AP US Government Required Court Cases

A brief description of every SCOTUS case required for the AP US Government Test. Formatted to show ruling, overview of the case, reasoning, and precedents.

McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)

Ruling: McCulloch

Overview: McCulloch v. Maryland arose when Maryland enacted a tax on all banks not chartered by the state, a measure that effectively targeted the Baltimore branch of the federally chartered Second Bank of the United States. James McCulloch, the branch’s cashier, issued bank notes without paying the tax, prompting Maryland to sue him to collect penalties. The case moved through Maryland’s courts—which upheld the tax—before McCulloch appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The dispute centered on Congress’s authority to create the national bank and whether a state could tax a federal institution.

Reasoning: The Court’s reasoning rested on two core ideas: implied powers and federal supremacy. Chief Justice John Marshall argued that Congress could create a national bank because the Constitution’s enumerated powers—such as taxing, borrowing, and regulating currency—require practical means to carry them out, and the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes those means even if not explicitly listed. He further reasoned that because the federal government acts within its constitutional sphere, states cannot tax or impede federal institutions, since allowing that power would let states undermine national authority.

Precedents: Article 1, Section 8, “Necessary and Proper Clause” and Article 6, “Supremacy Clause” of the United States Constitution

United States v. Lopez

Ruling: Lopez

Overview: Lopez v. United States began when Alfonso Lopez Jr., a 12th‑grade student in San Antonio, Texas, brought a concealed handgun to school. He was first charged under Texas law, but those charges were dropped when federal prosecutors charged him under the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it a federal crime to possess a firearm in a school zone. Lopez argued that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to pass this law because mere possession of a gun near a school was not an economic activity and therefore fell outside Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. The case moved through the federal courts and ultimately reached the Supreme Court, which had to decide whether the Act was a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

Reasoning: The Court’s reasoning centered on limits to the Commerce Clause and the need to preserve the distinction between national and local authority. The majority held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not regulate an economic activity and did not contain a requirement that the firearm possession be connected to interstate commerce. Because the activity was non‑economic and the statute lacked any jurisdictional element tying it to commerce, Congress could not justify the law as part of regulating interstate commerce. The Court emphasized that accepting the government’s argument—that guns in schools affect education, which affects the economy—would effectively give Congress a general police power, something the Constitution reserves to the states. The decision marked the first time in decades that the Court limited Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.

Precedents: Article I, Section 8, “Commerce Clause” of the United States Constitution and the 10th Amendment

Engel vs. Vitale

Ruling: Engel

Overview: Engel v. Vitale began when the New York State Board of Regents directed public schools to begin each day with a short, voluntary, nondenominational prayer. The prayer—written by state officials—was recited in classrooms in the presence of teachers. A group of parents challenged the practice, arguing that government‑authored prayer in public schools constituted an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Lower New York courts upheld the practice, and the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether the state’s involvement in composing and promoting a daily prayer violated the Establishment Clause.

Reasoning: The Court’s reasoning focused on the prohibition of government involvement in religious activity. Justice Hugo Black, writing for the majority, explained that the Establishment Clause forbids government from composing official prayers for citizens to recite as part of a government‑run program. Even though the prayer was voluntary and nondenominational, the state’s act of writing and endorsing it constituted an unconstitutional government promotion of religion. The Court emphasized that the First Amendment was designed to prevent exactly this kind of government entanglement with religion, noting that historical conflicts and persecutions often arose when governments inserted themselves into religious practice.

Precedents: First Amendment, Establishment Clause, and Fourteenth Amendment.

Wisconsin v. Yoder

Ruling: Yoder

Overview: Wisconsin v. Yoder arose when three Amish fathers—Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy—were prosecuted under a Wisconsin law requiring children to attend school until age 16. The families refused to send their children to high school after eighth grade, arguing that secondary schooling conflicted with their religious beliefs and way of life. They were convicted and fined, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the convictions, prompting the state to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Reasoning: The Court reasoned that the compulsory attendance law imposed a severe and inescapable burden on the Amish families’ religious practice, directly conflicting with their centuries‑old way of life. High school attendance would expose Amish children to values “in sharp conflict” with their beliefs and threaten the survival of their religious community. Because the state failed to show a sufficiently compelling interest to override this burden, the law was unconstitutional as applied to the Amish.

