UIL 25-26 Document Quotes / Main Ideas

Churchill - Stalin Secret “Percentages” Agreement

• October 9, 1944

• Churchill and Stalin laid out post-war plans for spheres of influence in the balkans

“Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans…Don’t let us get at cross purposes in small ways…how

would it do for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety per cent of the

say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?”

Churchill - Stalin Secret “Percentages” Agreement

October 9, 1944

Churchill-Stalin “Percentages” Agreement

Yalta Conference

• Created the UN which would meet for the first time in San Francisco on April 25 1945

• Created UN security council

• Former Axis countries should be allowed to create their own independent governments - reaffirmed the Atlantic Charter

• Germany would be occupied by the Big 3 w/ a french zone of occupation created from the US and UK sectors, Germany would pay reparations through goods and labor worth 22b and USSR would get half

• Poland to be reestablished under Polish Provisional Government of National Unity (elections soon) and should be given more territory from Germany

• Yugoslavia would get a new government under Tito and Dr. Subastitch and a Parliament would be established with the AFANL and former government that didn’t collaborate with the axis powers

• continual effort to communicate between big 3 every 3-4 months

• USSR agreed to enter the war against Japan after ending it with Germany, would get territory back lost in the Russo-Japanese war

"The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by

processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to

create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter - the right of

all people to choose the form of government under which they will live - the restoration of sovereign

rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor

nations."

Yalta Conference

Feb 4 - 11, 1945

Yalta Conference

President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union

• voiced his concerns over events since Yalta - lack of action on USSR’s behalf toward setting up a government in Poland

• stated Yalta called for Polish provisonal government of national unity to not only have Stalin’s Lublin Committee members and recommended that new candidates should be invited

• to end the impasse suggested dissidents in poland should stop and USSR and US should foster that

• and US and UK commission members should be able to visit poland

• felt success in Poland was key for allied cooperation to continue bc otherwise public support would falter

“I am frankly puzzled as to why this should be and must tell you that I do not fully understand in many

respects the apparent indifferent attitude of your Government. Having understood each other so well at

Yalta I am convinced that the three of us can and will clear away any obstacles which have developed

since then.”

President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union

April 1, 1945

President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union

Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

• ho chi minh declaration of independence directly after the end of WW2 (ended Japanese control)

• quotes US declaration of independence and also declaration of the rights of man

• lists infringements of the basic rights of the Vietnamese people by colonial occupiers

• Japanese occupation led to death of 2m people from starvation

• french could not protect Viet Minh and colonists massacred them, claimed french ceased to control the area in 1940, therefore the removal of the Japanese created the Democratic republic of vietnam

• based on declarations of Tehran conference and the UN charter Vietnam should have right to self determination

“‘All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among

them are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.’

This immortal statement was made in the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America in

1776. In a broader sense, this means: All the peoples on the earth are equal from birth, all the peoples

have a right to live, to be happy and free. The Declaration of the French Revolution made in 1791 on the

Rights of Man and the Citizen also states: ‘All men are born free and with equal rights, and must always

remain free and have equal rights.’ Those are undeniable truths. Nevertheless, for more than eighty years,

the French imperialists, abusing the standard of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, have violated our

Fatherland and oppressed our fellow-citizens. They have acted contrary to the ideals of humanity and

justice.”

Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

September 1945

Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Stalin’s Speech before Meeting of Voters

• addressed voters in Moscow about the future of the USSR and the events of the past 8 years, focused on causes and results of ww2

• stated capitalism creates a system that inherently results in conflict, so victory of the Soviet union proves success of socialism

• laid out focus of the next 5 year plan: make USSR independent in case of future wars, wanted to recover from war and significantly increase production in industry and agriculture

“It would be wrong to think that the Second World War broke out accidentally, or as a result of blunders

committed by certain statesmen, although blunders were certainly committed. As a matter of fact, the war

broke out as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis

of present-day monopolistic capitalism.”

Stalin’s Speech before Meeting of Voters

“Our victory signifies, first of all, that our Soviet social system was victorious, that the Soviet social

system successfully passed the test of fire in the war and proved that it is fully viable.”

Stalin’s Speech before Meeting of Voters

February 9, 1946

Stalin’s Speech before Meeting of Voters

“Long Telegram” by George Kennan

• he was living in Moscow representing the state dept and sent an interpretation of Stalin’s speech, decided to give an overview of Soviet communism, foreign policy, and proper response

• five points

• stalin and USSR believed that capitalist countries were inherently opposed to socialist ones and conflict was inevitable, and capitalists will have conflicts with themselves, which can be used to the benefit of the USSR. advancing the status of the USSR is aconstant goal in addition to the reduction of capitalist power, and the USSR wants to deepen divide between capitalist countries to exploit conflict

• The party outlook is not the natural outlook of the Russian people. Peaceful coexistence is possible. Moderate socialist policies have seen success in Scandinavia and are sincere efforts, shows that the party line is not based on reality, but goals that existed before WWII - inherent sense of insecurity that has pervaded Russian thought bc feared invasion and influence from more advanced or powerful societies. Bolshevism amplified this feeling and worked it into its ideology. Because of this, dogma plays an important part in all Soviet actions. The outside world is hostile and is inevitably going to fail. This party line is not necessarily disingenuous. This is partly due to the lack of unbiased information from the outside world making it through. There is a basic distrust of facts as they are seen to be used for some other purpose. It is possible that even Stalin does not receive objective information. The influence of advisors is unknown and a dangerous factor that must be remembered.

