Presidentialism

Shugart and Carey’s 3 differences between presidentialism and parliamentarism are:

1. Separate origin and survival of executive and legislative branches

2. Constitutionally guaranteed executive authority to execute the laws

3. Chief executive control over the cabinet

Definition of semi-presidentialism

Both branches of government are directly elected, but the head of government is accountable to the legislature

What, according to Samuels, is the supposed trade-off between decisiveness and resoluteness under presidentialism?

Because the legislative and executive branches are in institutionally different environments, steamrolling the minority (tyranny) is more difficulty to coordinate
But we would expect to see slower and less dramatic policy change under presidentialism as a result

What do Cheibub and others find regarding proposal approval under similar levels of legislative support?

Under similar levels of legislative support, parliamentary executives always approve their proposals with a higher rate than presidents (83% vs 64%)

What are the two purposes of the cabinet?

1. Build legislative support to pass legislation

2. Control the executive-branch bureaucracy that implements legislation

Why does Samuels argue that parties considering whether to join a party under power separation may worry?

They may worry that they will be unable to translate participation into real policy influence, because ultimately the president has the final say in policy making

What does the worry regarding translation of cabinet participation into policy influence suggest about coalition forming under presidentialism, according to Samuels?

Coalitions will be costlier to maintain and less stable under presidentialism

What does Neto show regarding the impact of statute reliance on partisan cabinet proportion under presidentialism?

The more that presidents rely on statutes (passing through the legislature), as opposed to decrees, the more partisan their cabinet will be, and the more proportional the distribution of portfolios

What do Neto and Strom show regarding the impact of president’s appointment powers on the cabinet under semi-presidentialism?

The greater the president’s appointment powers, the higher the share of non-partisans in the cabinet

What % of presidential republic’s ministers are non-partisan, vs in parliamentary republics?

Almost 30% under presidentialism, 3% under parliamentarism

What does Neto show regarding the consequences of proportional portfolio distribution on legislative success?

“When portfolios are distributed proportionally to each party’s contribution to the coalition, legislative success increases”

How does Linz argue that presidentialism facilitated the breakdown of democracy in LA during the CW?

Because executive and legislative branches of government derive their legitimacy to govern from very different sources

And fixed terms of office discourage politicians in both branches of government from moderating their stances

What is the correlation between size of presidents party and the probability of a regime collapse?

Presidential collapse is 3x more likely at the lowest level of president support than at the highest level

What did Samuels find regarding sanctions when executive and legislative elections aren’t held simultaneously?

When executive and legislative elections are not held simultaneously, (a situation that cannot occur under parliamentarism) sanctioning for the state of the economy is relatively weak (because people aren’t sure about who to blame)

What is the core distinction between parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential systems?

The key issue is the relationship between government, legislature, and president. Ask: Can the legislature remove the government without cause? If no: presidential. If yes: parliamentary or semi-presidential. Then ask whether the head of state is popularly elected for a fixed term.

Define a presidential democracy

A system where the government does not depend on a legislative majority to exist. The legislature cannot remove the president/cabinet merely through a vote of no confidence. This creates “mutual independence” between executive and legislature.

Define a parliamentary democracy

A system where the government depends on legislative confidence and the head of state is not popularly elected for a fixed term. The PM and cabinet survive only while they retain explicit or implicit legislative support

Define a semi-presidential democracy

A system where the government depends on legislative confidence and the head of state is a popularly elected president serving a fixed term. It combines parliamentary dependence with presidential electoral legitimacy.

Why is the distinction between presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary systems important?

Cabinet Formation (coalitions)

Cabinet Formation (partisan, proportional)

Resoluteness/Regime Stability

Decisiveness

Rigidity

What does “legislative responsibility” mean?

The legislature can remove the government through a vote of no confidence. This makes governments continuously accountable to parliament, unlike presidential cabinets.

CP&S: What data show differences in minority governments?

In minority situations from 1946–1999, 65% produced minority governments in presidential democracies, compared with 35% in parliamentary democracies. Presidential systems are therefore more likely to tolerate minority executives.

CP&S: What data show differences in coalition governments?

In minority situations from 1946–1999, coalitions formed 78% of the time in parliamentary democracies but only 54% in presidential democracies. Coalition incentives are weaker under presidentialism because presidents can often govern alone.

