Europe in a global order concepts

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Last updated 10:00 AM on 6/4/26
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55 Terms

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International Order (Lawson 2023)

Regularised practices of exchange among discrete political units that recognise each other as independent. Includes both material elements (territory, infrastructure) and ideational elements (norms, international law).

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Bull's Concept of Order (1977)

A pattern of activity sustaining the primary goals of the society of states: life (security), truth (keeping promises), and property (stable possessions). Order can exist without a hegemon, formal rules, or shared values.

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Post-WWII Liberal International Order

The order established after 1945, centred on multilateral institutions (UN, IMF, World Bank, GATT/WTO), international law, and Western liberal norms. Increasingly challenged by China, Russia, and internal Western populism.

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Power Transition Theory (Organski 1958)

A rising state will challenge the hegemon when: (1) its growth rate exceeds the hegemon's (2) it approaches power parity (~80% of hegemon + allies) (3) it is dissatisfied with the existing order.

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Three Collapsing Orders (Kefferputz 2025)

Europe faces collapse of (1) the geopolitical order (NATO crisis, Ukraine, US withdrawal) (2) the economic order (protectionism, trade wars) (3) the democratic order (backsliding, populism). Points towards a possible 'Pax Europaea'.

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Weaponised Interdependence

The use of economic ties (trade, technology, financial flows) as geopolitical leverage to coerce other states. Key dynamic in the US-China tech war and Russia's energy dependency on Europe.

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Westphalian Sovereignty

The principle of state sovereignty and non-interference originating (mythologically) from the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Contested as a foundational starting point ” many scholars argue it is a myth.

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Capabilities-Expectations Gap (Hill 1993)

The gap between the high expectations raised by the EU as a global actor and its actual capacity to shape outcomes. First exposed during the Yugoslav Wars (1991-1995), when EU-CFSP failed. Remains relevant today.

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Normative Power Europe (Manners 2002)

The idea that the EU exercises global influence primarily through norms and values (democracy, rule of law, human rights), not military power. Increasingly questioned as the EU 'geopoliticises'.

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Civilian Power Europe

The concept that the EU wields influence through non-military means: trade, diplomacy, development aid, and conditionality. Kagan (2003) critiqued this as weakness, dependent on US military protection.

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De-centering Europe

A postcolonial critique that asks analysts to move away from a Eurocentric perspective: to recognise that Europe's 'universal' norms are particular, and that non-Western actors have their own agency and perspectives.

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Eurocentrism

The sensibility that Europe is historically, economically, culturally and politically distinctive ” often treated as the norm against which others are measured (Sabaratnam 2013).

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Orientalism (Said 1978)

A deliberate strategy by which the 'East' is socially constructed and reproduced as exotic, backward, conflictual and dangerous. Relevant to understanding EU policy toward the Middle East (e.g. Borrell's 'garden vs jungle' metaphor).

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Geopoliticisation of the EU

The shift in the EU's self-understanding from a normative/civilian power to a geopolitical actor willing to use hard power instruments. Reflected in the Strategic Compass (2022) and Rearm Europe (2025).

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CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy)

The EU's overarching foreign policy framework, established by the Maastricht Treaty (1993). Strongly intergovernmental: the High Representative lacks enforcement power, decisions require unanimity. Developed further by the Lisbon Treaty (2007).

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CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy)

A sub-domain of CFSP covering both military and civilian crisis management. Dependent on voluntary contributions from member states. Established after Saint-Malo (1998), formalised in the Lisbon Treaty.

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PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation)

A framework within CSDP for member states willing and able to engage in deeper defence cooperation. Voluntary but binding commitments. Strengths: flexibility. Weaknesses: limited binding force, duplicates NATO.

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EDA (European Defence Agency)

The EU agency tasked with fostering joint procurement, R&D, and capability development in European defence. Addresses the fragmentation of the European defence industry.

