READINGS POLI 130

Fukuyama (2004) - What Makes a State Work

Argues that the main problem globally is not too much state intervention but weak states with low capacity; distinguishes State Scope (range of functions like welfare, education) vs State Capacity (ability to implement policy effectively), emphasizing that State Strength = capacity, not size. Shows weak states lead to instability, disease spread, and insecurity. IDs: State scope, State capacity, State strength.

Tilly (1985) - War Making and State Making as Organized Crime

Argues states formed through coercion, war, and extraction, not consent; describes state as a Protection Racket that creates threats and charges for protection. Introduces Bellicist model of state-building where war → taxation → bureaucracy → stronger state, and defines the state as having a monopoly on violence, eliminating Warlords and rivals. IDs: Protection racket, Bellicist model of state-building, Sovereignty, Warlords.

Feinstein & Wimmer (2023) - Revising the Bellicist Model

Argues war does not automatically build states; state-building depends on bargaining between rulers and citizens, requiring consent, taxation from population, and legitimacy. Without this, rulers rely on external resources and fail to build State Capacity. Revises Tilly by adding consent + legitimacy. IDs: Bellicist model (revised), State capacity, Sovereignty.

Herbst (1990) - War and State Development in Africa

Argues African states are weak because they lacked external war pressure; without war, there was no incentive to build taxation systems or bureaucracies. Weak states survive due to international recognition, leading to poor territorial control and "Brown areas" where the state cannot govern effectively. IDs: State capacity, Brown areas, Sovereignty.

Rodríguez-Franco (2015) - Internal War and State Building

Argues internal wars can build state capacity, especially taxation, but only if elites feel threatened, depend on the state, and identify with it. Internal war differs from external war because insurgents compete with the state for taxation. Outcome depends on whether elites support the state or defect. IDs: State capacity, Warlords (insurgents), Sovereignty, Bellicist model (modern update).

Slater (2010) - Ordering Power / Protection Pacts

Argues strong states emerge when elites form Protection Pacts in response to Contention (mass unrest). Elite fear leads to cooperation, allowing states to extract resources, build institutions, and maintain stability (often authoritarian). State-building depends on elite coalitions, not just war. IDs: Protection pact, Contentious politics, State capacity, State strength.

Acemoglu & Robinson - Why Nations Fail

Argue economic development depends on Inclusive vs Extractive Economic Institutions; inclusive institutions encourage participation and innovation, while extractive ones concentrate wealth and power. Political institutions determine economic ones. Uses cases like North vs South Korea. IDs: Inclusive vs extractive economic institutions, Economic development, Reversal of fortunes.

Sachs (2001) - Geography and Development

Argues geography explains economic development; factors like climate, disease, and access to trade (coastal vs landlocked) determine wealth. Tropical regions suffer disadvantages, leading to lower productivity and development. Competes with institutional explanations. IDs: Economic development.

Valenzuela & Valenzuela (1978) - Modernization Theory

Argue development follows a linear path from traditional to modern societies, driven by cultural change (rationality, mobility, industrialization). Underdevelopment is caused by traditional values and lack of modernization. IDs: Modernization theory, Economic development.

Baer (1984) - Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI)

Argues ISI initially promoted industrialization but failed due to inefficiency, lack of competition, small markets, and continued dependency on imports. ISI created inequality and weak export sectors. IDs: Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI), Dependency theory, ISI vs EOI, Salvador Allende (example).

Seth (2017) - South Korea Developmental State

Argues South Korea succeeded through a Developmental State that coordinated with firms, emphasized Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI), and enforced performance. Introduces Chaebol (large conglomerates) and leadership under Park Chung-hee. IDs: Developmental state, Chaebol, NICs/East Asian Tigers, EOI vs ISI, Park Chung-hee.

Linz (1990) - The Perils of Presidentialism

Argues presidential systems are unstable due to Dual Legitimacy (president vs legislature), fixed terms, rigidity, and winner-take-all dynamics. Contrasts with parliamentary systems that allow flexibility (Vote of no confidence). IDs: Presidentialism vs parliamentarism, Dual legitimacy, Lame duck effect, Vote of no confidence.

Quade (1991) - Proportional Representation Critique

Argues proportional representation (PR) leads to fragmentation, weak governments, and instability, especially in divided societies (e.g., Weimar Republic). Contrasts with plurality systems that produce stronger governments. IDs: Electoral system, Plurality vs proportional representation systems.

Sedelius & Linde (2018) - Semi-Presidential Systems

Argue stability depends on system design; premier-presidential systems are more stable, while president-parliamentary systems create conflict due to shared power. Expands on Linz's argument about executive-legislative conflict. IDs: Presidentialism vs parliamentarism, Dual legitimacy.

Grzymala-Busse (2019) - Populist Parties

Argues populist parties rise when mainstream parties fail to provide Substantive Representation; populists frame politics as "people vs elite" and claim to represent the true people. IDs: Political party, Populist party, Substantive representation.

Howard (2012) - Ethnocracy Trap

Argues Descriptive Representation and Consociationalism can backfire by entrenching ethnic divisions, leading to ethnocracy instead of democracy. Ethnic-based parties weaken national unity. IDs: Descriptive representation, Substantive representation, Consociationalism, Political party.

Reilly (2002) - Electoral Systems in Divided Societies

Argues electoral systems shape ethnic conflict; PR reinforces ethnic divisions, while centripetal systems (like alternative vote) encourage moderation and intergroup cooperation. IDs: Electoral system, Political party, Consociationalism, Alternative vote.

Wike (2025) - Representation Crisis

Argues citizens feel poorly represented, leading to declining trust in democracy and rise of populism. Highlights failure of Substantive Representation. IDs: Substantive representation, Political party, Populist party.

