Moral Philosophy Topic Learning only

Bentham Utilitarianism 2 Arguments

1. Bentham's quantitative hedonistic act utilitarianism

2. Bentham's Utility Calculus

1. Bentham's quantitative hedonistic act utilitarianism

The moral value of acts are calculated by considering consequences. Good acts apply the principle of utility: the greatest happiness for the greatest number. To calculate moral worth, add up all the pleasure the act brings and subtract all pain. Good acts maximise pleasure and minimise pain. This is known as the maximisation of utility. A utility calculus should calculate moral worth of an action. Taking account: intensity duration certainty remoteness fecundity purity and extent. He presupposed psychological hedonism (all we desire is happiness/pleasure) to argue for ethical hedonism (we ought to desire pleasure) It is the quantity of pleasure that matters, case-by-case basis.

2. Bentham's Utility Calculus

Good act is act that leads to the greatest pleasure for the greatest number.

Purity - if action will cause pain

Remoteness - if action will produce immediate pleasure

Richness - If will lead to more pleasure

Intensity - If action will lead to large amount of pleasure

Certainty - If pleasure will definitely occur

Extent - If action will make lots of people happy

Duration - if pleasure gained will be long-term

Bentham Util 5 Criticisms

1. Whether pleasure is the only good (Nozick pleasure machine)

2. Fairness & individual liberty/rights (tyranny of majority)

3. Issues around partiality

4. Whether utilitarianism ignores moral integrity / individual intentions

5. Problems with calculation

1. Whether pleasure is the only good (Nozick pleasure machine)

A pleasure machine: you are guaranteed a pleasurable VR life, don't know you are in the machine, can never come out.

Bentham claims matter of fact that all we desire is happiness/pleasure. If this was matter of fact then we would have no good reason to NOT plug into the machine. However it seems we do have good reasons to plug into the machine: 1. care about what is actually the case not just how things seem 2. want to be connected to reality, or change reality 3. want to share reality with others and to affect others C: Bentham's claim that all we desire is happiness/pleasure (as a matter of fact) is false.

2. Fairness & individual liberty/rights (tyranny of majority)

Act utilitarianism can lead to some counter-intuitive moral judgements e.g. it may be good to sacrifice an innocent scapegoat to please the masses. In this way utilitarianism can be used to justify taking away individual rights from minorities to increase happiness overall. This seems unfair.

3. Issues around partiality

Utilitarianism calls for us to be neutral and never to favour yourself or family. However this goes against our intuition to not show preferences for a family member or whether that's even possible.

4. Whether utilitarianism ignores moral integrity / individual intentions

Moral integrity: Utilitarianism requires us to do things that go against our intuitions and challenge our integrity. For example Jim and the Warlord: Warlord has captured 20 people and tells Jim that if he personally kill one of them he will release all of the others as a sign of goodwill. If he doesn't the Warlord will kill all of them. But if he does kill a person then his sense of self or purpose destroyed so utilitarianism can undermine our integrity.

Intentions of the individual: Utilitarianism considers consequences but not motives. Two individuals could perform the same action (caring for an elderly family member) one could out of compassion whereas the other to be left money in their will. Pleasure could be identical so both are equally good for utilitarians despite being counter-intuitive. Seems more appropriate to consider the motives.

5. Problems with calculation

Should we aim for average happiness or total happiness - large population who are less happy or small population who are happier per person.

Distribution of happiness, is it better to make 1 person 50 point happier or 5 people 10 point happier.

Do consequences have an end? If you save a drowning boy who later becomes a dictator is the action good? If so our judgements about actions need to be constantly revised.

Should we consider the happiness of animals? Singer thought we should.

Mill & Singer Utilitarianism 4 Arguments

1. Singer's Happiness of Animals

2. Mill's qualitative hedonistic Utilitarianism

3. Singer's Preference Utilitarianism

4. Mill's proof of greatest happiness principle

1. Singer's Happiness of Animals

Humans and animals have sentience, the happiness of creatures needs to be taken into account with maximum happiness:

If only human have moral status, must be special quality that all humans share. All human-specific possibilities for such a quality seem to be lacking in certain humans (intelligence). The only other special qualities we could consider are also qualities that animals can have. We cannot argue that only humans deserve moral status as we can't identify clear differences in our qualities

2. Mill's qualitative hedonistic Utilitarianism

Mill agreed with Bentham that:

1. The moral value of any act is calculated by considering its consequences

(hence it is a consequentialist theory).

