Political science 147

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Last updated 10:03 AM on 5/6/26
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Illusory Pattern Perception

-Human brain is hardwired to connect dots. If you have a high need for ‘sense making’, you might be more likely to see and believe in conspiracies.

-Is a conspiracy theory a pathology of the few, or a feature of the human brain?

- Pathology of few - dispositionism

-Feature of human brain - situationism

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Affective Polarization

-no longer just policy disagreement, intense emotional dislike for the “other”

1996 "adversary” (dole calls clinton a decent man)

Present “enemy” ( lock them up,traitors)

-people now would be more upset at child marrying “other” political party then people in the 60s did about marrying another race

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Genopolitics

Genopolitics in DNA - is your vote in your DNA

Liberals:Larger ACC

- associated with error detection and adaptability

Conservatives: Larger Amygdala

-associated with threat detection and response to danger

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Neuropolitics

a science which investigates the interplay between the brain and politics. It combines work from a variety of scientific fields which includes neuroscience, political science, psychology, behavioral genetics, primatology, and ethology. Often, neuropolitics research borrow methods from cognitive neuroscience to investigate classic questions from political science such as how people make political decisions, form political / ideological attitudes, evaluate political candidates, and interact in political coalitions

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Conspiracy Theories

significant political or social events that attribute them to the secret, coordinated actions of a small, powerful group — often with the intent to harm a rival group or undermine society. These theories reject the official narrative of the event, instead proposing an alternative account that is usually more sensational, morally charged, or ideologically aligned with the believer’s worldview.

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Nature v. nurture

-nature  inherent traits, genetic predispositions, and innate tendencies that may influence an individual’s political ideologies, affiliations, and behaviors. This perspective suggests that certain political orientations—such as preferences for equality, social progress, tradition, or hierarchy

Nurture - role of the environment—including upbringing, culture, education, socio-economic status, media exposure, and personal experiences—in shaping political views. This perspective holds that political beliefs are largely molded by socialization, lived experiences, and the political environment in which a person grows up

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Rational v. irrational behavior

  • Rational behavior - refers to decisions made based on a cost–benefit analysis, where individuals weigh the expected outcomes of their actions and choose the option that maximizes their utility.

  • irrational behavior- in contrast, occurs when decisions are made without sufficient information, based on biases, emotions, or preferences for certain beliefs over truth, even if it leads to suboptimal outcomes.

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Situationism v. dispositionism (first introduction)

Situationism

Focus: the Context

Personality: Social Pressure ,

The situation

Theory: “Bad Barrel”

-Certain situational features

Lead a person to be disposed to

A certain political action

-context over individual

Dispositionism

Focus: Individual

Personality: Personality,

Genetics, belief

Theory: “Bad Apple”

-explains differing a reactions to

Same stimulous

-certain individual level

Features lead person to be

Disposed to certain politica

Actions

Individual over context

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Conscious v. subconscious decision-making

humans are conscious decision makers,reason trumps emotion

-excuse to why women couldn't

Modern reality - neuro science

-98% thought is unconscious

-libet experiment

-brain activity predates movement before conscious awareness

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Homo Economicus (Econs) v. Homo Psychologicus (Humans)

Homo Economicus (Econs) -the economic man, is a theoretical model in economics that portrays humans as perfectly rational, self-interested agents who always make decisions to maximize their own utility or profit

Homo Psychologicus (Humans)- a term popularized by evolutionary psychologist Nicholas Humphrey to describe humans as a species uniquely equipped to understand and predict the intentions, emotions, and behaviors of others. It reflects the idea that our evolutionary history has shaped us to be “natural psychologists,” constantly hypothesizing about the minds of those around us.

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Bounded rationality

the idea that people make decisions based on limited information and cognitive resources, leading them to choose satisfactory solutions rather than optimal ones.

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Subjective utility

the personal value or satisfaction an individual derives from a good, service, or choice, based on their own preferences, desires, and circumstances rather than objective measures.

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• Abu Ghraib Torture Scandal

After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, when reports of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison started to surface. An investigation launched by the U.S. Army in January 2004 uncovered graphic evidence of misconduct by U.S. military personnel, including severe mistreatment of Iraqi detainees. The release of disturbing photographs depicting the abuse ignited a political and international outcry, severely damaging the U.S. military's reputation and raising questions about American values and practices regarding human rights.

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Psychoanalysis

  • Key motivation- understanding decisions of powerful elites (presidents, Hitlers)

  • Key scholars- sigmund freud, harold, alexander and juliette george

  • Core theory- psychobiography- into- psychoanalysis

  • Concepts- displacement. Private problems(low self esteem) are displaced into public objects(seeking power)

  • Example- wildrow wilson pol rigidity traced to his stern father

  • Limitations

  • -difficult to verify psychoanalytic claims

  • -Overemphasis on pathology

  • -limited applicability on mass behavior

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 Political psychology definition

The interdisciplinary studies how individuals and groups think, feel, and act politically, integrating insights from psychology, political science, sociology, economics, and other social sciences to understand political behavior and decision-making. It explores the psychological underpinnings of political attitudes, identity formation, motivation, perception, cognition, and socialization, as well as how these factors influence voting, leadership, policy-making, nationalism, extremism, and collective behavior.

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Eugenics v behaviorism

  • Eugenics  -  the idea that human traits, including intelligence, morality, and health, were inherited and could be selectively enhanced through controlled reproduction. Early proponents advocated encouraging reproduction among those deemed “genetically superior” (positive eugenics) and discouraging or preventing reproduction among those considered “unfit” (negative eugenics).

  • Behaviorism - A perspective in political science presenting itself as an alternative to traditionalism; behavioralism emphasises empirical analysis of the actual behavior of politically involved individuals and groups, as opposed to historical or textual analysis of institutions and laws.

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• Stimulus-response model

  • response model is a conceptual framework for understanding how political actors, institutions, and systems react to external stimuli—such as policy changes, events, or rhetoric—by producing observable behaviors, decisions, or outcomes. 

