Identity Theory to Functionalism

These flashcards cover key concepts from Chapter 5, including the transition from identity theory to functionalism, multiple realizability, machine functionalism, and critiques like Searle's Chinese Room.

Identity Theory

A theory advocated by JJC Smart suggesting that mental states are identical to physical brain states, such as pains being identical to C-fibers firing.

Multiple Realizability

The concept that the same high-level structure or property (like life or a mental state) can be realized through many different low-level physical structures.

Type Identity Physicalism

The view that types of mental states are identical to specific types of brain states; this is rejected by those who accept multiple realizability.

Token Identity Physicalism

The claim that every particular mental event occurring at a specific time is identical to a particular brain event, without requiring a sweeping identity between categories of states.

Functionalism

The philosophical view that mental states are defined by their functional roles—what they do and how they relate to other states—rather than the material they are made of.

A Priori Truth

A conceptual fact or truth that can be known through reflection on the concept or definition alone, without empirical evidence.

A Posteriori Truth

A truth that depends on actual sensory experience and observation of the world to be known as true.

Thomas Hobbes

A philosopher who argued that materialism was an a priori truth, claiming anything immaterial could be ruled out by reflection on the concept of materiality.

Jaegwon Kim

The author of the course text who argues that physicalism is an a posteriori thesis and that immaterial beings are logically possible even if they do not exist.

Realization Physicalism

The principle that every mental property is physically based and that each occurrence of a mental property is due to the occurrence of a physical realizer.

Machine Functionalism

A version of functionalism, also called computationalism, which posits that the functional role of the mind is information processing, similar to a computer.

Turing Machine

A mechanical model of computation involving a tape with distinct squares, a scanner/printer, internal states, and symbols following specific rules.

Probabilistic Turing Machine

A modified Turing machine that is not strictly deterministic but incorporates specific percentages of probability for different outputs (e.g., a $50\%$ chance of one action and a $20\%$ chance of another).

Turing Test

A behavioral test of intelligence suggesting that if a computer produces outputs indistinguishable from a person, it has the same psychological or intelligent state.

Strong AI

The view, as described by John Searle, that an appropriately programmed computer does not just simulate a mind but literally is a mind that understands and has cognitive states.

Chinese Room Thought Experiment

A thought experiment by John Searle intended to show that symbol manipulation according to rules does not constitute genuine understanding or intentionality.

John Searle

The philosopher who created the Chinese Room argument to challenge Strong AI and the adequacy of the Turing Test.