2. Good acts are those that apply the principle of utility: the greatest

happiness for the greatest number.

3. Good acts maximise pleasure and minimise pain.

However, Mill believed there was a difference between higher pleasures and

lower pleasures. Higher pleasures are pleasures of the mind, such as reading,

art, music, whereas lower pleasures are pleasures of the body. Mill believed we

should seek higher pleasures rather than lower pleasures

3. Singer's Preference Utilitarianism

Preference Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory. It

states that an action should be judged by how it conforms

to the preferences of all those affected by the action (and

its consequences). A good act is one which maximises the

satisfaction of the preferences of all those involved.

4. Mill's proof of greatest happiness principle

Mill claimed that the ultimate principles of morality, like all first principles cannot be

proven, but reasons/facts can be given for believing these principles. His 'proof'

looks like this:

1. The only evidence that something is visible is that it can actually be seen

2. Similarly, the only evidence that something is desirable is that it is actually

desired.

3. Each person desires their own happiness

4. Therefore, each person's happiness is desirable.

5. If each person's happiness is desirable, then the general happiness is

desirable.

In this way Mill shows that:

• Happiness is a good

• Each person's happiness is good to that person

• The general happiness is good to the aggregate of all persons

Mill's Proof 3 criticism + Objections to Mill

1. Hume is-ought fallacy

2. Equivocation Moore

3. Fallacy of Composition

4. Criticism of Mill's intentions

1. Hume is-ought fallacy

You cannot derive an 'ought' (how one should behave) from an 'is' (what

is factually true) as an 'ought' is a judgement of value and an 'is' is a judgement of reason.

Judgements of reason and value are different to each other.

2. Equivocation Moore

: 'desirable' is being used by Mill in two different ways:

• Desirable = that which is able to be desired (this could be anything, even paedophilia, owning

slaves, global domination)

• Desirable = that which ought to be desired e.g. Reducing class sizes in schools is a desirable

aim. it's regarded as a highly desirable job, the house is in a very desirable area of the city

3. Fallacy of Composition

just because it is good for each of us to be happy, it does not follow

that it is good for humanity to be happy. Humanity doesn't have desires

4. Criticism of Mill's intentions

Are we really still trying to maximize pleasure? Mill calls himself a utilitarian (we should seek the greatest pleasure) but really Mill is saying we should seek things that give less pleasure if they are a more worthy pleasure.

Utilitarianism loses its simplicity

Cultural Snobbery: do 'higher pleasures' really just means 'the things that Mill and his friends like to do'?

Kantian Deontology 3 Arguments

1. Good Will

2. First formulation of the categorical imperative: Universability

3. Second formulation of the categorical imperative: Ends not Means

Good Will

Most people pursue ends that we think of as good, each supposed goods can sometimes be bad (happiness from torture), the only pure good is one that arises out of good will, good will acts out of duty

First formulation of the categorical imperative: Universability

Act only according to maxim which you can will is a universal law, anything else is morally wrong, maxim which pass this test, maxims which pass test are morally permissible (but not morally obligatory), maxim fails if leads to contradiction either: contradiction of conception (perfect duties to never do) or contradiction in the will (imperfect duties to often not do).

Second formulation of the categorical imperative: Ends not Means

Always wrong to involve a person in an action they do not consent to, doesn't apply to: plumbers or taxis, but lying drugging deceit kidnapping slavery murder are wrong as use people as means to an end. Ex: Woman buys guitar with fake £20 notes.

Kantian 5 Issues

1. Clashing/competing duties

2. Not all universalisable maxims are moral nor non-uni, immoral

3. Foot: Morality is system of hypothetical imperatives not categorical

4. The view that consequences of action determine moral value

5. Kant ignores value of motives eg love, friendship, kindness

Clashing/competing duties

Kant does not offer much guidance when duties conflict giving utilitarians an advantage as you can simply apply the principle of utility when obligations compete.

Not all universalisable maxims are moral nor non-uni, immoral

"I will chew food 30 times before eating to aid digestion" is a universalisable maxim that isn't moral.