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 • Social engineering 

  • the large-scale, intentional shaping of societal structures, norms, and behaviors through policy, law, and institutional mechanisms, often using insights from sociology, psychology, and economics

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• Free will

the capacity of individuals to choose between different courses of action, exercise control over their decisions, and be morally responsible for those choices

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• Ethical concerns regarding behaviorism as a form of social engineering

autonomy, consent, and the potential exploitation of vulnerable populations.

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  Behaviorism as situationism

Behaviorism and situationism are both psychological perspectives that emphasize the role of the environment in shaping behavior, but they differ in scope, focus, and underlying assumptions.

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  • Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment • “Bad barrel” v. “bad apples”

Stanford prison experiment- Stanford experiment-a landmark study in social psychology that directly challenged the “bad apples” explanation for evil behavior. In the experiment, college students were randomly assigned to play guards or prisoners in a simulated prison set up in Stanford’s basement. The study was planned for two weeks but was terminated after six days due to extreme psychological distress and abusive behavior by the guard. Zimbardo introduced the “bad barrel” theory to explain how ordinary, well-adjusted individuals can commit harmful acts. Bad apples: Individuals with inherent moral flaws or tendencies toward cruelty.Bad barrels: Situational and systemic factors that can transform good people into perpetrators of evil.

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Dehumanization

Mechanism of action 

  • Suspending moral judgment. Victims as objects.

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Deindividuation

Mechanism of action 

  • Loss of self-awareness. Anonymity in the group.

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  • “The Lucifer Effect”

  • ordinary, even good people can commit acts of cruelty or injustice under certain situational and systemic pressures. The term draws from the biblical story of Lucifer, symbolizing the “fall” from good to evil, and is used to challenge the “bad apple” explanation of wrongdoing.

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  •  The “Bad Barrel” theory and the Abu Ghraib Torture Scandal

the situational and systemic factors (bad barrels) that influence and corrupt otherwise good people. Such in Abu Ghraib Torture Scandal where normal people were in an abnormal situation.

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Ethics of research

the ethical implications of torture in the context of the "War on Terror."

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  • Arguments for and against the “Bad Barrel” Theory 

  • Againsts

    • Orchestrated guard behavior: archived records show that guards received specific instructions and “creative” ideas from 

  • For 

    • The “bad barrel” theory in corruption and behavioral research argues that corrupt behavior is not solely the product of “bad apples” (individuals with corrupt tendencies), but is also heavily shaped by the organizational and situational context in which people operate. This perspective emphasizes that the “barrel” — the setting, culture, and norms of an organization — can either suppress or encourage corruption, depending on its moral climate

  • The demand characteristics’ flaw 

    • Participants likely guessed the intended results and acted to satisfy the researchers expectations.

    • Hidden Deception of guards 

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  • Zimbardo’s “Bad Barrel” theory as situationism 

  • Zimbardo argued that soldiers were “normal” Individuals in an “abnormal” environment created by the system.

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The Challenger Start Permission Decision as examples of groupthink

Morton Thiokol faced national, political, and organizational pressure to launch Challenger on schedule. The U.S. public had become less enthusiastic about spaceflight, and NASA’s projected launch frequency was falling short of its original 50 flights per year.

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  • the Bay of Pigs Invasion Decision as examples of groupthink

The desire for consensus among Kennedy’s advisors led to flawed decision-making and a disastrous military operation. Overview of the Bay of Pigs Invasion In April 1961, a CIA-trained force of approximately 1,400 Cuban exiles attempted to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs to overthrow Fidel Castro’s communist government. The plan, originally devised under President Eisenhower, was presented to newly elected President John F. Kennedy, who ultimately approved it. The operation failed within days, as the Cuban defense forces were stronger than anticipated, and the expected popular uprising did not occur.

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the decision to escalate the Vietnam War as examples of groupthink

a psychological phenomenon where the desire for harmony or conformity in a group leads to irrational or dysfunctional decision-making. Psychologist Irving Janis first described groupthink in 1972, and the Vietnam War was one of his early case studies

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  • Theoretical benefits and practical pitfalls of group decision-making 

  • Group decision-making involves multiple individuals collectively evaluating options and reaching a decision, often with shared responsibility for implementation. It can yield strong outcomes when managed well, but also carries risks if group dynamics are not controlled. 

  • Diverse Perspectives and Broader Knowledge
    Groups bring together people with different backgrounds, experiences, and expertise, increasing the range of ideas and solutions available. This diversity can uncover alternatives individuals might overlook.

  • Synergy and Shared Commitment
    Collaboration can create a sense of shared ownership, boosting motivation and buy-in. When decisions are made collectively, members are more likely to support and implement them.

  • Improved Problem-Solving for Complex Tasks
    For intellective or complex judgmental tasks, groups can pool cognitive resources, check each other’s reasoning, and reduce errors through cross-cueing and collective memory

  • Enhanced Creativity and Innovation
    Techniques like brainstorming, the Delphi method, and nominal group technique can stimulate creative thinking and structured consensus-building 

  • Team Building and Positive Climate
    Involving others in decision-making can strengthen relationships, foster trust, and create a more positive team environment 

  • Practical Pitfalls

  • Groupthink

    1. The desire for harmony can suppress dissent, leading to poor decisions. Members may conform to a dominant view without critical evaluation 

  • Diffusion of Responsibility

    1. With multiple participants, individuals may feel less personally accountable, reducing commitment to the final decision

  • Lower Efficiency and Time-Consumption

    1. Deliberation, consensus-building, and managing conflict can slow down decisions compared to individual decision-making.

  • Irrelevant or Overloaded Information

    1. Groups may discuss too many ideas or irrelevant points, wasting time and diluting focus 

  • Social Influence and Dominance

    1. Strong personalities or majority rule can override minority viewpoints, skewing outcomes toward the most vocal members 

  • Implementation Challenges

    1. Even if a decision is reached, lack of clarity or alignment can make execution difficult, especially if members have conflicting priorities.

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  • Irving Janis’ Groupthink theory: antecedents, mechanisms, and observable 

Case studies of major policy failures, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Vietnam War escalation, and the Challenger disaster.

