Dividing da Pie

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Last updated 11:50 AM on 5/11/26
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5 Terms

1
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What is the ultimatum game? Give an example using £100

-A simple two-person one-shot game

-Two anonymous players split £100. The Proposer offers any share to the Responder, who accepts or rejects it. If accepted, both get their share. If rejected, both get nothing. This is the take-it-or-leave-it offer

2
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Why is the take-it-or-leave-it game concerned with sharing economic rents and opportunity costs?

-The proposer is given the pie to divide. If such negotiation succeeds with the responder, both receive a rent.

-Their next best alternative is to get nothing

-So if the proposer divides the £100 by giving the responder £20, the Responder has a cost of saying no: £20. Therefore, we can say that £20 is the opportunity cost of rejecting such an offer

3
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<p>Why does this <em>game </em>showcase a <em>sequential game? </em></p><p>-Why does the difference <em>matter?</em></p>

Why does this game showcase a sequential game?

-Why does the difference matter?

-A game in which not all players choose their strategies at the same time. The players who choose later can see the strategies already chosen by the other players.

-This means the proposer needs to imagine how the responder will respond to their offer. You only have one try, and you can’t YOLO it.

4
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<p>What does the <em>minimum acceptable offer </em>entail in this <em>game?</em></p>

What does the minimum acceptable offer entail in this game?

-The smallest offer that is proposed, which will not be rejected by the responder. The least favourable offer that would be accepted.

-Where it lies depends on the relationship between the two players, social norms, fairness, insulting…

-Where the satisfaction the responder gets from rejecting the offer and getting 0 money equates the pleasure of getting the money

5
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<p>In theory, when would an offer here be <em>accepted? </em>Start with a fairness norm of 50-50</p>

In theory, when would an offer here be accepted? Start with a fairness norm of 50-50

-If a fairness norm of 50-50 exists, then if an offer below £50 was offered, the responder may punish.

-But being offered £45 compared to £0 invokes completely different levels of anger.

-So the responder’s satisfaction from rejecting an offer comes from a responder’s private reciprocity motive R and the gain from accepting the offer y. The larger the number, the more intense each force is.

-So we can say that the satisfaction at rejecting a low offer is R(50-y), and the satisfaction at gaining the offer is just y

-Therefore, an equation of the form such that if:

y < R(50-y), she will reject the offer. Thus to find the minimum acceptable offer, rearrange in terms of y < and:

<p>-If a fairness norm of 50-50 exists, then if an offer below £50 was offered, the responder may punish.</p><p>-But being offered £45 compared to £0 invokes completely different levels of anger.</p><p>-So the responder’s satisfaction from <em>rejecting </em>an offer comes from a responder’s <em>private reciprocity motive </em><strong>R </strong>and the <em>gain</em> from accepting the offer <strong>y. </strong>The larger the number, the more intense each force is.</p><p>-So we can say that the <em>satisfaction </em>at rejecting a low offer is R(50-y), and the <em>satisfaction </em>at gaining the offer is just y</p><p>-Therefore, an equation of the form such that if:</p><p>y &lt; R(50-y), she will <em>reject </em>the offer. Thus to find the minimum acceptable offer, rearrange in terms of y &lt; and:</p>