Property law

King v David Allen & Sons Billposting Ltd [1916] 2 AC 54

Licence to put up posters on a cinema wall could not bind a new tenant. A contractual licence is personal (in personam) only; it dies with the tenancy that granted it. Licences are NOT property rights.

Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809

Despite agreement being labelled a "licence", held to be a tenancy. OBJECTIVE TEST: Exclusive Possession + Term + Rent = Lease, regardless of what the parties call it. Courts look through shams and labels to find true substance. Lord Templeman: an occupier is a lodger if the landlord provides attendance/services requiring unrestricted access; otherwise the grant is a tenancy.

Pretoria Energy Co v Blankney Estates Ltd [2023] EWCA Civ 482

Commercial context: emphasises that parties' intention (especially in heads of terms / commercial negotiations) matters in deciding whether a binding lease was created. Illustrates continued application of objective test to modern commercial arrangements.

Lace v Chantler [1944] KB 368

Lease "for the duration of the war" — uncertain term = void. A lease must have a certain beginning AND a certain (maximum) duration.

Prudential Assurance Ltd v London Residuary Body [1992] 2 AC 386

Lease until land "required to widen the road" — uncertain duration = void. Cannot have a lease for an uncertain duration. Fell back to a periodic tenancy instead.

Hammersmith v Monk [1992] 1 AC 478

A periodic tenancy can be ended by either joint tenant serving a valid notice to quit for one full period. Notice by one joint tenant alone suffices to terminate the whole tenancy.

Javad v Aqil [1991] 1 WLR 1007

Tenant paid rent for 3 months during negotiations but no intention to create a periodic tenancy. Implied periodic tenancy will NOT arise if contrary intention is shown — rent payment alone is not conclusive.

Berrisford v Mexfield Housing Co-operative Ltd [2011] UKSC 52

Mexfield could only terminate if Mrs B fell into arrears/ceased membership. Clause fettered termination → no periodic tenancy → no certain term. SAVED by Berrisford workaround: ancient CL converts uncertain-term leases into leases for life, and s149(6) LPA 1925 converts leases for life into 90-year leases determinable on death.

Southward Housing Co-Operative Ltd v Walker [2016] EWHC 1615

Council intended long occupation but not for life → Berrisford workaround DID NOT apply → contractual licence instead. Limits on Berrisford: only works for humans, must pay rent, must be intended as a lease.

Gilpin v Legg [2017] EWHC 3220

Illustration of Berrisford workaround/uncertain term rules in context of beach huts; confirms workaround limited to humans and requires intent to grant a lease.

AG Securities v Vaughan; Antoniades v Villiers [1990] 1 AC 417

Decided together. Antoniades: contemporaneous agreements for a couple with sham clause purportedly allowing landlord to introduce strangers into tiny flat → read as one joint tenancy (4 unities satisfied). AG Securities: agreements at different times for different sums → no unity of time or interest → individual licences.

Aslan v Murphy [1990] 1 WLR 766

Key provisions have no magic in themselves — question is WHY the owner retains a key. Terms that are "wholly unrealistic and clearly pretences" (e.g. occupier could only use the room for certain hours) will be struck down to find the true bargain.

Markou v Da Silvaesa [1986] 18 HLR 265

Also cited as Marcou v De Silvaesa. "Unrestricted access" means the landlord's need to enter at their own convenience without the tenant being present — not merely having access rights.

Marchant v Charters [1977] 1 WLR 1181

Exclusive possession granted for a short, limited purpose consistent with caretaking → still a licence. Purpose and limited nature of occupation defeat lease classification.

Mikeover v Brady [1989] EWCA Civ 1

Separate agreements imposing individual (not joint) payment obligations → unity of interest fails → no joint tenancy → licences. Shared bundle of rights/obligations is essential for joint tenancy.

Hunts Refuse Disposals v Norfolk Waste Services [1997] 1 EGLR 16

Even refusing cleaning services doesn't create a lease if the landlord has retained sufficient control; no full liberty to use the site → licensee.

Appah v Parncliffe Investments Ltd [1964] 1 All ER 838

Long-term hotel resident with daily maid service and no fixed room → no exclusive possession → licensee.

Abbeyfield Society v Woods [1968] 1 WLR 374

Elderly care home resident = licensee. Lord Denning: look at the agreement as a whole to see if a tenancy was truly intended.

