The Move to Global War: Germany

Hitler’s Steps to Dictatorship:

1. Hitler called a new election, in hopes to gain a Nazi majority in the Reichstag.

* 27th February 1933, the Reichstag building was burnt down and the communist Van der Lubbe was found inside. The Nazis claimed it was a communist plot, as a result, a decree was passed suspending freedom of the press, of speech and of association. 


* Leading communist politicians were imprisoned and the Nazis won 43.9% of the vote.


2. The Enabling Act

* Hitler passed this to give him the power to pass laws without the Reichstag’s consent. 
* This change in the constitution for which Hitler needed ⅔ of the vote, was achieved by preventing the communists from taking their seats


3. The rest of the political system as Nazified

* Trade unions were shut down, the Socialist Party and Communist party were banned
* Other parties dissolved themselves so by July 1933, Germany was a one party state


4. Hitler moved against the SA in 1934

* Under Ernst Röhm, it was becoming a potential threat and an embarrassment. 
* Röhm wanted to join the SA and the army together. This was alarming both to Hitler and also the army leaders. 
* Hitler did not want any challenge to the regular army as he needed the support
* During the Night of Long Knives, some 200 people were killed as Hitler used the SS to purge the SA leaders and to get rid of other enemies.


5. Oath of Loyalty

* When President Hindenburg died in 1934, Hitler became the Führer of Germany and in August 1934, all German armed forces took a personal oath of loyalty to Hitler.

Hitler was in control of Germany by 1934 and Hitler’s position was unassailable and he was in a strong position to carry out his foreign policy aims, though whether he had a clear plan of how to achieve these is less clear.

Did Hitler have a Clear Plan for Achieving his Foreign Policy Goals when he took Power in 1933? Revisionists:

* Some historians such as AJP Taylor and Hans Mommsen have argued that Hitler didn't have a blueprint of how to achieve his objectives.
* His actions were usually determined by economic pressures and demands from within the Nazi Party and he seized each party that was presented to him.

Did Hitler have a Clear Plan for Achieving his Foreign Policy Goals when he took Power in 1933? Intentionalists:

* Intentionalist historians like Klaus Hildebrand argue Hitler had a definite programme of expansion and conquest with clear phases. They became fixed at an early stage and never really altered.


* The first phase would be ending the Treaty of Versailles and the formation of an alliance with Britain and italy. The Second would be the defeat of France. The Third and final would be the conquest of Russia.
* Intentionalist historians like Hildebrand, known as globalists, go further and argue that Hitler’s ultimate aim was to take over the US and thus achieve world domination.

Did Hitler have a Clear Plan for Achieving his Foreign Policy Goals when he took Power in 1933? **Continuation of Earlier German Foreign Policy?**

* Following WWII, historians argued Hitler’s foreign policy was a radical break from the past. However, the German historian Fritz Fischer claimed that Hitler’s aims were similar to those of Kaiser Wilhelm II in WWI; the creation of a Greater Germany and rule over a fragmented Russia…
* Other historians stressed the continuity between Weimar Republic’s foreign policy aims and those of Hitler with regard to his revision of the TOV. 
* Stephen Lee refutes Weimar continuity by saying it’s misleading. Although Weimar politicians had a strong element of opportunism, they did not share Hitler’s Social Darwinism and racialist vision. They also respected traditions of European diplomacy and under Streseman, contributed much to international cooperation. One of Hitler’s aims was to smash the multinational agreements, like the Locarno Pact, which had been carefully built up during the 1920s. 

Changing Diplomatic Alignments in Europe after 1933:

* **Britain** was preoccupied not only with the economic crisis but also by events in the Far East, where it was worried about Japanese expansion. Its main priority was the safety of the British Empire and many British politicians considered TOV to be unfair. Many right wing politicians sympathise with Hitler and were afraid of Stalin, Hitler was a buffer to the spread of communism from the East


* **France** was very concerned by a possible German threat but was too weak to act alone, especially after the failure of the intervention in the Ruhr. It was also politically divided and had major economic problems. Lacking support from the USA or Britain in preserving TOV, it built a defensive line of fortresses along the Maginot Line between 1929-1938. It developed alliances with countries on Germany's eastern borders: Poland and ‘The Little Entente’ countries: Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia
* **The USA** was focused on domestic concerns and was unlikely to change its isolationist stance due to the Economic Depression. 
* **Internationally the economic situation encouraged national insularity rather than collective security. The need to avoid another war was necessary, especially with the weakness of Britain and France’s military at the time.**

Withdrawl from the Disarmament Conference:

* Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations had demanded that national armaments be reduced with the lowest point consistent with national safety. But difficulties in implementing an international disarmament policy meant it took until 1932 for an international conference to be organised


* When the Disarmament Conference finally convened there was still little consensus on how it should be achieved. France was unwilling to with the new threat of Nazism on its borders 
* German governments prior to Hitler had requested parity of armaments, arguing Germany would only participate if other countries reduced their armaments to Germany’s level or allow Germany to rearm to theirs
* When France refused this at the Disarmament Conference in 1933, Hitler pulled out of both the Conference and the League of Nations, claiming both were part of a French conspiracy to keep Germany weak and incapable of self-defence. 