• i am not writing all of that

• Unofficial Policies (Subterranean Plane):

  An internal core of Communist Parties in other countries will work on orders from Moscow.

  Regular party members are kept outside of the control structure. This was not the previous situation.

  These members can still be used, but for dominating other institutions not connected to the party.

  Examples are international unions, civic organizations, the Russian and Eastern Orthodox Church,

  Pan-Slav movement and other racial movements, and governments of friendly nations. This influence will

  be used to weaken Western power and influence. Groups that suffer repression will be pushed to seek

  violent means for reform rather than compromise. Groups will be purposefully set against each other. This

  policy will be used with the most aggressiveness in colonial areas. Soviet backed/controlled regimes will

  be created to take control after conflict or independence. They will work to eliminate the influence of

  individuals such as clergy, business people, or others that may gain individual popularity. The USSR even

  moves its own local officials to limit their influence. Groups and factions within Western powers will be

  set against each other (US vs UK etc.). International organizations and cooperation will be undercut. All

  unofficial policies focus on diminishing the influence of any power or group that the USSR cannot

  directly control. Police influence in other countries is a key priority and the focus on police powers dates

  back to Tsarist times.

  5. Practical Deductions (for US Policy Based on Soviet Outlook)

  The Soviets are not naturally adventuristic like the Nazi regime. It does not respond to logic of

  reason, but to force. It will quickly withdraw from situations where power is likely to be applied against

  it. The Soviet system has not yet been proven durable. The succession after Stalin will be the real test.

  Communist beliefs are not widely held in great esteem by the Russian people. Soviet propaganda is

  essentially negative and can be easily refuted.

• proper response must be objective and the public should be educated properly to better form relations

• commitment to solve internal issues is the best way to contain communism

• guidance in other countries is key to prevent spread

• US must stay committed to values to avoid using the tactics the USSR uses

“Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced

and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political

general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness

and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in

planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that

problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict.”

“Long Telegram” by George Kennan

“I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of

this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the

unknown.”

“Long Telegram” by George Kennan

“Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of

human society. After Al(sic), the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet

communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.”

“Long Telegram” George Kennan

February 22, 1946

“Long Telegram” George Kennan

“Iron Curtain Speech” by Winston Churchill

• churchill was a guest of Truman in Fulton, Missouri at Westminster college

• addressed the domination of E. Europe by the soviets following the end of WW2, US public still considered soviets an ally so speech was controversial at the time

• stated US was a major power and with power came responsibility and not considering the job completed

• despite being allies with Stalin an Iron Curtain of Soviet control existed blocking the E. half of Europe from the W

• united Europe needed to prevent future wars and UN should be used as a guide to settle disputes

• “communist fifth columns” are spreading across the world under Moscow control, Yalta was favorable to the soviets due to the need to end the war and it has allowed Soviets to spread influence East

• Russia didn’t want war but wanted to expand power

• Russia respects strength above all, churchill saw the same situation with Germany before war and it could've been prevented, so US and UK needed to combine effort to stop it

“From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.

Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin,

Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations

around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only

to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow.”

“Iron Curtain” speech by Winston Churchill

“Last time I saw it all coming and I cried aloud to my own fellow countrymen and to the world, but no

one paid any attention. Up till the year 1933 or even 1935, Germany might have been saved from the

awful fate which has overtaken her and we might all have been spared the miseries Hitler let loose upon

mankind.”

“Iron Curtain” speech by Winston Churchill

March 5, 1946

Iron Curtain speech Winston Churchill

Novikov Telegram

• novikov was Soviet ambassador to the US, Telegram was response to Kennan’s long Telegram but was an internal document

• stated US was seeking world supremacy based on natural tendencies of capitalism. US feels it has a right to lead and its resources are put towards that end - web of bases being extended and new weapons developed to create control

• US outlook changed greatly due to WW2 - able to influence world economies like never before

• assumption that USSR would be weakened was wrong - no longer faces threats from border countries and increased influence through economic support with former adversaries and allies

• influence in E. Europe and Balkans seen as obstacle to US

• US kept developing military to show they are offensive - plan for world dominance

“The foreign policy of the United States, which reflects the imperialist tendencies of American monopolistic capital, is

characterized in the postwar period by a striving for world supremacy. This is the real meaning of the many statements

by President Truman and other representatives of American ruling circles; that the United States has the right to lead the

world. All the forces of American diplomacy -- the army, the air force, the navy, industry, and science -- are enlisted in

the service of this foreign policy.