Antecedents (Conditions that Increase Risk)

Janis identified three main antecedents that make a group vulnerable to groupthink

  1. High group cohesiveness – Strong in-group bonds and shared identity.

  2. Structural faults – Insulation from outside opinions, directive (authoritarian) leadership, and lack of clear decision-making rules.

  3. High-stress or time-pressure situations – Urgency to reach a decision quickly.

These factors create an environment where conformity is prioritized over critical thinking.

Mechanisms (How Groupthink Occurs)

The mechanisms involve psychological pressures that suppress dissent and narrow thinking:

  • Illusion of invulnerability – Overestimating the group’s ability to succeed and underestimate risks

  • Collective rationalization – Dismissing warnings or contradictory evidence.

  • Belief in inherent morality – Assuming the group’s cause is right, ignoring ethical consequences.

  • Stereotyped views of out-groups – Dehumanizing opponents to justify actions.

  • Direct pressure on dissenters – Encouraging conformity to avoid conflict.

  • Self-censorship – Withholding doubts to maintain harmony.

  • Illusion of unanimity – Assuming everyone agrees, even if not.

  • Self-appointed “mindguards” – Protecting the group from challenging information

These mechanisms work together to reduce mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment, leading to poor decisions.

Observable Signs

Janis documented eight observable symptoms 

  1. Illusion of invulnerability

  2. Collective rationalization

  3. Belief in inherent morality

  4. Stereotyped views of out-groups

  5. Direct pressure on dissenters

  6. Self-censorship

  7. Illusion of unanimity

  8. Self-appointed mindguards

When these symptoms appear in a decision-making group, the risk of groupthink is high, though not guaranteed.

  • consequences of groupthink 

    • Groupthink can lead to poor decision-making, lack of innovation, and significant failures in judgment due to the suppression of dissenting opinions and critical evaluation. Groupthink is a psychological phenomenon where the desire for harmony and conformity within a group results in irrational or dysfunctional decision-making. Members suppress dissenting viewpoints, leading to a lack of critical analysis and the pursuit of consensus at the expense of quality outcomes

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  • Criticism of groupthink 

  • it undermines sound decision-making by prioritizing harmony and consensus over critical evaluation. Critics argue that it leads to flawed, often dangerous outcomes in politics, business, and even online communities. Core criticisms Flawed decision-making: Groupthink replaces critical thinking with conformity, leading to overconfidence, ignoring dissenting opinions, and overlooking important information. Failure to consider alternatives: When members suppress dissent to maintain group cohesion, the group misses creative solutions and risks poor outcomes. Overestimation of group power: Groups may believe they are infallible, leading to unrealistic optimism and risky decisions LEB. Ethical and safety risks

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  • Newgroup syndrome 

  • newly formed advisory groups to a president often operate under conditions that can lead to poor decision-making, including a form of groupthink where members avoid dissent and defer to the leader

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Groupthink and newgroup syndrome as examples of situationism

  • Groupthink and newgroup syndrome as examples of situationism 

    • Groupthink and newgroup syndrome are both examples of situationism in social psychology — the idea that people’s thinking and behavior are heavily influenced by the social context and group dynamics rather than solely by individual traits.

Groupthink as Situationism

Groupthink, as defined by Irving Janis, occurs when a cohesive group’s desire for unanimity overrides critical thinking, leading to poor decisions. It is a situationally driven phenomenon because it emerges from specific conditions:

  • High group cohesiveness (members are close and identify strongly with the group)

  • Insulation from outside opinions (lack of diverse perspectives)

  • High-stress or time pressure (urgent decisions with little time for deliberation)

These situational factors create pressures toward uniformity, self-censorship, and collective rationalization, which suppress dissent and distort reality testing. Historical examples include the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Challenger shuttle disaster, and the Pearl Harbor attack, where group cohesion and situational pressures led to catastrophic outcomes.

Newsgroup Syndrome as Situationism

Newgroup syndrome, introduced by Stern (1997) and later discussed in Janis’s work, refers to the rapidly formed, high-cohesion groups that emerge in new situations — such as newly formed organizations, teams, or political coalitions. These groups often:

  • Seek quick consensus to establish legitimacy

  • Suppress dissent to maintain unity

  • Overestimate their own competence and the group’s ability to handle challenges JSTOR

Like groupthink, newsgroup syndrome is situationally bound: it arises from the novelty and urgency of the group’s formation, the need for rapid decision-making, and the desire to project strength and unity. This can lead to similar symptoms — illusion of invulnerability, self-censorship, and collective rationalization — even if the group is not long-established.

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  • Do Individuals Change History? (Fred Greenstein): Actor Dispensability and Action Dispensability 

  • Actor dispensability An actor is not dispensable if their presence or personality traits are necessary for a given decision or outcome. If anyone else could have made the same decision under the same circumstances, then the actor is dispensable. In other words, if the decision could have been made by someone else with similar traits or without them, the actor’s unique characteristics do not appear to be decisive. 

  • Action dispensability An action is not dispensable if it has a direct, material impact on history. If the decision or action could have been made in a different way without changing the outcome, then the action is dispensable. This means the action must have altered the course of events in a significant way.

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  • Personality Traits (The Engine): 

    • Motives (David Winter): Need for Power and Need for Affiliation, Cognitive Complexity

  • The understanding social motives—particularly the need for power, need for affiliation, and need for cognition—and how they influence behavior in both personal and organizational contexts

Need for Power

Winter’s research on the power motive focused on the drive to influence, control, and achieve impact, not necessarily political office. He distinguished between:

  • Personalized power – the desire to exert influence over others for personal satisfaction.

  • Socialized power – the desire to influence others to achieve social or organizational goals 

Winter found that high power motivation correlated with:

  • Pursuit of prestige and impact.

  • Warlike behavior in political leaders when power motivation was high, and peace when it was low 

  • Both prosocial and antisocial outcomes, depending on context and expression

Need for Affiliation

The need for affiliation reflects the drive to form and maintain close, positive relationships. Winter’s work showed that:

  • Affiliation motives are linked to social cohesion, cooperation, and conflict de-escalation.

