Free Will

What are the four jointly inconsistent claims at the heart of the free will debate?

1. Determinism is true. 2. If determinism is true, no one could have done otherwise. 3. One acts freely only if one could have acted otherwise. 4. Some actions are free.

What is Laplace's Demon?

A hypothetical intellect that knows all forces and positions in nature — if it existed, it could predict all future events with certainty, implying determinism.

Define determinism.

For all times t1 and t2, the laws of nature and the fundamental state of the universe at t1 jointly necessitate the state at t2 — only one possible future exists.

How do hard determinists respond to the four inconsistent claims?

They reject premise 4 — they deny that any actions are genuinely free.

How do libertarians respond to the four inconsistent claims?

They reject premise 1 — they deny that determinism is true, holding that free choices are not determined by prior states.

How do compatibilists respond to the four inconsistent claims?

They reject premise 2 or 3 — they argue free will is compatible with determinism, either by denying determinism removes the ability to do otherwise, or that free will doesn't require it.

What is the basic libertarian definition of a free action?

S acts freely if and only if S's action/decision/volition was NOT determined by prior states of affairs.

What is the 'challenge from chance' against libertarianism?

If two agents are identical in all relevant respects but make different choices, the difference is mere luck. If so, the choice is not truly 'up to' the agent — randomness doesn't ground freedom or responsibility.

What is the 'challenge from reasons' against libertarianism?

If free action requires the ability to act against one's interests, agents would have to be capable of bizarre, apparently irrational acts — suggesting insanity rather than freedom (Wolf, 1980).

What is the Conditional View of free will?

One acts freely only if one WOULD have acted otherwise HAD one so chosen — redefining ability in conditional terms compatible with determinism.

What is Problem 1 with the Conditional View (Chisholm's objection)?

A murderer might satisfy the conditional (if he'd chosen otherwise, he'd have done otherwise) yet still couldn't have chosen otherwise — so the condition is insufficient for freedom.

What is a Frankfurt-style case and what does it show?

A neuroscientist implants a chip to override any Republican vote; Smith freely votes Democrat while the chip lies dormant. She acted freely, yet couldn't have done otherwise — refuting the Conditional View.

What is Actual-Sequence Compatibilism?

Whether an action is free is fully determined by the ACTUAL causal history of the action — the capacity to do otherwise is irrelevant.

What is the Desire View of free action?

S's doing X is free if and only if it was caused by a desire to do X (Hobbes: liberty is simply for a man to do what he will).

Why does the Desire View fail? Give the counter-example.

A drug addict does what she wants when taking drugs, yet intuitively she doesn't act freely — her desire is compulsive.

What is the Higher-Order Desire View, and why does it fail?

S acts freely iff the action was caused by a desire S desires to have. But the 'willing addict' wants to want drugs, yet still seems unfree — compulsion persists.

What is Forking-Paths Compatibilism?

The view that free will is compatible with determinism AND requires the ability to do otherwise — it therefore must reject premise 2 of the consequence argument.

What is van Inwagen's Consequence Argument?

If determinism is true, my actions are consequences of laws + past facts. I can't render the laws false or the past false; so I can't render their conjunction false; so I couldn't have acted otherwise.

What is the 'invalidity' objection to the Consequence Argument?

The inference from 'I can't render L false' and 'I can't render P false' to 'I can't render L&P false' is invalid. Example: I can ban students from having both meat AND veg, even if I can't ban each alone.

What is the 'fishy premise' objection to the Consequence Argument?

Premise 1 conflates a necessary condition with making something the case. If I played piano, there would have been a piano — but I needn't have MADE it be there; I may just have found it.

What is Hume's conception of causation and how does it apply to human action?

Causation is just constant conjunction — regular succession, not mysterious power. Human motives reliably produce actions just as natural causes produce effects, so necessity applies to human action too.

What does Hume mean by 'liberty'?

Liberty is simply the power to act or not act according to the determinations of the will — freedom from external compulsion, NOT freedom from causal determination.

What is 'liberty of indifference' and why does Hume reject it?

The idea that actions are entirely uncaused. Hume rejects it as incoherent: an uncaused action would be random, not free in any meaningful sense — equivalent to chance.

How does Hume argue necessity is the foundation of moral responsibility?

Praise and blame only make sense if they flow from a person's character. If actions were uncaused, there would be nothing in the person to blame — moral sentiment requires the necessary link between character and action.

What is Hume's response to the moral objection against necessity?

If an act proceeds from nothing durable in a person's character, they cannot be responsible. Necessity (character → action) is what makes responsibility possible, not what undermines it.

What is the theological objection to compatibilism and Hume's response?

If God causes everything and actions are necessitated, God becomes the author of sin. Hume notes this problem is worse for those who deny necessity — and uses it to subtly critique theism.

What is the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP)?

A person is morally responsible for what they have done only if they could have done otherwise.

What is Frankfurt's central claim about PAP?

PAP is false — a person may be morally responsible even if they could not have done otherwise, because what matters is the actual causal history of the action, not the presence of alternatives.

Describe the Jones 3 case and what it shows.

Jones performs an act from his own considerations, even though an irresistible threat exists. He's not coerced (the threat didn't cause his action), yet he couldn't have done otherwise — showing coercion does not equal mere inability to do otherwise.

Describe the Jones 4 / Black case.

Black would intervene if Jones chose Democrat, but Jones chooses Republican on his own. Jones is responsible even though he couldn't have done otherwise — Black's presence never influenced him.

What is Frankfurt's revised principle to replace PAP?

A person is not morally responsible for what they did if they did it ONLY BECAUSE they could not have done otherwise.

What is PAP-general, and does it survive Frankfurt cases?

PAP-general: responsibility requires the general ability to do otherwise (capacity/skill), not the specific ability in those circumstances. Black's device doesn't remove Jones's general capacity — but critics argue FSCs target a stronger sense of PAP.

What is the 'flickers of freedom' response to Frankfurt cases?

Agents in FSCs retain a small alternative (e.g. Jones could have refrained from deciding independently), which is enough to satisfy PAP — responsibility tracks this residual alternative, not the blocked main one.

What is the dilemma objection to Frankfurt-style cases?

Either the prior sign determines Jones's choice (making him already determined, not a counterexample to PAP) or it doesn't (and Jones could still choose otherwise). No version of the case avoids this dilemma.

What is van Inwagen's 'rolling back history' thought experiment?

If determinism is true, rewinding the universe to an earlier state and letting it run forward again would always produce exactly the same result — only one future is ever possible.

What is an 'untouchable fact' in van Inwagen's argument?

A fact no human has ever been able to do anything about, regardless of knowledge or luck — e.g. the shape of the earth, laws of mathematics, events in the distant past.

What is the Conditional Principle in van Inwagen's argument?

If p is an untouchable fact, and 'if p then q' is also an untouchable fact, then q is also untouchable — chains of untouchable consequences cannot be broken.

What is agent causation and what mystery does it involve?

The idea that a person (not a prior event) directly causes an action. Van Inwagen confesses he doesn't understand how an individual thing — rather than an event — can be a cause; it replaces one mystery with another.

What is van Inwagen's conclusion about free will, determinism and indeterminism?

Free will seems incompatible with both determinism (no alternatives) and indeterminism (random outcomes not up to us). Belief in free will may be practically indispensable, but the metaphysics leaves us with irreducible mystery.