novikov telegram

September 1946

Novikov telegram

Truman Doctrine

• truman addressed Congress after he was informed that the UK couldn’t support Greece in their effort to end the civil war against communist forces

• stated that Greek govt asked for economic assistance to “survive as a free nation,” they suffered during ww2 from invasion and internal conflict

• Germans destroyed infrastructure as they retreated resulting in economic collapse and disease (85% of kids had TB)

• Communist insurgency stepped into the chaos left by germans

• greece needed assistance and advice

• N. Greece suffering from terrorist activities due to Communist insurgency - bordered comm. Yugoslavia, bulgaria, albania

• army was also poorly equipped and no other country could provide this assistance

• British could no longer help and any assistance to Greece had to be with the goal of making it self-sufficient, UN would not act fast enough so US needed to help

• turkey needed help also, needed more help to modernize and maintain stability in the middle east as a whole

• success not possible without US stepping in to help countries maintain freedom

• totalitarian regimes were spreading (Poland, Romania, bulgaria) in violation of Yalta agreement

• totalitarian govts suppress personal freedoms and democracy so US should oppose that

• fall of Greece could lead to disorder in Turkey and middle east

• asked for 400m in aid bc totalitarianism spreads in impoverished places w/ little hope - US to provide that hope

“The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies

upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal

freedoms. I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting

attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free

peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.”

Truman Doctrine

“The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil

of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We

must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their

freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world -- and we shall surely

endanger the welfare of our own nation.”

Truman Doctrine

March 12, 1947

Truman Doctrine

Marshall Plan speech by George Marshall

• truman’s secretary of state announced his ideas for helping struggling European economies at the Harvard commencement ceremonies (previously declined but after learning of the situation in Europe he accepted)

• believed situation was serious but so complicated that most couldn’t get it just from news reports - visible destruction obvious but economic less so, but more significant - war efforts of Germany destroyed long held treaties and econ. ties

• lack of proper peace treaty between Germany and Austria made rehabilitation even more difficult and even with a resolution economies had more basic problems

• exchange between industry and agriculture had been disrupted bc of the destruction of most cities - cities starving and govts using funds to buy food so had none left for reconstruction - US had to step in if it wanted peace to continue

• real enemies were poverty and chaos, if countries tried to limit reconstruction of others they would not get aid

• Europe must be responsible for own reconstruction but US would fund it and help create programs

• politics would not be a part of it

• said informing the public was key to avoid vague / emotional responses - distance made it seem disconnected but it was still important

• asked for 13b in aid somewhere along the way

“In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe, the physical loss of life, the visible

destruction of cities, factories, mines, and railroads was correctly estimated, but it has become obvious

during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the

entire fabric of European economy.”

Marshall plan speech

“The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and

other essential products -- principally from America -- are so much greater than her present ability to pay

that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social and political deterioration of a

very grave character.”

Marshall Plan speech

“The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in

the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical

for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, European nations.”

Marshall Plan speech

June 5, 1947

Marshall Plan speech

Effects of Soviet Restriction on the US Position in Berlin, Intelligence Report

• highlights difficulty of continuing counterintelligence missions in Berlin due to the soviets trying to limit access / movement across the occupied sectors of the city

• specifically lack of access and support to deserters and anti-comm informers, limitation of US propaganda, inability to ship products between zones, and diminishing hopes of German reunificaiton

• continuation of western forces in Berlin required constant influx of supplies - fuel still coming in but subject to more restrictions

• civilian traffic supply not affected but military transport stopped bc US did not allow USSR inspections - logistical situation not yet hampered but strategic efforts greatly impacted

• moving intelligence assets in and out very difficult due to new Soviet security protocol, also limited propaganda except through radio

• trade of goods between Berlin and the west basically stopped

• by walking out of the Allied Control Council USSR removed mechanism for reunification and a clear way to reduce tension

• situation could deteriorate further if they were to block aircraft and other traffic by incorporating all of Berlin into the Soviet sector, US could increase secret ops but would not improve situation facing Berlin govt

“The USSR still has at its disposal further means of harassing the US and making the latter’s position in

Berlin more difficult. These means include: imposition of unilateral traffic regulations of inbound food

and freight shipments…”

Effects of Soviet Restriction on the US Position in Berlin, Intelligence Report

June 1, 1948

Effects of Soviet Restriction on the US Position in Berlin, Intelligence Report

CIA Weekly Summaries regarding the Soviet Blockade

• CIA created briefings of the main events of the berlin blockade

• first briefing - last week of october 1948 and interprets the soviet veto statement keeping the UN security council from mediating the situation - statement seen as mild and explained by the fact that the blockade seems to have the opposite effect as intented (the isolation of west berlin, weaking of allied resolve)