Putnam (1994) - Making Democracy Work

Argues strong Civil Society and Social Capital (trust, networks) produce effective democratic governance; contrasts Civic Community (high trust, participation) with Amoral Familism (low trust). IDs: Civil society, Social capital, Civic community vs amoral familism.

Putnam (1995) - Bowling Alone

Argues social capital in the U.S. is declining due to reduced civic participation, weakening democracy. Introduces idea of declining civic engagement. IDs: Social capital, Civil society, Bridging vs bonding social capital.

Berman (1997) - Civil Society and Weimar Germany

Argues strong civil society can undermine democracy when political institutions are weak; in Weimar Republic, associations enabled Nazi mobilization, creating Uncivil Society. IDs: Civil society, Uncivil society, Weimar Republic, Nazi Party.

Yang (2000) - Theories of Ethnicity

Explains Primordialism (fixed identity), Constructivism (socially constructed), and Instrumentalism (used strategically). Argues ethnicity is flexible and often manipulated. IDs: Primordialism vs constructivism, Instrumentalism (ethnicity), Ethnic group.

Mamdani (2001) - When Victims Become Killers

Argues Hutu-Tutsi divide was socially constructed and politicized through colonialism, not ancient; systems like Ubureetwa created inequality, later hardened into ethnic identity. Post-colonial elites like Habyarimana used ethnicity politically; Arusha Accords triggered backlash and Interhamwe mobilization leading to genocide. IDs: Hutu and Tutsi, Ubureetwa, President Juvenal Habyarimana, Arusha accords, Interhamwe, Ethnic entrepreneur.

Gagnon (1994) - Ethnic Conflict in Yugoslavia

Argues ethnic violence is deliberately created by elites to maintain power; leaders use nationalism to block democratization. Violence is strategic, not spontaneous. IDs: Ethnic entrepreneur, Ethnic security dilemma, Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman, Josip Broz Tito.

Varshney (2001) - Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society

Argues ethnic violence depends on civic networks; Intercommunal civic associations prevent violence, while intra-communal ones increase it. Uses Surat (peaceful) vs Ahmedabad (violent) to show effect. IDs: Intercommunal vs intra-communal civic associations, Surat, Ahmedabad.

Wilkinson (2004) - Electoral Incentives for Ethnic Violence

Argues ethnic violence is driven by electoral incentives; politicians incite violence to mobilize voters or prevent it when they rely on minority votes. Introduces Effective Number of Parties (ENP) to explain when minorities are protected. Example: BJP in Gujarat allowed violence due to lack of minority reliance. IDs: Effective number of parties, BJP, Gujarat, Ethnic entrepreneur, Ethnic security dilemma.

Schmitter & Karl - "What Democracy Is... and Is Not"

Argue democracy is not just elections; it is a system where rulers are held accountable by citizens through real competition, cooperation, rights, and elected representatives. Democracy does not automatically mean economic growth, social peace, free markets, or effective government. They use Dahl's polyarchy to show democracy needs fair elections, inclusive suffrage, free expression, alternative information, associational autonomy, and elected officials who are not controlled by unelected actors. IDs: Plural democracy, Polyarchy, Democratic consolidation vs democratic transition, State vs regime vs government.

Huntington - "Democracy's Third Wave"

Argues democratization happens in waves, not in a straight line. The Third Wave began in 1974 and was caused by declining authoritarian legitimacy, economic growth, expansion of education and middle classes, Catholic Church shifts, external pressure, and snowballing effects. He also warns waves can reverse. IDs: Third Wave of Democracy, Democratic transition, Performance legitimacy, Autocracy.

Przeworski & Limongi - "Modernization: Theories and Facts"

Argue economic development does not strongly cause dictatorships to become democracies, but it does help democracies survive once they already exist. This revises modernization theory by separating democratic transition from democratic survival. Wealth stabilizes democracy more than it creates democracy. IDs: Modernization theory, Genetic model of democracy, Survival model of democracy, Democratic consolidation vs democratic transition.

Levitsky & Way - "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism"

Argue many post-Cold War regimes are neither democracies nor full dictatorships; they are competitive authoritarian regimes where elections, courts, legislatures, and media exist but incumbents abuse state power so competition is unfair. Opposition can compete and sometimes win, but the playing field is heavily skewed. IDs: Competitive authoritarianism, Linkage, Leverage, Autocracy, Democratic transition.

Anderson, Brownlee, & Clarke - "Autocracy: A Substantive Approach"

Argue autocracy should not mean "anything that is not democracy." Instead, autocracy should mean politically exclusive rule where rulers truly exclude rivals from meaningful competition. They separate autocracy from competitive authoritarianism, limited-franchise regimes, and transitional/non-regime cases. IDs: Autocracy, Structure of contestation, Competitive authoritarianism, Monarchical dictatorship, Military dictatorship, Dominant party dictatorship, Personalistic dictatorship.

Gunder Frank - "The Development of Underdevelopment"

Argues underdevelopment is not a traditional stage before development; it is produced by capitalism and unequal metropolis-satellite relationships. Rich core countries develop partly through exploiting poorer peripheral countries. This challenges modernization theory and supports dependency theory. IDs: Dependency theory, Economic development, Modernization theory.

Seth - "South Korea's Economic Development, 1948-1996"

Argues South Korea's growth was built through land reform, education, state-led industrialization, export-oriented growth, and close state-chaebol cooperation. Park Chung-hee's developmental state used planning, credit control, and export discipline to push firms into global competition. IDs: Newly Industrialized Countries/East Asian Tigers, Developmental state, Chaebol, EOI vs ISI, Park Chung-hee in South Korea.