Non-Aggression Pact with Poland:

* Poland, on Germany’s eastern border, was particularly vulnerable and, alarmed at the West’s failure to stop Germany rearming, entered into a 10 year Non-Aggression Pact with Germany in January 1934


* Hitler was satisfied as he was unable to take any action against Poland at this stage and, by signing the pact, he was securing his eastern frontier. 
* It also weakened France’s security system in Eastern Europe. France had signed an alliance with them in 1921 and had hoped this would keep pressure on Germany's eastern borders and now Germany had broken out of the diplomatic encirclement that the French had attempted to impose on it
* It looked to the international community like an act of statesmanship, it could be used to convince Britain and other that Germany was a peaceful nation
* Hitler had no intention of keeping to this agreement, he preferred bilateral agreements to collective security agreements as these could more easily be broken 

Mussolini and Austria:

* June 1934, Mussolini and Hitler met but the meeting wasn’t a success. Mussolini would not agree to Hitler’s position on Austria. The Anschluss, the unification of Germany and Austria, had always been an important part of Hiter’s foreign policy aims and Hitler tried to persuade Mussolini that Austria should become a ‘satelite’ of Germany


* Mussolini wanted to keep Austria as a buffer state between Germany and Italy 
* Hitler was supporting the Austrian Nazi party and they organised a campaign which culminated in the assassination of the Austrian Chancellor, this was intended to be the first step of a coup d’etat to force the union with Germany.
* The attempted coup stirred international concern and Mussolini immediately mobilised 100,00 troops and moved them to the Brenner pass, Italy's border with Germany. Hitler was forced to back down and to play a waiting game for Anschluss. He needed Mussolini’s support against the Western democracies and he reassured Mussolini that Austria wouldn’t be annexed.

The Saar Plebiscite:

* In accordance with TOV, the Saar, a small coal-rich territory in Germany held a plebiscite in 1935. 


* This area had been under French control since 1919 and was now given the opportunity to return to Germany, the result of the plebiscite was an overwhelming agreement that the Saar should return to Germany. This was a trump for Hitler and it was done fairly as well. Results weren’t surprising given that the entire population of the territory was German. 
* Great opportunity for Nazi propaganda to reinforce the growing power and strength of Germany along with the popularity of the Nazi regime

Rearmament:

* As early as February 1933, Hitler told his generals 'the next five years must be devoted to the defence capacity of the German people’


* Germany had always ignored TOV rearmament clauses and Hitler was continuing had already been started by previous German governments, he just increased the pace dramatically.
* By 1935 the army had increased from 7 to 21 visions and conscriptions were introduced the same year. Hitler justified this level of rearmament on the grounds that Britain and France had failed to disarm and that Germany needed to be able to protect itself against the growing Soviet Army. 

Remilitarization of the Rhineland:

* The Rhineland had been demilitarised under the terms of TOV in order to provide security for France. No military installations or garrisons were permitted on the left bank 


* For Hitler the remilitarization of the Rhineland would be an important step in his plans for strengthening Germany; he would be able to build fortifications there to prevent an attack from France
* The timing for his actions in 1936 was due to domestic and international reasons. In Germany, rising prices and food shortages were causing unrest among the population and Hitler needed to distract attention from economic problems. 
* Internationally, Mussolini’s Abyssinian crisis meant he was seeking closer ties with Hitler so he agreed not to oppose Hitler’s takeover of the Rhineland. Hitler knew he could take advantage of the effect that Britain and France were distracted by both this crisis and the fallout from the Hoare-Laval Pact
* Hitler’s excuse for moving troops back into the Rhineland Was the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty which was ratified on 4th March 1936. He argued this violated the spirit of the Locarno Pact and threatened Germany with encirclement.
* German troops moved into the Rhineland on 7th March 1936. This was not a surprise to Britain or France and they did nothing to stop the remilitarization, despite the fact that the Germans invaded with a  relatively weak military force.
* The successful invasion was accompanied by a peace offer, which was intended to make Hitler look as though he was a man of peace and to divert the attention of Britain and France Away from his challenge to the post-war settlement. The offer included demilitarising the Rhineland, provided Britain and France created similar zones on their sides of the frontier as well. 