• also discusses how the USSR was trying to set up a separate E. German govt as a puppet once soviet troops left, part of this effort was a purge in the Socialist Unity Party of all non-comm and ministry of interior was being controlled via the Socialist Unity party to police all levels of govt

• second doc - beginning of december - discussed difficulty in ending the crisis since Soviets est. a separate govt for E. Berlin

• stated USSR used UN discussions to gain time to create a separate govt, currency issue thta preceded the crisis had become secondary to the fallout from the new govt admin

• discussed possible Soviet plans to force the two city admins together later as a compromise that would push comm. leaders into w. part of the city

• w. Berlin set to hold elections and it was feared that soviets would respond by removing the ability of people to work in diff sectors, limit utilities, stop transportation, communication

• if they put a physical barrier that would halt economic activity and create need to increase airlift activity

• january - CIA reported formation of E. Germany more likely w/ plans for a W. Germany in place soviets might have tried to preempt that and claim E. Germany as “true” germany

• final summary - march - impact of the “B” mark (Berlin specific Deutsche mark") - response predicted to be tightening of blockade, so increase in airlift efforts

• possible specifics - ending rail traffic, cutting off mail, water, phone lines, etc but limited by reprecussions that E would suffer as a result

October 29, 1948

CIA Weekly summaries regarding the Soviet blockade

NATO treaty

• signed in DC to be the defense for the Charter of the United Nations and desire for peace, to defend democracy and individual rights and promote security through collective defense

• 14 articles

• 1 - commits members of the treaty to settle disputes peacefully as dictated by the charter

• 2 - promotion of free institutions within the nations will promote their furtherance across the globe

• 3 - mutual aid to help achieve treaty’s goals and build defenses

• 4 - group consultation about possible threats

• 5 - IMPORTANT ONE - mutual defense

• 6 - specifies territories included as part of prev. article including forces in other areas

• 7 - NATO does not usurp the Security Council

• 8 - all current and future agreements will be in line with NATO treaty

• 10 - future members can join (current members belgium, canada, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK, US and would ratify according to respective constitutions)

• 12 - treaty in effect for 10 years before being renewed for change

• 13 - after 20 years nations could leave w/ a year’s notice to US

• 14 - eng and french versions to be kept in US archives

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall

be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack

occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defence recognised by Article

51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,

individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of

armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

NATO treaty

April 4, 1949

NATO treaty

NSC Paper-68

• suggestions of this paper had significant influence on US outlook concerning CW activities 50s-60s - cemented by Korean conflict

• BACKGROUND - states history marked by cycles of violence bc competing powers wanted to gain leverage without any one establishing dominance

• recent collapse of ottoman, AH, German, italian, japanese empires, weakening of UK and France, revolution in Russia and china changed world power dynamic

• asserted USSR wanted to spread its beliefs across the world, antithetical to US

• addition of nuclear weapons makes total annihilation possible, desire for peace but also a need to maintain deterrent to USSR power - need action to avoid destruction of civilization

• FUNDAMENTAL DESIGN OF THE KREMLIN - The goal of Soviet leadership was to maintain their control in the USSR and in areas they

  controlled. That required an increase in their control and an elimination of dissent. They sought

  to destroy competing governments and sources of dissent in non-communist areas so they

  could be controlled by the Kremlin. They sought to control Eurasia and saw the US as their

  main alternate source of power, and therefore main enemy that needed to be undermined.

• The USSR had the military capacity to defend its territory and far beyond, but not enough in its

  own estimation to confront the US. Its strength and atomic weapons gave it the power to leverage its

  position to further its influence during peacetime and deter others from stopping it due to the risk of war.

  In 1950, the USSR and its allies would be able to overrun the rest of Europe, except perhaps the furthest

  extension of the Ibernian and Scandinavian Peninsulas. It would be able to pull together communist areas

  in the Far East. It could threaten Britain with airstrikes and attack Western communications. The Soviets

  could use atomic weapons against US positions or keep them to threaten the UK and keep it from being

  the base of operations for the West. It could then lead a secondary attack on the rest of Europe and into the

  Middle East while attacking North America via air.

• The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 and the Defense Assistance Act of 1949 would not be

  able to significantly increase European defenses until 1952. An effective defense was predicted to not be

  likely until 1960. Atomic capabilities of the Soviet Union were predicted to be 10-20 weapons by

  mid-1950 and 25-45 a year later. By mid-1952, the number would be 45-90 and 70-135 the next year

  before reaching 200 in 1954. It was a rough estimation that could change, but there was evidence that the

  USSR was developing a thermonuclear weapon. They had enough bombers to deliver their current

  stockpile, but they did not have the US’s level of accuracy. They would be able to accurately deliver 100

  of their bombs when they reached 200 in total. That would be enough to seriously damage the US.

• The Soviets could launch a surprise atomic attack once they had a large enough capacity. That

  could result in the destruction of the British Isles, destruction of Western communications, and devastate

  parts of the US and Canada. If they achieved thermonuclear capabilities the damage would increase

  significantly.

