nature of God

omniscient (3)

perfect knowledge: knowing all that is possible to know

omnipotent (3)

having perfect power: having the ability to do anything that is possible to do

omnibenevolent (3)

being perfectly or supremely good: being perfectly morally good

supremely good (3)

highest possible standard of moral goodness: moral perfection and lacking any defects

eternal (3)

Timeless (atemporal), without beginning or an end

everlasting (3)

Existing throughout all time (temporal), without beginning or end

free will (3)

the capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action among various alternatives

personal (3)

conscious and self-aware being capable of forming relationships with individuals

transcendent (3)

existing outside of spatial, temporal, and physical limitations

Immutable (3)

absolutely unchaging, incapable of alteration

Incoherent (3)

beliefs who components are logically incosistent, where all components cannot be true simultaneously

Paradox of the stone (5)

An omnipotent being should be capable of doing anything: creating a stone as heavy as possible and lifting a stone as heavy as possible. However, can an omnipotent being create a stone so heavy that it cannot lift? If it can, then there is one thing it cannot do: lift the stone. If it cannot, then there is one thing it cannot do: create the stone. Either way, an omnipotent being must be able to do anything. Therefore, the idea of an omnipotent being is logically incoherent.

Mavrodes’ response to the the paradox of the stone (5)

The paradox fails as the assumption for “a stone that is too heavy for an omnipotent being to lift” cannot exist, as it is self-contradictory: an omnipotent being can do anything. Therefore, the paradox does not attack the existence of an omnipotent being, but that “a stone so heavy an omnipotent being cannot lift” can’t exist.

response to Mavrode’s paradox of the stone

He begs the question by presenting the conclusion that an omnipotent being exists in the premise.

C. Wade Savage’s response to the paradox of the stone (5)

• Imagine 2 omnipotent beings: X and Y

• X’s stone making power is unlimited

• Y’s stone lifting power is unlimited

• For any stone that X makes, Y can make

• X’s stone making power is unlimited, it’s just that Y can lift all of them. Neither of their powers are limited.

• Therefore, if X and Y are the same being, X, then X can be omnipotent. X can create anything and lift anything. There is no task which X cannot do

• Therefore, there is no logical contradiction in the idea that an omnipotent being can lift any stone it can create, therefore the paradox fails

Savage’s rephrasing of the paradox of the stone

• Either an omnipotent being X can create a stone so heavy which X cannot lift, in which case there is a task which X cannot do: lift the stone

• OR X cannot create a stone which X cannot lift, in which case there is one that X cannot do: create the stone

• Therefore, there is at least one thing X cannot do

• Therefore, if X is omnipotent, X can do anything

• The existence of X is logically impossible

Descarte’s view of God’s omnipotence (5)

• God’s power is unlimited: he can do what is logically impossible

• The human mind is too limited to understand God’s omnipotence

• God is not constrained by logical or scientific possibility

Aquinas’ view of God’s omnipotence (5)

• Omnipotence is the ability to do all logically possible things

• principles with necessary, fundemental nature (such as logic) are not arbitary- God would not go against them not because he cannot do so, but because what is logically incoherent cannot exist

The Euthypro Dilemma (5)

The dilemma which questions if God wills what is morally good because it is good in nature, or if it is because it is what is good in nature that God wills it. If former, God is not omnipotent and limited by an independent moral standard. If latter, morality is arbitary and “God is good'“ is tautologous.

3 solutions to the Euthypro dilemma

1. “goodness'“ means God is good to us in our relationship, so goodness is not dictated arbitrarily by God nor is God dictated by morality

2. Goodness means having all perfections

3. Goodness and God’s will are 2 different concepts, using the H2O analogy

The problem from omniscience and free will (5)

• If an omniscient being knows something about the future, that thing is necessarily true

• An omniscient being knows our future action

• Therefore, an omniscient being’s knowledge of our future actions would mean that we cannot choose alternaton

• However, for an action to be free, we must be able to choose an alternative

• The existence of an omniscient being is incompatible with human free will

Aquinas’ response to the problem from omniscience and free will (5)

God is not measured by time but rather eternity: everything God sees is within the present. God knowing what appears to us in the future doesn’t mean that we can’t choose, but rather, God knows what we will choose because he sees everything happening at once.