Facchini v Bryson [1952] 1 TLR 1386

Even a labelled 'licence' = tenancy if it grants exclusive possession for a term at a rent, UNLESS circumstances clearly show no tenancy was intended (e.g. family/charity/employment context).

Norris v Checksfield [1991] 1 WLR 1241

Employee is a licensee if occupation is genuinely required for better performance of duties and is of "material assistance" to employment. Need not be strictly necessary — material assistance suffices. If not material to the job → lease.

Heslop v Burns [1974] 3 All ER 406

Person allowed to occupy as a matter of friendship or generosity, without any intention to create legal relations → licensee, even with exclusive possession.

Nunn v Dalrymple [1990] 59 P & CR 231

Exclusive possession for a short term at rent, with no special relationship (employment/family) to negate it → lease regardless of label.

Cobb v Lane [1952] 1 All ER 1199

Brother allowed brother to occupy his house for 13 years → no intention to create legal relations → licence despite exclusive possession.

Ashburn Anstalt v Arnold [1989] Ch 1

Confirms rent is NOT actually required to create a lease despite the Street v Mountford formula. LPA 1925 s205(1)(xxvii) definition of 'term of years absolute' confirms rent non-essential. Why exclusive possession matters more than rent in family/informal settings.

Bruton v London and Quadrant Housing Trust [1999] 3 All ER 481

EP + term + rent → lease regardless of landlord's lack of title. Creates a NON-PROPRIETARY "Bruton tenancy" — cannot be enforced against third parties but creates obligations between parties. Controversial, against academic opinion.

Kay v Lambeth Borough Council [2006] 2 AC 465

Never formally overturned Bruton. Same situation but HL did not want to cite Bruton. Modern practice: grant property guardianship a licence to avoid the Bruton problem.

London Development Agency v Nidai [2009] EWHC 1730 (CH)

Illustrates application of lease/licence principles in property guardianship / temporary accommodation contexts.

Cabo v Dezotti [2022] UKUT 240 (LC)

[2023] 1 P. & C.R. DG10. Applies Street v Mountford framework to a modern residential context — exclusive possession analysis.

Camelot Property Management Ltd v Roynon (24 Feb 2017, CC Bristol)

Despite 'licence' label, Camelot had no strong right of entry and could NOT move Roynon between rooms → no retention of control → exclusive possession → TENANCY. Property guardianship CAN become a tenancy if control not genuinely retained.

Camelot Guardian Management Ltd v Khoo [2018] EWHC 2296

Shared occupation, non-exclusive nature emphasised, labelled licence → no exclusive possession → licensee. Context and degree of retained control is everything.

Global 100 Ltd v Laleva [2021] EWCA Civ 1835

Guardian had lockable room but had to share flat, could be moved at will, required to occupy certain nights, no common intention to disguise tenancy → no sham → licensee. Global 100 could seek possession even though not the property owner.

Lysaght v Edwards [1876] 2 Ch D 499

Estate contract: purchaser of land becomes equitable owner from contract; vendor holds legal title as trustee. Foundational for doctrine of anticipation.

Walsh v Lonsdale [1882] 21 Ch D 9

DOCTRINE OF ANTICIPATION: "Equity treats as done that which ought to be done." A contract for a lease is as good as a lease in equity, provided the contract would be specifically enforceable (s2 LP(MP)A 1989: signed writing, all terms).

Coatsworth v Johnson [1886] 54 LT 520

Limits Walsh v Lonsdale: tenant in substantial breach of covenant could not claim equitable lease — equitable remedies depend on equitable conduct ("he who comes to equity must come with clean hands").

Baker v Craggs [2016] EWHC 3250

What constitutes "actual occupation" under Sch 3 para 2 LRA 2002. Court has discretion — considers physical presence (not just legal entitlement), meaning varies with nature of property, some permanence required, intention relevant, and length/reason for absence matters.

Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1989] Ch 350

Two-pronged test for acquisition of beneficial interest under common intention constructive trust: (1) express common intention + detrimental reliance, OR (2) direct financial contribution to purchase price. Criticised for setting the hurdle "rather too high" (Baroness Hale, Stack v Dowden).

Link Lending v Bustard [2010] EWCA Civ 424

Actual occupation under Sch 3 para 2 LRA 2002: occupier in psychiatric care still deemed in actual occupation because her furniture was there and she intended to return. Physical presence of the person is not always required.