"When taking an exam i will always come top 50%, i will always help the poor when i can afford to, i will trick or treat but not myself leave out any sweets" all non-universalisable maxims which aren't immoral

Foot: Morality is system of hypothetical imperatives not categorical

Foot believes (unlike Kant) that with hypothetical imperatives: there is a clear reason to be

moral, whereas with categorical imperatives there is no clear reason to be moral (e.g. why is it wrong to steal?)

The view that consequences of action determine moral value

For example: A friend has asked if he can stay with you for a few days. On the first

night, a deranged-looking man with an axe knocks at the door and asks if your friend is

staying with you. Do you tell the truth?

Most people would have no hesitation in lying. This is because we place some moral value

in the consequences of an action.

Kant wants us to act as though everyone is moral and treats people as ends. However, in

the real world, people are not like that - there are axemen! Some argue that because

the world is not ideal, we need to look at consequences. Kant seems more concerned

with us being morally consistent, than whether someone is murdered by an axeman!

Kant ignores value of motives eg love, friendship, kindness

If a father looks after his son out of love, Kant thinks his actions do not have moral value. However, our intuition places moral value on love, compassion, guilt, sympathy, pride, jealousy

Aristotle Virtue Ethics

1. The good for human beings

2. Eudaimonia as final act

3. Function argument, relationship between virtues and function

4. Role of education/habituation with development of moral character

5. Skill analogy

6. Importance of feelings

7. Doctrine of the mean

8. Moral responsibility: voluntary, involuntary, non-voluntary actions

The good for human beings

P1: everything we do is aimed at some good

P2: each good is also done for the sake of a higher good

P3: This cannot go on forever (otherwise our aim would be pointless)

C: there must be an ultimate good, which everything we do is aimed at.

For Aristotle, this ultimate good for which humans aspire is eudaimonia

Eudaimonia as final act

The empirical approach:

Eudaimonia must be the 'final end' because everything else is flawed:

• Pleasure because this would make us just animals

• Wealth as this is just a means to an end

• Honour as this depends on other people's recognition

• Goodness as this is compatible with a life of suffering

Conceptual approach: the final end must be:

• An end, never a means to an end

• The 'most final' of final ends, for the sake of which everything is done

• Self-sufficient, so nothing could be added to it to make it even better

• The most desirable of all things

Eudaimonia meets all these criteria

Function argument, relationship between virtues and function

P1: Every type of person has a function in society and every part of the body has a

function

P2: Therefore, human beings must also have a function

P3: Our function cannot be growth/nutrition (shared with plants) or sentience (shared

with animals) as these are not distinctive to human beings

C1: Our function is to live guided by reason.

P4: X is good if it fulfills its function well

P5: X fulfils its function well if it has the right qualities (virtues)

P6: Therefore, a good human is someone with the right qualities (virtues) which enable

them to love guided well by reason

C2: Eudaimonia is reached by someone with the right virtues which enable them to be

guided well by reason

Role of education/habituation with development of moral character

• Virtue is not innate: we are not born with it.

• Humans have the potential to develop virtues over time: by learning them through

commitment, practice and habit.

• The use of reason is needed to develop the virtues

Skill analogy

• Aristotle compared developing a virtue to developing a skill.

• We are not born with a skill to play a musical instrument (e.g. a harp)

• We have the capacity to learn that skill

• We only learn the harp by first playing the harp

• Equally:

• We are not born with virtues (e.g. bravery)

• We have the capacity to learn the virtues

• We only learn virtues, such as bravery, by first performing brave acts

Importance of feelings

Aristotle gives a central place to feelings in his moral theory. All our actions are a

display of an emotion: desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, hatred, longing, pity

Virtue means expressing the appropriate amount of these feelings: neither too much

nor too little, but in the 'mean'. A virtuous person has no inner conflict: they don't have

to overcome their feelings in order to do the right thing

Doctrine of the mean

Virtue lies between displaying 'too much' and 'too little' of a particular feeling - this is

the doctrine of the mean. For example, displaying too much fear is cowardly; displaying

too little fear is rash. Reason helps us display the right amount of fear, which is to act

courageously

Moral responsibility: voluntary, involuntary, non-voluntary actions

Aristotle distinguishes between three different types of actions:

Voluntary actions

• Those that are fully intended

• The origin comes from within us.

Involuntary actions

• Acts done under compulsion (e.g. giving money to a burglar who is holding a gun to

your head.)

Non-voluntary actions

• Acts done from ignorance (e.g. buying a guitar online only to find out it was stolen).