Boethius’ understanding of God’s relationship with time (5)

• God judges us justly and knows about the future

• God is atemporal, not existing in time

• God observes everything in the present

Anselm’s first ontological argument (5)

• starts from a position of faith: understanding comes from belief

• It is greater to exist in understanding and in reality than it is to exist in understanding

• The greatest possible being must exist in both understanding and reality to be the greatest

• God is that than which nothing greater than can be conceived

• Therefore, God must exist in both reality and understanding (God is a necessary being that cannot not exist)

• Even a fool can understand that God is the greatest possible being

• A fool denies that God exists

• The food is convinced that God only exists in his mind, and not in reality

• The fool is really a fool because he denies the existence of a being which must exist

Conclusion: God exists

Form: deductive a priori

Gaunilo’s perfect island objection (5)

• Uses the same framework as St Anselm to show that the “perfect island” exists

• The greatest possible island must exist in both understanding and reality to be the greatest

• The greatest possible island is that island than which no greater island can be conceived

• Therefore, the island exists in both reality and understanding

• Yet, Gaunilo replies that this is absurd, as no such island exists

St Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo

Tbere is nothing about the nature of the greatest conceivable island to suggest that it must exist and cannot not-exist

Anselm’s second ontological argument (5)

• God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived (TTWNGCBC)

• We can imagine a being that cannot not-exist: a being with necessary existence

• A being with necessary existence would be greater than a being that could not-exist

• If God is TTWNGCBC, and the greater being is one with necessary existence, then God we imagine must have neccessary existence

• Therefore it is impossible for the God not to exist by definition

Conclusion: God exists necessarily

Form: deductive a priori

Issue with St Anselm’s second ontological argument

• The conclusion “God necessarily exists” is in the premise “God is the greatest being you can imagine”

• This is begging the question and circular

• This is saying a being which necessarily exists, exists

• special pleading: the way God exists is different to the way any other thing exists

• response: God is a special category so “special pleading” is justfied

Descartes’ ontological argument (5)

• cogito: he has a clear and distinct idea of himself existing, therefore clearn and distinct ideas guarantee truth, therefore whatever he has a clear and distinct idea of must exist

• There are truths that one can know clearly and distinctly, like geometrical properties. Therefore, properties can be a a part of clear and distinct idea

• Existence is a property of perfection, a perfect thing must exist to be truly perfect

• Therefore, if God is a supremely perfect being, God must exist

• I have a clear and distinct idea of God existing

• Therefore God exists (existence is a predicate)

Hume’s empiricist objections to ontological arguments (5)

• Things are either a matter of fact or a relation of ideas

• Relation of ideas are necessarily truth or false. They do not require sense data to be known. They are demonstrably true or false.

• Matters of fact cannot be established by reflecting on the meaning of words involved. It can only be known through experience. It tells us about how the world appears to be. They can never be demonstrably true or false- we can never know its truth value for certain

• You cannot demonstrate an argument about a matter of fact a priori (denying synthetic truths)

• Nothing is demonstrable unless the contrary implies a contradiction

• What is inconceivable cannot imply a contradiction (if it is illogical to conceive of a contradiction, it is demonstrable)

• There is no being whose non-existence implies a contradiction

• Therefore, there is no being whose existence is demonstrable

conclusion: existence is contingent for all X

Ayer’s empircist objection to ontological arguments (5)

• All meaningful claims are either empirically verifiable or analytically true

• A statement is anallytically true if it is true or false in virtue of the meanings of the words, but they do not tell us anything new about the world as they are tautological

• A statement is empirically verifiable if empirical evidence would count towards establishing the probability of the claim being true or false

• Otherwise, the claim is meaningless

• Claims about God via a priori deduction is meaningless as they are tautological. They are empirically unverifiable.

Kant’s objections to ontological arguments that existence is not a predicate (5)

• Existence is not a predicate, it is a state of affairs

• A predicate is a part of a sentence which describes the subject (e.g. “Jane is happy”, the predicate is “is happy”)

• Existence is not a quality a being can possess

• Saying x exists doesn’t tell you anything new about what x is. The concept of a non-existent x is the same as a concept of an existent x. Therefore existence describes reality, not the subject.

• Defining God as existing necessarily is making a claim about the concept of God, not existence.

• Existence claims cannot be without a posteriori synthetic experience

• Therefore you can’t deduce the existence of God from conceptual claim about his nature because existence is not a predicate

Malcolm’s ontological argument (5)

• Either God exists or he does not

• God cannot come into existence or go out of existence

• If God exists, God cannot cease to exist

• Therefore, if God exists, his existence is necessary

• If God does not exist, God cannot come into existence

• Therefore, if God does not exist, his existence is impossible

• God’s existence is impossible IFF the concept of God is self-contradictory

• Concept of God is not self-contradictory (yikes…)

• Therefore, God’s existence is not impossible

• Therefore, God necessarily exists

Hume’s design argument from analogy (Cleanthes) (5)

P1) In nature, things work together to achieve a purpose

P2) In objects designed and produced by humans, things work together to achieve a purpose

P3) Analogy tells us like effects have like causes

P4) Products of human design are designed by beings with thought, wisdom, and intelligence