The Spanish Civil War:

* Mussolini and Hitler were pushed closer together when they both intervened on the side of Franco in the Spanish Civil War


* The Spanish Civil War began in 1936 with a nationalist revolt led by the army against the republican Spanish government. Franco led the Nationalists.
* Germany did not send ground troops but played a key role in transporting Franco’s troops from Morocco to Spain at the start of the conflict, and German bombers of the Condor Legion caused havoc by attacking civilian centres. German submarines also attacked government ships in the Mediterranean but in contrast to Mussolini, Hitler placed limits on the extent of German involvement. 

Why Intervene in The Spanish Civil War?

* He wanted a friendly government with Spain so they’d apply mineral resources and also provide military bases for German submarines


* He would be able to test out his air force and see effects of air attacks on civilian populations
* He was able to pose as the defender of European civilization against the Communist threat
* A pro-Fascist government in Spain would undermine French security

Results of the Spanish Civil War for Hitler’s Position in Europe:

* War dragged on for 3 years, polarising opinion in Europe


* Reinforced suspicions between Britain and France and the Soviet Union, thereby preventing a strong anti-Fascist alliance
* Distracted the West and Britain’s failure to take any action led Hitler to believe he wouldn’t face further opposition to expansion in Eastern Europe

The Rome-Berlin Axis and the Anti-Comintern Pact:

* The most significant result of the Spanish Civil War on diplomatic alignments was improved relations with Mussolini


* Hitler recognized King Emmauel of italy as the ‘Emperor of Abyssina’ and worked with Italy to prevent a British intuitive to update the lOcarno treaties
* Opposition to German influence in Austria from Italy was now removed so in July 1937, with Mussulini’s approval, Hitler signed an agreement with Chancellor Schuscnigg of Austria where Austria acknowledged itself to be a German state in return for a German commitment to non intervention.
* The new atmosphere of co=operaiton between Germany and Italy culminated into the Rome-Berlin Axis in October 1936 between them. It consisted of a series of secret protocols setting out their mutual interests. This was followed up in November 1936 with an agreement with Japan: the Anti-Comintern Pact. 
* The Comintern Pact was directed against the Communist International. It stated in case of an attack by the Soviet Union, the signatories would consult on measures to ‘safeguard their common interests’. This militant nature of the agreement indicated the beginning of Hitler’s foreign policy’s open aggressive phase. It also meant Germany was no longer isolated but  played an important player on the world stage.

Four Year Plan: What Happened and Why?

* By 1936 rearmament was not progressing fast enough for Hitler and the consumer economy was starting to struggle: there were shortages of butter and meat as well as shortages of vital imports of raw materials and of foreign exchange


* The economics minister, Schact favoured spending less on armaments in order to enable more exports to be produced, thus encouraging foreign trade
* Hitler believed Germany’s economic problems could only be solved by the acquisition of more land and living space. He decided to go all for autarky, bringing the economy more closely under party control, in order to prepare for war. This was to be done via the Four Year Plan, which Hitler introduced in September 1936 under the leadership of Göring. 
* Believing that this would make the pace rearmament too fast and that it would cause an economic crisis. Schact thus resigned but there was no doubt that Hitler was now in a strong position.

How did the International Community respond to the Four Year Plan?

* Eastern and south-eastern Europe made bilateral trade agreements with Germany 


* Food and raw materials were also supplied to Germany in exchange for manufacturers and armaments

How significant was the Four Year Plan overall as a ‘turning point’ in Hitler’s Foreign Policy?  

* In the process of the Plan, Germany was to make every effort to become more self-supporting by developing a wide range of synthetic materials by stockpiling essential raw materials and by concluding bilateral trade agreements with states in  eastern and south-eastern Europe 


* Food and raw materials were supplied to Germany in exchange for manufacturers and armaments
* Romania was a particular target for German advances because she could supply vitally needed supplies of oil
* Ian Kershaw believed with the German Italian axis secured, the creation of the anti-Comintern pact with Japan and the Spanish Civil War all provided evidence of the passivity of western democracies. The German economy was committed full tilt to preparation for war, the contours of growing international tension and an escalating arms race in the latter 1930s were all set. 

The Hossbach Memorandum:

* On 5th November Hitler called a special meeting to be attended by top general and war ministers. Colonel Hossbach made notes.


* Hitler gave an overview of Germany's international situation and proposed several actions that now needed to be taken. The meeting outlined the primary targets for his desired ‘living space’ were Austria and Czechoslovakia and when and how. He identified the time frame to be from 1943-35. 