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Strategic Compass (2022)

The EU's first comprehensive security strategy. Characterises the EU as a regional (not global) power. Goals include a 5,000-strong Rapid Deployment Capacity by 2025. More a proposal than a binding document.

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Rearm Europe (2025)

An EUR 800 billion EU initiative to boost European defence spending. A major shift in EU defence policy in response to US de-prioritisation of Europe and continued Russian aggression.

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Albright's 3 D's (1998)

US conditions for EU defence cooperation: No Duplication (no parallel NATO structures), No Discrimination (no exclusion of non-EU NATO members), No Decoupling (no separation from the US). Increasingly abandoned since Obama.

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Strategic Cacophony (Meijer & Brooks 2021)

Diverging threat perceptions between European states (e.g. terrorism vs Russian tanks) that hamper joint European defence. Combined with defence capability shortfalls, the two constraints reinforce each other.

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Historical Taboo (CSDP)

Europe's post-WWII anti-militarist culture that has historically constrained defence cooperation. Partly broken by Russia's invasion of Ukraine (Zeitenwende), but NATO remains the central framework.

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Zeitenwende

German for 'turning point in time'. Germany's 2022 reversal of its post-WWII strategic culture: commitment to defence spending above 2% GDP and supply of weapons to Ukraine, in response to Russia's invasion.

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EU Battlegroups

Standing multinational military units (~1,500 troops) created in 2004 to give the EU a rapid reaction capacity. Limited in scale. Notably: they have never been deployed, illustrating the gap between EU defence ambitions and reality.

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Copenhagen Criteria

The conditions a state must meet to join the EU: (1) stable democracy + rule of law, (2) functioning market economy (3) capacity to take on the acquis communautaire. Used in enlargement policy, including for Ukraine.

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ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy)

EU policy offering partnership and conditionality to neighbouring states without a membership perspective. Described as a 'ring of friends' that became a 'ring of fire' ” neighbours in conflict (Ukraine, Libya, Syria).

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Liminal State (Bossuyt 2024)

Ukraine as a state that claims agency and identity (democratic defender) at a geopolitical crossroads. Critiques the realist 'buffer state' framing and recognises Ukraine's own role in shaping the conflict's meaning.

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EU-China Triple Identity (EU 2019)

The EU officially describes China as simultaneously: a cooperation partner (trade, climate), an economic competitor (technology, market access), and a systemic rival (values, governance model).

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Power-Based vs Transformational Logic (Keukeleire & Yang)

Two ways of understanding EU-China relations: (1) realist/power-based: relative gains, security implications of trade (2) liberal/transformational: institutionalisation builds trust. The EU attempts both, creating tensions.

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Imaginary China (Breslin 2011)

Western narratives extrapolate current Chinese growth into a future 'China' that does not yet exist, shaping EU and US policy beyond actual capabilities. A warning against threat inflation.

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De-risking vs De-coupling

De-risking: reducing strategic vulnerabilities in critical sectors without severing all economic ties (EU official position). De-coupling: complete separation of supply chains (closer to US approach in semiconductors and AI).

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Wedging & Binding (Zaccagnini & Calcara 2025)

How external powers (China, US) try to influence European states: wedging = driving divisions, binding = creating dependency. Vulnerability depends on (1) economic cohesion and (2) political cohesion at the state level.

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Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

China's infrastructure investment programme spanning Asia, Africa, and Europe. Creates economic interdependence and potential strategic leverage. Raises EU concerns about strategic dependence.

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Technological Sovereignty

The EU's ambition to reduce strategic dependence on non-EU technology providers (US, China) and build autonomous capacity across the digital value chain. Expanded from defence (2016) to tech/digital after COVID and Russia invasion.

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Brussels Effect (Bradford)

The phenomenon whereby EU regulations become de facto global standards, because multinational companies find it efficient to apply the strictest standard worldwide. Gives the EU structural power through regulation.

