Criminal Law Case Reference

R v Hill & Baxter

D drove past a sign saying halt causing his van to crash into another car. D argued the monotonous road had caused him to become an automaton incapable of making voluntary decisions. The judge rejected this as there was no real evidence instead giving the examples of a swarm of bees attacking the driver or the driver having a heart attack as what true involuntary acts would look like.

R v Larsonneur

Case of state of affairs action. D was deported from England and attempted to enter Ireland but was turned back and returned to England despite arguing she could not return. Upon arrival she was arrested for illegal immigration. It did not matter it was all against her will the crime had nonetheless been committed.

R v Pitwood (1902)

D was employed to open and close the gates to a level crossing. One day he failed in his contractual duty to do so and a person tried to cross and was killed. As the omission to perform his duty directly led to this death he was liable for manslaughter.

R v Gibbons and Procter

Ds were the father and mistress of a small child. They failed to feed this child they had a duty of care to via relationship and V died of starvation. Both were liable for murder.

Dytham

D was an on duty, uniformed officer. While working he witnessed V being attacked outside a night club, but he chose not to intervene even though he was required to due to his official position and V died. The failure to perform his duty was a criminal offence in this instance.

R v Stone and Dobinson

Stone’s elderly sister came to live with them under the pretense of receiving care from Stone but Dobinson also helped out. Over time they gave up and without care V fell ill and died. Stone was liable due to the relationship, but as Dobinson had also provided care they had voluntarily taken on a duty of care for V which they had failed to fulfill so they were also liable.

R v Mitchell

D pushed an old man in the queue for the post office and he fell onto a very old woman breaking her leg. Complications due to her age meant V died from the injury. The old man was not to blame as his actions were not voluntary as he fell from the push of D. By this reasoning D is liable for murder in this situation.

R v Miller

D, a squatter, fell asleep in a building with a lit cigarette. He awoke to the mattress ablaze but simply moved rooms and fell asleep again. He awoke soon after to the whole building ablaze. His failure to deal with the chain of events put in place by him made him liable for the resulting arson.

R v White

D put poison in his mother’s drink as she went to bed. She took a few sips and they fell asleep. While sleeping she died from a heart attack completely independent from the poison. Factual causation here suggests ‘but for’ the poisoning V would still have died so D cannot be liable for murder instead liable for attempted murder.

R v Blaue

Example of the thin skull rule. D stabbed V causing them to lose a lot of blood. D was a devout Jehovah’s witness so refused a life saving blood transfusion and they died. The application of the rule meant that D could not argue he was not aware of her issue and that he only meant to harm V. Instead D was liable for murder.

R v Smith 1959

D stabbed V in the barracks of their army base. V was then stretchered to the medical tent but dropped on the way there. Once at the tent V received improper treatment and V promptly died. It was estimated with proper treatment V would have had a 75% chance of survival. D was still liable in this situation as the stabbing was the main cause for V’s death and the medical failures only a minor cause.

R v Jordan 1956

V was stabbed and taken to hospital. Their wounds were healing well when V was given a large dose of an antibiotic they were allergic to by an incompetent doctor causing V to die. In this situation the medical failure was the main reason and the stab the minor reason for V’s death therefore the chain of causation was broken by 3rd party influence and D was only liable for the stab not the death.

Airdale NHS Trust v Bland 1993

Bland was a victim of the Hillsborough disaster and was only alive due to life support machines and was irreversibly braindead so the family successfully applied for the plug to be pulled. This case set the precedent that removing life support does not break the chain of causation and the disaster would still be their cause of death.

R v Roberts compared to R v Williams

In Roberts V jumped from a moving car to avoid sexual assault and was injured. It was judged this was proportionate and D was liable for these injuries. In Williams, V was a hitchhiker picked up by D to go to Glastonbury. D asked V for money in exchange for the ride but V only wanted to give him weed for the help. D then tried to take some money at which point V jumped from the moving car and died. This was not judged to be proportionate and D could not be liable because of this.

R v Evans

A 16 year old was returned from rehab to her home with her mother and older half sister. The half sister bought the 16 year old some heroin which she injected herself. When it became obvious she was suffering an overdose they did not get her help and put her to bed where she died. The mother owed a duty as it was her child and the half-sister owed a duty as she had voluntarily involved herself in a situation she knew was life threatening so therefore owed a duty.

R v Pagett

D kidnapped his pregnant girlfriend and used her as a shield in a shootout with armed police. She was hit by police fire and killed and D was convicted of her manslaughter as but for his choice to use her as a shield she would not have gotten killed.