City of London Building Society v Flegg [1987] UKHL 6

OVERREACHING worked even though beneficiaries (parents) were in actual occupation. Overreaching can operate even if purchaser/lender knows of the beneficial interest — provided capital money is paid to two trustees (s27(2) LPA 1925).

State Bank of India v Sood [1996] EWCA Civ 835, [1997] Ch 276

Overreaching can occur even where NO capital money is advanced at the time (e.g. charge secures future advances). Confirms the payment-to-two-trustees rule is a protection, but absence of money at moment of charge does not defeat overreaching.

Williams & Glyn's Bank Ltd v Boland [1981] AC 487

Wife with beneficial interest was in actual occupation → overriding interest binding the bank. Led to the "two trustees" rule being relied upon by lenders; inquiry became standard practice.

Abbey National Building Society v Cann [1991] 1 AC 56

ACQUISITION MORTGAGE doctrine: where a bank lends money specifically to fund acquisition, the charge and acquisition are one indivisible transaction — no "scintilla temporis" in which any other interest could arise before the bank's charge. Bank takes priority over beneficiaries.

Chaudhary v Yavuz [2013] Ch 249

Equitable easements do not bind purchasers unless protected by notice on the register OR overriding under Sch 3. Informal/oral arrangements about access generally do not survive registration of a disposition.

Chhokar v Chhokar [1984] FLR 313

Wife temporarily absent giving birth in hospital when husband sold the house to defeat her interest → still in actual occupation. Temporary absence does not destroy actual occupation.

Thompson v Foy [2009] EWHC 1076

Mother transferred property to daughter who mortgaged it. Mother claimed overriding interest, but had left by time charge was registered. ACTUAL OCCUPATION must exist at BOTH time of disposition (deed) AND time of registration.

Southern Pacific Mortgages v Scott [2014] UKSC 52

Sale-and-rent-back scheme. Confirmed Cann principle: purchaser under such schemes who also mortgages the property takes the charge as an integrated acquisition → personal rights/constructive trust arising from the vendor's agreement cannot override the acquisition mortgage.

Goodman v Gallant [1986] Fam 106

Mr G and Mrs G bought property, contributing different amounts. Express declaration stated they held "upon trust for themselves as joint tenants". CA: Express declarations are CONCLUSIVE — refused to look behind the declaration. Shares on severance are EQUAL.

Re Scarle [2019] EWHC 2224 (Ch)

Applied s184 LPA 1925 (commorientes): where joint tenants die in circumstances making it uncertain who died first, law presumes they died oldest to youngest. Younger is deemed to have survived the elder.

Re Draper's Conveyance [1969] 1 Ch 486

Wife's affidavit in divorce proceedings requested sale AND equal split. VALID severance under s36(2) LPA 1925 — requesting equal split expresses immediate desire for an individual share.

Harris v Goddard [1983] 1 WLR 1203

Divorce petition requested court make "such order as may be just" — no specific split mentioned. NOT valid severance: a general request for court discretion is not an immediate intention to sever.

Kinch v Bullard [1999] 1 WLR 423

Notice of severance posted to husband, he never read it before his death (intercepted by wife) — STILL served. s196(3) LPA 1925: deemed served when LEFT at last known abode — need not be read.

Re 88 Berkeley Road NW9 [1971] Ch 648

Registered post — B never saw letter that A had sent to their own home address where both lived → STILL served. Exception s196(4) LPA: registered post deemed served when ordinarily delivered unless returned undelivered.

Williams v Hensman [1861] 70 ER 862

Three routes to sever a joint tenancy in equity (beyond s36(2)): (1) acting on one's own share, (2) mutual agreement, (3) course of dealing. NEVER by will. Foundational authority for severance methods.

Burgess v Rawnsley [1975] Ch 429

"Lonely widows" case. Discussions between parties amounted to MUTUAL AGREEMENT to become tenants in common — no formal contract needed. Denning (obiter): unilateral communications may suffice for course of dealing — but doubted now.

Davis v Smith [2011] EWCA Civ 1603

Couple went to solicitor, had common understanding on how to split house, divided life insurance policy 50/50 → sufficient COURSE OF DEALING even though they never discussed proceeds of the house itself.