  • In diplomatic contexts, high affiliation motivation can reduce the likelihood of war, while low affiliation (and high power) increases conflict risk

  • Affiliation is often expressed through social incentives, such as recognition, belonging, and collaborative opportunities

Cognitive Complexity

While not as central in Winter’s public-facing summaries, his broader research on personality and social contexts included cognitive complexity as a related construct. Cognitive complexity refers to the ability to think flexibly, consider multiple perspectives, and integrate diverse information. Winter’s work on personality and political psychology often intersected with this concept because:

  • High cognitive complexity can moderate the expression of power and affiliation motives—allowing individuals to balance self-interest with social harmony.

  • In leadership and decision-making, cognitive complexity can help leaders manage both power and affiliation needs effectively, avoiding polarized or extreme outcomes.

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  • Leadership Trait Analysis (Margaret Hermann): aggressive leaders (high power/distrust) and conciliatory leaders (high affiliation/complexity)

  • a method for assessing political leaders’ personalities and leadership styles by analyzing their public statements — especially spontaneous media interviews — rather than requiring direct psychological testing. This approach is useful because leaders often cannot be subjected to clinical interviews or personality tests without political risk.

Core Personality Traits in LTA

Hermann’s framework identifies seven key psychological characteristics that shape leadership style

  1. Need for power – Desire to influence and control outcomes.

  2. Distrust – Skepticism toward others, often toward in-groups or external actors.

  3. In-group bias – Favoritism toward one’s own group.

  4. Conceptual complexity – Ability to think abstractly and handle complex ideas.

  5. Belief in control – Confidence in one’s ability to shape events.

  6. Self-confidence – Assurance in one’s judgment and decisions.

  7. Task orientation – Focus on achieving goals and solving problems.

These traits are measured by coding nouns, verbs, and phrases in leaders’ speech to detect patterns in their language use.

Aggressive Leaders (High Power/Distrust)

Aggressive leaders in LTA tend to score high on need for power and high on distrust.

  • High power: They often use assertive, directive language, emphasize control, and frame problems as challenges to be dominated.

  • High distrust: They may express skepticism toward opponents, downplay cooperation, and focus on threats or competition.

  • Leadership style: Dominant, confrontational, and outcome-focused, often prioritizing decisive action over consensus.

Conciliatory Leaders (High Affiliation/Complexity)

Conciliatory leaders score high on in-group bias and high on conceptual complexity.

  • High affiliation: They emphasize unity, shared goals, and mutual benefit, often using inclusive language and framing differences as solvable.

  • High complexity: They may use abstract, nuanced language to articulate intricate policy or strategic ideas, showing a capacity for deep analysis.

  • Leadership style: Collaborative, relationship-oriented, and intellectually sophisticated, often seeking broad agreement and long-term vision.

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Executive Leadership Styles (Thomas Preston): Need for Control and Need for Information/Complexity (e.g., Directors, Magistrates, Delegators, and Observers)

  • Thomas Preston, in The President and His Inner Circle, develops a leadership style typology based on M. G. Hermann’s Personality Assessment-at-a-Distance (PAD) framework. This model identifies two key personality dimensions:

  1. Need for Power/Control – How much a leader wants to direct, influence, and control the policy-making process.

  2. Need for Information/Cognitive Complexity – How much a leader values detailed, complex information and is attentive to the external environment

  •  Integrative Complexity: low complexity vs. high complexity

    • Low vs. High Complexity

  • Low integrative complexity:

    • Thinking is rigid, with limited perspective-taking.

    • Decisions are based on fixed rules or single viewpoints.

    • Example: Viewing abortion solely as “murder” or solely as a “woman’s right,” without acknowledging both could be valid in different contexts

  • High integrative complexity:

    • Flexible, multi-perspective reasoning.

    • Ability to see connections between seemingly conflicting viewpoints.

    • Example: Recognizing that abortion can be seen as both a moral/ethical issue and a civil rights issue, and understanding how these relate to one’s stance on when personhood begins.

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  •  Belief Systems (The Map): 

    • Defining Belief Sets (Yaacov Vertzberger)

  •  belief sets refer to the internalized frameworks of perception, interpretation, and evaluation that decision-makers carry into the foreign policy process. These sets are not static; they are accumulated through experience, cognitive shortcuts, and repeated interpretations of events, and they shape how leaders perceive and respond to information. 

  • Dimensions of Beliefs: Normative vs. Positive; Central vs. Peripheral; and Open vs. Closed 

    • Beliefs can be understood through multiple dimensions that describe their nature, source, and flexibility. These dimensions help psychologists and sociologists categorize and analyze how beliefs influence attitudes, behaviors, and cultural patterns.

1. Normative vs. Positive

  • Normative beliefs are those that align with societal expectations, cultural norms, or moral standards. They are often shared across a group or culture and guide acceptable behavior. For example, believing that honesty is a virtue is a normative belief

  • Positive beliefs are evaluations that express approval or disapproval toward an idea, person, or object. They are part of the affective component of attitudes and can be favorable (positive) or unfavorable (negative)
    Together, normative beliefs often underlie positive or negative attitudes, shaping how individuals interpret and respond to the world.

2. Central vs. Peripheral

  • Central beliefs are core, deeply held convictions that are less changeable and have a strong influence on other beliefs and behaviors. They are often foundational to a person’s worldview or cultural identity

  • Peripheral beliefs are more situational, changeable, and have a weaker influence on overall attitudes and actions. They may be shaped by immediate experiences or context-specific information
    Central beliefs act as anchors for belief systems, while peripheral beliefs can shift more easily in response to new information or persuasion.

3. Open vs. Closed

  • Open beliefs are flexible and can be updated or changed in light of new evidence or experiences. They are often associated with openness to new ideas, critical thinking, and adaptability.

Closed beliefs are rigid and resistant to change, often tied to strong emotional attachments, cultural traditions, or entrenched ideologies. They may be maintained even in the face of contradictory evidence.
Open beliefs allow for cognitive flexibility, while closed beliefs can protect self-image or group identity but may limit adaptability.

