Concept EIGO

International Order (Bull / Bullian definition)

A pattern of activity sustaining the elementary goals of the society of states: (1) Life security against violence (2) Truth keeping promises/treaties (3) Property stability of possession. Order can exist without a hegemon, formal rules, or shared values.

The Anarchical Society (Bull)

Bull's concept: states form a functioning 'society' based on common rules and shared goals despite the absence of a central world government. Anarchy =/=  chaos it is a space where an ordered society can still emerge.

International Order (Lake, Martin & Risse 2021)

Patterned or structured relationships among units.

International Order (Lawson 2023)

Regularised practices of exchange among discrete political units that recognise each other as independent (patterns of interaction: commerce, war, diplomacy, law). Multiple IOs exist across history.

George Lawson core argument

The modern international order did NOT originate in 1648 (Westphalia). It emerged from a 19th-century 'global transformation' driven by three mutually reinforcing dynamics: (1) industrialisation, (2) rise of 'rational states', (3) imperialism.

Westphalian Myth

Critique of the idea that the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia created modern sovereignty. In practice, the same powers frequently violated non-intervention through colonialism. Sovereignty was emphasised non-intervention was not (see Acharya & Buzan 2019).

Consequences of the modern international order (5 factors)

(1) Shrinking of the planet via technology/infrastructure (2) rise of IGOs requiring international coordination (3) structural power relations (material + ideational, racial hierarchies, imperial legacies) (4) institutions (WTO, UN, Bretton Woods) (5) discursive power who decides what is 'good/bad/just'.

Structural Power Relations

Material: control of resources. Ideational: dominance of Western ideas in IGOs. Includes racial power hierarchies (scientific racism) and economic inequality from imperial legacies (e.g. Opium Wars).

Shrinking of the Planet

Technologies (steamships, railways, telegraph, now 5G) increased interdependence and created structural power for those who provide the core infrastructure.

Haves and Have-Nots

Structural inequality defining the modern international order. 'Haves' (historically Western) control core infrastructure (IMF, WTO). 'Have-nots' (Global South, former colonies/'the periphery') are often dependent on that infrastructure.

Power Transition Theory (Organski 1958)

A rising state challenges the hegemon when: (1) it has higher growth rates (2) reaches power parity (~80% of hegemon + allies) (3) is dissatisfied with the existing order.

Material vs Ideational Orders

Orders consist of physical infrastructure (territory, railways, 5G) AND/OR ideational elements (norms, culture, law). Providers of physical infrastructure hold more structural power.

Probabilistic vs Deterministic (Meijer & Brooks)

Their arguments about European autonomy are 'probabilistic' (highly likely) not 'deterministic' (inevitable). Important methodological nuance.

Technology Determinism in IR

Orders change when new technologies favour the attacker or defender. Technologies act as 'structural modifiers': they alter the effects of structure, potentially tilting the balance of power toward rising states.

Kefferpütz: 3 collapsing orders

Europe faces the simultaneous unravelling of: (1) Geopolitical order (NATO crisis, Ukraine, Gaza, US withdrawal) (2) Economic order (protectionism, trade disputes, weaponised interdependence) (3) Democratic order (democratic backsliding, illiberalism, media capture). Question: can Europe move from being an 'object' of history to a 'subject'?

Pax Europaea

A proposed new era of European stability and influence where the EU takes full responsibility for its own security and acts as an independent subject in a fragmenting global order.

Great Power Bias

A tendency in IR to interpret global events primarily through the lens of dominant states, neglecting the agency of smaller or marginalised actors.

State Determinism,An explanatory lens where changes in international order are determined by the actions and relative power of states as the primary drivers (e.g. Organski's power transition theory).

Expectations-Capabilities Gap (Hill)

The persistent disconnect between what the EU is expected to do internationally and its actual material and political ability to deliver. Core concept from Hill, Smith & Vanhoonacker.

Normative Power Europe (Manners 2002)

The EU is a distinct political entity that shapes global norms and standards rather than relying on military force. Influence through values, not hard power.

Methodological Pluralism

The necessity of using both material and ideational factors (norms, culture) to explain Europe's global role.