Aristotle believed you were responsible for voluntary actions and you could not be held

responsible for involuntary actions. If there is regret after non-voluntary actions and

we wish we had acted differently, then the action was contrary to our intention. We

would still be responsible but we could be forgiven and pardoned. If there is no regret

and we would not have acted differently, then we should be judged and held fully

responsible as if this were a voluntary action

5 Issues w/ Aristotle's virtue ethics

1. Whether virtue ethics can give sufficiently clear guidance about how to act

2. Clashing/competing virtues

3. Whether a trait must contribute to eudaimonia to be a virtue

4. Possibility of circularity

5. Relationship between the good for the individual and moral good

Whether virtue ethics can give sufficiently clear guidance about how to act

Aristotle's ethics has no such clear rules about how to behave (unlike Mill or Kant)

Clashing/competing virtues

Someone who you love has a painful terminal illness and pleads with you to end their

life. The virtue of charity motivates you to help them towards euthanasia, the virtue

of justice forbids you from killing them. Aristotle had a hierarchy of virtues with

justice above charity

Whether a trait must contribute to Eudaimonia to be a virtue

In some horrific situations, following vices might be the right thing to do (in

concentration camps, theft, dishonesty and bribery were routinely the right thing to

do) So, traits can be virtues, but do not lead to eudemonia.

Possibility of circularity

The definition contains the term being defined:

A virtuous act is an act done by a virtuous person

A virtuous person is someone who habitually performs virtusou acts

Therefore, a virtuous act is an act done by someone who habitually performs virtuous

acts.

This circular definition does nothing to help explain the nature of virtuous acts or

people

Relationship between the good for the individual and moral good

Ethics is meant to be about helping others. Aristotle has told us how we can achieve

eudaimonia for ourselves! He hasn't said much about others. Some of Aristotle's

virtues benefit only the individuals possessing them, e.g. ambition, pride, being

aristocractic.

Applied Ethics (Aristotle)

1. Stealing

2. Telling lies

3. Eating animals

4. Simulated Killing

Stealing

Aristotle: morality is about finding the mean between excess and deficiency, judged case by case.

However, some actions like stealing are never virtuous because they violate justice, so there is no "mean" for them.

Modern virtue ethicists may be more flexible and allow context to matter, even if the action looks extreme.

Example: stealing to pay for medical treatment could express benevolence, but one act is not enough. What matters is character over time.

Virtues can conflict here: benevolence vs honesty vs consideration for others.

Partiality (favouring loved ones) is allowed, but may clash with wider justice.

Final point: a virtuous person should use practical wisdom to avoid needing to steal at all.

Telling lies

Aristotle treats truthfulness as a virtue, the mean between boasting and self-deprecation, mainly about honesty regarding ourselves.

• More broadly, honesty supports flourishing both individually (good character) and socially (trust, reliable communication, promise-keeping).

• Virtue is built through habitual, voluntary actions, so consistently telling the truth develops moral character.

• Dishonesty undermines this, as false beliefs distort judgement and make truly voluntary action harder.

• However, virtue ethics is not absolute. In some cases, lying is the right action.

• Using practical wisdom, a virtuous person may lie (e.g. to protect someone from harm), provided it does not become a habit.

Eating animals

Aristotle: moral decisions involve finding the mean case by case.

• But on animals, he is not flexible. Humans are rational, so higher in the natural hierarchy.

• Therefore, animals exist for human use, including food. Eating animals is acceptable.

• Modern virtue ethics revises this.

• Hursthouse: factory farming is cruel, showing lack of compassion and presence of greed.

• Therefore, eating factory-farmed meat expresses vice, not virtue.

• Key contrast:

• Aristotle justifies eating animals via natural hierarchy.

• Hursthouse focuses on character and treatment, condemning cruelty even if eating animals itself is not always wrong.

Simulated Killing

Aristotle: moral judgement is case-by-case, aiming at the mean.

• Simulated killing may not build courage, since real courage involves genuine risk (e.g. war). Activities like sport or martial arts may be better for developing virtue.

• However, Aristotle defends tragedy. Watching death on stage creates catharsis, a controlled release of emotion.

• This helps train us to feel the right emotions, at the right time, supporting moral development.

• Modern concern: violent video games.

• Some virtue ethicists argue repeated simulated killing can foster cruelty or callousness, shaping bad character.