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 Operational Code Analysis (Alexander George): Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs

  • Alexander L. George’s 1967 analysis of the “operational code” reinterprets Nathan Leites’ original concept, arguing that the term is a misnomer — it does not refer to a mechanical set of action recipes, but rather to a general belief system about the nature of history, politics, and political action. This belief system shapes how leaders perceive the political universe, view their opponents, and approach conflict.

Philosophical Beliefs

At the philosophical level, the operational code addresses fundamental questions about:

  • The essence of the political universe — e.g., whether politics is a struggle for power, a contest of ideas, or a process of historical inevitability.

  • The nature of history — e.g., whether history is driven by class struggle, ideological forces, or other determinants.

  • The role of politics — e.g., whether it is primarily about maintaining order, advancing ideology, or achieving strategic objectives.

These beliefs are not tactical manuals but premises that influence how leaders interpret events, assess threats, and frame policy goals. For example, Soviet leaders’ operational code was rooted in Marxist-Leninist philosophy, which shaped their view of the world as a class struggle and their approach to international relations.

Instrumental Beliefs

At the instrumental level, the operational code includes policy-related premises about:

  • The relationship between means and goals — e.g., whether to prioritize ideological purity, material gains, or strategic dominance.

  • Risk calculation and control — e.g., how leaders weigh potential costs and benefits of conflict, and whether they prefer calculated risks or cautious containment.

  • Optimizing strategies — e.g., whether to pursue maximum gains, avoid escalation, or use asymmetric tactics.

These beliefs guide decision-making in concrete policy contexts, such as choosing between deterrence, negotiation, or confrontation

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The Dispositionist Formula: Personality Traits (Engine) + Belief Systems (Map) = The Operational Code (The Predicted Path)

  • The Dispositionist FormulaPersonality Traits (Engine) + Belief Systems (Map) = The Operational Code (The Predicted Path) — is a way of framing how stable internal factors shape decision-making and behavior. It draws on dispositionism, the social psychology view that people’s actions are largely conditioned by enduring internal characteristics such as personality traits, values, and beliefs, rather than solely by external situations.

Breaking Down the Formula

  • Personality Traits (Engine)
    These are the stable, enduring aspects of an individual’s character — such as conscientiousness, openness, or authoritarianism — that influence how they perceive, interpret, and respond to situations. In operational code analysis, these traits form the “engine” — the internal mechanism that drives action.

  • Belief Systems (Map)
    These are the cognitive frameworks, ideologies, and worldviews that guide how individuals interpret reality and set goals. In political psychology, belief systems can be organized into epistemological (philosophical) and action-oriented (ends–means) domains. They act as the “map” — the mental framework that directs the engine toward certain outcomes.

Operational Code (Predicted Path)
The operational code is the set of values, worldviews, and response repertoires that an individual or group shares and uses to make decisions. It is the “predicted path” — the expected course of action that emerges from the interaction of personality traits and belief systems.

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  • Cognitions (definition and implications) 

  • Definition - Political cognition is the study of how individuals come to understand the political world and how that understanding influences political action Wikipedia. It draws on social psychology, political science, and communication studies to examine:

  • Perception: How political information is noticed and filtered.

  • Interpretation: How information is meaningfully processed and attributed.

  • Judgment: How individuals evaluate political issues and actors.

  • Memory: How political knowledge is stored and recalled.

Implications

  1. Voter Behavior: Political cognition influences voting decisions, candidate evaluations, and turnout, sometimes through unconscious processes like priming 

  2. Policy Attitudes: How people interpret policy issues shapes support or opposition, affecting political participation.

  3. Media and Persuasion: Political messages can be subliminally or subtly shaped to align with existing schemata, influencing attitudes

  4. Political Polarization: Cognitive structures can reinforce ideological boundaries, contributing to polarization.

Decision-Making Models: Viewing political decisions as cognitive processes helps explain inconsistencies in voting, protest, and policy support.

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  • Cognitive science 

Cognitive science and political science intersect in the study of political cognition—how individuals perceive, interpret, and act upon political information—and in understanding the mental processes that shape political behavior

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Cognitive revolution

a shift toward understanding political decision-making through the lens of cognitive psychology, behavioral economics, and experimental research. This approach moves beyond traditional rational choice models to account for the bounded rationality, heuristics, biases, and individual differences that shape how people—especially political elites—make decisions in complex, uncertain, and high-stakes contexts.

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  “hot cognitions” v. “cold cognitions”

  • two distinct modes of thinking that influence how individuals process information, make decisions, and evaluate political issues. 

    • Cold cognition refers to non-emotional, logical, and systematic reasoning. It involves processing information in a neutral, goal-directed way, often relying on facts, evidence, and structured analysis. In political contexts, cold cognition is used when individuals evaluate policies, weigh evidence, or plan long-term strategies without being swayed by strong emotions. For example, a policymaker might use cold cognition to compare the economic impacts of different tax proposals, focusing on data and logical consistency.

    • Hot cognition, in contrast, is emotionally charged reasoning. It is rapid, automatic, and influenced by feelings, values, and personal motivations. In politics, hot cognition often arises when decisions are tied to moral issues, identity, or strong affective responses—such as public support for a candidate, outrage over a policy, or loyalty to a cause. This mode can lead to biased or impulsive decisions, such as a juror disregarding evidence because of emotional attraction to a defendant

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 Festinger: Cognitive consistency theory

Leon Festinger’s Cognitive Consistency Theory (later known as Cognitive Dissonance Theory) proposes that people have an inherent need for internal psychological consistency between their thoughts, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. When these elements are inconsistent, it creates cognitive dissonance — a state of mental discomfort or tension.

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• Attribution theory

Attribution theory is a psychological framework that examines how individuals explain the causes of behavior and events in their lives and the lives of others (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). It originated with Fritz Heider in 1958, who proposed that people act like "naive psychologists," constantly trying to make sense of social interactions by identifying cause-and-effect relationships, even when none exist (Heider, 1958). The theory has been expanded by Harold Kelley and Bernard Weiner to include models such as the covariation model and three-dimensional model, which help explain how attributions influence motivation and behavior.

