Leg Reg Specific

What is textualism and what tools does it use

The interpretative theory of textualism bases its interpretation on what a word means, not what congress intends for it to mean. They claim to be faithful to Congress by using the meanings of the specific words that Congress chose to use. Textualist tools include the text of the statute, other related statutes, dictionaries, and semantic canons.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Textualism

 Its advantages are based on it being faithful to Congress, it showing judicial restraint in not having them legislate from the bench, and this interpretation allowing for ex ante clarity, meaning people can tell the meaning of a statute before the fact. Its disadvantages include the fact that the ordinary meaning of a word isn’t always easy to determine and that words have different meanings by dictionary

Things to Consider in Textualism

 For textualism, we should look for the plain meaning, then we look to the specific industry (specialized meaning), then we look at context in the surrounding text (across the statute), and then we look at the surrounding statutes. 

How to know which definition—--Nix vv. Hedden: Tomato–type of statute–business law statute-we should go with ordinary statute, not scientific

Dictionaries: Smith v. United States: statute issue is “use of firearm”---trading gun for cocaine—majority uses dictionary (black’s law and websters) to say that use means use in any way, not to just shoot it—-also Rule of leniety Interpretive canon that says if there is ambiguity, we read criminal statutes narrowly

New Textualism

New Textualism (the words and only the words) began in the 1980s (the best decade for alternative music). It was the first challenge to the legitimacy of legislative history and acknowledged the idea that statutes are awkward compromises. For example, in West VA Univ. Hospitals, the court considered whether expert fees were included in a statute providing for reasonable attorneys fees. The supreme court said that the text was the only thing to look at and that it was their job to give the words their meaning and that it should not attempt to understand congress’s intent or legislate. Opposite of church case—text was clear but ignore text). They looked at the plain meaning, finding that there was not one, so then they looked at the industry usage and other statutes. They completely ignore the legislative history which offered a clear purpose. 

Newer Textualism

Newer textualism (we look at the words first but sometimes we need more information) . For example, in King v. Burwell, the court was dealing with interpreting what it meant for an exchange to be established by the state (because some states did not set up own and instead federal government did). Under the new textualist view, taxpayers would have been exempted if state only meant not opting into federal plan. Instead, the court with the Newer textualist view because, even though the words were clear, look at other words showing that not doing opting in was still setting up, absurdity type of argument that ACA would not apply if not held. 

Purposivism

Purposivism: The goal of purposivism is to take a holistic approach as to what congress was trying to do with the act (aka what problem congress was trying to solve). The primary tools of purposivism are legislative history and contemporaneous documentation (ie newspapers from the year).

Intentionalism

Intentionalism: The goal of intentionalism is to figure out what meaning Congress intended the meaning to have when they picked that world. The primary tool for intentionalism is the legislative history. The benefits of this theory are that it supports legislative supremacy. However, the disadvantages of this theory are that it is hard to tell sometimes what congress intended for a word to mean, they may have had multiple different meanings across the members, and concerns between the letter of the law not reflecting the spirit of the law. 

Legislative History

• Documents with bills from the committee that is marking up the bill to give to chamber for vote

• Viewed as very reliable source of legislative intent

• Probably the best avaliable view point

For example, in Comtienntal Can Co Inc v. Chicago Truckers, the court looked towards the legislative history to find what congress intended. Although the senate sponsor saif it meant majority, his statement came after the vote was done with 85% understanding.

For example, in Exxon Mobil, the court interpreted the meaning of the supplemental jurisdiction statute and whether Congress intended the statute to overturn two court cases. Kennedy’s majority insists the language is clear and unambiguous, so there is no need for legislative history and that different pockets of leg history say different things. Steven’s dissent says that the legislative history shows a clear different meaning from the words of the statute and that we should stick with the leg history over the words.

Courts using different theories

Courts do not have to just apply one single theory of interpretation. Often, they will use whatever theory best supports the conclusion they want to reach. 