R v Cheshire

D shot V in the thigh and stomach. V was given a tracheotomy to support his breathing in hospital. He later died from complications with the tracheotomy in hospital by which time his wounds had started healing to the point they were no longer life threatening. This did not break the chain and D was still liable for murder.

R v Mohan

D refused to stop for a policeman instead he drove right at him showing a direct intention to scare him. This is the case to use to establish direct intent.

R v Woolin

D lost his temper and threw his baby towards his pram but it hit the wall behind it and died. The fact that throwing a baby against a wall had a virtual certainty of causing it serious harm meant intent could be proven.

R v Matthews and Alleyne

Two defendants pushed a victim in a river even though they knew he could not swim. His death by drowning was a virtual certainty from which intent could be established.

R v Cunnigham

The case that established the test for recklessness intent. For something to be reckless it needs to be an unjustified risk. D must have recognised the presence of this risk and still decided to take it. In this case this couldn’t established but the principle was set.

R v Latimer

D tried to attack a man in the pub with his belt buckle but it bounced off and hit a woman in the face. The MR transferred as he intended to hit someone and did hit someone, it just wasn’t the exact person he intended.

R v Pembliton

D had been fighting a group and threw a stone at the group but missed and broke a window. This was criminal damage which D did not have the mens rea for so he could not be held liable for as the malice did not transfer.

Fagan v MPC

D drove over a police officers foot by accident but refused to move when told to and swore at the officer. While he had no MR originally the act continued and during that time he acquired the MR for it to become an offence.

R v Church

D knocked V unconscious during sex. He believed he had killed her so put her body in a nearby river. When she was found it was discovered she drowned and was still alive when he put her in there. This was a series of events and he was convicted of manslaughter.

Pharmaceutical Society v Storkwain Ltd

The pharmacist had supplied drugs on a prescription that alter turned out to be forged. The forgery was indistinguishable from a real one and the pharmacist had no mens rea to illegally supply drugs whether directly or negligently. The fact this was a strict liability crime meant the mens rea was irrelevant and D was liable.

Callow v Tillstone

A butcher asked a vet to assess some meat to see if it was fit for human consumption. The vet assured him it was but it was, in fact, not. The butcher was still liable for selling unsound meat as it is a strict liability offence.

Harrow LBC v Shah

D owned a shop that sold lottery tickets. He told his workers never to sell them to persons under 16. One of them sold a ticket to a 13 year old without asking for proof of age. D was convicted of selling the tickets to underage persons despite their best efforts.

Cundy v Le Cocq

D had sold a man a drink without realising he was already intoxicated. The man had shown no signs of his intoxication but proof of sale and that he was too drunk alone convicted D.

Sweet v Parsley

Here the D had let a farmhouse to teenagers who then used it to smoke weed. The legislation did not explicitly mention mens rea but the courts chose to presume that unless it was specifically detailed mens reas should not be considered that it will be.

Purpose of strict liability

It’s aim is to keep standards high in areas like food and alcohol distribution by not giving any weight to the mens rea of the offence. Even if the defendant is not at fault, this can be applied. There is also no defence of making a mistake here also intended to keep standards high and uniform to promote greater vigilance.

Gammon v AG of Honk Kong

Issues with building regulation are of social concern and therefore more likely to come under strict liability. The knowledge the defendants had when breaking the law is irrelevant as it is a strict liability offence.

R v White (1910)

– D had put poison in his mothers drink and she had a few sips before going to sleep where she would die. It was found after examination she had actually died of a heart attack not from the poison. The defendant also testified he was going to use multiple doses to kill her and only one wouldn’t be enough. The but for test was used and established that he was guilty of attempted murder not murder as but for his actions his mother still would have had the heart attack and died.

R v Pagett (1983)

the defendant had kidnapped his girlfriend and her family. He was pursued by police and he used a shotgun he brought and shot at a police officer before grabbing a his pregnant girlfriend to act as a human shield. Returning fire from the officers killed the woman. D was found guilty of manslaughter and appealed the conviction on the base he hadn’t killed her. The conviction was upheld as it was clear by firing at the officer and kidnapping the girl he had set about a dangerous chain of events.