Precedents: First Amendment, Free Exercise Clause and Fourteenth Amendment

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District

Ruling: Tinker

Overview: Tinker v. Des Moines began when three students—Mary Beth Tinker, John Tinker, and Christopher Eckhardt—wore black armbands to school as a silent protest against the Vietnam War. School officials, having learned of the plan, created a policy banning armbands and warned that students who wore them would be suspended. The students wore them anyway and were suspended. Their parents filed suit, arguing that the school violated the students’ free‑speech rights. The federal district court upheld the school’s actions, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed without opinion. The case then went to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Reasoning: The Court held that the armbands were “pure speech” and that students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate. The majority reasoned that the school could restrict student expression only if it could show that the speech would “materially and substantially interfere” with school operations. In this case, the school acted based on fear of potential disruption, not actual disruption, which was insufficient to justify suppressing speech.

Precedents: First Amendment, Free Speech Clause, and Fourteenth Amendment

New York Times Co. v. United States

Ruling: New York Times

Overview: The case arose when the New York Times and Washington Post obtained portions of the Pentagon Papers, a classified Defense Department study detailing U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Daniel Ellsberg, a former military analyst, leaked the documents. When the newspapers began publishing excerpts, the Nixon administration sought court injunctions to halt further publication, arguing that releasing the material threatened national security. Conflicting lower‑court rulings sent the case to the Supreme Court on an expedited basis.

Reasoning: The Court emphasized the “heavy presumption against” prior restraint, meaning the government must meet an extraordinarily high burden to justify censorship before publication. The justices concluded that the government failed to show that publication would cause a direct, immediate, and irreparable harm to national security. Several concurring justices stressed that vague appeals to “security” cannot override the First Amendment’s core protections for a free press.

Precedents: First Amendment, Freedom of the Press, and Near v. Minnesota

Schneck v. United States

Ruling: Schneck

Overview: Schenck v. United States arose during World War I, after Congress passed the Espionage Act of 1917, which criminalized interference with military recruitment and operations. Charles Schenck, the general secretary of the Socialist Party, mailed thousands of leaflets to drafted men, urging them to resist the draft and arguing it violated the Thirteenth Amendment. He was charged with conspiracy to obstruct recruitment and unlawful use of the mail. After being convicted in federal court, Schenck appealed, claiming the law violated his First Amendment rights.

Reasoning: The Court held that speech may be restricted when it creates a “clear and present danger” of substantive harm that Congress has the power to prevent, a standard articulated for the first time in this case. Justice Holmes explained that the legality of speech depends on the circumstances, emphasizing that wartime allows greater restrictions than peacetime. The leaflets were deemed likely to obstruct the draft and thus posed a danger significant enough to justify limiting speech. Holmes famously compared such speech to falsely shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater, which is not protected.

Precedent: First Amendment, Free Speech Clause, and Espionage Act of 1917

Gideon v. Wainright

Ruling: Gideon
Overview:The case began when Clarence Earl Gideon, a poor drifter with an eighth‑grade education, was charged with felony breaking and entering in Florida. At trial, he asked the judge to appoint him a lawyer because he could not afford one, but the request was denied because Florida only provided counsel in capital cases. Gideon represented himself, was convicted, and sentenced to five years in prison. From prison, Gideon filed a handwritten petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that his conviction was unconstitutional because he had been denied counsel. The Court agreed to hear the case to determine whether the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel applies to state felony prosecutions.
Reasoning: The Court held that the right to counsel is fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and therefore must be provided to indigent defendants in state courts. Justice Hugo Black wrote that a fair justice system cannot exist if a poor defendant must face prosecution without legal assistance. The Court emphasized that the Sixth Amendment’s protections are incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Precedent: Sixth Amendment, Right to Counsel, Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause, and Overruled Betts v. Brady

Roe v. Wade

Ruling: Roe
Overview: The case began when “Jane Roe” (Norma McCorvey), a pregnant woman, challenged Texas statutes that made abortion a crime except to save the mother’s life. A physician facing prosecution under the same laws (Dr. Hallford) intervened, and a married couple (the Does) also filed related claims. The laws prohibited nearly all abortions and penalized providers. The federal district court found the statutes unconstitutional but denied injunctive relief, sending the case to the Supreme Court.
Reasoning: The Court reasoned that the right to privacy—derived from the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment—includes a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy. However, this right is not absolute and must be balanced against legitimate state interests in maternal health and potential life. The Court adopted a trimester framework: no state interference in the first trimester, limited regulation in the second, and broader regulation or prohibition after viability.
Precedents: Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause and Nineteenth Amendment