For example, in United States v. Marshall, the court interpretted what Congress meant to count in weighing LSD (counting the paper vs just the drug itself). Ultimately, the court concluded that the weight does include the carrier and based this off of different thoeries of interpretation. They used textualism in examining the meaning of the word mixture, finding that the plain meaning of the term would include the paper’s weight. They also used textualism by looking at the structure of the statute itself, finding that Congress included PCP provisions that separated out pure and mixed punishments (expressio unis). They also used purposivism in their interpretation, finding that the purpose of this statute was to catch smaller scale dealings of LSD. Finally, they used intentionalism finding that there was no proof of absurd results occurring from that definition. The dissent also used textualism, finding the meaning of to be absurd when considering the context of the surrounding text and intentionalism, stating that irrational results mean that the court should read the statute differently (absurdism).

Letter vs Spirit of the law

In considering the letter vs spirit of the law, Blackstone suggests that we first give the text its common (or industry if appropriate) meaning. If that is ambiguous, we should consider the word in context. Then we should consider the legislator’s intent. Therefore, if the meaning is not absurd, we should stick with the plan meaning. If it is, then we should consider the spirit. For example, in Riggs v. Palmer (grandson murdering to inherit case), the court said that inconceivability is the threshold in determing when to go to the spirit over the text of the law.

For example, in Holy Trinity Church v. United States, the court determined whether a statute making it illegal to support any one from coming from a foreign country to work in the United States applied to a reverend. The court found that reverends were not included even though they would be by the plain language, the legislative history showed that they assumed a narrower interpretation would occur (intentionalism–Congress is assuming the courts will interpret it to their meaning), the title of the bill (textualism), and absurdity argument that we should not interpret laws to be absurd outcomes. This case represents the spirit of the law, not the text of the law because they knew what congress wanted and it wasn’t the words.

Positivism

: The role of judges is to be a faithful interpreter of the law

Pragmatist

The role of judges is to act as a partner to legislators, ensuring the law holds up morals and values it should.

Semantic Canons

Semantic canons are text-based rules that inform interpreters on how to read language, focusing on the meaning of words (and what informs that meaning), the grammar in the statute, and the structure of the text. Examples include ejusdum generis, noscitur a sociis, and expressio unius. While semantic canons technically inform a consistent way in interpretation, the reality is that judges will use whichever semantic canons justify the outcome that they want. Semantic canons are typically a tool for textualists

Ejusdem generis

Ejusdem generis is applicable when there is a catch all at the end of a list. This cannon then allows interpretors to come up with a common characteristic between the other things in the list. For example, in McBoyle, the term vehicle came at the end of a list, so they looked for common characteristics. (See also, Smith—-catch all with dagger, dirk, stiletto—M1 is not in the dangerous weapon catch all)

Noscitur a sociis

Noscitur a sociss is the idea that a word is known by associates. (For example, Gustason—any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any security”---define prospectus by others). This is applicable when there is not a catch all and you are trying to interpret the meaning of a word in the list. To do this, you consider the words meaning in the context of the list

expressio unis

Finally, expressio unis is the idea that the expression of one is the exclusion of another (West Virginia University Hospital, also Silvers v. Sony—she was not listed in the group of people who could sue—dissent leg history).

Substantive canons

Substantive canons do not focus on the text itself but broader policy based concerns. Instead of telling judges how to interpret specific language, it seeks to implement certain values that the court seeks to uphold in interpretation. Unlike semantic canons that are neutral tools that are picked from to achieve the desired outcome, substantive canons deliberately push for certain outcomes to uphold values.

Constitutional avoidance

A statute should not be construed in a manner that will raise serious questions under the Constitution, unless Congress has clearly expressed an affirmative intent for the statute to be interpreted in that manner.

For example, in Catholic Bishop, the court had to interpret a labor statute to determine if it applied to teachers at a private religious school even though they were not listed as an exception. Because interpreting the statute to apply to religious teachers would raise constitutional questions under the first amendment, the court had to interpret that it did not apply to them under constitutional avoidance.

State Sovereignty Canon:

This canon is related to the idea of federalism, but is not avoidance of the constitution flat out. It is the idea that the federal government should not interfere with issues of state sovereignty. For example, in Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court held that if Congress intends to intrude on traditional areas of state sovereignty—like defining qualifications for state officials—it must make that intent unmistakably clear in the statute’s text. Courts will not lightly assume Congress meant to upset the federal-state balance.