R v Hughes (2013)

D was driving his campervan perfectly down a road. Round a corner came a drover swerving on the road who hit him and died. This driver was found to be on heroin and that caused the swerving and speed. D had no licence or insurance and was found guilty of death by driving without a licence and he was convicted using the ‘but for’ test. This was appealed all the way to the supreme court and legal causation was used instead to show the event was not caused by D and so he could not be guilty of causing death. This set the precedent that D’s acts must substantially cause the consequence for them to be liable.

R v Hennigan (1971)

D charged with death my dangerous driving for hitting a car while speeding. The other car was across in D’s lane trying to turn when it was hit. It was decided that because D was speeding their action was the most substantial cause so they were legally liable.

R v Inglis

Case on MR of murder. D’s son was in a coma but seemed likely to recover however D decided he was in a world of hurt and she had to put him out of his misery so she gave him a lethal dose of heroin. She intended to kill him and there was no defence for euthanasia. Also established ‘malice aforethought’ does not require any ill will towards the victim.

R v Vickers

Case established that intent to cause GBH that leads to murder is still sufficient MR for murder. D broke into a sweet shop of an old, disabled lady and attacked her and she died. It also established that where hurt is made worse by the fragility of the victim the assailant is liable for those injuries even when exacerbated by V’s condition.

R v Blaue

Established the thin skull rule. D stabbed V who then refused to take blood due to their religion and they died. D was still liable for murder on the basis of ‘take your victim as you find them’.

R v Poulton 1832

D strangled her baby while it was still connected to her by the umbilical cord. As it was still connected and not operating independently the baby was judged not to be a reasonable person in being and V was acquitted.

AG’s reference No.3 of 1994

D stabbed his girlfriend causing her to prematurely give birth to their baby and the fetus died. It was ruled the fetus could not be considered a reasonable person in being so it couldn’t be considered a murder victim. If a child is injured by an act or omission, but then born alive and then dies they can be considered a reasonable person in being.

R v Malcherek

Established that removing life support does not break the chain of causation. D stabbed V and she received medical help but then suffered a blood clot and her heart stopped for 30 minutes. When she was revived her brain stem had lost all activity and she was taken off life support after 1 day. D was still liable and convicted of murder.

R v Blackwell

D was at war in Afghanistan so could kill but he executed a man illegally. This defined ‘under the King’s peace’ as any time outside or war and if in war within the rules of wartime.

R v Woolin

D threw his baby across a room into his pram that was up against a brick wall and the baby was killed. The jury had to decide both whether there was a clear and obvious risk and if D recognised that risk and acted anyway. D was convicted of murder with oblique intent.

R v Moloney

D accidentally shot his step father while they were both drunk not believing the gun was pointed at V. At first this was directed as oblique intent but on appeal the conviction was downgraded to manslaughter as the MR was missing entirely.

R v Mohan

Defines direct intent as D was told to slow his car down by an officer and he then sped up directly intending to scare or even hit the officer.

R v Gibbons and Procter

Ds failed to feed their 7 year old child. This omission was enough of an act to satisfy the ‘killed’ element of murder.

Year and a day rule

There is no time limit on how long there can be between the act and the consequence of death for it to be prosecuted. However, any time over 3 years requires the attorney general’s consent to be prosecuted.

R v Conroy (2017)

D had strangled and killed the victim which was not argued in court. Instead his condition of aspergers syndrome was argued to have impaired his decision making ability and recognition of normal behaviour. D and V both lived in a special condition house in Bristol to support them as they both had learning disabilities. D had become obsessed and had broken into her room and strangled her in order to take her to his room to rape her but he dropped her body alerting staff. By the time medical teams arrived the victim was dead. D was found guilty of diminished responsibility voluntary manslaughter establishing autism as a sufficient abnormality of mind.

R v Byrne (1960)

the defendant was a sexual psychopath who murdered a young girl in a YMCA hostel. He then mutilated her body. He did so as he was suffering from irresistible impulses which he was unable to control due to his medical condition. This was held to be an abnormality of mental function and he was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter instead of murder. Defined abnormality of mind as ‘a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human beings the reasonable man would term it abnormal’

R v Gittens (1984)

D had severe depression and took sleeping pills and drank alcohol before murdering his wife and raping and killing his daughter which he blamed on his state of mind. Depression and the intoxication was accepted as a abnormality of mind and he was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter.

R v Gray (2003)

D had been thrown from a window in a train crash and had been diagnosed with PTSD afterwards. The victim was drunk and had been banging on his window which may have triggered his abnormality. D punched the victim before driving to get a knife and stabbing his 7 times. At trial diminished responsibility ws pleaded and he was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. As a result PTSD became an accepted abnormality of mind sufficient to diminished responsibility.