McDonald v. Chicago

Ruling: McDonald
Overview: The case began when Otis McDonald, a Chicago resident, along with several others, challenged Chicago’s 1982 handgun ban, which effectively prohibited most private handgun ownership. Similar suits were filed against both Chicago and Oak Park, arguing that the laws violated the individual right to possess firearms recognized in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008). Lower courts dismissed the suits, holding that the Second Amendment did not apply to the states. The Supreme Court took the case to decide whether that right was incorporated against state and local governments.
Reasoning: The Court held that the right to keep and bear arms for self‑defense is “fundamental to the Nation’s scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Because of this, the right is incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority relied heavily on the logic of Heller, which recognized an individual right to possess firearms for self‑defense. The Court concluded that states, like the federal government, cannot infringe this fundamental right.
Precedents: Second Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause, and District of Columbia v. Heller

Brown v. Board of Education

Ruling: Brown
Overview: Brown v. Board of Education consolidated multiple cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Washington, D.C., all challenging laws that required or permitted segregated public schools. In each case, Black students were denied admission to white schools under segregation statutes. The plaintiffs argued that segregation harmed Black children and violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Lower courts largely upheld segregation under Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but equal” doctrine, prompting appeal to the Supreme Court.
Reasoning: The Court held that segregated schools are inherently unequal because they generate feelings of inferiority that undermine the educational and personal development of Black children. The justices concluded that even if physical facilities were similar, segregation itself violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court emphasized that public education is central to good citizenship and that separating children solely by race is unconstitutional.
Precedents: Fourteenth Amendment, Equal Protection Clause and Rejection of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)

Baker v. Carr

Ruling: Baker
Overview: Baker v. Carr began when Tennessee voters challenged the state’s failure to redraw legislative districts since 1901, despite massive population shifts over six decades. Urban areas like Memphis had grown dramatically, yet still had the same number of representatives as sparsely populated rural counties. This meant rural votes carried far more weight than urban votes, diluting the plaintiffs’ voting power. The voters sued Tennessee officials, arguing that the outdated apportionment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lower federal courts dismissed the case, claiming redistricting was a non‑justiciable political question, prompting appeal to the Supreme Court.
Reasoning: The Court held that malapportionment claims under the Equal Protection Clause are justiciable, meaning federal courts can review them. Justice Brennan explained that the case did not fall under the political question doctrine because it involved a constitutional claim with manageable legal standards. The Court emphasized that extreme population disparities—where some votes were worth many times more than others—raised legitimate constitutional concerns requiring judicial review. This opened the door to enforcing the principle of “one person, one vote.”
Precedents: Fourteenth Amendment, Equal Protection Clause and Political Question Doctrine

Shaw v. Reno

Ruling: Shaw
Overview: Shaw v. Reno arose after the U.S. Attorney General rejected North Carolina’s initial congressional redistricting plan because it created only one majority‑Black district. In response, the state created a second majority‑Black district, but its shape was extremely irregular—at points no wider than the interstate highway it followed for miles. A group of white voters challenged the plan, arguing that the bizarrely shaped district was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Lower courts dismissed the case, saying the plaintiffs had not raised a valid constitutional claim, so the case went to the Supreme Court.
Reasoning: The Court reasoned that although states may consider race to comply with the Voting Rights Act, using race as the dominant factor in district design triggers strict scrutiny. The majority emphasized that districts so irregular that they “bear an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid” raise serious constitutional concerns.The Court held that classifying citizens by race—even for seemingly benign purposes—threatens the ideal of equal treatment and risks reinforcing harmful racial stereotypes. Therefore, the plaintiffs had stated a valid Equal Protection claim.
Precedents:Fourteenth Amendment, Equal Protection Clause and Voting Rights Act context

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission

Ruling: Citizens United
Overview: The case began when Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, produced and sought to distribute Hillary: The Movie, a political documentary critical of then‑Senator Hillary Clinton during the 2008 primary season. Because the film was intended for on‑demand cable within 30 days of a primary, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA)—also known as McCain‑Feingold—classified it as an “electioneering communication,” which corporations were prohibited from funding. Citizens United sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC), arguing that applying BCRA to their film violated the First Amendment. Lower courts upheld the law, and the case reached the Supreme Court.
Reasoning: The Court reasoned that political speech is indispensable to democracy, and that the First Amendment does not allow the government to restrict speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity. The majority held that independent expenditures—spending not coordinated with a candidate—do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption, and therefore cannot be banned. The Court also emphasized that suppressing corporate political speech would allow the government to silence media corporations as well, which would be incompatible with First Amendment principles.
Precedents: First Amendment, Free Speech Clause, Overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), and Partially overruled: McConnell v. FEC (2003)