may actually reduce the likelihood that the incumbent stays in power

Emilie Hafner‐Burton., Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski "When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?" British Journal of Political Science Volume 44, Issue 1 January 2014, pp. 149-179. What issue does the author address?

The authors address the complex issue of election violence, specifically focusing on when and why incumbent governments choose to use violence as a tool to maintain power. Their research aims to fill a gap in existing scholarship by distinguishing between violence that occurs in the pre-election versus the post-election periods, rather than relying on aggregate annual measures of human rights abuses

→ Motivation of fear

→ Role of Uncertainty

→ Institutionalized constraints (checks and balances basically)

→ Link between pre-election violence leads to post election protests which lead to furhter gov. Repression

Emilie Hafner‐Burton., Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski "When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?" British Journal of Political Science Volume 44, Issue 1 January 2014, pp. 149-179.What other authors say:

 → Straus and Taylor: Sub -Saharan Africa = vast majority of election violence is perpetrated by the incumbent

→ Davenport, C. found authoritarian govs. = statistically more likely to reduce censorship and political restrictions during national election years (to legitimize the regime or institutionalize dissent). Also documented that govs typically respond to domestic threats, such as protests with repression, increasing censorship as dissent intensifies.

→ Cingranelli and Filippov, argue that incumbents strategically choose to engage in/ignore poor human rights practices based on the presnece/absence of proper electoral incentives (basically if they don’t benefit from advocating, they won't do anything).

→Carey, S. offers specific view on triggers for governmental action, finding that while guerrilla warfare increases risk of political repression, non-violent/spontaneous forms of dissent often do not create a threat substantial enough to warrant a violent government response

→ Collier, Vicente, Robinson, Torvik, and Zakaria argue that elections can actually increase political polarization and potentially lead to more human rights abuses in countries that lack a well-developed respect for the rule of law

→ Lindberg, Lipset, and Sisk argue that even in illiberal states, elections eventually foster broader political participation and accountability, which improves respect for human rights over time

→ Richards, D. found that the presence of national elections has no effect on the general levels of government respect for human rights during an election year 

→ Wilkinson explores how parties have used voter-initiated ethnic riots as a specific tactic for electoral manipulation

→ Schedler describes violence and fraud as part of a broader “menu of manipulation” available to incumbents

→

Emilie Hafner‐Burton., Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski "When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?" British Journal of Political Science Volume 44, Issue 1 January 2014, pp. 149-179. What are the author's critiques and arguments?

Election violence is a calculated, strategic choice made by incumbents who fear losing their grip on power

Factors: Motivation of fear, uncertainty as a catalyst, institutional constraints (checks and balances), "trigger effect"

Prior research into the relationship between elections and political repression have significant limitations

Factors: Lack of specificity, temporal oversight, conflicting results, misinterpreting violence

Emilie Hafner‐Burton., Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski "When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?" British Journal of Political Science Volume 44, Issue 1 January 2014, pp. 149-179 Theory

Election violence is a strategic tool used by incumbent governments primarily driven by the fear of losing power depending on the incumbent's level of uncertainty regarding the election outcome and the strength of the institutional constraints they face

3 components

Pre-election strategy + uncertainty

Link between stages

Role of Institutional Constraints

Emilie Hafner‐Burton., Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski "When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?" British Journal of Political Science Volume 44, Issue 1 January 2014, hypothesis

(Pre-Election Violence): An incumbent who is uncertain about electoral victory and lacks significant institutional constraints is more likely to resort to pre-election violence. 

The logic is that if a leader is confident of victory, violence is unnecessary and risky; however, if the outcome is in doubt, they may use violence to harass the opposition or intimidate voters to improve their odds

(The Trigger for Protest): An incumbent who employs pre-election violence or fraud significantly increases the likelihood of post-election protests against their regime. 

Pre-election tactics often act as a focal point that helps citizens overcome collective action problems to mobilize against the government

(Post-Election Violence): When faced with these protests, an incumbent who lacks significant institutional constraints is more likely to use violence against protesters in the post-election period