The Hossbach Memorandum significance

* AJP Taylor points out the memorandum is only a copy and a fragment of a copy of the original, which ahs disappeared


* Taylor also argues the purpose of the meeting was not actually to discuss foreign policy aims but to convince conservative military and financial experts of the need to continue with the rearmament programme, and to isolate Schacht who opposed it
* But other historians would argue that, white it can’t be used as a road-map for war, the Memorandum clearly set out Hitler’s central goal to secure and preserve the Aryan race. It also made clear Hitler’s war-like and expansionist intentions and Hitler’s sense of urgency; this was all taken seriously by those present

The Anschluss 1938:

* Between 1938-39, Hitler was able to achieve his aims he had set out at the Hossbach Conference in 1937: the annexation of Austria and dismemberment of Czechoslovakia


* Despite Hitler’s failure to take Austria in 1934, he made an Austor-German agreement in 1936 which agreed to Austria conducting a foreign policy consistent with it being a ‘German state’ 
* However, in 1938 the opportunity to take over Austria directly arose due to the actions of Austrian Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg. Schuschnigg was alarmed by activities of Austrian Nazis and requested an interview with Hitler but Hitler thus launched into an attack on Austria. 
* After being subjected to 2 hours of abuse, Schuschnigg was forced to agree to a list of demands that include releasing all imprisoned pro-Nazi agitators and lifting the ban against the Nazi party. Pro-Nazis were being made ministers of war and finance and the economic systems of both countries were to be assimilated. These demands thus effectively ended Austrian independence. If Schuschnigg were to not agree, Hitler threatened a march into Austria. 
* Schuschnigg attempted a desperate last action. He announced a plebiscite for 13th March 1938 where Austrians were to vote on whether or not they wanted a ‘free and German united Austria.’ Austrian could answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Many Yes votes would give him a chance to break free of his agreement with Hitler.
* Hitler therefore decided to act before this could occur. With Mussolini’s permission, Hitler mobilised his army for the Anschluss. Once Schuschnigg found out, he resigned as there was no help coming from Italy, Britain or France. 
* 12th March 1938, Hitler marched into Austria.

The Sudeten Crisis:

* After the success of the Anschluss, Hitler turned his attention to Czechoslovaia. 


* He considered Slavs to be untermenschen 
* Many Cezchs had resided Austrian rule in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and had fought for Russia during the First World War rather than Austria
* Czechoslovakia was the only successful independent state created by the Versailles Settlement and consisted of many different peoples, therefore proving ethnically diverse people could live together
* One of the new ethnic groups within Czechoslovakia was Germans. These Germans formally lived in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and now lived in the area known as the Sudetenland which bordered Germany. 
* Czechoslovakia was an enthusiastic supporter of the League of Nations
* Czechoslovakia was allied to France and Russia

Sudeten Germans:

* Some 3.5 million people had not accepted their position in Czechoslovakia. They resented their loss of status and regarded themselves as victims of Czech discrimination due to their former AUstrian Imperial status. With impacts of the Great Depression, their grievances grew
* Konrad Heinlienn became the leader of the Sudeten Germans and the mouthpiece of discontent. He led the Sudeten German Party which was later funded by the Nazis. Hitler encouraged Heinlien to make continual demands on the Czech government and to keep up a relentless programme of agitation and subversion. 
* Heinlein presented the Czech government with his Eight DEmands in the form of the Karlsbad Programme; they included autonomy and various special rights.
* Hitler was reluctant to use force against Czechoslovakia initially. He did not commit himself to any clear plan on how this was to be achieved and many of Hitler’s generals warned him Germany wasn’t ready for a war at this stage.

The May Crisis 1938:

* Hitler changes his mind as a result of the May Crisis. On 20th May rumours started spreading that the Germans were making military preparations near the Czech border. As a result, the Czech government ordered partial mobilisation and Britain and France sent Germany warnings.


* The rumours were false and Hitler had to tell the powers involved that no such preparations to attack were true. He found this action humiliating as it looked as though he had responded to British and French threats. 
* Operation Green on 28th May therefore was made and Hitler said ‘It is my unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future.’
* On instructions from Hitler, the Sudeten Germans increased their violence against the Czech government. On 5th September the President agreed to all demands of the Sudeten Germans for self-government but Heinlien was told by Hitler to reject this offer which proved Hitler was interested only in conquest and not in justice for Sudeten Germans
* The German press whipped up a frenzy of anti-Czech feeling by showing pictures and film footage of the apparent ill-treatment of Sudeten Germans

Chamberlain’s Intervention:

* This was the point Britain decided to act


* Chamberlain desperately wanted to avoid war and so he flew 3 times to meet Hitler to try to make a deal over the Sudetenland

Berchtesgaden: 15th September 1938

* At this meeting, it was agreed that the Sudeten German areas of Czechoslovakia should be transferred to Germany


* Chamberlain persuaded his Cabinet and the French to agree to this deal. The Czechs finally agreed after 2 days

Godesberg: 22-23rd September 1938

* Chamberlain flew to Godesberg to tell Hitler the good news but Hitler was furious. Hitler wanted an excuse for a war with Czechoslovakia, not a peaceful handover of the Sudetenland