Absurdity

• we should not interpret a law to its absurd outcomes

• Usually classified under intentionalism

• Congress would not have intent to lead to this absurd result

• Has to assume there is a widely held social value that we are upholding

Will case

Scrivenger’s error

• Not fully rational on its face, although it may not be apparent until arises in circumstance

• Failure of expression, misstatement, policy neutral

• Less controversial

Why does the modern admin state exist?

The modern administrative state exists because the modern world is complex. Agencies are able to address changes and problems much more quickly than congress. Generally, agencies live in the executive branch, promulgate rules with the force of law in a quasi-legislative way, and adjudicate disputes involving the laws and rules they have been tasked with (quasi-judicial). With this, agency power crosses between the three branches, which puts us on guard for separation of powers issues. This also results in specific analysis of what power the agency has had delegated to it and procedural safeguards that agencies must follow to prevent them from having too much power.

Theories of constitutional interpretation of SOP

Formalism: the idea that the constitution draws sharp lines between the three branches and that those sharp lines of separation of powers must be enforced.

Functionalism: the constitution is not so clear outside of the heads of the three branches. We should interpret the constitution to its best function. Generally, functionalists are okay with agencies because they fall under the necessary and proper clause of the constitution. 

Did Congress delegate authority?

Required intelligible principle. It does not take much to satisfy this. The intelligible principle is that it is Congress providing guardrails to the agency so that the delegation does not offend the constitution. For example, in JW. Hampton, Congress delegated the legislative power to set tariff prices to the president. The court upheld this delegation because the act contained an intelligible principle that provided guidelines for the president to follow in setting prices. For example, in Whitman, Congress had delegated authority to the EPA to “set ambient air quality standards to protect the public health”. While this is much less clear than the intelligible principle in Hampton, the court finds that this is satisfied. This shows the intelligible principle really needs very little guardrails.

The modern court also shows favor to the major question doctrine. This doctrine appeared in the Whitman and Vax Mandate concurrences ad then the West Virginia v. EPA majority. In WV v. EPA, the court explicitly relied on major question doctrine, which says that where a question is significantly important it must be decided by congress or by they must provide clear guidelines for the agency. For example, in the Vax Mandate concurrence, Thomas’s concurrence finds that this action should have been Congress itself. This is a major question that is a politically and economically important question that should not have bee

However, the court can also narrow the guardrails to be one of narrow interpretation instead of broad delegation power.  For example, in the Vax Mandate case, Osha overstepped its delegate powers to make rules to create “safe and healthful working conditions” in its vax mandate that was done under its emergency powers (with less standards). The problem here is not the delegation itself but the agency’s action being outside of the delegation. COvid was not a uniquely workplace problem and their requirement would affect everyone outside of their jobs in the rest of the world. It’s not a workplace regulation at that point. There were also very limited exceptions drawn. For example, in the Benzene case, Congress gave OSHA the power to regulate a chemical to level of safety or level of feasibility. OSHA’s standard was too strict and was economically infeasible and was not “reasonable/feasible”.

Ways Congress can check Congressional authority

Congress cannot retain a form of review over agency action because it would violate the constitution. or example, in INS v, Chadha, Congress tried to reserve the power to overturn the attorney general’s power to suspend deportation. However, in reserving this power, they attempted to have a unilateral house veto that was also not subjected to presidential approval. This violated both bicameralism and presentment. With this case, we see that there is no ability to reserve a legislative veto not subject to bicameralism and presentment because a legislative veto is an act of legislation because if congress is doing it, it is legislating.

However, Congress can  have other forms of control over executive action. They can have appropriations (using funding power), hearings/investigations/audits, and appointments and removal of some executive officers.

Under the appointments clause of the Constitution, Congress has the power to give the executive or judges the power to appoint inferior officers while principal officers (as well as ambassadors, public ministers and consuls, and judges of the Supreme Court must be appointed by the president and approved by the Senate. For example, in Buckley v. Velo (formalist opinion), Congress gave the president, the speaker of the house, and the Senate the power to appoint. However, the court found this to be unconstitutional because of the appointments clause. 