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  • • “naïve scientists” 

  • the term “naïve scientists” is not a formal academic label, but it can be understood as referring to scholars who approach their discipline with an idealized or overly optimistic view of objectivity, detached from the realities of political power, ideology, and institutional constraints. This concept appears in critiques of how political science positions itself between naïve objectivity and self‑destroying pure partisanship.

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  • • Fundamental attribution error 

the tendency to overemphasize personality traits and underemphasize situational factors when explaining other people's behavior. Definition and Mechanism The fundamental attribution error (FAE), also known as correspondence bias or over-attribution effect, occurs when people attribute others’ actions primarily to their character or personality rather than considering external situational influences.. This bias arises because observers often focus on the person rather than the context, and they typically lack full information about the circumstances affecting behavior.  The term was coined by Lee Ross

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  • • Internal and external attribution 

Internal attribution (also called dispositional attribution) occurs when we explain behavior as stemming from a person’s traits, abilities, motives, or personality rather than external circumstances. For example, if a student aces a test and we say it’s because they are intelligent or hardworking, we are making an internal attribution. Internal attributions help us predict future behavior based on perceived stable characteristics of the individual (Heider, 1958; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 

External attribution (also called situational attribution) occurs when behavior is explained by environmental or situational factors outside the person’s control, such as luck, task difficulty, social pressures, or physical conditions. For instance, if a student fails an exam and we attribute it to a noisy environment or poor teaching, we are making an external attribution. External attributions are often used when explaining our own behavior to reduce self-blame (Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977).

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  • • How to overcome fundamental attribution error

To overcome the fundamental attribution error (FAE), practice self-awareness, consider situational factors, and actively seek alternative explanations for others' behaviors.

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Heuristics

Cognitive shortcuts or rules of thumb used to make decisions or judgments under uncertainty, especially when time, information, or resources are limited. They differ from classical rational choice models because they do not require exhaustive analysis but instead rely on simplified mental processes.

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• Representativeness heuristic

A cognitive shortcut described by Kahneman and Tversky in the 1970s, where people judge the probability of an event based on how closely it resembles a prototype or stereotype of that event, rather than on statistical likelihood or base rates. In political science, it is used to explain how individuals—both voters and political elites—make quick judgments under uncertainty.

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Satisficing

  •  A decision-making strategy where individuals or organizations set a minimum acceptable standard and choose the first option that meets or exceeds it, rather than searching for the optimal solution Fiveable. The term comes from Herbert A. Simon, who introduced it to challenge the classical economic assumption of perfect rationality, arguing that real-world decision-making is constrained by cognitive limitations, time, and incomplete information 

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Cognitive misers 

  • The metaphor suggests that the human mind is like a miser: it avoids “spending” mental energy on detailed reasoning and instead uses mental shortcuts such as stereotypes, party affiliations, or simple cues to make quick judgments. This is especially relevant in political contexts where voters, diplomats, and policymakers must process vast amounts of information under time constraints.

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Schema theory

Schema theory is a branch of cognitive science that describes how the brain structures knowledge into organized units called schemas (plural: schemata) to interpret and understand the world. A schema is a mental framework derived from past experiences that helps individuals process new information efficiently, predict outcomes, and guide behavior. Schemas can store both declarative knowledge (facts and concepts) and procedural knowledge (how to perform tasks) and are dynamic, evolving as new information is acquired. Philosophical ideas come from Plato and Aristotle, but it was Kant who first described schemas as organizing structures for perception. In psychology, F.C. Bartlett (1932), Jean PiagetLater, Richard Anderson and David Rumelhart expanded schema theory in the 1970s and 1980s.

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Framing

the process by which communicators—whether governments, political actors, or social movements—select, organize, and present information in a way that shapes how audiences perceive and interpret political issues, policies, or events. It is not merely about conveying facts, but about highlighting certain aspects while downplaying others to influence understanding, attitudes, and decisions

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  •  • Analogical reasoning and its dangers 

Analogical reasoning in political science refers to the process of drawing parallels between past events and current or future situations to guide decision-making. Policymakers and scholars often use historical analogies to interpret novel crises, identify patterns, and propose solutions. For example, during the Iranian hostage crisis, U.S. officials, despite seeing the situation as unprecedented, relied heavily on historical precedents to frame their responses.

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  • • Attributions, schemas, and heuristics as complementary theories 

  1.  Attributions
    Attributions refer to the process of assigning causes to people’s behavior — either to internal (dispositional) factors (e.g., personality traits) or external (situational) factors . The fundamental attribution error shows that people often overemphasize dispositional explanations and underemphasize situational ones when judging others. Attribution theories, such as Heider’s naïve scientist model and Kelley’s covariation model, provide frameworks for understanding how we infer causes and predict future behavior.

2. Schemas
Schemas are mental frameworks or “blueprints” that organize and interpret information based on past experiences and cultural influences. They can be person schemas (expectations about individuals), role schemas (how people in certain positions should behave), event schemas (scripts for typical sequences of events), and self schemas (self-concepts). Schemas speed up processing but can lead to biases such as stereotypes and confirmation bias.

3. Heuristics
Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts that simplify decision-making and reduce mental effort. Examples include the availability heuristic (judging likelihood based on ease of recall), representativeness heuristic (matching new information to stereotypes), and anchoring heuristic (relying too heavily on initial information). While efficient, heuristics can produce systematic errors and biases

Complementarity

  • Schemas provide the framework for organizing social information, influencing what we notice, remember, and interpret.

  • Heuristics are the shortcuts we use within that framework to make quick judgments, often relying on schema-based expectations.

  • Attributions are the causal explanations we draw from the information processed through schemas and heuristics, shaping how we understand and respond to others’ behavior.

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• Confirmation bias (“I buried Paul”) and its political relevance

  • The tendency to seek, interpret, and remember information that confirms one's existing beliefs while ignoring or rejecting contradictory evidence.

  • It influences political behavior, leading to polarized views, ineffective policies, and challenges in public discourse.