R v Ahluwalia

D was in an arranged marriage where her husband had been abusive and that night had threatened to beat her with an iron. As he slept D poured caustic soda and petrol on him- creating napalm- then set him on fire killing six days later. At her first trial she argued provocation and was found guilty of murder. At appeal she raised diminished responsibility and was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Domestic abuse or battered women syndrome was now a useable defence.

R v Campbell (1997)

D picked up a hitchhiker and made sexual advances towards her. She hit him in the eye and he hit her in the throat which made her gargle blood. In a panic he strangled her then beat her to death. At first he was found guilty of murder with rejected provocation. D appealed this as he had frontal lobe damage and seizures and medical understanding around these had improved. As a result seizures were accepted as diminished responsibility as they impaired decision making and the ability to understand circumstances and surroundings.

R v Squelch (2017)

At trial it wasn’t argued D had not stabbed the victim  14 times for insulting his dead mother at their place of occupation. Instead D’s paranoid personality disorder was argued to have established an abnormality of mind substantial enough to reduce the crime to voluntary manslaughter under diminished responsibility. The jury found D’s disorder to be insufficiently substantial to reduce the severity of this crime and this was upheld at appeal. This established a high burden of proof that required a number of doctors to ensure the mind of the defendant was sufficiently abnormal to allow such a horrific crime.

R v Ward (2012)

In a bar altercation Ward attacked and killed another man with a weapon after he had threatened both him and his brother. At trial Ward used the recently implemented special defence of loss of control to argue that he feared for the life of his brother and acted to defend him. The jury agreed this was reasonable and he was acquitted.

R v Jewell (2014)

D went to his colleagues house under the pretence of a lift but whipped out a loaded shotgun and shot the victim at point blank range. D was later discovered with camping gear and passports. At trial he attempted to argue stress, depression and lack of sleep had accumulated along with perceived threats from the victim and he had suddenly snapped. The trial judge ruled not to present this to jury due to lack of evidence he had suddenly snaped including the escape, shotgun, and gear. This set a precedent that a high level of evidence is needed to prove loss of control.

R v Bowyer (2013)

D broke into the victims house who he had a dispute with over a woman. D was confronted by the victim who taunted him about this woman to the point that D assaulted him leaving him fatally wounded. At trial he attempted to argue he had lost control but the jury found the taunting was not sufficiently triggering for the response. D was found guilty of murder. This set a precedent that proportion is considered in loss of control cases. The court also decide D had wronged the victim in burgling his house and the victim could use all force or insults to eject him from his house.

R v Dawes (2013)

D returned to find his wife with another man. D flew into a rage and killed the man. Loss of control was argued at trial where it was found by the court that it was incorrect to blame the victims for the defendants actions and that an affair could not be used as a special defence. This precedent was argued at appeal but the conviction was upheld and D was found guilty of murder.

R v Zebedee (2012)

D had been looking after his 94 year old incontinent father when his soiling got too much and D murdered him. He attempted to argue that there was a loss of control but both crown and appeal courts decided that personal did not amount to enough and loss of control only applied to severe cases of provocation. D was libel for murder.

R v Christian (2018)

D fatally stabbed two people in their shared accommodation over the heat of the shower water. Despite the presence of a loss of control and qualifying trigger the judge ruled the response to a minor inconvenience was so incredibly disproportionate loss of control could not be given to the jury to consider.

Statute for VM

• Diminished responsibility - set out in section 2 of the homicide act and amended in section 52 of the Coroners and Justice act 2009

• Loss of control - set out in s54 of the Coroners and Justice act 2009

Elements of loss of control

1. D’s acts and omissions involved in the killing must have resulted from a loss of control

2. the loss of control must have had a qualifying trigger

3. a person of the same age, sex, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of the defendant, might have reacted in the same or a similar way

Element 1: Loss of control

The loss of control does not have to be sudden but it does have to be a total loss of control. Whether they lost control is subjective to the jury but it does have to be based on something extremely grave and D must have really ‘lost it’.

Element 2: Qualifying trigger

• Fear of violence against themselves or another identified person. It cannot be a fear of general violence and D cannot have insighted the violence.

• Things done or said that were extremely grave in character and caused D to have a justifiable sense of being wronged. This is an objective test based on a reasonable person. Sexual infidelity cannot be a trigger. The only factors considered are age, sex, and possibly mental illness or a history of sexual abuse.