Under the appointments clause, Congress can vest the appointment of inferior officers in the president, in judges, or in the heads of departments. For example, in Morrison v. Olson, the court examined the IC that Congress set up to investigate government officials after watergate. The majority found that they were inferior officers (functionalist) found that inferior officers exist when subject to removal by higher executive branch officer--even though not subordinate still removed, Performs only certain, limited duties. Office limited in jurisdiction, Limited in tenure. Under this, the removal power does not have to be vested in the president–it does not interfere with the president’s ability to do his job. The dissent argued that the IC was not an inferior officer because they were a core executive. Focusing on the removal power, Congress can hamstring the presidents’ ability to do remove as long as it does not impede the president’s authority. Setting the standard of good cause does not in this case.

Additionally, In United States v. Arthrex, Inc., the Supreme Court addressed whether Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board were constitutionally appointed. The Court held that APJs exercised authority inconsistent with their status as inferior officers (by the appointment) because their decisions were not reviewable by any presidentially appointed officer, giving them too much unaccountable executive power. This violated the Appointments Clause, which requires principal officers to be appointed by the President with Senate confirmation. As a remedy, the Court did not invalidate the entire system but instead made APJ decisions reviewable by the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office, a properly appointed principal officer. The rationale was that ensuring such supervision restored constitutional accountability within the executive branch.

Did the agency follow the proper procedure in making a rule?

What did the agency do: The APA provides default procedures agencies must follow. (also procedure from the constitution, statutes, agency’s choice, judicial opinions). It attempts to balance procedure and still allow agencies to be quick and nimble. Agencies can do informal rule making, which requires them to follow Section 553 of the APA, formal rule making, which is rare and requires them to follow Section 553, 556, and 557, formal adjudication, which requires them to follow Section 554, 556, and 557, and theoretically informally adjudicate but this does not happen and there are no rules for its procedure.

Informal rulemaking (notice and comment rule making) is the most common. APA 553 governs this. Rulemaking only becomes formal if the statute contains the language “made on the record after an opportunity for agency hearing”. For example, in Florida East Coast Railway, the statute only said hearing, not the “magic words”. Formal rule making is very slow and should only be used when it is entirely clear Congress wanted them to. 553 is not required for military or foreign affairs or internal agency management. It requires a notice and comment period including a statement of the time, place, and nature of the public rule making proceedings, a reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed, and either the terms or substance of the promised rule or a description of the subjects/issues of it. After notice and comment, the agency must provide a statement responding to comments. 

For example, in US v. Nova Scotia Food Products, the FDA was delegated authority to protect against adulterated food. They made a rule saying that specific procedures had to be followed for fish sale to provide botulism. They provided notice and received comments on it that resulted in them changing their minds and changing the rule to include an additional standard. However, they did not provide a response to comments on needing different standards for different fish with their statement. The court found that they had to give scientific facts based on APA Section 706 because they cannot act arbitrarily or capriciously. They need to disclose the evidence they relied on. The court also found that the statement was not adequate. While 553 calls it a concise, general statement, Courts have interpreted it to require a response and explanation to “buckets” of comments.

Notice must contain the substance of the rule but it must catch attention of parties of interest. The final rule can differ from the proposed rule without additional notice when the final rule doesn’t bring in new interest parties. If the final rule is a logical outgrowth (same character/does the final rule provoke the right people to comment), then supplemental notice is not needed. For example, In Chocolate Manufacturers Association v. Block, the USDA revised its WIC food package rules to eliminate flavored milk, even though the proposed rule had allowed milk generally and did not specifically signal that flavored milk was under consideration for removal. Although the statute emphasized reducing sugar and comments discussed sugary foods (including flavored milk), the court held that the agency failed to provide adequate notice under the APA. Applying the “logical outgrowth” test, the court asked whether the final rule was a natural extension of the proposed rule such that interested parties would have been prompted to comment. It concluded that it was not: by listing acceptable foods and not indicating flavored milk was at risk, the proposal effectively reassured interested parties that flavored milk would remain allowed. As a result, affected parties—like the chocolate industry—were not fairly alerted to comment on its elimination. The court therefore required supplemental notice, emphasizing that agencies must give notice sufficient to alert the “right” parties to participate, and that a final rule cannot unexpectedly depart from the proposal in a way that deprives stakeholders of a meaningful opportunity to comment

Comment must allow adequate time to comment.

Statement must provide responses to comments, including detailed explanation of why final rule.

553 is meant to allow for political oversight, potential for judicial review, and increase transparency/legitimacy.