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EU Chips Act (2023)

EUR 43 billion initiative to secure European semiconductor supply and raise the EU's global chip market share from 10% to 20% by 2030. Contested in feasibility ” EU no longer has a chip manufacturer (but leads in equipment via ASML).

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EU AI Act (2024)

First comprehensive AI regulation globally, entering into force August 2024. Bans unacceptable-risk AI (social credit scoring, mass facial recognition). Imposes rules on high-risk AI and foundation models. Embodies the Brussels Effect.

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EuroStack

The ambition to build European capacity across the full digital value chain: semiconductors, data infrastructure, cloud computing, software, and connectivity ” to achieve full digital sovereignty at every layer.

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New Mercantilism

A trend in which the US, China, and EU all intervene heavily in strategic industries (semiconductors, AI, green tech) through subsidies and export controls, departing from free trade orthodoxy.

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Geo-economics

The use of economic instruments (trade, investment, sanctions, supply chains) to achieve geopolitical objectives. Increasingly central to EU foreign policy alongside or instead of military/normative tools.

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Draghi Report (2024)

Assessment warning that the EU is falling behind the US and China in technology and productivity. Calls for major investment in innovation and a rethinking of EU industrial policy.

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Venice Declaration (1980)

The most important early EU declaration on Palestine, introducing the idea of a Palestinian homeland and right to self-determination. Marks the beginning of EU diplomatic engagement with the two-state solution.

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Paris Protocol (1994)

Agreement embedding the Palestinian economy into the Israeli economy as a customs union. Israel controls all borders and tax revenues. Intended as temporary ” became permanent, structurally limiting Palestinian sovereignty.

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Organised Hypocrisy (Huber 2025, JCMS)

The systematic gap between the EU's stated norms and its actual behaviour in the Israel-Palestine conflict compared to other cases (e.g. Russia/Ukraine). Evident in ICJ support, sanctions policy, and diplomatic measures.

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Partners in Crime (TNI Report)

Report documenting EU complicity in the Gaza conflict through arms exports, increased trade, and diplomatic protection of Israel. Germany was the second largest arms exporter to Israel during the genocide.

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Securitisation of Renewables (Goldthau & Youngs 2023)

The framing of wind and solar energy not just as climate solutions but as security assets, reducing strategic dependence on fossil fuel exporters. A post-2022 energy crisis development.

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Renewables Extractivism

The EU seeking to source renewable energy from third countries (e.g. North Africa) in ways that reproduce dependency relationships analogous to fossil fuel imports. A form of 'green-realpolitik'.

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Green Deal

The EU's flagship climate policy aiming for climate neutrality by 2050 and 55% emissions reduction by 2030. Positions the EU as a global climate leader but also raises competitiveness concerns (cf. Draghi Report).

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Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)

An EU tool charging a carbon price on imports from countries with lower carbon standards. Combines climate policy with trade policy ” an example of geo-economic instrument use.

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Council of the European Union

The EU institution representing the governments of member states. Meets in different configurations (e.g. Foreign Affairs Council). Key decision-making body for CFSP ” decisions often require unanimity, giving each state a veto.

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Normative Power Europe vs Realist perspective

Manners (2002): EU influence through norms. Hyde-Price (2006): EU foreign policy as states pursuing national security interests. Key debate about the nature and motivation of EU external action.

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Saint-Malo Declaration (1998)

Franco-British declaration establishing the basis for EU autonomous defence capacity. Led to the creation of ESDP (later CSDP). Key moment because the UK ” traditionally NATO-first ” agreed to EU defence cooperation.

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European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)

” Conditionality,The EU offers benefits (trade access, visa liberalisation, financial support) in exchange for political and economic reforms. Works as 'soft power' leverage ” but has been criticised for delivering little actual transformation.

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Fiott (2023)

” Ukraine & CSDP,'In every crisis an opportunity': the Russian invasion led the EU to offer Ukraine candidate status, impose sanctions, supply weapons via the European Peace Facility (EPF), and adopt the Strategic Compass. But EU defence policy remains strongly intergovernmental.