* Hitler insisted that the demands of the Hungarians and the Poles for territory in Czechoslovakia should also be met and that German troops should be allowed to occupy the Sudetenland on 28th September
* War seemed inevitable and the Czechs rejected Hitler’s terms and France said they’d support Czechoslovakia
* The Czechs had good defiances and a strong army and hoped with the help of allies, they could resist a German attack

Munich 29th September 1938

* Britain and France showed they were prepared to fight and Hitler’s own generals saying they weren’t prepared for war, Hitler showed up for further conference


* Mussolini stepped in as a mediator to prevent war
* A plan was agreed upon which outlined that German occupation of Sudetenland would take place by 1st of October and Czechs were allowed to leave nad Germans allowed to join the Sudeten territories (this transfer never occurred)
* Neither the Czech oPresident nor Stalin was invited to the conference. The Czechs were told if they resisted this agreement they would receive no help from Britain or France. The Czechs therefore had no option but to agree
* Chamberlain, after the agreement, got Hitler to sign a statement in which he agreed to settle all matters of international interest through consultation but Hitler was determined to be deprived of his war against Czechoslovakia. On 21st October, he gave orders for the ‘liquidation of the remainder of the Czech state’

The Liquidation of Czechoslovakia:

* As a result of the Munich Conference, Czechoslovakia lost 70% of its heavy industry, ⅓ of its population and mountainous defences and man-made fortifications of the Sudetenland


* Hitler saw the Munich Agreement as ‘a stepping stone to the liquidation of the Czech state’ From early 1939, Hitler encouraged Slovaks to cause disruptions and to ask for complete independence. 
* Hitler was given the excuse to directly get involved when the new Czech President (previously had resigned)  moved troops into Slovakia to crush his agitation. But Hitler was then asked for German protection. In the hope of saving Czechoslovakia, the new president asked to see Hitler but this was a mistake. He was forced to sign over Moravia and Bohemia to Hitler. 
* On 15th March 1939, German troops occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia and on the 16th, Bohemia and Moravia were declared a protectorate of Germany. 
* This action led to a change in British policy towards Germany. On 18th March Chamberlain told the British Cabinet that ‘no reliance could be placed on any of the assurances given by the Nazi leaders’

Britain’s Reaction to the Liquidation of Czechoslovakia

* Many British politicians and sympathy with Czechoslovakia, as it had survived as a democracy for a longer period than the other new states in central eastern Europe


* But Chamberlain did not believe Czechoslovakia was worth fighting for. He saw it as ‘highly artificial’ and one that was unsustainable. He had sympathy for Sudeten Germans and believed he could organise a peaceful and negotiated handover of the Sudetendland to Germany
* Britain was not in a position ot offer military help to Czechoslovakia
* When Chamberlain flew for the first meeting, Hitler demanded all areas of Czechoslovakia in which Germans comprised over 50% of the population should join Germany. Chamberlain agreed but said he would have to get the agreement of the Czechoslovakia 

For or Against Chamberlain: Public Opinion

JUSTIFIED:

* British public was against the war
* British public opinion polls were supportive of appeasement and of Nevile Chamberlain
* Chamberlain’s declaration of ‘peace for our time’ was met with cheers from the public
* Even Churchhill said ‘appeasement from strength’ can be a good policy
* The British public were still scarred by horrors of WWI and wouldn’t have warmly welcomed a war

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UNJUSTIFIED:

* The public opinion was not firmly against war


* Many British infarct wanted to be firm with Hitler and some volunteered to join the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War and were vehemently opposed to Fascism and to bullies
* British people favoured sanctions against aggressors
* When Mussolini invaded Abyssinia in 1935, there was a British-French attempt at a secret deal to appease him called the ‘Hoare Laval Pact’. When this was leaked, the British public were outraged showing they weren’t always happy for dictators to get their way
* A censored survey showed a significant number of British people didn't trust Hitler, this wasn’t public as it wouldn’t have been favourable to Chamberlain
* Many senior British politicians thought appeasement was naive at best, if not outright stupid. The Labour party opposed appeasement

For or Against Chamberlain: Strength of Armies and the Need for Time to Reform

JUSTIFIED:

* German army was stronger than Britain’s


* German propaganda had successfully persuaded the British that the German army was strong and difficult to bear
* Because of WWI, Depression and Disarmament Treaties, the British and French armies were still under-strength
* The success of the German armies in Poland, Norway, the Low Countries and France in 1939-40 shows how strong the German army actually was
* If Britain had fought Germany in 1938, it would’ve been an even more total defeat for the British. The years 1938-39 gave Britain time to put some defences in place. They increased military spending in 1938-89 hugely

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UNJUSTIFIED:

