CPO 2002 Final Review (Chapters 10 & 11)

Dictatorships

Have to rely on their inner circle (provides the dictator with the power and control that is necessary to continue their rule)

-if not happy, pose a threat to dictator (can challenge him, overthrow/replace)

When a dictator leaves office:

1) democratization may occur

2) same authoritarian regime with new leadership

3) incumbent authoritarian regime replaced by a different type of regime

*inner circle allows for regime to keep going even after death

Monarchic Dictatorships

An autocracy in which the executive comes to and maintains power on the basis of family and kin networks (royal family)

-suffer from less violence and political instability (monarchic leader individual survives longer)

-BC monarchs have political culture where the leader’s promise to distribute rents to his support coalition is more credible than in other types of dictatorships

Monarchic Culture

1) clear rules as to who the insiders and outsiders are (sense of security for insiders)

2) have rules or norms that indicate exactly how regime rents are the be shared among the various members of the royal family (all family inclined to promote regime)

3) institutions that allow members of the royal family to monitor that actions of the monarch & enforce norms regarding distribution of regime rents (everyone watching to receive benefits)

Military Dictatorships

Portray themselves as “guardians of the national interest”

-threats to stability come form military itself

-tend to have short durations and more likely to end with negotiations as opposed to violence (transition military power)

-try to appear as democratic leaders (suits & ties)

Strong Potential for Democratic Reform in Military Dictatorships

More likely to leave behind competitive and democratic forms of government

-coups provide a “shock” to system taht creates opportunities for liberalization

-most common outcome is the establishment of a new, more repressive form of authoritarian regime

Civilian Dictatorships (most common)

Do not have immediate institutional base of support, have to create one

-rally support from population (populist to personalist) or through a political party (dominant party)

Single Party Weapon: Electoral Fraud

Incumbents frequently engage in electoral fraud even with little chance of losing

-deters regime party defections, discourages opponents, reduces likelihood of protests

-lopsided electoral victories signal strength of regime party (no point in challenging)

-close-run elections signal weakness!!

Personalist Dictatorships (type of Civilian Dictatorship)

The leader (often supported by party/military) retains personal control of policy decisions and the selection of regime personnel

-rise to power can come from genuine support from population (makes promises to change systems for the better)

-characterized by weak press, strong secret police, arbitrary use of state violence (population in fear)

Personalist Dictatorship Power (type of Civilian Dictatorship)

Alters belief of the citizenry through a steady process of state indoctrination

-eliminates alt sources of information (no media freedom), take complete control of media & persuade citizens of powers and leadership qualities

-generates support

-once in power, make outlandish claims to test gullibility of population (raises degree of “over the top”, gauge societal support)

Economic Trouble in Personalistic Dictatorships (type of Civilian Dictatorship)

Must be longer and cut deeper before regime becomes unstable

1) concentration of benefits in inner circle means that poor economic performance can be ridden out (less people on the payroll)

2) highly repressive nature of security apparatus means that its hard to overthrow regime (people do not have hope)

3) members of leader’s faction have less valuable exit options (once committed cannot leave)

Power-Sharing in Dictatorships

When dictator first comes to power, agreement on ow to share economic/political rents among the members of the support coalition

-no independent third-party actor to enforce power-sharing agreement

-uncertainty between dictator and support causes tension

Control in Dictatorships

Dictators must have firm grasp over populations they control (repression can be double-edged sword)

-dictator must rely on other actors to do actual repressing (military, secret police, etc.)

-give actors resources, gives them power to go against dictator

Group Decision Making in Dictatorships

All decision-making alternatives have some sort of trade-off (someone always unhappy)

Condorcet’s Paradox

Shows this by demonstrating it might be possible to reach a stable group decision under majority rule

-majority rule = key foundation of democracies (give the most people what they want)

Voters must be RATIONAL!

1) have complete preference ordering

2) have transitive preference ordering

*with three choice- round robin, no clear winner (paradox in action)

Condorcet’s Paradox Winners

Possible in real life

Group decision making isn’t too difficult to practice this

1) # of decision makers is kept small and the preferences that produce intransitivity (preferences loop rather than linear ranking) are rare

2) some other decision-making mechanism is being used

Borda Count

Asks individuals to rank potential alternatives from most to least preferred and assign numbers to reflect ranking

Weighted voters for each alternative are summed ad the alternative with largest score wins

-irrelevant alternatives can change results of election (untrustworthy politicians can more easily manipulate the outcome of a decision process in order to produce their most preferred outcome, put different weights on other alternatives, change outcome

Multi-Round Competition

Rather than simultaneous complete iron this alternative pits tw options against each other and last option faces off with winner of round 1

-but people lie, winning alternative has to face off remaining option (could vote for less preferred alternative in round 1)

-agenda setter could manipulate whole game

Median Voter Theorem**

States that no alternative can beat the one preferred by the median voter in pair-wise majority-rule elections if the number of voters is odd, voter preferences are single-peaked over a single-policy dimension, and voters vote sincerely

-when voters are arrayed along a single-issue dimension in terms of ideal points, the median voter is the individual who has at least half of all the voters at his position or to his right and at least half at his position or to his left

-for parties, if a party is located at the median voter’s ideal point they will win (if both do, then there will be tie)

Arrow’s Theorem

Argues that is impossible to design a system of decision-making that can guarantee a rational while ALSO meeting “minimum standards of fairness” (non-dictatorship, universal admissibility, unanimity, independence from irrelevant alternatives)

Conditions:

-suggests that any fair group decision-making mechanism must:

• percent dictatorship (non dictatorship)

• Not restrict types of preferences that individuals can hold (universal admissibility)

• Link group choice to individual preferences (stable outcomes/independence from irrelevant alternatives)

-BUT every decision-making process that we could possibly design must sacrifice at least one condition if it is to grant group transitivity and stable outcomes

In decision making…

YOU CAN ONLY HAVE ONE SIDE!! Either:

-group transitivity (stable outcomes)

-universal admissibility

-OR nondictatorship

Outcomes could represent powerful subset of group rather than preferences of group as a whole