C1) Therefore, nature mustve been designed by a being with thought, wisdom, and intellignece

C2) Therefore, it would have to have far greater intelligence than humans who make designed objects due to the “grandeur of the work he has carried out”

William Paley’s design argument from spatial order and purpose (5)

• A watch has characteristics of design such as complexity, parts that work together for a purpose (even if we don’t know what that purpose is), parts that work together such as that if they were differently shaped/organised it would not have regulated motion, it is made out of materials that help it achieve its purpose

• If we found a watch in a natural area, we wouldn’t say it appeared naturally. We would say it is designed because it has the characteristics of design

• Design implies a designer

• the universe shares the characteristics of design

• Therefore the universe has a designer

• The universe is greater than a watch

• Therefore, the designer of the universe must be greater than the designer of a watch

• This designer is therefore greater beyond human comprehension due to the complexity of the design

Richard Swinburne’s design argument from temporal order and regularity (5)

• There are two types of order in the universe: spatial order (parts that work together to form a purpose, like an eye or ecosystem) and temporal order (laws that govern the nature of existence, like gravity)

• Evolution can explain spatial order, but not temporal order

• We can’t infer the laws of the universe without inferring more laws

• Fundamental laws can’t explain themselves

• The only possible explanation left is a personal explanation, explained in terms of the agency of the mind

David Hume’s objections to the design argument from analogy (5)

1. The analogy is weak: nature is nothing like a watch

2. If there is a designer, it is not necessarily God. Don’t assume a cause greater than the effect

3. fallacy of composition: even if we concluded that some things in nature are designed does not mean the entire world was designed

4. Epicurean thesis: apparent design could be the result of probability as finite particles eventually end up aligning given infinite amount of time

5. Unique case argument: we have no experience of how nature came by because it has only happened once. We can’t explain it by suggeseting a cause we have never seen happen and can’t repeat (without constant conjunction)

6. appeareance of design is insufficient to conclude a designer, and even if there is, all we can know about them is that they are a designer

David Hume’s objections to the design argument from spatial disorder (5)

• The universe contains too much ‘vice and misery and disorder’ to justify belief in a God

• There are areas of the universe which are empty, lacking purpose

• Some parts of the world frequently go wrong and cause chaos, such as volcanoes and earthquakes

• animals are not as good as survival as they could be: they would be better if they had better functioning parts

Paley’s understanding of spatial disorder (5)

• Spatial disorder is an issue for inferring that the universe as a whole is designed- there are huge parts of space where there seem to be no purpose and no organised parts

• The design argument is accused of cherry-picking data which supports its claim and ignoring the data which suggests the universe is not designed

• Paley argues that we don’t need there to be more order, or more significant order than disorder, to claim that there is design (imperfections do not detract from the nature of design)

Objections to the design argument that God is not the only/best explanation from Charles Darwin (5)

• Natural things look designed because they are so well adapted to their environment, but this is not actually design

• Things look well-adapted because things that were not well-adapted died out, this is process of evolution by natural selection

• Members of a species that were well-adapted lived and reproduced successfully, making them look like they were tailor made for their environment

• However, this is a result of trial and error: evolution by natural selection

Objections to the design argument that God is not the best explanation from Mill (5)

• The world contains so much evil that it is not evidence for a benevolent powerful designer

• evil would be a design flaw if the designer is loving, showing a lack of omnipotence

• if they were chosen, it would show a lack of goodness

• therefore, the designer cannot be God: either the designer is not all powerful or not omnibenevolent

Kalam cosmological argument (5)

weak:

P1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence

P2) The universe must have a beginning

C1) Therefore, the universe has a cause

strong:

P1) The universe is made up of things that exist in time and follow laws of cause and effect

P2) An infinite regress of cause and effect is impossible

C1) Therefore, the universe must have a beginning

P3) Everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence

C2) Therefore, the universe has a cause for its existence

Aquinas’ first way from motion (5)

P1) some things in the world are in motion

P2) nothing causes its own movement

C1) whatever is in motion is put into motion

P3) If this goes onto infinity, there is no first mover

P4) For anything to be moving now, there must have been a first mover that started the process

C2) Therefore there must be a first mover

C3) The first mover is God

Aquinas’ second way from cause (5)

P1) To cause itself, something would have to exist before it existed, which is impossible

C1) Therefore, nothing can be the cause of itself

P2) We find cause and effect in the world

P3) If you remove the cause you remove its effect

C2) Therefore, if there was no first cause there would be no latter causes

C3) Therefore, there cannot be an infinite regress of causes because then nothing would exist now

C4) Therefore, tehre must be a first, uncaused cause

C5) God is the first cause

Aquinas’ third way from contingency and necessity (5)