Intergovernmental vs Community Method

Fundamental tension in EU foreign policy between: (1) member states (Council-led, intergovernmental) (2) supranational institutions (Commission, Parliament). Foreign/security policy is dominated by the former.

Theoretical debates on EU as actor

(1) Normative Power Europe Manners 2002: EU shapes norms (2) Realist Hyde-Price 2006: EU FP = states pursuing security interests (3) Kagan 2003: EU's civilian power is a sign of weakness, dependent on US military umbrella.

Keukeleire & Delreux core argument

Member state cooperation is as vital to EU FP as common actions, yet national policies often prevail. Neighbourhood policy = 'zero-sum game' with Russia, EU technocratic frameworks clash with Russian geopolitical spheres.

Keukeleire & De Bruyn BRICS argument

The EU lacks a coherent strategy for the rise of emerging powers. Its desire for stable legalistic frameworks often fails to produce genuine strategic partnerships with BRICS nations.

Meijer & Brooks 'Illusions of Autonomy'

European strategic autonomy is an 'illusion': Europe cannot provide for its own security if the US pulls back due to (1) 'strategic cacophony' and (2) severe defence capability shortfalls. Argument is probabilistic, not deterministic.

Strategic Cacophony (Meijer & Brooks)

Divergent national threat perceptions among EU member states (esp. regarding Russia) that prevent a coherent European defence policy. A core constraint on strategic autonomy.

Can Europe Defend Itself? 3 perspectives

(1) IISS 2019: pessimistic needs $100bn for sea lanes, $300bn for territorial defence (2) Posen 2020: optimistic European NATO members have sufficient capacity for defensive ops (3) Meijer & Brooks 2021: pessimistic strategic cacophony + capability shortfalls.

Michael Smith & Rebecca Steffenson EU-US

'Competitive cooperation': the EU is an economic equal but remains subordinated to the US military umbrella. The relationship is increasingly fraught with contradictions over norms and trade.

Albright's 3 D's (1998)

Constraints on European defence integration: No Decoupling from NATO, No Duplication of NATO capabilities, No Discrimination against non-EU NATO members. Long governed EU-US defence relations, now changing under Trump.

EU-US Transatlantic Relations key tensions

Trade disputes, diverging tech regulation, defence burden-sharing, Trump's repeated challenges to multilateral order, Biden's economic protectionism (IRA), current US pressure on European defence spending.

Fiott 'In every crisis an opportunity?'

War in Ukraine acted as catalyst for EU defence integration (Strategic Compass, European Peace Facility for lethal equipment). 3 core points: (1) continued intergovernmentalism ('new intergovernmentalism') (2) Commission as 'policy entrepreneur' (with Council consent) (3) high risk–high return trajectory depends on overcoming strategic cacophony.

Strategic Compass 2022

The EU's first dedicated security and defence strategy. Provides a strategic vision for EU security policy through 2030. Key objective: enhance strategic autonomy and ability to act as a regional power. Introduced a 5,000-strong Rapid Deployment Capacity target.

Zeitenwende

A 'critical juncture' triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Germany announced massive increases in defence spending (>2% GDP) a historic reversal of post-WWII strategic culture. Also a broader turning point in European security policy.

Rearm Europe / Readiness 2030

Recent EU initiative (€800bn plan) to boost European defence spending and industrial integration. Includes the European Defence Fund (EDF). Addresses military capability shortfalls highlighted by the Ukraine war.

Calcara & Simón, Franco-German defence

Explain divergence using 'two faces of market size': France favours efficiency in ad-hoc arms programs where it has competitive advantage. Germany pushes for supranational EDF efficiency while seeking 'juste retour' in specific programs to preserve its own industrial autonomy.

Efficiency vs Autonomy (defence)

Fundamental tension: France prioritises industrial efficiency (competitive advantage). Germany prioritises national industrial autonomy ('juste retour' fair return on investment).

CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy)

Intergovernmental framework established by the Maastricht Treaty (1993) to coordinate EU foreign policy. The European Council sets the course, execution is with the High Representative. No supranational enforcement, member states retain sovereignty.

CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy)

Operational component of CFSP, involving military and civilian missions. A 'misnomer': no defence of EU territory not fully 'common' (Denmark opt-out, voluntary contributions, no common capabilities). In a 'grey zone' not empty, but not fully filled.

