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Assurance engagement
Three seperate parties
Subject matter to audit
Criteria to evaluate against it
Sufficient and appropriate evidence
Written report with the auditor’s conclusions
4 phases of an audit
Acceptance - Johnstone & Bedard (2003)
=> Should we take this client?
Understanding and risk analysis
=> What are the risks of this specific client?
Executing the audit plan - Sherwood (2025)
=> Doing the actual audit work
Completing & reporting - Reid, et al (2019)
Why auditing standards?
Guideline for the auditor
Legal reason (they cannot be sued under the negligence law if they can prove they followed the standards)
Testing management assertions - income statement
1. Occurrence
2. Completeness
3. Accuracy
4. Cutoff
5. Classification
6. Presentation
Testing management assertions - balance sheet
1. Existence
2. Rights and obligations
3. Completeness
4. Accuracy
5. Valuation
6. Classification
7. Presentation
The audit risk model
Audit Risk = IR × CR × DR
Audit Risk = IR × CR × DR
IR = inherent risk
CR = control risk
DR = detection risk
==> always non zero
Audit opinion categories
Unqualified opinion
Unqualified opinion with emphasis of matter
Qualified opinion
Adverse opinion
Disclaimer of opinion
3 types of risk - Johnstone 2003
Audit risk
Client business risk
Auditor business risk
Strategies for acceptance risk
Assigning specialist personnel
=> mitigates risk through lower error en fraud, But they cannot save a financially dying company (client business risk) and cannot shield the firm from public scandal if a publicly traded client collapses (auditor business risk).
Higher billing rates
=> accepts the risk and ask for compensation. Charging more does not make the team better at finding problems — it cannot mitigate audit risk.
Paper completing and reporting Reid, et al 2019
KAM (uk reform that extends the report)
Three measures
Abnormal accruals (decrease)
Earnings risk management (decrease)
Meeting and just beating the analyst forecast (decrease)
=> Can be driven by two types of mechanisms
Threat of disclosure
Increased auditor accountability
==> Conclusion: All measures decrease, so quality increases. This is driven mostly by mechanism 1, because there is no increase in costs.
Professional skepticism
Indicated by auditor judgment and decisions that a reflect a heightened assessment of risk that an assertion is incorrect, conditional on the information available
Skeptical judgment
Noticing that a potential problem exists
Skeptical action
Actually doing something about it
Informing the manager
Requesting additional docs
Adding audit hours
Seeking a second opinion
4 determinants of PS - Nelson 2009
Knowledge
Incentives
Evidence
Traits
PS gap between judgment and action - Nelson 2009
Incentive to stay silent
Trait suppresses action
Knowledge gap
How to improve PS? - Nelson 2009
Hiring and training
Evaluation and rewarding
Safe channels and strong culture
Outcome effect and PS - Brazel, et al 2016
The outcome effect is when people judge a decision based on the result even if the decision was perfectly reasonable at the time.
Brazel et al, 2016
Method: same decision different outcome ==> performance as a dependent variable
Performance was rated worse when outcome was that there was nothing found after flagging. Consultation did not fix it, and made it even worse in some situtations as it seemed that the auditor was trying to shift the blame.
CONCLUSION: Underinvestigating, the auditor will only investigate and flag something when they are absolutely sure they will find something, because other wise it will be seen as waste of time and making the client unhappy.
Theory of planned behaviour - Hardies,et al 2025
Your actions are driven by intentions
Intention comes from 3 things
attitudes
Subjective norms
Perceived control
Findings firm level paper Hardies, 2025
Firm level
Firms professional orientation
=> if the culture is doing the right thing auditors are more skeptical
Firm quality control system
Individual accountability
Findings client and auditor level - Hardies 2025
Client => client identification
Auditory:
These all predict more skeptical action:
• Trait skepticism
• Moral courage
• Motivation to perform well
• Audit knowledge
• Industry expertise
Fraud triangle
Incentive and pressure ==> inherent risk
Opportunity ==> control risk
Attitude or rationalization ==> inherent risk
Control are limited when it comes to fraud
Human judgment is biased
Human error
Collusion
Management override
External factors
Anti fraud measures examples
Job rotation
Mandatory vacation policies
SOD
Surprise audits
Whistleblower hotline
ANTI fraud measures
The fraudulent act
Concealement
Conversion
Most common fraud techniques
Improper revenue recognition: 61% of cases — example: channel stuffing (booking sales
before they are real)
• Overstatement of assets: 51%
• Understatement of expenses or liabilities: 31%
• Misappropriation of assets: 14%
Targeted risk assessment (TRA)
Identifying fraud schemes specific for the industry, business model and environment
Likelihood that the scheme could be executed and completed
Identify the weakest point in the control environment.
Channel stuffing
side agreements with suppliers and customers that are withheld from
auditors
6 motives for fraud - Andon and free 2025
Justification
Incosequnetiality motive
Permission motive
Unfair treatment
Excuses
Personal
Appeasement
Addiction
Paper alternative risk assessment - asare & wright
Fraud is rare, SALY heuristics, anchoring and decion aids create an illusion of control
Research:
Checklist vs no checklist
Standards vs zero based
The use of checklists and standards reduce the fraud risk assessment effectiveness because they encourage mechanical thinking