Rules for voluntary intoxication and defendants circumstances

R v Asmelash confirmed that intoxication cannot be considered for voluntary manslaughter. However, if a sober person would have acted the same way it still applies. Also if D was being taunted about an addiction that can constitute a trigger

R v Clinton

D lost control and killed his wife. He suffered depression and took medication. She had taunted him about her sexual infidelity, suicide websites he had been on and told him she no longer wanted their children. While this case confirmed sexual infidelity alone cannot be a trigger, it was decided that it can be if it forms an integral part of a wider qualifying trigger. The issue of loss of control was therefore put to the jury.

R v Rejmanski

D lost control after being taunted about his service in Afghanistan. He suffered PTSD from that service. His condition was excluded from the judge’s description of the hypothetical normal person but he was right to direct the jury to consider D’s army experiences when considering the qualifying trigger.

Elements of diminished responsibility

1. D was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning which arose from a recognised medical condition

2. substantially impaired D’s ability to make rational judgement or understand the nature of their actions or exercise self control

3. which provides an explanation for the defendants acts or omissions party to the killing

Four stage test for dimished responsibilty

1. Whether D was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning

2. If so whether it arose from a recognised medical condition

3. if so whether it impaired their ability to make rational judgement or understand the nature of their actions or exercise self control

4. If so whether it provided an explanation for their conduct

R v Golds

D killed his wife and admitted the killing. The medical evidence satisfied he had a abnormality arising from a medical condition. The issue was whether he was in a psychotic state when he killed her. The judge directed that while an impairment must be more than trivial, it is not the case that any impairment that is more than trivial will suffice.

R v Dowds

D and V had got very drunk. D then stabbed her 60 times in this state. He appealed his murder conviction on the ground acute intoxication should have allowed the jury to consider diminished responsibility. This was rejected as voluntary acute intoxication does not arise from a medical condition.

R v Dietschmann

D was suffering from an adjustment order after his aunt died and killed V for ‘disrespecting her memory’ while heavily intoxicated. It was found this disorder was sufficient for diminished responsibility even when disregarding the intoxication.

R v Kay

D suffered from schizophrenia and had a history of substance abuse. During a three day bender he suffered a psychotic break and murdered a stranger in the street in a brutal attack. The courts did not accept diminished responsibility as D was aware of the risk of substance abuse with his condition and still ran it. It was also accepted that without the bender the schizophrenia alone would not have caused the break.

R v Tandy

D suffered from Alcohol Dependence Syndrome. One day while drinking she strangled her daughter to death. The judge instructed the jury to consider whether the ADS was the abnormality or if she was just drunk. She was convicted. For ADS to be enough it must have caused brain damage or proved that it caused D to become involuntarily intoxicated.

R v Stewart criteria for ADS as an abnormality

1. ADS alone does not automatically amount to an abnormality. The nature and extent have to be considered too

2. Was the defendants abnormality caused by the ADS

3. If so, was the defendants mental responsibility substantially impaired. This is based on medical evidence around the extent and seriousness of the dependence.

R v Jones

The defendant purchased a shotgun and saw off the barrel before confronting the victim in a car. He pulled the trigger, but the safety was still on so it did not fire, the court ruled these were more than merely preparatory acts . This case set a precedent on when a defendant’s actions move beyond preparation

R v Tosti

The defendants examined a lock on a barn they intended to rob but had not yet intended to break. The court ruled these actions were preparatory, as they had not yet attempted to commit burglary.

AG’s reference No.1 of 1992

This case involved an attempted rape where he assaulted the victim ,but failed to make any attempt to penetrate as he couldn’t get an erection. This was ruled to be more than merely preparatory as he exposed himself and assaulted her.

R v Geddes

D broke into a school and was discovered in the boys toilet with tape and rope. Despite this, his actions were to be ruled as merely preparatory and not an attempt.

DPP v Stonehouse

D was a British politician. He faked his own death to escape financial problems and possibly a forced espionage arrangement. He was found a month later living in Australia under a pseudonym. He was charged and convicted with attempted fraud as he had taken out a life insurance policy just before doing it. To be more than merely preparatory the defendant must have ‘ crossed the Rubicon and burnt his boats’ – taken an irrevocable step.

R v Husseyn

D and another man were loitering by a van full of scuba equipment. When police approached to question them they ran off. They could not be charged with attempted robbery as their intention could not be proved. Conditional intent is insufficient. Attempt also has to be intent not recklessness

R v Easom

D rummaged through a handbag, but found nothing worth stealing and put it back. In this case the intention was enough as if there was something worth stealing D would have taken it.