Petersberg Tasks

Defined scope for EU/CSDP missions: humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management. Does NOT include territorial defence of EU member states.

European Peace Facility (EPF)

Off-budget tool used since 2022 to provide lethal military equipment to Ukraine a significant shift in EU policy (EU had previously only supplied non-lethal aid).

PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation)

Framework for member states to deepen defence cooperation through legally binding commitments on specific projects. A potential (partial) solution to EU defence capability gaps.

European Defence Agency (EDA)

Can set up groups for joint projects and joint procurement, facilitates capability development among member states.

Strategic Autonomy (EU definition)

'The capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible' (EU Global Strategy 2016). Originally focused on defence, expanded to tech, digital, and industrial policy post-2016.

EU-NATO divide

Tension between EU and NATO roles in European defence. France historically pushes for European independence from NATO, UK (pre-Brexit) and Eastern European states emphasised NATO primacy. EU must avoid Albright's 3 D's. Partly addressed by Berlin Plus agreements, tensions remain.

Mearsheimer 'Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault'

Offensive realist argument: the West bears primary responsibility for the crisis. NATO and EU enlargement into Russia's 'backyard' provoked Putin by ignoring Russia's legitimate security interests. Ukraine should be a neutral buffer state.

Bossuyt, Amoris & Riabchuk 'The Subaltern Strikes Back'

Postcolonial lens: Ukraine is a 'Double Subaltern' peripheral to both Russia (portrayed as 'little brother') and the EU (seen as '2nd-rate Europeans'). The 2022 invasion was a 'critical juncture': Ukraine claimed agency, rejected both imperial narratives, and successfully pushed for EU candidate status.

Ukraine's liminality (Bossuyt 2024)

Hybrid liminality (pre-2014): acted as bridge between East and West. Marginal liminality (2014-2022): chose European path but remained in 'becoming'. Post-2022: definitive break rejected Russian identity narratives, secured EU candidacy.

3 Perspectives on the Russian Invasion

(1) Realist/Mearsheimer: West's fault NATO/EU enlargement provoked Russia (2) EU/IR Fiott 2023: intergovernmentalism + policy entrepreneurship + high-risk trajectory (3) Critical/Postcolonial Bossuyt 2024: Ukraine as subaltern claiming agency.

Martill & Sus 'Winds of Change?'

Variation in European national responses to Ukraine (Germany's Zeitenwende vs Poland's leading role) is explained by interaction of: geopolitical position, national identity, and domestic party politics not purely systemic factors.

European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

EU foreign policy framework (2004) to manage relations with countries to the East and South not in the enlargement process. Aims for a 'ring of friends', uses conditionality (without accession). Has had mixed results 'ring of friends' became 'ring of fire.'

Conditionality

The EU's primary enlargement and neighbourhood tool: states must fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria to join the EU. Creates leverage but also creates paternalistic dynamics (see Palestine / Earned Statehood).

Copenhagen Criteria

EU membership conditions: (1) stable democracy + rule of law, (2) functioning market economy (3) ability to take on the 'acquis communautaire' (body of EU law).

EU-China: 2 Logics (Keukeleire & Yang)

(1) Power-based logic (realist): relative gains, China increasingly assertive, economic relations acquire security implications (2) Transformational logic (liberal/constructivist): institutionalisation and mutual socialisation can build trust but EU–China differ more than EU–US.

China as 'Systemic Rival'

EU's 2019 framing of China as simultaneously: a partner for global challenges, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival promoting alternative governance models. Key concept for exam captures the tripartite complexity.

Imaginary China (Breslin 2011)

Western narratives extrapolate Chinese growth trends into a future 'China' that does not yet exist. This construction shapes EU and US policy beyond actual Chinese capabilities sometimes generating premature threat perceptions.

Wedging and Binding (Zaccagnini & Calcara 2025)

Great power strategies: Binding = maintaining the loyalty of an ally, Wedging = breaking up opposing alliances. Target state's susceptibility depends on its political and economic cohesion. Applied to the 5G case (Italy, UK).