• US INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES - The US had the strongest military of any country. It still could not match the number of Soviet

  forces and did not have attack positions for its forces and weapons that would be needed in a direct

  conflict with the USSR. The US had a larger military than at any other time of peace, but it was not

  currently large enough to react to the commitments of defense it had made if conflict were to begin. In

  1950, the US and allies could defend the Western Hemisphere as well as strategic points in the Middle

  East and the British Isles. Air attacks against the USSR would also be possible. If military strength was

  increased then deterrence would be possible. It would allow the US to counter any Soviet-led attack. The

  increase would require a building up of forces, weapons, and development of future weapons. Such an

  increase would require 2-3 years in peacetime and less during war. The increase would be capable of

  deterring any Soviet attack and defending it if it was needed.

• ATOMIC ARMAMENTS - The US stockpile could have dramatically reduced Soviet war-making abilities, but would not

  have likely caused a surrender or stopped them from occupying Western Europe. It would have still given

  the US a position of strength for the rest of the war. The Soviet stockpile would carry more of a threat as it

  increased and could have kept the UK from being used as an advanced base for the US and its allies.

  Within four years, the USSR would have an arsenal that could take away the economic advantage the US

  had if a surprise attack was launched. A system to defend against a Soviet attack would be needed

  including a civilian defense program. If their capabilities continued to grow, a surprise attack could be

  powerful enough to defeat the US. The advantage of a surprise attack might convince the USSR of such a

  strategy. The US needed the ability to retaliate to keep eventual victory possible for the West after the

  Soviets reached the 1954 levels of expected weapons. A further build up by the US would have also

  delayed when the USSR would have enough weapons to calculate a high probability of a successful

  surprise attack. It would also have given time for political and economic influence to be used against the

  Soviet sphere. The dangers increased significantly if the USSR developed a thermonuclear weapon. The

  US could have used its own development of such a device to pressure the Soviet Union.

  -Stockpiling and Use of Atomic Weapons

  Eliminating atomic weapons would bring the greatest benefit, but if that could not be achieved

  there was a great need to rapidly increase the atomic stockpile. A conventional weapon build up was also

  necessary.

• concluded increase in Soviet atomic weapons required the US to dramatically increase its military

  strength to deter and counter the growing threat to the country and its allies. The current status of growth

  would not attain such levels. Current levels of growth would lead to isolation by the realities of power and

  abilities rather than by aims and designs of the government. The US was central to any defense of the

  West and that created a growing responsibility to build up strength. There needed to be a strong enough

  build up to help the West counter Soviet aims during peace and in times of war.

  The US needed to seek to use its leadership of the free world to frustrate Soviet goals and build up

  its own strength. It had to be willing to negotiate with the USSR, but only from a position of power. Only

  through such action would the USSR abandon the ideal of expansion and power to influence the world at

  large. The success of that initiative required a belief throughout the allied “free world” that the cold war

  was a real military, political, and social struggle that had to be immediately faced and responded to.

“In time, the atomic capability of the USS.R. can be expected to grow to a point where, given surprise and

no more effective opposition than we now have programmed, the possibility of a decisive initial attack

cannot be excluded.

NSC-68

“In the initial phases of an atomic war, the advantages of initiative and surprise would be very great. A

police state living behind an iron curtain has an enormous advantage in maintaining the necessary

security and centralization of decisions required to capitalize on this advantage.”

NSC-68

“The only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady development of the moral

and material strength by the free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring

about an internal change in the Soviet system. Such a positive program -- harmonious with our

fundamental national purpose and our objectives -- is necessary if we are to regain and retain the

initiative and to win and hold the necessary popular support and cooperation in the United States and the

rest of the free world.”

NSC-68

April 14, 1950

NSC-68

CIA summaries on the Korean Conflict

• July 8, 1950: The document discussed possible Soviet reasons for supporting the DPRK’s invasion

  of the South. The analysis was that the USSR did not believe the UN or the US would or could respond in

  the time needed to avoid the collapse of the South.

• possible Soviet strategies - A. They could limit fighting in Korea and not become heavily involved while painting the US as outside

  aggressors. This was seen as unlikely since any upside for the USSR would be limited and slow.

  B. The USSR could limit the conflict, but supply the DPRK and involve PRC troops. That alternative

  would prolong the conflict and could lead to a weakening of resolve amongst US allies. It would also

  increase Soviet prestige while tarnishing that of the United States. This was seen as the likely alternative.

  C. The Soviets could create similar conflicts in other areas such as Formosa (Taiwan), Iran, Greece, or

  increase pressure on the jointly held areas of Berlin or Vienna. That alternative was seen as aggressive,

  but would also be something the US was unprepared to respond to. It would require the US to either

  reconsider its containment response or prepare for continual or total military activity. The report believed

  that the USSR would adopt such a policy if a total world war did not seem likely, but would not do so if

  the US mobilized to respond.