* The British army could’ve stopped Germany


* Military advisers warned Chamberlain that he must stand firm against Hitler but he ignored them
* The British still had the strongest Navy and the largest empire in the world along with an incredible industrial capacity. If they did fight Hilter in 1938, he wouldn’t have been as prepared and able to fight as he was in 1939
* Appeasing in 1938 gave Hitler an opportunity to build up his armies even further and also to sign a pact with Stalin that allowed him to easily defeat Poland

For or Against Chamberlain: Hitler’s States Aims and Trustworthiness:

JUSTIFIED:

* Hitler’s aims were reasonable to those at the time
* The Sudetenland had a 3 million German speaking population
* TOV was seen as too hard by many and this was merely a corrective to that treaty
* Hitler was seen as trustworthy - Chamberlain himself felt Hitler presented as a reliable and cooperative statesman. Lloyd George and others were admirers of Hitler’s who purported to be pro-British at a time of growing anti-communism

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UNJUSTIFIED:

* Hitler’s demands were unreasonable and he could never be trusted
* The Sudetenland may have had a German speaking population but it was part of a sovereign state formed out of the Paris treaties. It was an unforgivable humiliation to sign a way to Hitler and expose the Czech border defences so the rest of the country could be invaded. And it was on March 1939
* TOV was not that harsh, Germany had been also given help with the Dawes and Young Plans and Hitler was already ceasing reparations payments.
* Hitler had already more than proved himself as sinister and untrustworthy. Mein Kampf, conscription, rearmament, Rhineland, Austria, Anti-comintern pacts, Spanish Civil War involvement… How many more clues were needed that Hitler wasn’t going to stop by being ‘appeased’ with Sudetenland.
* Ultimately the most compelling argument is that appeasement had failed. Hitler did not stop and went on towards a devastating war. Appeasement was completely ineffective and if anything only encouraged Hitler.

The Nazi-Soviet Pact:

* In the summer of 1939, both the Western democracies and Hitler approached the Soviet Union for an alliance. 


* Despite Hitler’s loathing of communist Russia and his plans for Lebensraum in the East, an alliance with the Soviet Union at this stage was highly desirable. It would prevent the Soviets forming an alliance with Britain and France and secure Soviet neutrality in a war with Poland, preventing a two-front conflict.
* The Soviet Union initially favoured an alliance with Britain and France, in 1934 the Soviet Union had joined the League of Nations hoping that collective security would work to prevent Hitler’s growing aggression. The Western Democracies were still suspicious of communism and worked to appease Hitler. Despite this, Stalin renewed a proposal of military alliance with the West. Negotiations dragged on as both sides ultimately distrusted each other. 
* Meanwhile, Stalin had made it clear to Germans that he would welcome an agreement and as a result, on 24th August 1939, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed.
* Under this Pact the Soviet Union and Nazi-Germany each pledged to remain neutral in the event of either nation being attacked by a third party. The pact also included a secret protocol dividing Northern and Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence. 

The Nazi-Soviet Pact: for Hitler

* The alliance meant he could have a free hand in Poland and that he coulda void fighting a war on two fronts


* He could get valuable raw materials from the Soviet Union. 
* He clearly regarded the alliance as short-term expedient due to his long term Lebensraum plans

The Nazi-Soviet Pact: for Stalin

* It would keep the Soviet Union out the war and this was important as it faced a threat in the East from Japan as well as the army being weakened from Stalin’s purges


* There was always the hope Germany and the West would weaken each other in the war and that the SOviet Union could emerge as the strongest nation
* He got considerable territorial gains from the pact: half of Poland and opportunity to take over Finland and Baltic States
* The Soviet Union could keep trading with Germany. Germany was to send mechanical goods to the Soviet Union in return for raw materials and foodstuffs.

German rearmament: international response

* There was sympathy in Britain towards Germany’s desire to reverse certain aspects of the Treaty of Versailles.
* After Germany’s withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations in 1933, Britain worked hard to get Germany back into the conference. It proposed that Germany should be allowed to have an army of 200,000 (rather than the 100,000 stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles), that France should also reduce its army to 200,000, and that Germany should be allowed an air force half the size of the French air force.


* However, the realisation in 1935 that Germany was introducing conscription and already had an air force ended attempts by the British and French to bring Germany back into the League of Nations and to establish new conditions for rearmament. Germany’s actions blatantly opposed the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. This was obviously a concern to the other powers, who could see that Germany was now catching up militarily.
* It was clear that such rearmament would strengthen German demands for further treaty modifications and that, indeed, Germany would be able to achieve these by force if it could not get them by peaceful means.