• Unlike Kantian or utilitarian views, the issue is not consequences but character formation.

• Simulated killing can aid virtue if it educates emotions (Aristotle's tragedy).

• But if it habituates cruel attitudes, it moves away from virtue.

Moral anti realism 3 theories

1. Mackie Error Theory (cognitivist)

2. Ayer Emotivism (non-cognitivist)

3. Prescriptivism (non-cognitivist)

3 Issues with moral anti-realism

1. Whether anti-realism can account for use of moral language incl moral reasoning, persuading, disagreeing

2. Problem accounting for moral progress

3. Does anti-realism become moral nihilism

Moral Realism 4 Arg

1. Moral naturalism (cognitivist)

2. John Mackie argument from relativity

3. Moore's open question argument

4. Cognitivism Humes fork moral realism

1. Moral naturalism (cognitivist)

Naturalism is a type of moral realism that argues that moral properties/facts are natural

properties in the world. It leads to a cognitivist view of moral language since our ethical

judgements are true or false insofar as they correctly (or incorrectly) refer to those natural

properties in the world.

Utilitarianism: (Bentham): Utilitarianism defines good in terms of a natural property: pleasure.

Virtue Ethics: Aristotle does not reduce moral terms to naturalistic properties, but it is based

on natural facts.

• 'the Good' is the thing humans most value, and we can empirically determine this by looking at

what people strive for (i.e. they strive for eudaimonia). It is a natural fact about human

behaviour.

• 'the Good' can be determined by the kind of thing we are. He argues that to live a good life

as a human means fulfilling your function as a human (reason). Our function is a natural fact

about us.

2. John Mackie argument from relativity

P1: There are differences in moral codes from society to society

P2: Accompanying these radical differences are disagreements between people about

moral codes

P3 Moral disagreements may occur because:

There is an objective truth about the matter, but people's perceptions of it are

distorted

There is no objective truth about the matter

C: the best explanation of moral disagreements is that there are no objective moral

values.

3. Moore's open question argument

Moore's "open question argument" attempts to prove that moral properties cannot be

reduced to any non-moral properties, that they are their own unique sort of properties.

Moore's distinguishes between an open question and a closed question: a closed question

is a question whose answer is decided by the meanings of the concepts involved in the

question whereas an open question is a question whose answer cannot be decided in this

way.

P1: Naturalists claim 'good' = N (a natural property e.g. pleasure)

P2: Naturalists claims that if X is N then X is good

P3: To ask, is X really good should be a meaningless question

P4: However, to ask, is X really good is NOT a meaningless question. It is an open

question.

C1: X cannot be the same as Good

C2: Good cannot be the same as N and moral naturalism is false

4. Cognitivism Humes fork moral realism

P1: Moral realists are cognitivists who believe moral judgement can be true or false.

P2: There are two types of knowledge: relation of ideas and matters of fact.

P3: Moral judgements are not a relation of ideas because they are not tautologies

P4: Moral judgements are not matters of fact because there is no way to verify the

truth of moral judgements

C: Cognitivists are wrong to claim moral judgements can be true nor false

Issues with Moral realism

1. Hume: Moral judgements are not beliefs since beliefs alone could not motivate us

2. Realism Hume's is-ought gap

3. Realism AJ Ayer verification principle

4. Mackies argument from Queerness

5. Naturalistic Fallacy

6. Intuitionism

Hume: Moral judgements are not beliefs since beliefs alone could not motivate us

P1: Moral judgements, such as 'it is good to help other people', motivate us to act

P2: Beliefs and reason can never motivate us to act

C1: Moral judgements cannot be beliefs

C2: Moral judgements cannot be true or false as they are not beliefs (so cognitivism is wrong)

C3: Moral judgements (like desires) have their source inside us. They do not represent

something independent of us (so moral realism is incorrect)

Realism Hume's is-ought gap

P1: Judgements of reason describe what is the case

P2: Judgements of value describe what ought to be the case

P3: Judgement of reason and judgements of value are entirely different from each other -

there is a gap between 'is' and 'ought'

C: You cannot draw conclusions about value ('ought') based on premises about reason ('is') - you

cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.

This presents a problem for realism, as if moral judgements are mind-independent I should be

able to infer them from descriptive statements. As I cannot do this, moral realism is false.