Formal Adjudication: Adjudication of individual cases can result in rules being made that apply to all. In general, agencies can issue forward-looking generally applicable guidance through adjudication so long as there’s a hook tying it to an existing rule or law (notice and fairness) and it follows the required procedures for adjudication under the APA (556, 557). 

For example, In SEC v. Chenery Corp. (often called Chenery II), the Court addressed whether an agency can make policy through adjudication rather than rulemaking. The SEC had applied a general “fair and equitable” standard to invalidate a corporate reorganization, even though it had not previously articulated a clear rule on the issue. The Court upheld the agency’s action, holding that agencies have discretion to announce and apply new principles through adjudication, even if doing so has retroactive effects. The rationale emphasized flexibility and practicality: agencies cannot anticipate every issue in advance, and requiring rulemaking in all cases would undermine efficiency and adaptability. While concerns about fair notice and due process exist (as highlighted in Justice Jackson’s dissent), the majority concluded that adjudication is acceptable so long as the result is not arbitrary and parties are not unfairly surprised. The case thus stands for the principle that agencies may develop policy case-by-case, especially in complex or evolving areas where advance rulemaking is impractical.

Notice and Comment doesn’t apply to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice. General statements of policy are forward looking but do not have force of law, easy when agency is just settling forth its inention/agenda btu if harder when they are telling uou what like and don’t like. INterpretive rules are also forward looking, but can have the force of law, but must have a hook. However, if a general statement of policy looks like it has binding/force of law, if an interpretive rule is not interpreting but is just creating, or if announcing rules that didn’t spring from existing rules or laws, then could be violating. For example, In Bell Aerospace v. NLRB, the Supreme Court considered whether the National Labor Relations Board could, through adjudication, reverse its prior position that certain “purchasing agents” were managerial employees excluded from collective bargaining protections. The case arose after the NLRB abruptly changed course, effectively a 180-degree shift in policy, prompting Bell Aerospace to argue that such a sweeping change affecting thousands of employers and workers required notice-and-comment rulemaking rather than adjudication. The Board, relying on SEC v. Chenery, defended its authority to develop policy through case-by-case adjudication without categorical limits. The Second Circuit attempted to distinguish Chenery, emphasizing that the issue was not one of first impression, the change was foreseeable, and the decision had broad industry-wide implications, suggesting adjudication was inappropriate. The Supreme Court rejected this limitation, holding that agencies generally retain discretion to announce and apply new principles through adjudication, even when they represent significant policy shifts, so long as the decision is not arbitrary or capricious; however, the Court acknowledged that retroactive application may be limited where it would unfairly upset serious reliance interests.

In Pacific Gas & Electric, the court addressed whether the Federal Power Commission’s “Order 467,” which established a priority system for allocating natural gas during shortages, was a binding legislative rule or merely a general statement of policy exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking. The case arose in the context of pipeline shortages, where the agency required firms to file advance curtailment plans and later issued guidance ranking customers by priority without engaging in formal rulemaking procedures. Industry challengers argued that the order effectively created binding obligations and thus required notice and comment under the APA. The court drew a distinction between “rules,” which carry the force of law and are binding in their application, and “general statements of policy,” which are nonbinding announcements of how an agency intends to exercise its discretion in future cases. A policy statement, the court explained, does not itself determine rights or obligations but instead provides notice of the agency’s intended approach, facilitating planning while preserving flexibility. By contrast, a rule has legal effect and must be justified through the proper rulemaking process, with review focused on whether both the rule and its application are lawful. The court acknowledged that the line between the two categories is not always clear, but emphasized that policy statements receive less stringent procedural requirements and less binding effect, even though courts still consider agency expertise when reviewing their implementation.

NO HOOK—-In Hoctor v. Department of Agriculture, the agency issued a regulation requiring that animal facilities be “structurally sound” and constructed with “materials and strength appropriate for the animals involved,” then later issued an “interpretive rule” specifying that dangerous animals must be kept behind at least an eight-foot fence. The regulated party was fined for having only a six-foot fence, and the Department of Agriculture argued that the guidance was merely an interpretation of what “strength” required. The court in Hoctor rejected that characterization and held that the eight-foot requirement was a substantive (legislative) rule, not a true interpretive rule, because it imposed a new, specific, and binding obligation that could not reasonably be derived from the vague regulatory language. While the underlying regulation gave the agency discretion to define adequate “strength,” translating that standard into a precise numerical requirement went beyond interpretation and effectively created new law, which required notice-and-comment rulemaking. The court therefore found the agency’s action procedurally invalid, even though the underlying regulation itself was broadly framed.