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  • • The Backfire Effect 

a phenomenon in political science where individuals double down on their beliefs—even when presented with factual corrections—because the challenge to their views triggers defensive reactions

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  • • Effect of media bubbles 

environments where individuals are exposed primarily to information that reinforces their existing beliefs, often due to algorithmic curation, selective exposure, or homophily in social networks. In political science, these phenomena are studied as key drivers of political polarization and distortions in public discourse.

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  • • Ways to overcome confirmation bias 

  • Recognize and Acknowledge the Bias 

  • Seek Diverse Perspective

  • Apply the “Devil’s Advocate” Technique 

  • Question Assumptions

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• Cognitive theories as dispositionism

 the view that mental states (including beliefs, attitudes, and cognitive tendencies) are best understood as dispositions to behave or think in certain ways. Dispositionism holds that believing something is not just a matter of having a propositional content, but of having a tendency to respond in certain ways when appropriate stimuli are encountered

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• Availability heuristic

The availability heuristic is a cognitive bias that influences decision-making based on the most readily available information or examples that come to mind. It leads individuals to judge the likelihood of events based on how easily they can recall similar instances, often resulting in skewed perceptions of reality. For example, if someone frequently hears about airplane accidents, they may overestimate the dangers of flying, despite statistical evidence showing it is safe.

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  •  The Sociological/Columbia Model of Voting; mechanisms and associated scholars

often called the Columbia School model, was developed in the 1940s by Paul Lazarsfeld and colleagues at Columbia University, notably in The People’s Choice (1944) and Personal Influence (1955). It emerged from large-scale survey research and marked a shift from viewing voting as a purely individual, rational choice to seeing it as shaped by social structure and group identity.

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 The Socio-Psychological/Michigan Model of Voting; mechanisms and associated scholars

the Michigan Model (also called the Socio-Psychological Model) is a theory of voting behavior developed in the 1950s–60s by political scientists at the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center. It explains how individuals make electoral choices by focusing on party identification, candidate evaluation, and issue perceptions

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• The Funnel of Causality

How  a wide range of influences, from broad sociological factors to specific personal experiences, converge to shape an individual's decisions. Initially developed by researchers at the University of Michigan, this model emphasizes the importance of long-term influences, such as social class, ethnicity, and family background, in determining political preferences and behaviors

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  • • Partisan identification as lens

  • the psychological bond individuals form with a political party, going beyond formal membership or voting behavior. It reflects a sense of belonging and loyalty that shapes how people perceive political issues, events, and other groups. This attachment can be stable over time and strongly influences political attitudes and behaviors.

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  •  • Nature of belief systems in mass publics 

  • Philip Converse’s seminal work demonstrates that ordinary citizens rarely possess fully structured belief systems. While elites often organize their political ideas into coherent ideologies, the mass public typically exhibits low conceptualization, meaning their opinions are fragmented, inconsistent, and often disconnected from abstract ideological frameworks such as the liberal-conservative spectrum (Converse, 1964). Many individuals respond to political questions in a manner akin to random choice, reflecting a lack of underlying cognitive structure.

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• Role of independent and swing voters

Independent and swing voters are crucial to close election outcomes because they are not locked into party loyalty and can shift their support based on candidates, issues, or the political climate.

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  •  • Issue voting 

Issue voting refers to the practice of casting votes based on political issues that are controversial or significant in public policy, rather than simply following a party line or candidate image. Voters compare candidates’ positions or perceived competence on these issues to decide whom to support, often without needing in-depth knowledge of every policy detail. It contrasts with party voting, where allegiance to a political party primarily guides decisions

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• The Psychology of voting as a combination of situational and dispositional elements

Voting behavior is best understood as the interaction of situational (external, context-dependent) and dispositional (internal, personality-based) factors. These two elements together shape how individuals make political choices.

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“The Cold War”:

  •  Underlying psychology and logic of Cold War alliances and defense mechanisms, including MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction)

The Cold War was as much a psychological and ideological struggle as it was a geopolitical one. Both the United States and the Soviet Union built alliances and defense strategies not only on material power but also on fear, identity, perception, and cognitive biases.

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Historical overview of Cold War

The Cold War was a period of geopolitical tension marked by competition and confrontation between communist nations led by the Soviet Union and Western democracies including the United States. During World War II, the United States and the Soviets fought together as allies against Nazi Germany. However, U.S.-Soviet relations were never truly friendly: Americans had long been wary of Soviet communism and Joseph Stalin’s tyrannical rule. The Soviets resented Americans’ refusal to give them a leading role in the international community, as well as America’s delayed entry into World War II, in which millions of Soviet citizens died. These grievances ripened into an overwhelming sense of mutual distrust and enmity that never developed into open warfare (thus the term “Cold War”). Soviet expansionism into Eastern Europe fueled many Americans’ fears of a Soviet plan to control the world. Meanwhile, the USSR came to resent what it perceived as U.S. officials’ bellicose rhetoric, arms buildup and strident approach to international relations. In such a hostile atmosphere, no single party was entirely to blame for the Cold War; in fact, some historians believe it was inevitable.

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Cognitive consistency/dissonance theory

a Theory emphasizes the human drive to maintain harmony among beliefs and behaviors, while Cognitive Dissonance Theory focuses on the discomfort arising from conflicting cognitions and the motivation to resolve that discomfort.

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Marian Keech story/doomsday cult

Marian Keech's story is a compelling narrative of a woman who, through automatic writing, received messages from otherworldly beings warning of a coming disaster. These messages promised enlightenment and happiness, but Keech's followers were prepared for the end of the world. The group, known as the Seekers, gathered in anticipation of a rescue by a UFO, but the prophecy never materialized. The group's commitment to their beliefs led to a significant psychological phenomenon, as Festinger and his colleagues observed their reactions when their prophecy was disconfirmed. The story of Marian Keech and the Seekers is a testament to the power of belief and the impact of cognitive dissonance theory on human behavior.

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Situationism v. dispositionism

  • Situationism posits that a person's behavior is largely influenced by external circumstances or the environment. For example, a person may act aggressively in a stressful situation, such as during a heated argument, but may be calm and friendly in a relaxed setting.