Pivot to Asia (Keukeleire & Yang)

EU's strategic reorientation toward the Asia-Pacific in response to China's rise. Hindered by: hard security deficiencies and internal dependencies on member states limiting EU's credibility as a strategic partner in the region.

De-risking vs De-coupling

De-risking (EU official position): reduce strategic vulnerabilities in critical sectors (chips, rare earths, clean tech) while maintaining trade ties. De-coupling (US tendency): complete separation of supply chains in strategic sectors. The distinction is a key EU–US tension.

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

China's global infrastructure investment program. In Europe: investments in Greece (Piraeus port), Hungary, etc. Raises concerns about strategic dependence and debt traps.

Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI, 2020)

EU-China investment deal agreed in principle, frozen in 2021 after mutual sanctions over Xinjiang human rights violations. Illustrates the tension between economic and normative logics.

FDI Screening Regulation (2020)

EU framework to screen foreign (including Chinese) investments in strategic sectors. Part of the broader shift from openness to strategic protection.

Technological/Digital Sovereignty

The EU's quest to develop its own critical infrastructure (chips, data, cloud, AI) and reduce dependencies on US and Chinese tech to avoid being caught in the 'geopolitical crossfire' (Csernatoni).

The Brussels Effect

The EU's ability to project global influence through its market power and regulatory capacity foreign companies must comply with EU rules to access the single market, effectively globalising EU standards (e.g. GDPR, AI Act).

Regulatory Mercantilism (Farrand, Carrapico & Turobov)

The EU has shifted from 'regulatory capitalism' to 'regulatory mercantilism': using market-access rules and regulations as tools of geopolitical power and protectionism merging security and economic rationales to assert digital sovereignty.

Csernatoni 'The EU's AI Power Play'

The EU is at a crossroads in AI governance: shifting from regulatory power toward a deregulatory, innovation-focused path to compete with US and China. Risk: undermining its own ethical standards. Technological sovereignty is a necessity to avoid geopolitical dependency.

EU InvestAI Initiative (2025)

€200 billion initiative announced by Von der Leyen at the Paris AI Action Summit. Includes €20 billion for AI factories and gigafactories (high-performance computing centres). Investments remain uncertain largely dependent on private capital.

The EuroStack

Ambition to build EU capacity across the full digital value chain: semiconductors → data → computing → connectivity → software. Aims for sovereignty at every layer of the tech stack.

EU Chips Act (2023)

€43 billion to secure European semiconductor supply and raise EU's global chip market share from 10% to 20% by 2030. Feasibility debated EU lacks a chip manufacturer, but leads in chip-making equipment (ASML, Solvay). Chips Act 2.0 underway.

EU AI Act (2024)

Entered into force August 2024. Prohibits 'unacceptable risk' AI (social credit scoring, mass facial recognition, emotion detection). Imposes rules on high-risk AI (law enforcement, education, recruitment) and foundation models. A 'hybrid strategy' combining internal market, fundamental rights, and geopolitics. Controversial: exemptions for French/German open-source companies 'AI Omnibus' risks delays.

Draghi Report (2024)

Alarming assessment of EU competitiveness: tech change is happening rapidly and the EU is falling behind, missing productivity gains from the digital revolution. Growing gap with the US is a central concern. Triggered renewed EU industrial policy ambitions.

DeepSeek (2025)

China released a high-performing AI model at low cost, demonstrating that the US was not as far ahead in AI as assumed reshaping the narrative of the US–China tech race and complicating EU strategic positioning.

New Mercantilism

The rise of state-directed industrial policy across the US, China, and the EU. Raises questions: (1) Is the EU abandoning neo-liberal identity for protectionism? (2) Is the EU becoming a geopolitical power at the cost of its normative identity? (3) Is this environmentally sustainable?

2022 Energy Crisis 3 Shifts (Goldthau & Youngs)

(1) Securitisation of renewables: renewable energy becomes a core security issue, (2) Renewables extractivism: EU seeks renewable energy from third countries a 'EU green-realpolitik' (3) State interventionism: return to state-directed energy policy, away from purely market-based thinking.

Securitisation of Renewables

The shift toward viewing the energy transition as a core security issue, not just an environmental one. Post-2022: renewable energy supply becomes as strategic as military capability.