  D. The Soviets would use Korea as an onramp to a global war with the United States and its allies. This

  was seen as unlikely since other alternatives provided positives without the severe risks involved in such a

  policy.

• possible outcome of the US failing to stabilize South

  Korea - believed that the loss of prestige might lead to further Soviet aggression or the need for the

  US to invade another location to regain its perception of strength.

• July 10. 1950: This memo focused on the repercussions of the US voluntarily withdrawing its

  forces from Korea. Such action was seen as the most dangerous alternative for the United States. It was

  predicted to undermine all its foreign policy agreements and relations. Such an action would have

  undercut NATO and other commitments by causing doubts amongst allies concerning the US ability to aid

  in stopping Soviet aggression. It could have led areas such as Iran and Indochina to preemptively seek

  positive relations with the Soviet Union. The USSR would also have been more likely to initiate similar

  actions to Korea since the fear of general war would have been significantly lessened. The US would

  likely have needed to heavily mobilize or totally mobilize to prepare for future aggression after a

  withdrawal. Such actions may then have been perceived as preparations for a general war by the USSR. It

  would have been more logical to mobilize to support efforts in Korea than to do so after a withdrawal.

  Mobilization after the fact would not have reduced the damage to the alliances and relationships of the

  North Atlantic community.

• July 12, 1950: The memo discussed an Army report that the PRC was preparing to attack Taiwan

  imminently. Military movements, preparations, comments by Foreign Minister Chou En-Lai (Zhou Enlai),

  a trip by Mao to Moscow, and events in Taiwan were given as evidence. The CIA did not have evidence

  to suggest an attack, but believed PRC troops were capable.

• July 7, 1950: This document breaks down the possible Soviet reactions to US involvement of troops. The

  document stated that US involvement made the Soviets more cautious about being aggressive, but they

  could still reap the benefits of the North’s advances if they continued. The Soviets could have prolonged

  the war by supplying the North without fully involving itself. The PRC was not expected to involve its

  troops unless the North suffered losses. The PRC was thought to be looking at other opportunities for

  aggression in the Far East. US support of Taiwan was seen as a strong factor in discouraging PRC

  aggression there. It was also not believed the PRC would move into Korea under the current

  circumstances. China was believed to be interested in using the conflict to increase its support of other

  groups in Southeast Asia such as Ho Chi Minh’s forces and those in Malaya. There was fear of possible

  action by the PRC into Burma to contain the Chinese Nationalist troops living there.

1950

CIA summaries on the Korean conflict

“Declaration of Conscience” by Margaret Chase Smtih

• senator from Maine that chose to attack prosecutions led by fellow Republican senator Joseph McCarthy (WI)

• opened statement w/ invocation of the constitutional right to free speech and trial by jury

• believed lives were being ruined by committee attacks and being done in the name of “americanism” that was ignoring the founding principles of the country - right to criticize, hold different beliefs, protest, think differently

• rights should not be used against people to destroy their lives, US does not want thought control, people were tired of being called Communist for expressing themselves

• smith felt challenge was like the civil war, senate spreading dangerous suspicion

• democratic admin ineffective but replacing it with a dangerous Republican one was no better

• could destroy entire 2 party system

• wondered how other women felt about family members being vilified by the senate

• attacked both parties for recklessly throwing accusations around, drafted the Declaration w/ 6 other Republican senators

• declared that country came before party and therefore a statement about the threat needed to be made

• truman admin had not provided the necessary leadership and had not accepted the criticism about response to Communist threats

• accusations had unwittingly helped Communist agenda to destabilize US

“Those of us who shout the loudest about Americanism in making character assassinations are all too

frequently those who, by our own words and acts, ignore some of the basic principles of

Americanism—The right to criticize;The right to hold unpopular beliefs;The right to protest;The right of

independent thought.”

“Declaration of Conscience” by Margaret Chase Smith

“Today our country is being psychologically divided by the confusion and the suspicions that are bred in

the United States Senate to spread like cancerous tentacles of “know nothing, suspect everything”

attitudes…”

“Declaration of Conscience” by Margaret Chase Smith

“The Nation sorely needs a Republican victory. But I don’t want to see the Republican Party ride to

political victory on the four horsemen of calumny—fear, ignorance, bigotry and smear.”

“Declaration of Conscience” by Margaret Chase Smith

“It is high time that we all stopped being tools and victims of totalitarian techniques—techniques that, if

continued here unchecked, will surely end what we have come to cherish as the American way of life.”