Realism AJ Ayer verification principle

statement is meaningful (factually significant/truth-apt) if and only if either:

• it is an analytic statement (tautology) or,

• it can be empirically verified (it is factually meaningful) either in the sense that...

its truth could be conclusively empirically verified in practice (strong version)

its probable truth could be empirically verified in principle (weak version)

All moral judgements fail this criteria. Therefore, moral judgements are meaningless.

Mackies argument from Queerness

Accepting moral realism, involves too many strange implications

Realists have a strange ontology: moral facts or moral properties exist (somewhere)

Realists have a strange epistemology: We can detect these facts/properties

Moral values are strange: They make us act in certain ways. Other properties don't do this!

Naturalistic Fallacy

• Good is indefinable (it is simple and unanalysable)

• Moral naturalists attempt to define good in natural terms

• Naturalism is guilty of the naturalistic fallacy

Intuitionism

Moore maintains the 'autonomy of ethics' (i.e. ethical judgements are unique and cannot

be analysed in non-moral or natural terms). In his view:

• Good is indefinable

• There are objective moral truths

• We know these moral truths by intuition (This faculty is appealing to unique, nonnatural properties

Moral Anti-Realism 3 Arg

1. Mackie's Error theory (cognitivist)

2. Emotivism (non-cognitivist) - Ayer

3. Prescriptivism (non-cognitivist) - Richard Hare

1. Mackie's Error theory (cognitivist)

Mackie's ontological claim

Something is objective if one of these is true:

• Its either true or false

• Its about the world 'out there'

• It describes something that is mind independent

Moral judgements do not fulfil these criteria, so they are not objective

Mackie's semantic claim

Mackie believes we have made an error:

It is not a linguistic error - we are not misusing language

It is an error that occurs from internalising cultural values as if they are out there in the

world.

We are brought up to believe that moral rules are objective In fact, for the rules to have

any authority we have to believe that they are absolute and objective

So, moral values are subjective (anti-realist), but when we use language about morality we

are making a truth claim - claiming to be objective (cognitivist)

2. Emotivism (non-cognitivist) - Ayer

Moral terms are expressions of emotions, like saying 'boo' (at things we do not like) and

'hooray' (at things we do like)

Emotivists regard moral judgements as expressive rather than descriptive. These

judgements do not point us to facts, but they influence our behaviour by conveying

strong feelings of approval or disapproval

3. Prescriptivism (non-cognitivist) - Richard Hare

Hare thinks Moore's open question argument is correct in demonstrating that moral

terms like 'good' cannot be defined in naturalistic terms. However, he disagrees with

Moore in concluding that, therefore, moral terms describe a non-natural, moral

property.

Hare argues that moral judgements:

• are not propositions (making claims about the world) but prescriptions, so terms like

'good' or 'right' are used to recommend and guide action.

• Contain prescriptions that are universalisable

• Are rational, in that:

• We can ask and answer questions about moral conduct

• We can look for facts that support our moral judgements

• We can aim for consistency in our moral judgements

• We can highlight logical contradictions in the moral judgements of others.

3 Issues with moral anti-realism

Issue 1: whether anti-realism can account for how we use moral language, including

moral reasoning, persuading, disagreeing etc.

Issue 2: Problem of accounting for moral progress

Issue 3: Does anti-realism become moral nihilism?

Issue 1: whether anti-realism can account for how we use moral language

We use moral language every day - it plays a critical role in our personal relationships,

communities, education system etc. Its uses include moral reasoning and decision

making; commanding, telling and guiding; disagreeing and arguing; persuading and

influencing action.

A moral realist and cognitivist can account for these uses because there are moral

facts about which they are disagreeing, reasoning etc. But anti-realists who are noncognitivists struggle to account for these uses

Emotivism can only account for how moral judgements are used in persuading

It cannot account for moral judgements in commanding and guiding, disagreeing and

agreeing

Prescriptivism: Warnock points out that morality is not always concerned with

prescribing - it is also about advising, confessing, resolving

Issue 2: Problem of accounting for moral progress

An anti-realist cannot say there has been moral progress because there is no objective

standard we can use to assess whether or not our moral code is an improvement

Issue 3: Does anti-realism become moral nihilism?

It could lead to moral nihilism in this way:

P1: There are no objective, mind-independent moral facts or properties (moral antirealism)

P2: If there are no objective moral facts then there is nothing that is morally wrong

C: If there is nothing that is morally wrong then we can do anything we like (moral

nihilism