Did the agency make a good decision?

Arbitrary and capricious: Hard Look analysis: agency must examine relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational choice between facts found and choices made. An agency that has failed to do a hard look is arbitrary and capricious under APA § 706. This occurs when they rely on factors that Congress did not intend for them to rely on, fail to consider an important aspect of the problem, offer an explanation not supported by evidence, or offer an explanation so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to difference in view or expertise. In general, there is a preference for the status quo (not non regulation)

In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm, the Supreme Court applied “hard look” arbitrary and capricious review to strike down the Department of Transportation’s rescission of a rule requiring passive restraints (such as automatic seatbelts or airbags) in automobiles, a safety standard originally adopted to reduce highway fatalities under a statutory mandate to promote vehicle safety. After initially promulgating the rule, the agency later reopened it and rescinded it based on concerns about cost, feasibility, and doubts about effectiveness, especially given the prevalence of detachable seatbelts. The Court held the rescission was arbitrary and capricious because the agency failed to engage in reasoned decision-making: it did not adequately consider important alternatives like airbags-only requirements, failed to address relevant evidence supporting safety benefits, and did not sufficiently explain why prior findings about life-saving effects were being rejected. Under the “hard look” framework, an agency must examine relevant data and provide a rational connection between the facts found and the decision made, and may not ignore important aspects of the problem, rely on irrelevant factors, or offer explanations unsupported by the record. The Court also rejected the argument that rescission is entitled to greater deference as a return to the “status quo,” clarifying that the relevant baseline is the existing regulatory regime.

Did the agency properly interpret its own statutory authority (in understanding its delegation)

Under Cheveron, courts would defer entirely to agency’s interpretation of their power. However, after growing discomfort with this and a change of the supreme court, the court in Loper-Bright said that they may give some respect to agency’s interpretation but that ultimately courts are the arbiters of what law means.

Congress sets up an agency to do a task and designs it via process. How challenge?

Is the process constitutional (appointments, removal, power reserved for congress)

Congress gives an agency the task of blank based on blank

Do the criteria provide guardrails?

Is the task something super important Congress couldn’t get done itself? (MQD)

Does the task feel as though it exceeds the agency’s usual boundaries or do the criteria feel too broad (narrow the guardrails)

Congress tells an agency to regulate (space). The agency acted by going through notice and comment steps

This is good and allowed

Congress tells an agency to regulate (space). The agency goes through notice and comment and the final rule is different from the proposed rule

Is the final rule a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule? If no, invalid

Congress tells an agency to regulate (space). The agency goes through notice and comment but does not address all of the various comments/doesn’t explain why it made its choices when finalizing the rule

(invalid due to unsatisfactory statement)

Congress tells an agency to regulate (space). The agency is enforcing an existing rule or law under its purview; upon encountering a new situation, it announces a rule against that party and keeps going forward

Allow if the announced rule is hooked to the existing rule or law

Agencies announces its priorities in a speech

General statement of policy, fine

Congress tells an agency to regulate (space). Agency announces how its going to decide things in an order, not adjudicating

If it feels like a rule, is binding, there is not a safety valve, then not allowed without notice and comment

Congress tells an agency to regulate (space). Agency announces how it is going to decide things in an order (not during adjudication) but the agency is interpreting a term from an existing law or rule

This is fine, it’s a interpretive rule

Congress tells an agency to regulate (space). Agency issues a rule, not through notice and comment, because there is a terrible catastrophe that needs to needs to be addressed now

Allowed (n and c impracticable, unnecessary, and contrary to the public interest))

need to move fast or knowing the rule would defeat its purpose

Congres tells agency to do a task and there are a bunch of ways agency can do task. Agency picks X as their way

Design choice—hard look

Congress tells agency to do task but it is not clear whether X is encompassed in task. Agency interprets task to include A.

Interpretation of statute—-respect if consistent, thorough, and reasoned. Otherwise, it is court’s interpretation

What are the magic words