Gould v Kemp [1834] 39 ER 959

Severance cannot be effected by a will alone. A joint tenant cannot sever by bequeathing their interest — survivorship operates first.

Greenfield v Greenfield (1979) 28 P&CR 57

Physical division of a house into separate flats did not amount to severance by course of dealing — more is needed than the mere physical partition of use.

White v White [2003] EWCA Civ 924

Course of dealing requires ALL joint tenants to share the intention — mere unilateral acts or unreciprocated communications insufficient. Cautious approach to course of dealing.

Bank of Ireland Home Mortgages Ltd v Bell [2001] 2 All ER 920

s14/s15 TOLATA 1996 application. Gibson LJ: "a powerful consideration is whether the creditor is receiving proper recompense for being kept out of his money" — post-1996, creditor interests remain heavily weighted even under the new statutory framework.

First National Bank v Achampong [2003] EWCA Civ 487

Creditor's interest under s15(1)(d) TOLATA can outweigh welfare of minors under s15(1)(c) — court ordered sale despite children's presence. Illustrates how creditors remain privileged in TOLATA disputes.

Edwards v Lloyds TSB [2004] EWHC 1745

TOLATA application by creditor. Court postponed sale for 5 years until youngest child reached majority — showing s15(1)(c) welfare of minors CAN outweigh creditor interests in some circumstances.

Mortgage Corporation v Shaire [2001] Ch 743

s15 TOLATA 1996 marked a shift from the old Insolvency Act approach — gave courts more discretion to consider welfare of family/occupiers against creditor interests. Neuberger J: s15 intended to tip the balance slightly back towards families.

Alliance & Leicester Plc v Slayford [2001] 1 All ER (Comm) 1

Where TOLATA route fails, lender can pursue bankruptcy instead — bypassing TOLATA protections by making the borrower bankrupt and forcing sale via IA 1986 s335A. Demonstrates lender workarounds.

Four Maids v Dudley Marshall [1957] Ch 317

Harman J: lender has right to possession "as soon as the ink is dry on the mortgage" — at common law, NO requirement to wait. In practice lenders won't exercise this because it undermines business.

Ropaigealach v Barclays Bank plc [2000] 1 QB 263

Bank repossessed without a court order while owners were away — LPA rights allow possession without judicial oversight when property is unoccupied. Mortgagor had no opportunity to invoke AJA 1970 s36 protections. Shows gap in statutory protection.

Quennell v Maltby [1979] 1 WLR 318

In equity, possession claim must be brought for the purpose of ENFORCING SECURITY. Here, mortgagor's wife paid off the mortgage and tried to use the charge to evict students — court refused because not bona fide enforcement of security.

Bristol & West Building Society v Ellis (1997) 29 HLR 282

Under s36 AJA 1970: borrower must show a REALISTIC plan to clear arrears. Speculative prospect of future sale/employment insufficient. "Reasonable period" needs concrete supporting evidence.

Cheltenham and Gloucester v Norgan [1996] 1 WLR 343

Key case. STARTING POINT for "reasonable period" under s36 AJA 1970 is the FULL REMAINING MORTGAGE TERM. Rebuttable presumption. Waite LJ: "The court should take as its starting point the full term." Evans LJ: 8 factors for rebuttal (affordability, duration of difficulty, reason for arrears, remaining term, contract terms, accelerated-payment power, reasonableness of recoupment period, security concerns).

Cukurova Finance International Ltd v Alfa Telecom Turkey Ltd [2013] UKPC 20

Equitable relief from forfeiture of shares. Confirms equitable scrutiny of mortgagee/chargee conduct — enforcement must be in good faith and for proper purposes.

Silven Properties Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland [2004] 1 WLR 997

Lender has NO duty to sell, no duty to wait, no duty to improve — BUT when they DO sell, must take reasonable precautions to obtain FAIR/TRUE MARKET VALUE at date of sale. Duty to account in equity for what they should have received if they exercised power correctly.

Southern & District Finance Ltd v Barnes [1995] 27 HLR 691

Time orders under s129 CCA 1974: court must consider ALL circumstances and position of both creditor and debtor. "Just" test. Court can also use s136 CCA to vary agreement (lower interest, change payments, extend term).

Downsview Nominees Ltd v First City Corporation Ltd [1993] AC 295

Lord Templeman: lender exercising power of sale must act in GOOD FAITH — must actually want to obtain repayment, not act out of spite or for ulterior motives.