How do cabinets differ between parliamentary and presidential systems?

Presidential cabinets have more nonpartisan ministers and less proportional portfolio allocation. Data: parliamentary cabinets averaged 3% nonpartisan ministers and 0.90 proportionality; presidential cabinets averaged 30% nonpartisan ministers and 0.65 proportionality.

What is Gamson’s Law and why is it useful?

In parliamentary coalitions, cabinet portfolios tend to be distributed in proportion to each party’s contribution to the governing majority. This helps explain why coalition bargaining matters so much in parliamentary systems.

Premier-presidential

Government responsible to legislature, not president; tends to resemble parliamentarism.

President-parliamentary

Government responsible to both legislature and president; president is stronger and dual authority can create conflict.

What is cohabitation and why does it matter?

Occurs when the president and PM come from opposing political blocs. It may work as checks and balances, but can also produce conflict, as in Ukraine. In France, cohabitation showed presidential dominance depended on controlling a legislative majority.

How does Siaroff’s scheme of measuring presidential power work?

9 dichotomous variables, incl. whether the president is popularly elected, whether the president may dissolve the legislature, and whether there is a presidentialist electoral formula (coattail effect)

Van Cranenburgh: how high is presidential power in the 30 African countries?

Very high, median was 7

Van Cranenburgh: how high is the range of presidential power in the semi-presidential African countries?

Much more compressed. Where Siaroff’s analysis showed that semi-presidentialism isn’t a hugely useful regime label because of its range (1-8), in Africa the range was 7-8, as well as a higher mean score than for pure presidential systems

How does van Cranenburgh’s analysis provide further support for Siaroff’s conclusion?

Because mean rates for presidential power are a full point higher than that for pure presidential system, we cannot meaningfully infer that the presence of a premier implies that the president possesses less power

Does van Cranenburgh’s analysis show a statistically significant relationship regarding the political consequences of high presidential power?

No, largely due to a small sample and low variation in presidential power. But there was a very high chance of democratic breakdown (more than 25%) among countries with very high presidential power.

How does the data show that presidential democracies are more fragile than parliamentary ones?

1946-2002, expected life of a presidential democracy was 24 years vs 58 years for parliamentary ones

What does Cheibub argue is the real factor that kills democracies?

Their military legacy. If a "military legacy" variable is added to the model of democratic survival, being coded 1 if the dictatorship preceding the current democracy was headed by a professional military, presidentialism has no effect on the longevity of democracy.

Since presidential democracies tend to follow military dictatorships more frequently than they follow civilian dictatorships, they are more fragile

Does Cheibub argue that a former military dictatorship causes presidential democracies?

No. The former military that rules the country country doesn’t prefer to have more concentrated power distributions.

There is not a causal explanation because both regime types are (roughly) as equally likely to break down if they follow a military dictatorship

The data is largely skewed by Latin America, where the onset of the Cold War meant that the military justified their rule in “fighting” it

What does Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh show regarding government coalition forming?

Government coalitions are still formed in over half of the situations where a president lacks a legislative majority, so it’s far from an exceptional situation

What do Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh show regarding the probability of a legislative stalemate when no coalition is formed under presidentialism?

Under presidentialism, minority governments legislate at least as successfully as majority coalitions

What do Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh show regarding the probability of regime collapse under presidentialism?

While the expected life of a presidential democracy is lower than under parliamentarism, the probability that a presidential democracy would die is about the same under a coalition or not and also the same as to whether it controls a majority or not

What do McManus and Ozkan find regarding inflation dynamics in presidential versus parliamentary democracies?

Average inflation is 4 to 6 percentage points higher under presidential systems.

Presidential systems also experience significantly more volatile and unpredictable inflation spikes, creating an unstable environment for long-term domestic and foreign investment.

What do McManus and Ozkan find regarding income inequality in presidential versus parliamentary democracies?

Income inequality is between 12% and 24% worse (measured via Gini coefficients) under presidential governance than under parliamentary systems.

What is the mechanism that McManus and Ozkan point to regarding income inequality in presidential versus parliamentary democracies?

Parliamentary systems rely on multi-party coalitions and legislative consensus to survive. This forces the executive to implement policies catering to a broad coalition of voters, spreading economic benefits more evenly across society.