EU Green-Realpolitik

EU seeks renewable energy from third countries for its own energy security needs a pragmatic and geopolitical approach to the energy transition, prioritising EU interests over development ethics.

REPOWER EU

EU initiative to phase out reliance on Russian gas by importing from elsewhere and investing in renewable energy. Response to the 2022 energy crisis triggered by the Ukraine war.

Vogler: EU as Climate Power

Climate diplomacy is the EU's most successful area of external action. However, credibility depends on reconciling divergent member state energy interests. Internal contradictions (CAP, fisheries, AI investment) undermine the EU's normative climate leadership.

EU Climate Diplomacy key milestones

Late 1980s: central role in developing UNFCCC, 1997: Kyoto Protocol, 2009: failure at COP15 Copenhagen (financial crisis + BRIC rise), 2015: COP21 Paris success, 1.5°C aspiration, NDC framework. EU leveraged its status as development power to bridge developed/developing country divide.

ERTA Case (ECJ, 1971)

Legal ruling granting the European Commission capacity for external representation foundation for EU environmental (and other) international actorness.

European Green Deal

EU's flagship initiative to transform the economy for sustainability: climate ambition for 2030/2050, clean energy, circular economy, Farm-to-Fork, biodiversity, zero pollution. Positions the EU as a global climate leader.

Goldthau & Youngs core argument

The 2022 energy crisis revealed that Europe's approach to energy and climate has fundamentally changed: renewables are now a security issue, extractivism from third countries is the new norm, and the state is back as the central economic actor.

The EU and Palestine (Bouris)

EU exhibits complicity, silence, and double standards. Treats Palestinian statehood as something to be 'earned' through reform rather than an inherent right. Ultimately ensures the impossibility of a two-state solution. Gaza as 'ground zero' of EU double standards (contrast with response to Ukraine).

Earned Statehood

The concept that Palestinian sovereignty is treated by the EU as something to be 'proven' conditional on reform and good governance rather than a right under international law. EU put financial conditions on Palestinians. Contrasts sharply with EU recognition of Ukraine's European belonging.

Complicity and Double Standards (EU& Palestine)

EU's different treatment of Russian invasion of Ukraine vs Israeli military operations in Gaza: language differences ('killed by' vs 'lost their lives'), reluctance to use 'ceasefire', continued arms exports to Israel. Reflects Eurocentrism and Orientalism in EU foreign policy.

Eurocentrism & Orientalism in EU FP

EU foreign policy shaped by cultural hierarchies: the Middle East is portrayed as exotic, conflictual, and dangerous. Borrell's 'garden and jungle' quote illustrates this. Colonial hierarchies are not just historical they continue to shape EU–Middle East relations.

Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916)

UK &France agreement dividing the Middle East into zones of influence. Directly relevant to the origins of the Palestinian question and EU colonial responsibility in the region.

Paris Protocol (Oslo framework)

Palestine's market was integrated into Israel's economic system, giving Israel substantial control over Palestinian trade and profit. Supposed to be temporary (confidence-building step) became permanent.

English School (Bull)

Absence of hegemonic leadership does not preclude order from existing or emerging. States can form an international society with shared norms even under anarchy.

Liberal International Institutionalism (Keohane 1984)

International cooperation is possible in the absence of hegemonic power, facilitated by international institutions.

Commercial Peace Theory (Angell 1909)

Economic interdependence makes the cost of war incredibly high a liberal argument for cooperation through trade.

Structural Realism (Waltz 1979)

Economic interdependence is the main cause of tensions under anarchy. States are primarily concerned with relative gains and security competition.

Commission as Policy Entrepreneur (Fiott)

The European Commission's increased activity in defence = policy entrepreneurship, but done with express consent of the European Council. Commission acts as coordinator/expert, not central decision-making authority.

New Intergovernmentalism (Fiott)

Despite EU defence initiatives (EPF, Strategic Compass), decision-making remains controlled by national governments. EU defence integration does not follow the classical supranational model.

Subaltern Agency (Bossuyt)

The argument that Ukraine is successfully claiming its own agency, rejecting both Russian and EU-centric narratives of its identity. Relevant for broader debates about small/peripheral states in IR.