Stresa Conference

* In response to German rearmament, and following Hitler’s threatening moves over Austria in 1934, a conference was held at Stresa in Italy, and was attended by the prime ministers and foreign ministers of France, Britain and Italy.
* The ministers drew up a formal protest at Hitler’s disregard of the Versailles provisions regarding disarmament, and they reframed their commitment to Locarno and to Austrian independence.
* This collective action, was known as the Stresa Front, and it could have acted as a deterrent to Hitler’s plans. However, three developments now took place that undermined this united front.

three developments of international response to remarmament

* First, France concluded the Franco–Soviet Mutual Assistance Treat with Russia, in 1935. This coincided with Russia’s entry into the League of Nations; with Poland in a pact with Germany, it was important to keep Russia on side. However, Italy was unwilling to conclude any pact with a communist government. Britain was also worried about using a communist country to contain Germany and opposed France’s idea of surrounding Germany with alliances, believing that this would lead to Germany feeling encircled.
* The second development was initiated by Britain and it offended both the French and Italian governments. Britain was unwilling to enter a naval race with Germany at a time when its naval strength was already stretched to capacity; there was also a concern that Japan might want to renegotiate the terms of the naval treaties of Washington and London (see page 22). This made it tempting to respond to Hitler’s offers to limit the German eet to 35% of the British eet, which in fact gave the opportunity for the German navy to triple its size. On 18 June, this percentage was agreed in the Anglo–German Naval Agreement. The agreement also allowed a German submarine eet equal to Britain’s. The Versailles restrictions on the German navy had thus been completely set aside.
* The third development which undermined the Stresa Front was Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935. In fact, this left the Stresa Front in ruins. After this, Hitler was able to pursue his aims with greater confidence.

International response to Remilitarization of the Rhineland: the French

* When Hitler marched into the Rhineland in 1936, violating both the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaties, he faced no opposition from either Britain or France.


* The French government at the time was only a “caretaker” government and thus was not in a position to consider war. The divisions in French society made a clear response impossible and neither left nor right wanted to propose a war against Germany with forthcoming elections.
* In addition, the general staff of the French army had exaggerated the number of German forces marching into the Rhineland, putting them at 265,000 when in fact there were only 30,000. To deal with an invasion of such supposed size, the French would have to mobilize its army and General Gamelin, the Chief of Staff, told French ministers that this would lead to a long, drawn-out war for which there was little support in France. 

International response to Remilitarization of the Rhineland: the British

* The French thus looked to Britain for a response, but they made it clear that they, too, were unwilling to contemplate war over the Rhineland.
* One reason for this was Britain’s overstretched military commitments, and in 1936 the Chief of the Imperial General Staff made it clear that the armed forces were not in any position to ght a successful war against Germany
* Significantly, the British also did not see Hitler’s action as particularly threatening. As the British politician Lord Lothian put it, “The Germans… are only going into their own back garden”.
* Hitler of course, had also offered negotiations at the same time as invading, this made it easier to aim for a settlement rather than to confront Hitler directly.
* The failure to stop Hitler at this point, especially given that his troops had instructions to turn back if confronted, is often seen as a turning point: the last chance to stop Hitler without war.
* But war was the minority opinion. The reality is that it would have been hard for the British government to act given that political and public opinion were only in favour of peace and of negotiating with Germany.

Spanish Civil War: The Non-Intervention Committee:

* In France, a Popular Party government with similar views to the republican government in Spain was elected in June 1936. The new prime minister, Leon Blum, wanted to support the Spanish government; but, Blum feared opposition if he directly intervened and knew that Britain was unlikely to support such a move. He therefore came up with the idea of non-intervention, whereby all of the European countries would commit to keeping out of the conflict.


* Britain wanted to prevent the Spanish Civil War becoming a wider conflict and so agreed with the French plan. However, British motives were different from those of the French.
* PM Stanley Baldwin’s largely Conservative government believed that the nationalists would probably win the war and so did not want to make an enemy of the Spanish nationalist leader, General Franco.
* In addition, the British government did not want to upset Mussolini. It also viewed the Republican government as communist. There were many British business interests in Spain, and investors believed that they faced financial risks if Franco lost; resulting in a socialist or communist government in Spain.


* A total of 16 countries signed the Non-Intervention Pact. However, three of the key members of the Non-Intervention Committee (NIC) – Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union – ignored the NIC commitment completely and, as we have seen, sent substantial aid into Spain.
* In December 1936, Britain signed a trading agreement with the Nationalists that allowed British companies to trade with the rebels.
* Franco, not the Spanish republicans, was able to get credit from British banks.
* The policy of non-intervention thus played a key role in allowing Franco to win the civil war in Spain. Non-intervention worked against the Republicans, while Hitler and Mussolini continued to give effective aid to the Nationalists.
* The failure of non-intervention further discredited the appeasement policies of Britain and France. Hitler had ignored non-intervention, which was also the policy of the League of Nations, and had successfully helped a right-wing government to power. The Western democracies thus appeared weak to Hitler, and this encouraged him further in his actions.