    2Dispositionism, on the other hand, suggests that behavior is primarily shaped by internal traits or characteristics of the individual. For instance, a person who is generally kind and empathetic will likely help others in need, regardless of the situation.

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Abu Ghraib Torture Scandal

-not rogue soldiers but toxic environment that transformed behavior

Classic studies: milgram-obidience to authority electric shock, zombardo-social roles stanford prison experiment, janis-group think group structure impacts how group work

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Political Science and related fields

political theory, comparative politics, international relations, public policy, and public administration

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Eugenics v behaviorism

The Dark History of Hyper-Disposition

Context:Eugenics (Francis Galton, 1970s)

Definition: the belief that human behavior is 100% determined by biology.

The consequence:Justification for anti-immigration, sterilization, and “racial purity”

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Political psychology as a relatively new and international interdisciplinary field operating at the individual level of analysis

top

System Level

(Global/power)

middle

State level

(Nations/institutions)

bottom

Individual Levels

(psychology/Citizens)

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Tabula rasa/blank slate

The Democratic Alternative

Behaviorism and the “Tabula Rasa”

The shift: Post-WWII rejection of biological determinism

The concept: Tabula Rasa(blank slate). We are born with nothing:we learn everything

Political implication:The American Dream. Anyone can be anything

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Walden Two and A Clockwork Orange

The Utopian Promise: Walden two

A utopian Novel; by B.F. Skinner (1948)

A vision: A community ruled by “Planner Managers’

The result: No crime, no drunkenness, no jealousy.

The Method: Conditioning from birth. Negative emotions are ‘conditioned out’.

(a paradise or a nightmare, no freedom)

The Dystopian Reality: A clockwork orange

source:Anthony Burgess/Stanley Kubrick

The method: The Ludovico technique

Process: force viewing of violence+Nausea inducing drugs

Result: Physical illness at the mere thought of violence

Social engineering– reforming Alex

Ethical concern

Who watches the watcher

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Pavlov’s Dog

Pavlov observed that dogs began to salivate not only when presented with food (an unconditioned stimulus, UCS) but also in response to stimuli associated with food, such as the sight of a lab assistant or the sound of a bell, which initially had no effect on salivation (neutral stimulus, NS).

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Classical conditioning and associated scholars

Classical conditioning is a learning process in which a neutral stimulus becomes associated with an unconditioned stimulus to elicit a conditioned response.

Definition and Background

Classical conditioning, also known as Pavlovian or respondent conditioning, is a type of learning through association discovered by Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov in the 1890s.

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Operant conditioning and associated scholars

Learning by consequence

B.F Skinner & Voluntary response

The logic: we learn behavior because it is followed by an effect.

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Adorno’s Authoritarian Personality Theory

The theory (1950): Adorno proposed the “F-scale”(Fascism scale)

The mechanism: Harsh, repressive parenting creates repressed hostility. → Freudian

The displacement:Hostility is projected onto “outgroups” and minorities.

The verdict: A dispositionist view-bad acts are committed by “bad apples”

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“The Banality of Evil” (Arendt)

Evil is often the result of a chain of command where no single person feels responsible. Elchmann was not a monster, he was a bureaucrat.

This is what Milligram wanted to study psychologically- why ordinary people can do bad things.

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Ash’s conformity experiment

The Asch Conformity experiment (1951)

The twist: When actors in the group gave the wrong answer, 37% of subjects went against their own eyesight to conform. Some just wanted to fit in; others convinced themselves they were wrong.

The Implication: If we yield to social pressure on simple lines. WHat happens when authority is involved?

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Milgram’s Obedience to Authority Study – including variations

Milgram’s Obedience to Authority Study – including variations

The Milgram Obedience to Authority Study, conducted by Stanley Milgram in the 1960s, revealed a significant level of obedience to authority, even when the orders conflicted with personal moral beliefs. The study involved participants administering electric shocks to an actor, who was feigned to be in pain, as they answered questions incorrectly.

The variations of the study included

location4touch proximity

absent authority

group pressure

absence of a lab coat

can instruct the assistant to push the switch

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Milgram’s Agency Theory

Autonomous State (self-directed)

Agentic state (instrument of Authority)

We evolve for Hierarchy (survival advantage)

The shift: Occurs when we perceive a legitimate authority who will take responsibility.

The Result: We shift responsibility to the authority figure.

“I was just following orders”

how individuals can commit acts against their moral beliefs when instructed by an authority figure, highlighting the concepts of the agentic state and the agentic shift.

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Altemeyer’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism

Authoritarian Submission (follow leaders)

Authoritarian aggression (hostility to outgroups)

conventionalism (adherence to norms)

RWA is a learned disposition. It functions as a "personality" trait that makes an individual prone to obedience and prejudice.

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Arguments for and against Milgram’s Obedience Paradigm

Arguments for Milgram’s Obedience Paradigm: Validity: The experiment's validity is supported by its ability to demonstrate a universal human vulnerability to authority pressures, regardless of cultural or social context. 1 Ethics: The experiment raises important ethical questions about the use of deception in psychological research and the potential for participants to suffer emotional distress. 1 Historical Relevance: The experiment has been used to explore the historical context of obedience to authority, particularly in relation to the Holocaust.

Arguments Against Milgram’s Obedience Paradigm: Methodological Criticism: Some critics argue that the experiment lacks internal validity, as participants may not have believed the "learner" was actually receiving the shocks. 1 Ethical Concerns: The use of deception in the experiment has raised ethical concerns about the treatment of participants and the potential for the experiment to cause harm. 1 Cultural Bias:

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Obedience to Authority as situationism

Stanley Milgram’s Obedience to Authority experiments are a classic example of situationism in social psychology — the idea that people’s behavior is often more influenced by situational factors than by stable personality traits.

The Milgram Experiment

In the 1960s, Milgram tested how far ordinary people would go in obeying an authority figure who instructed them to administer increasingly severe electric shocks to another person (an actor) who feigned distress. Despite visible signs of pain, most participants continued to the maximum shock level, showing that ordinary people can be persuaded to harm others when an authority figure is present.