P1) everything in the universe exists contingently

P2) If everything is contingenet, its non-existence is possbile, so there was a time when it didn’t exist

P3) At a time where nothing existed, contingent beings could not cause others to exist

C1) If there was ever really nothing then tehre would be nothing now

P4) Things do exist

C2) there was never nothing in existence

C3) There must have been a necessary being which existed but not contingently

C4) This being is God

Descartes’ cosmological argument (5)

P1) There is a need to explain my continuing existence as a conscious being with the idea of God as a supremely perfect being in my mind

P2) I am not a perfect being

C1) Therefore I cannot be the cause of the idea of a perfect being

P3) I dont have the power to bring about my continuing existence as a conscious being

C2) Therefore, I cannot be the cause of my continued existence as a conscious being

C3) Therefore, the cause of my continued existence as a conscious being and my idea of God as a perfect being must lie outside of myself

P4) Either this external cause caused itself or had its own cause, which either caused itself or had its own cause, and so on

P5) A sequence of cause cannot run back to infinity

C4) Therefore, we will eventually reach an ultimate cause that is its cause

C5) the ultimate cause is God

objection to descartes’ cosmological argument from the cartesian circle (5)

Leibniz’s cosmological argument from the principle of sufficient reason (5)

P1) Anything that is factual or exists has a reaosn why it is the way it is

P2) There are contingent facts

C1) Contingent facts have an explanation

P3) A series of contingent facts cannot be explained by any fact that is contained within the series of contingent facts

The objection to cosmological arguments from an infinite series of past events (infinite regress)

• an infinite regress is a process which goes back into the past without a beginning

• an infinite series is a chain of events which continue forever without beginning or end

• This attacks the premise in cosmological arguments that there must be an ultimate cause- infinite regress argues that there may be no utlimate cause and that instead, cause-effect is a process which repeats infinitely into the past

Hume’s objection to causal principle (5)

• we cannot infer a cause for an effect unless we have repeated experience of the cause causing the effect

• We do not have repeat experiences of universes, we only have one that we can observe. It is a unique case

• Hume objects to the claim that cause an effect always apply as “everything has a cause” is not an analytic truth (deniable without contradiction)

• The need for a first cause makes a fallacy of composition

The objection to cosmological arguments from the fallacy of composition (5)

• Fallacy of composition: what is true of the parts of something is not necessarily true of the whole

• The items that are part of something have a specific property: the thing itself does not necessarily have that property

• For example, trees are made up of atoms which have the property of not being visible to the naked eye. however, its not true to say that the tree shares the property of being not visible to the naked eye

• In cosmological argument, the fallacy can be used to criticse that there is a first cause/explanation/mover

• It is not accurate to conclude that the universe as a whole has the causal property just because things have causal properties

The objection to cosmological arguments from the impossibility of a necessary being (Hume, Russell) (5)

• David Hume argues that a necessary being is not possible

• A necessary being is one that cannot be imagined to not exist, so their non-existence must be a contradiction

• But there is no being whose non-existence is contradictory

• Therefore, there is no being whose existence is necessary

• Russell argues it is meaningless to say that any being has necessary existence

• “necessary” is a term which can only applied to analytic propositions that are true a priori

• The claim that “God exists” is not true by definition, tehrefore “God exists” is not necessarily true

moral evil (3)

bad things that arise as a result of actions of the free agents (e.g. murder)

natural evil (3)

bad things that arise as a result of natural processes, especially pain and suffering (e.g. death via earthquake)

logical problem of evil (3)

The existence of evil and suffering in the world is logically incompatible with the idea of God

evidential problem of evil (3)

The amount and unfair distribution of evil and suffering in the world is evidence that God does not exist

classic logical problem of evil (5)

• God is omnipotent, omniscient, and supremely good

• Evil exists

• If God is

JL Mackie’s logical problem of evil (5)

evidential problem of evil (5)

classic free will defence (5)

Platinga’s free will defence (5)

Hick’s soul-making theodicy (5)

God’s attributes can be reconciled with existence of evil (5)

distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism about religious language (5)

the empiricist/logical positivist challenge to religious language from the verification principle (5)

challenge to religious language from falsification (5)

Hick’s response to Ayer on religious language from eschatological verification (5)

Problems with eschatological verification (5)

Flew on falsification (Wisdom’s gardener) (5)

Mitchell’s response to Flew on falsification (5)

Hare’s response to Flew on falsification (bliks and the lunatics) (5)

Issues with Flew on falsification (5)

Issues with Basil Mitchell’s response to Flew on falsification (the Partisan) (5)

Issues with Hare’s response to Flew on falsification (bliks and lunatics) (5)