Key Legal Cases and Doctrines

Flashcards summarizing key legal cases and principles from the lecture notes.

Fagan v MPC (1969)

Established the 'continuing act' doctrine: driving onto a policeman's foot and refusing to move off was a single continuing act, satisfying the coincidence of actus reus and mens rea.

Thabo Meli v R (1954)

Held that it was impossible to divide up what was really one series of acts concerning causation.

Miller (1983)

D has a duty to take reasonable steps to avert danger they accidentally create, failure to do so can ground criminal liability.

R v White (1910)

Leading case on 'but for' causation: D poisoned V's drink, but V died of a heart attack unrelated to the poisoning.

R v Hughes (2013)

Confirmed 'but for' causation alone is not sufficient; D's conduct must also be culpable.

R v Smith (1959)

Even if medical treatment was 'palpably wrong,' the original wound was still the operative cause of death as long as it significantly contributed.

R v Cheshire (1991)

Medical treatment only breaks the chain of causation if it is so independent of D's acts that it renders D's contribution insignificant.

R v Jordan (1956)

Medical treatment was held to break the chain of causation as it was 'palpably wrong' and the original wound had largely healed.

R v Blaue (1975)

Extended the 'thin skull' rule to include the victim's religious beliefs; refusal of a blood transfusion did not break causation.

Kennedy (No 2) (2007)

A free, voluntary, and informed act by V (self-injecting heroin) breaks the chain of causation.

Wallace (2018)

V's decision for euthanasia following an acid attack may not break causation if V's choice was not truly free, voluntary, and informed.

Gibbins and Proctor (1918)

Murder can be committed by omission where there is a duty to act.

R v Woollin (1999)

Jury cannot find necessary intention unless satisfied that death or serious harm was a 'virtual certainty' as a result of D's actions.

R v Cunningham (1957)

Established subjective recklessness: a conscious taking of an unjustified risk.

R v G and R (2003)

Overruled Caldwell; recklessness is assessed subjectively, D must have foreseen the risk.

DPP v Majewski (1977)

Voluntary intoxication is no defense to basic intent crimes but may be relevant to specific intent crimes.

Kingston (1994)

Even with involuntary intoxication lowering inhibitions, if D formed mens rea, the offense is established.

Sheehan (1975)

A drunken intent is still an intent; all evidence, including drink, is considered in proving intent.

Hardie (1985)

Majewski does not apply to drugs that do not cause unpredictability or aggressiveness.

AG for Northern Ireland v Gallagher (1963)

'Dutch courage': forming intent while sober to commit an offense after becoming intoxicated provides no defense.

R v Vickers (1957)

Mens rea for murder is intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.

R v Inglis (2010)

Consent of V is not a defense to murder; mercy killings are not recognized.

R v Dawes (2013)

Normal irritation and serious anger do not usually constitute loss of control; cumulative impact may suffice.

R v Jewell (2014)

Loss of self-control is defined as the inability to act according to considered judgment.

R v Gurpinar (2015)

Three requirements of self-control must be considered separately; cases are fact-sensitive.

R v Church (1966)

Dangerous act test for constructive manslaughter: would a sober, reasonable person recognize the risk?

R v Newbury and Jones (1977)

D need not appreciate that the act was unlawful or dangerous.

R v Lamb (1967)

Base offense for constructive manslaughter must be 'unlawful in the criminal sense.'

R v Adomako (1995)

Leading case on gross negligence manslaughter: D must have owed a duty of care, breached it, causing death.

R v Rose (2017)

Clarified 'serious and obvious risk of death' in gross negligence manslaughter.

Ireland and Burstow (1997)

Psychiatric injury can constitute ABH under s47 and GBH under s20.

Chan-Fook (1994)

ABH includes psychiatric harm, not mere emotions like fear or distress.

R v Brown (1994)

Consent is generally no defense to ABH or worse; sado-masochistic acts causing harm are unlawful despite consent.

R v Dica (2004)

Reckless transmission of HIV can be an offense under s20 OAPA; consent to sex does not imply consent to disease risk.

R v Konzani (2005)

Informed consent to risk of HIV is a defense; uninformed consent is not.

R v Bree (2007)

Drunken consent is valid if V retains capacity to consent.

R v Heard (2007)

Discussed intoxication and sexual offenses, particularly mens rea in intentional touching.

Lawrence v MPC (1971)

Consent of the owner is irrelevant to appropriation.

Morris (1984)

Appropriation is an assumption of any right of the owner.

Gomez (1993)

Affirmed Lawrence: an act authorized by the owner can amount to appropriation.

Hinks (2000)

D can be guilty of theft even if V made a valid gift in civil law.

Turner (No 2) (1971)

One can steal one's own property if another has possession.

Oxford v Moss (1979)

Confidential information is not considered 'property' for theft.

Kelly (1998)

Body parts may be 'property' if they acquire different attributes through skill.

Ivey v Genting Casinos (2017)

Current test for dishonesty: assessing D's knowledge against ordinary decent people's standards.

Lloyd (1985)

Borrowing constitutes intention to permanently deprive only where all goodness is gone.

Velumyl (1989)

Taking cash to replace it with an equivalent is still intent to permanently deprive.

Gilbert (2012)

D must have intended to gain by misrepresentation for conviction.

O'Leary (2013)

Illustrates 'causation in the head' through intent to gain by deceit.

Lambie (1982)

Implied representations when presenting a credit card remain relevant under the Fraud Act.

Allen (1985)

Intent to avoid payment under s3 Theft Act requires permanent intent, not temporary.

Vincent (2001)

D dishonestly obtaining deferment of payment still removes the expectation of immediate payment.

Troughton (1987)

D cannot be said to have 'made off without payment' if the contract isn't complete.

Smith (David) (1974)

D must be reckless about ownership; an honest belief negates the offense.

Khan (1990)

On mens rea for attempts involving recklessness.

Pace and Rogers (2014)

'Intent to commit an offense' means intent to commit all elements of the offense.

Jogee (2016)

D2 must intend to encourage or assist the offense; mere foresight is insufficient.

Bourne (1952)

D can be convicted as an accessory even if the principal had a defense.

Cogan and Leak (1976)

Principal lacking mens rea does not prevent the procurer from conviction as an accessory.

Collins v Secretary of State (2016)

Examines definitions under 'householder' provisions and 'grossly disproportionate' force.

M'Naghten's Case (1843)

D must be laboring under a defect of reason due to disease of the mind to not know the act's nature.

R v Keal (2022)

Insanity is not a defense if D knew the act was wrong but believed there was no choice.

Sullivan (1984)

Epilepsy is an internal cause; differs from non-insane automatism due to external factors.

Oye (2013)

Insane individuals cannot set the standards of reasonableness for self-defense.

Bratty v AG for Northern Ireland (1963)

Evidential burden for automatism lies on the defense; requires complete loss of control.

Quick (1973)

Hypoglycemia due to insulin is non-insane automatism; self-induced incapacity will not excuse.

Hennessy (1989)

Hyperglycemia is insanity, not automatism; stress and anxiety are not external factors.

Smallshire (2008)

Automatism requires complete loss of voluntary control not self-induced and not from disease.

Graham (1982)

Classic two-part test for duress: threat of death/serious injury and reasonable response.

Howe (1987)

Duress is no defense to murder, whether as principal or accessory.

Re A (Conjoined Twins) (2001)

Court permitted separation of conjoined twins in a necessity defense case.