Meretz Investments v ACP Ltd [2007] 2 WLR 403

Proper motives test: if there are MIXED motives but some part is genuine (wanting to recover debt), lender CAN still sell. Good faith tolerates mixed purposes so long as recovery is genuinely among them.

Tse Kwong Lam v Wong Chit Sen [1983] 1 WLR 1349

Lord Templeman: lender cannot sell to HIMSELF or his own company — true sale required. BUT can sell to a closely connected company; courts will scrutinise the transaction closely.

Cuckmere Brick Co v Mutual Finance Ltd [1971] Ch 949

Mortgagee selling must take reasonable care to obtain TRUE MARKET VALUE. Must advertise properly and highlight any special features that increase value. Classic statement of the duty of reasonable care in sale.

Waring v London and Manchester Assurance Co [1935] Ch 310

When lender contracts to sell, the borrower's EQUITY OF REDEMPTION IS SUSPENDED. Stage 1 of the sale process. Purchaser acquires an estate contract via doctrine of anticipation.

Hotak v London Borough of Southwark [2015] UKSC 30

VULNERABILITY test under s189(1)(c) HA 1996. Lord Neuberger: the comparator is an "ordinary person if made homeless" — NOT the ordinary homeless person (overruling Pereira). Would the applicant suffer harm/detriment which the ordinary person would not suffer or be at risk of suffering, such that the harm would make a noticeable difference to their ability to cope? Also confirmed Equality Act 2010 PSED applies.

Denton v London Borough of Southwark [2007] EWCA Civ 623

Applicant aged 20 with severe learning difficulties and depression. Mother revoked licence to occupy due to cannabis use/threats. Reviewing officer found deliberate act causing occupation to cease → INTENTIONALLY HOMELESS. CA upheld. Dyson and Mummery LJJ: when people live together they must show appropriate respect and comply with reasonable requests.

Baptie v Kingston Upon Thames [2022] EWCA Civ 888

Concerned review of homelessness decision and interaction with welfare benefits/affordability assessments. Single parent evicted for rent arrears → priority need. Illustrates the case-sensitive assessment of intentionality and reasonableness to continue occupation.

Nzolameso v City of Westminster [2015] UKSC 22

Duty under s208 HA 1996 to accommodate "so far as reasonably practicable" IN the authority's district. Westminster offered accommodation in Bletchley with no evidence of its policy for out-of-area placements. UKSC: authority must explain why in-borough/closer accommodation was not available; standard paragraph insufficient. Strong welfare-focused reasoning.

URS v BDW Trading [2025] UKSC 21

Building Safety Act 2022. Developer (BDW) could recover costs of remediating dangerous defects from original designer (URS) even before being sued by homeowners. SC strongly endorsed the policy goal: those who build dangerous buildings should bear the cost of making them safe. Gave retrospective effect to s135 BSA — "unfairness… may be the necessary price of achieving an important policy goal" (Lord Leggatt).

Adriatic Land [2025] EWCA Civ 856

Building Safety Act 2022. Confirms retrospective operation of BSA provisions — significant for freeholders' service-charge recovery post-Grenfell. Heard with/after related Triathlon Homes appeal.

Triathlon Homes [2025] EWCA Civ 846

Remediation Contribution Orders under s124 BSA 2022. Upper Tribunal / CA gave broad interpretation of "just and equitable" jurisdiction — developer and associated companies held liable. Confirms FTT/UT's unanchored discretion to spread remediation costs among responsible parties.

In re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch 131

Four-part test for a valid easement: (1) dominant & servient land, (2) different owners, (3) accommodates dominant land, (4) capable of forming subject matter of a grant. Recreational rights CAN satisfy requirement 3 — right to use communal garden was an easement enhancing enjoyment of the houses.

Hill v Tupper [1863] 2 H & C 121

Exclusive right to hire out pleasure boats on a canal. NOT an easement — purely commercial/personal benefit, did not accommodate the dominant land. Right must relate to normal enjoyment of land, not just personal commercial benefit.

Moody v Steggles [1879] 12 Ch D 261

Right to hang a pub sign on a neighbouring building — VALID easement. Sign benefited the pub (dominant land) by directing customers. Distinguished from Hill v Tupper — business accommodation can qualify where tied to land use.