What is the mechanism that McManus and Ozkan point to regarding inflation differences in presidential versus parliamentary democracies?

In a presidential system, "dual democratic legitimacy" (where both branches claim a popular mandate) frequently leads to legislative gridlock. When an economic shock hits (e.g., an inflation crisis), a gridlocked presidential system cannot react swiftly or cohesively. This institutional friction leads to the highly volatile inflation and unstable policy cycles observed in the data.

What does Saeigh find regarding the probability of legislative paralysis under presidentialism (data)?

On average, 62% of single-party minority presidents’ bills are approved by the legislature. Hence, it is clear that legislative paralysis is a relatively rare phenomenon, even under presidentialism.

What is Protsyk’s core theoretical framework for analyzing semi-presidentialism, and who is the "agent"?

The Prime Minister/Cabinet acts as the agent serving two distinct principals (the President and the Parliament).

Because both principals possess separate democratic legitimacies, they actively compete to pull the cabinet agent toward their respective agendas.

What did Protsyk find regarding the statistical relationship between formal constitutional subtype and intra-executive conflict?

Constitutional subtype (Premier-Presidential vs. President-Parliamentary) does not directly predict conflict. Both setups are prone to intense instability.

The interaction between the party system and cabinet type dictates whether institutional conflict occurs.

Protsyk: How do Minority Cabinets affect the statistical probability of intra-executive conflict when the cabinet opposes the president’s ideology?

Non-Minority Cabinet: 41.9% chance of conflict

Minority Cabinet: 86.5% chance of conflict

What does Protsyk define as conflict?

Conflict requires that either the president or the prime minister actively and publicly contests the status quo interpretation of their constitutional powers.

What is the fundamental difference between dispositional and relational properties in regime classification?

Dispositional properties are morphological; they outline the formal institutional framework (e.g., whether an official is popularly elected or has a fixed term) without defining actual power relations.

Relational properties describe the real-world exercise of power, tracking how political actors actually interact and deploy their political resources.

According to Elgie, why is it a mistake to classify a political regime based on relational properties?

Relational power is open to interpretation. Classifying regimes based on "who is stronger" forces comparativists to choose a single, highly contested narrative of power, leading to different scholars categorizing the exact same country under different regime types.

Why does Elgie categorize formal constitutional powers (like the power to dissolve parliament) as relational properties rather than dispositional ones?

A constitutional text can grant a power, but the realistic ability to use it depends entirely on the political environment. For instance, a PM cannot realistically dissolve a parliament if their party is trailing severely in the opinion polls; thus, the power is relational

What was Duverger’s definition of semi-presidentialism?

• The president is elected by universal suffrage.

• The president possesses "quite considerable powers".

• There is a prime minister and cabinet who possess executive power and can only stay in office with the consent of the parliament.

Why do Sedelius and Åberg reject the arguments of critics who want to scrap the "semi-presidential" category entirely?

Semi-presidentialism creates a fundamentally unique power structure.

Unlike other systems, the executive cabinet is uniquely caught in the middle, sitting at the mercy of two separate agents of the electorate: the president and the parliament.

What specific political outcome do Sedelius and Åberg reveal when evaluating the long-term track record of president-parliamentarism in transitional contexts?

The post-communist countries that gave their presidencies the strongest initial structural powers suffered the worst democratic outcomes.

In countries like Russia and Belarus, choosing a strong president-parliamentary setup at the start of independence provided a constitutionally sanctioned tool that leaders used to legitimize, reinforce, and lock in authoritarian tendencies.

Sedelius: What does the Eastern European data show about how informal, relational power can completely override a president's formal constitutional limitations?

In post-communist states, public trust in the president is consistently higher than in any other political institution, including the prime minister.

Presidents in Poland, Bulgaria, and Lithuania effectively weaponized this immense moral prestige and media dominance to publicly bash cabinets and bully prime ministers into resigning—completely bypassing the fact that they lacked the formal constitutional power to dismiss them

Siaroff’s category of presidential systems is very

Consistent in its presidential powers, low s.d. , median of 7

What is Siaroff’s conclusion?

The categories of presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential systems can certainly all be defined conceptually, but definitions are of varying utility in telling us about the powers of presidents.