“Declaration of Conscience” by Margaret Chase Smith

June 1, 1950

“Declaration of Conscience” by Margaret Chase Smith

Warsaw Security Pact

• collective security agreement but specifically stated it was not based on political systems, stated it was a reaction to military alignment of W. Europe and the fact that West Germany was rebuilding military and joining NATO

• that was seen as increasing risk of war and showing need for existence of a separate security pact

• claimed to have been guided by principles of UN charter - 11 articles

• 1 - claimed to renounce use of force to settle disputes

• 2 - committed members to support peaceful initiatives to reduce arms and nuclear weapons

• 3 - consult each other over threats

• 4 - mutual defense like NATO, also claimed that security council will be followed to settle disputes

• 5 - est Joint Command and commitment to build defensive capabilities

• 6 - created Political Consultative Committee to manage concerns

• 7 - precluded any other agreements that ran counter to Warsaw Pact agreements

• 8 - promised econ cooperation and respect for internal sovereignty

• 9 - opened agreement to add new members

• 11 - pact would last 20 years and if no member wanted to withdraw at least a year prior then it would last 10 more, would cease to exist if a General European Treaty of Collective Security created

“(Article IV) In the event of armed attack in Europe on one or more of the Parties to the Treaty by any

state or group of states, each of the Parties to the Treaty, in the exercise of its right to individual or

collective self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations Organization,

shall immediately, either individually or in agreement with other Parties to the Treaty, come to the

assistance of the state or states attacked with all such means as it deems necessary, including armed

force.”

Warsaw Pact

“(Article XI) Should a system of collective security be established in Europe, and a General European

Treaty of Collective Security concluded for this purpose, for which the Contracting Parties will

unswervingly strive, the present Treaty shall cease to be operative from the day the General European

Treaty enters into force.”

Warsaw Pact

May 14, 1955

Warsaw Pact

Khrushchev’s Address to the 20th Party Congress / Secret Speech

• beginning of official de-Stalinization

• reportedly caused heart attacks bc inflammatory nature

• denounced “cult of personality” around Stalin and “perversions” it caused to the party

• use of arbitrary terror emulated and spread by others - arrests, deportation, execution common and many suffered who were not enemies, but people who admitted to false charges

• after true enemies eliminated, Stalin cont to purge workers and party members through mass terror and the NKVD

• became paranoid and his suspicions not based on evidence but immediately accepted on faith

“Quite a lot has been said about the cult of the individual and about its harmful consequences. ... The cult

of the person of Stalin ... became at a certain specific stage the source of a whole series of exceedingly

serious and grave perversions of party principles, of party democracy, of revolutionary legality.”

Khrushchev’s Address to the 20th Party Congress / Secret Speech

February 25, 1956

Khrushchev’s Address to the 20th Party Congress / Secret Speech

Zhou Enlai Discussion with Nehru Concerning Hungary

• nehru heard from his ambassadors in Hungary and yugoslavia that people of Hungary were still unhappy and taking part in slow-downs at work

• Zhou informed him that he believed the situation was improving and the new govt (led by Kadar) was fixing problems

• soviet invasion worsened the situation and according to Zhou, Kadar had sought to work with nagy but the USSR sent him to romania

• UN wanted to investigate situation in hungary

• Nehru believed hungary would lose sympathy amongst countries if secretary general Dag Hammarskjold wasn’t allowed in, UN may not recognize Kadar govt

• zhou gave his version of the revolution - led by “reactionary forces” aided by w. countries, compared nagy to Wang Jingwei in 1927 China which justified kadar and Soviet response

• “reactionaries” massacred socialists and without USSR intervention Hungary would’ve been lost

• nehru agreed about western influence but the invasion and removal of Nagy wasn’t favored by the rest of the world

• Zhou responded Yugoslavia helped shield Nagy and disapproved of the invasion but supported kadar’s govt

• China would’ve arrested Nagy or let him go to the west, Zhou believed socialist countries could work to improve themselves but had to stand together in the face of western influence

• Nehru reiterated that Hungary should respond to UN requests and Zhou agreed to share his thoughts w/ kadar and also believed conversation should be shared w/ USSR

December 3, 1956

Zhou Enlai Discussion with Nehru Concerning Hungary

Soviet Foreign Ministry Analysis of Third World Reaction to Hungary and Suez

• reactions to UK in Egypt - anti English feelings increased as a result of invasion of Suez canal

• India’s Chakravarti Rajagopalachari suggested they leave the commonwealth if UK rejected UN decision to withdraw troops, Pakistan and Sri Lanka agreed

• Nehru said India would not withdraw, not considering sanctions, Sri Lanka PM Bandaranike agreed

• pres iskander mirza of Pakistan also cautious about his country’s reaction - reactions regarded as not surprising bc strong econ ties to UK

• still many English in govt offices / military - explained by belief that “bourgeois and land-owning circles” wanted to stay connected with UK

• UK began to withdraw - most criticism stopped but overall reputation still damaged

• Reaction to USSR in Hungary - hostility to USSR increased in these countries esp Pakistan and burma - invasion compared to West in Egypt

• PMs of India, Burma, sri Lanka, and Indonesia declared united stance against aggression against weaker countries by strong ones in violation of UN charter at the Bandung Conference - called for withdrawal of troops from hungary and self determination for the people