R v Whybrow

D had met a younger woman and tried to kill his wife. He put wires leading into the bath and when his wife got she got a minor shock and called the police. Only direct intent will suffice and it was clear in this case his intention had been to shock her to death in the bath tub.

R v Shivpuri

D was convicted of drug carrying offences. D was carrying what he though was heroin, but it was actual vegetable powder. D argued the crime was impossible as he hadn’t actually got any drugs. As he had the intent to smuggle class A drugs into the country he was still found guilty of attempted drug smuggling.

R v Gullefer

D jumped onto a greyhound race track in order to have the result declared void so his bet would be cancelled. His conviction was quashed as his actions were merely preparatory.

R v Campbell

D had an imitation gun, sunglasses, and a threatening note. He was arrested and admitted he was planning to rob the post office but his conviction was quashed as this was still merely preparatory.

R v Boyle

D was found by a door having broken the lock. It was ruled that gaining entry was embarking on the crime proper and breaking the lock was part of that.

R v Millard and Vernon

Ds pushed against a wooden fence at a football ground. They were accused of attempted criminal damage as they may have been trying to break it down but recklessness was insufficient mens rea for an attempt.

AG’s ref (No.3 of 1992)

D threw a petrol bomb at a car with 4 people in it but missed. He was convicted on attempted damage to property and attempt to endanger life. The first charge had clear mens rea but the second charge could rely on recklessness because of the first charge.

Anderton v Ryan

D bought a cheap video camera believing the cheap price was because it had been stolen. She admitted this to police that searched her house for a different reason. Her conviction was quashed as the camera was not stolen so no crime was present even if she thought there was.

Moriarty v Brookes 1834

The victim kept stealing drinks for the defendants pub. In retaliation D grabbed V and punched him in the face causing a cut under his eye that led to bleeding. This helped to clarify wounding as the continuity of the skin was broken.

JCC v Eisenhower (1984)

Two 15 year olds bought an air rifle that fired metal bullets and used it to fire at a crows of people. V was hit in the eye which caused a blood vessel to break and swelling in the eye but not break in the skin. The court ruled a break in both layers of the skin was required for wounding and this hadn’t been fulfilled.

DPP v Smith (1961)

D was escaping police custody in is car when an officer jumped on the bonnet of his car and held on as he drove. He began to zigzag to throw the officer off and succeeded in doing so throwing him into the oncoming traffic and killing him. This led to Grievous being defined as serious not really serious being intended.

R v Saunders (1985)

V was waiting to be picked up when D cam up to him and said I’ll give you a problem and punched him in the face. At trial grievous was once again defined as only serious allowing GBH to include punches in the face.

R v Bollom

D was the step father of a 17 month baby and he was particularly rough with her by shooting her with a toy gun and throwing pillows at her. One day the parents were drinking and the mum goes downstairs. While she’s gone she hears a loud thud upstairs. The next day bruising is discovered on the child. At trial D was charged with GBH because although the harm wouldn’t be serious to an adult in cases with a more fragile person that is considered to make minor injuries more serious as damage done to children or the elderly is worse.

R v Burstow (1997)

D went on four days with V when she said it wasn’t going to work. He then began a campaign of stalking and sending letters to her over a period of 8 months. As a result she was diagnosed with a severe psychological illness which was judged to be sufficient for GBH meaning Bodily includes physical and mental damage.

R v Dica (2004)

D had been diagnosed with AIDS. After this he slept with two women and intentionally made them not use contraception and never told them he had AIDS. At trial this was agreed to be GBH for intentionally spreading STI’s without consent from the victim.

R v Brown & Statton (1997)

The two defendants were cousin and the victim was Stratton’s father. The father had been undergoing gender reassignment surgery and embarrassed them when he came to their workplace wearing a dress. In retaliation Ds got drunk went to V’s house and beat her up. Although none of the injuries alone were Gbh there is a cumulative affect in GBH meaning they add up to GBH. This goes on the principle of would the victim call the injuries serious.

R v Parmenter

Clarified MR of GBH. D had little idea of what to do with his 3 month old baby. He was playing catch with the child as he had with others but the baby was too young and he was throwing it too high leading to damage to its bones. This clarified that the MR for section 20 GBH is that D needs to foresee some harm, not serious harm. D was found not guilty as he foresaw no harm. This is the difference between s20 and s18 GBH