International reaction to Anschluss

* With Anchluss in May 1938, Hitler had again violated the Treaty of Versailles which especically forbade the union of Germany and Austria.


* He invaded an independent state and was in a stronger position to attack Czechoslovakia. Yet, apart from British and French protests to Berlin, there was limited international response.
* France was paralysed by an internal political crisis and did not even have a government at the time of Anschluss. Ministers threatened to call up reservists to strengthen France’s army but needed Britain’s support, which was not forthcoming.
* Italy was now increasingly dependent on German friendship and refused to respond to Chancellor Schuschnigg’s appeals for help.
* The League of Nations was discredited after the Abyssinian affair and Anschluss was not even referred to the League for discussion.
* In Britain, there was a feeling that Germany’s union with Austria was inevitable. Chamberlain made a statement in the House of Commons in which he condemned Germany’s actions and the way in which Anschluss had taken place, but also stated, “the hard fact is …that nothing could have arrested this action by Germany unless we and others with us had been prepared to use force to prevent it”.

Czechoslovakia: France’s Reaction:

* Following Anschluss, it was clear to Britain and France that Czechoslovakia would be the focus of Hitler’s next foreign policy moves.
* France had two treaties with Czechoslovakia, signed in 1924 and 1925, which committed France to assisting Czechoslovakia in the event of a threat to their common interests.
* However, the French also saw that they were in no position to keep to these treaty obligations. They argued that Czechoslovakia could not be defended, and were only too happy to follow Britain’s lead in ending a way out of a military showdown with Germany.

Czechoslovakia: Britain’s Reaction

* Many British politicians had sympathy with Czechoslovakia, as it had survived as a democracy for a longer period than the other new states in central and eastern Europe.
* However, Chamberlain did not believe that Czechoslovakia was worth fighting for. He saw Czechoslovakia as a “highly artficial” creation and one that was ultimately unsustainable. He had some sympathy with the Sudeten Germans and believed that he could organize a peaceful and negotiated handover of the Sudetenland to Germany.

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Hitler and Chamberlain: first meeting

* Given their determination to avoid a conflict over Czechoslovakia, Britain and France worked hard to find a diplomatic solution. Following Hitler’s speech of 12 September 1938 at the Nuremberg Rally. Chamberlain decided to seize the initiative and to meet Hitler in Germany. This was a radical move in the world of diplomacy, as at this time prime ministers did not go abroad to meet other leaders one to one.
* At the meeting, Hitler demanded that all areas of Czechoslovakia in which Germans comprised over 50% of the population should join Germany. This would be supervised by an international commission. Chamberlain agreed, but said that he would have to get the agreement of the Czechs and the French first.
* Over the following week, Chamberlain was able to get agreement for this deal from the British Cabinet and the French government, despite the fact that this would mean ignoring their alliance with Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakian government, was told that, if these proposals were rejected, the Czechs would have to face Germany on their own. Czechoslovakia accepted the plan on 21 September 1938.

Hitler and Chamberlain: second meeting

* On 22 September, Chamberlain flew back to Germany, expecting to have a discussion at Godesberg about the proposals that had previously been discussed and were now agreed upon. However, Hitler now said that the previous proposals did not go far enough. He wanted the claims of Hungary and Poland to Czech territory met and he wanted to occupy the Sudetenland no later than 1 October.
* Back in Britain, many of Chamberlain’s colleagues rejected the Godesberg proposals. France now said it would honour its commitments to Czechoslovakia; the Czechs said that the new proposals were unacceptable. All countries started preparing for war. In Britain, trenches were dug in London’s parks and 38 million gas masks were distributed.

Hitler and Chamberlain: third meeting

* Hitler agreed to a third conference, which was to be chaired by Mussolini. This last hope for peace was greeted with much enthusiasm in Britain. Neither the Czech president, Edvard Beneš, nor the Soviet leader, Stalin, was invited to the conference, which agreed to give the Sudetenland to Germany 
* For Chamberlain, however, the highlight of the conference, was securing from Hitler a joint declaration that Britain and Germany would only deal with problems through negotiation and would not attempt to use force. For Chamberlain, this meant “peace in our time”.
* There was much relief in Britain that war had been averted. The British press mostly supported Chamberlain’s policy and Chamberlain had support from the majority of his party. However, even at the time, there was criticism of the agreement. Winston Churchill called British policy “a total and unmitigated disaster”

End of Appeasement

* Hitler’s takeover of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, caused great shock and outrage in Britain.
* It was now clear that Hitler’s aims were not limited; he had broken a signed agreement and his invasion of Czechoslovakia could not be justified by any claim to be uniting Germans.
* There was a shift of opinion in Britain, and Chamberlain was put under pressure to take a stronger stand against Hitler.