• Pakistan co-authored UN resolution to intervene in Hungary, Burma considered sanctions against USSR - stances mirrored Yugoslavia on hungary

• Nehru displeased about how Nagy was treated

• press in those countries more hostile to soviet foreign policy - undermining UN, Nehru stated the 5 principles of peaceful relations being ignored by powerful countries, connected to USSR not fulfilling trade agreements

• tensions didn’t stop PRC from growing relations

• Reaction to US response - increased prestige in Asia, seen as peacemaker in Egypt

• discussion about warmer relations with US, who prev agreed to resume aid to India, agreements made for loans

• those efforts were made to try to foster Indo-American treaty, Nehru agreed to visit US after previously avoiding it, and spoke warmly of US while there but no agreements made

• changes in perception seen as possibly leading to stronger ties between US and india, US also considered increasing aid to Pakistan and burma (rejected prev but growing warmer)

“In the memorandum of the Indian Government handed to Com[rade]. GROMYKO on 17 December

1956, the current position of the Soviet Union is judged in its essentials, and it is asserted that ‘the events

in Hungary shatter the belief of millions of people, who had begun to view the USSR as the defender of

peace and rights of the weakest people.’”

Soviet Foreign Ministry Analysis of Third World Reaction to Hungary and Suez

December 28, 1956

Soviet Foreign Ministry Analysis of Third World Reaction to Hungary and Suez

Speech at the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties by Mao Zedong

• speech made near apex of Sino-Soviet relations and known as “East Wind Over West” - described how Mao believed socialist countries were beginning to overtake capitalist

• dealt with turning point in history that was the result of prev turning point October revolution, other turning point was when Nazis were defeated in Stalingrad and ww2 tide changed to USSR favor

• west tried to insult socialist bloc based on Hungary but USSR was strong enough to stop Suez crisis w/ a single telegram

• mao said current year (1957) was a turning point due to launch of sputniks, joked that Dulles had to take a sleep aid due to success of USSR

• some still stated that US was more powerful and had more steel and weapons, he believed Radio Free Europe and Voice of America lied about US strength - believed fraud needed to be revealed and had a plan to show E. dominance over W.

• despite US and UK dom over USSR in steel during ww2 they had to ask for soviet help, they helped and region they liberated joined socialism - proved it’s not the quantity of material but the quality of people / system

• chinese communists so strong Truman wouldn’t support his “son” chiang kai-shek

• stated due to overwhelming military advantages the Chinese forces helped N. Korean troops push US forces back to 38th parallel. US also had air superiority but asked for peace, after delaying, a breakthrough by comm. forces caused US to sign a peace agreement 1953 - 3 comm armies vs 16

• stated The French were routed by Ho Chi Minh’s troops and despite the US wanting the French to continue to fight, they could not, caused them both to agree to give Ho Chi Minh over half of the country at the Geneva Conference

• suez crisis - UK and France had a lot of steel but stopped fighting after “just a word” from the USSR and entire world spoke against them. claimed same happening in syria

• US had twice as much steel as USSR but could not launch “a single potato [in reference to sputnik launches]”

• all points showed West was behind and would remain as such

• china planned to reach 45m tons of steel, Khrushchev committed USSR to overtake US in 15 years, Mao committed China to surpassing the UK in that amt of time

• sought period of peace so once they achieved their goals nobody could threaten them

• said there could be a nuclear attack during that time, China feared starting a war without having their own nuclear weapons but Mao said “elder brother” USSR had them

• said nuclear war not so terrifying (some of you may die but that is a sacrifice I am willing to make) bc imperialism would be destroyed, said socialism would win and after a century the world would recover, in which China would end construction to go to war then come back to construction

• bc decolonization - imperialism like the setting sun and communism like the rising one

• east would prevail not bc of material but bc of power and beliefs

“Can one estimate how many people would be lost in a future war? Possibly, it would be one third of the

whole world’s population of 2700 million, or just 900 million people. I think this is even too few if the

atomic bombs are really dropped. Of course, this is very scary. But it would not be that bad even if it were

a half. Why? Because we did not want it, and they are imposing a war on us. If we go to war, atomic and

hydrogen weapons will be used. I personally think that the entire world will suffer, if a half of the human

kind, or more than a half, die. I argued this question with Nehru. He is more pessimistic than I in this

respect. I told him: if half of the human kind is destroyed, the other half will still remain, but imperialism

will be destroyed completely, and there will just be socialism in the entire world, and in half-a-century or

a whole century the population will grow again, even by more than a half.”

Speech at the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties by Mao Zedong

“Inevitably, the East Wind will prevail over the West Wind, because we are stronger. That is, the question

is being decided not by the amount of steel. The question is being decided by the attitude of the people.”

Speech at the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties by Mao Zedong

November 18, 1957

Speech at the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties by Mao Zedong

The U-2 Incident

• US assumed Gary Powers had died and had to change its response