Regency Villas Title Ltd v Diamond Resorts (Europe) Ltd [2018] UKSC 57

Timeshare owners claimed easements to resort facilities (pool, tennis, golf course). VALID — broadened Ellenborough from "normal use" to include purely recreational rights. Policy move encouraging leisure access. The maintenance/repair issue was contentious — timeshare holders had to maintain facilities themselves.

Phipps v Pears [1965] 1 QB 76

House demolished, adjacent wall exposed to weather. NO easement of weather protection. Courts will NOT readily recognise new NEGATIVE easements. Rationales: (1) would unduly restrict neighbour's right to enjoy own land; (2) would discourage terraced building society needs. Only 4 recognised negative easements: sunlight, airflow, water, lateral support.

Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] 2 WLR 684

Residents claimed Canary Wharf tower interfered with TV reception — NO easement. A broad right to uninterrupted reception is too uncertain in scope — uncertainty itself is a burden on the servient owner. Certainty requirement.

Copeland v Greenhalf [1952] Ch 488

Wheelwright claimed easement to park vehicles and store equipment on neighbour's strip of land. TOO EXTENSIVE — amounted to joint user → ousted the servient owner substantially. OUSTER PRINCIPLE authority.

London & Blenheim Estates Ltd v Ladbroke Retail Parks Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 1278

Right to park on a defined area. TEST for ouster: does the servient owner retain REASONABLE ENJOYMENT of the land? If yes, easement valid.

Batchelor v Marlow [2003] 1 WLR 764

Parking Mon-Fri 9:30am-6pm on a small strip. TOO EXTENSIVE — left servient owner without reasonable use during business hours → failed "reasonable enjoyment" test.

Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42

Scottish HL decision (influential, not binding). TEST for ouster: does the servient owner retain SUFFICIENT POSSESSION AND CONTROL? Two approaches: (1) "zoom in/zoom out" — minor loss of control over small area is fine if control over land as a whole remains; (2) control extends to underground/airspace, not just surface.

Virdi v Chana [2008] EWHC 2901 (Ch)

Applied Moncrieff-style "sufficient possession and control" test in English context. Parking rights can be easements if servient owner retains meaningful use of the land.

Wheeldon v Burrows [1879] LR 12 Ch D 31

Thesiger LJ's rule: on grant of part of a tenement, all QUASI-EASEMENTS which are (1) continuous and apparent, (2) necessary for reasonable enjoyment, (3) in use at the time of grant — will pass as implied easements. GRANTS ONLY, not reservations. Largely superseded by s62 LPA but still operates for equitable interests.

Wright v Macadam [1949] 2 KB 744

Tenant stored coal in landlord's garden shed; on renewal, the right was UPGRADED to a legal easement via s62(1) LPA 1925. Also: storage rights can be easements where they don't amount to exclusive possession (relevant for ouster principle).

Wood v Waddington [2015] EWCA Civ 538

DIVERSITY OF OCCUPATION not strictly required for s62 LPA to operate. If no diversity exists, examine whether the right was "continuous and apparent" (physically obvious and regularly exercised). Broadens s62's reach.

P & S Platt Ltd v Crouch [2003] EWCA Civ 1110

s62 LPA 1925 can convert informal permissions/privileges enjoyed by occupier into legal easements on a conveyance. Important reminder for conveyancers to expressly exclude s62 (s62(4)) where they don't want this effect.

Darwall v Dartmoor National Park Authority [2023] EWCA Civ 927

Confirmed the statutory public right to wild camp on Dartmoor Commons under the Dartmoor Commons Act 1985. Illustrates statutory public easements and the "right to roam" exception to the general rule that easements cannot exist in gross.

Baron Bernstein of Leigh v Skyviews & General Ltd [1978] QB 479

Skyviews flew over Bernstein's estate taking photographs. NO TRESPASS. Applying "cuius est solum…" literally would produce absurdity (satellites would trespass). Ownership of airspace LIMITED to the height necessary for ordinary use and enjoyment of the land and structures upon it.

Kelsen v Imperial Tobacco [1957] 2 QB 334

Tobacco advertising sign overhung Kelsen's property by a few inches → TRESPASS. Ownership extends above the surface for ordinary use; physical objects encroaching into immediate airspace = trespass. Objects as well as people can trespass.