Political Science Lecture Review

Flashcards covering key political science theories, authors, and concepts from the lecture notes on collective action, governance, and political behavior.

Rational Choice Theory

A framework where individuals seek to maximize their own personal payoffs.

Olson's Logic of Collective Action

The theory that individual rationality leads to collective irrationality, where groups fail to achieve common goals unless there is coercion or selective benefits.

Prisoner's Dilemma

A trust and coordination problem between two groups, illustrated by a scenario where individuals must decide whether to cooperate or betray their partner.

Free Rider Problem

individuals in a large group have no incentive to contribute because they can enjoy the benefits of the group's efforts without helping.

Tragedy of the Commons

The depletion of natural resources resulting from individuals acting in their own self-interest rather than for the common good.

Affordable Care Act (ACA)

Biggest healthcare transformation BUT failed to provide single payer system or public option 

• Uninsured rate decr. 

• BUT: premiums + insurers profit lots 

Madison Tyranny of the Majority

majority faction could use its power to trample the rights of the minority, particularly those with wealth.

madison Fed 10

Many factions prevents any single majority from dominating.

Levitsky and Way

warn against “Competitive Authoritarianism”

• Bureaucracy = hollow + govt used to punish opponents/reward allies 

Bouie

Con Rot - pol institutes/norms have degraded over time

Unitary State

• govt has absolute authority + delegates power at whim (is revokable)

Federalism

power is divided between a central government and semi-autonomous states.

Supremacy Clause

federal law takes precedence over state law.

Necessary and Proper Clause

Congress has power to make all laws necessary to execute its other constitutional powers.

McCulloch v. Maryland

Congress had the right to establish a national bank under the Necessary and Proper Clause.

Wickard v. Filburn

Commerce Clause was applied to personal wheat production to manage market prices, limiting how much a farmer could grow.

Grumbach

Polarization → reversal of nationalization of politics 

• state = battleground of policies (reuslt determined by where you live)

Voters don't pay attention to national policies + even less to state policies / who their reps are → state politics dominated by special interest groups 

Weaver and Prose

Racial Authoritarianism

• People of color experience dramatic variations in surveillance and freedom depending on the state they live in (ie: N vs S post recon)

Burke

Optimistic view of parties

• People are united for national interest 

• Parties = vehicles for shared principles

• Collective action against monarchy/for common good

Downs

Party = group seeking to control govt by winning elections

• Policy = 2ndary to gaining power 

• Parties adjust positions to win election 

Components of Theory 

• Winner-takes all - only ever 2 majority parties 

  • Duverger’s Law - why vote for 3rd option if 1 of other 2 will def win

• Median voter theory - assumes voters = rational → point of pol preference → party adjust policies to meed media voter

  • Constrained by past reputations BUT can still shift

  • Builds off MVT → voters NOT well informed (party = guide)

• Simple left v right spectrum 

  • Dem support abortion AND gay rights

Bawn et. al. = UCLA school

Reject Downsian model 

• Parties have polarized

• Parties = coalition “policy demanders” tasked with carrying out agenda 

Components of Theory 

• Politicians can contradict median voter preference in the “electoral blind spot” 

• Main goal = policy → can control the govt. 

• Elections = more than voter rationality → must appease policy demanders 

• Hard for parties to adjust policies (sometimes long term deals with coalition groups)

• Coalitions not correlated with policies/random 

  • Support of gay rights NOT related to support of abortions

Pierson + Schickler

ALSO rejects Downsian model as prehistoric 

• Past pol = local BUT now nationalized → state/local have min authority + national media = popping 

• Dem. McGovern-Fraser reforms took away party boss ability to nom pres → primaries 

  • More median values 

• Repub party could win without outright majority w/t anti-majority institutes 

  • electoral college, gerrymandered House, Senate 

  • Does NOT respond to median voter → extreme positions 

• Pol party identification = self identity + hating other side

Mayhew

House members = single minded seekers of reelection BUT stable/functional 

• Fenno’s Paradox - poor image of Congress BUT indi members = popular in own districts 

→ members have to be responsive to constituents to win reelection 

• Parties = insignificant - signal value of voters but ultimately congress listens to voters, not party leaders 

Congress 3 activities:

• Advertising

• Credit claiming

• Position taking

Krehbiel’s

Builds off Mayhew → parties have NO role in bill’s passing 

• Party identification has nothing to do with positions taken 

• gridlock = absence of policy change despite leg majority that favors change 

  • Aka: nothing happens unless absolutely necessary

Neustadt's

Pol system = seperate institutes sharing power 

• Authority ÷ between fed govt + states AND fed ÷ into 3

  • Executive = 1 branch + President only 1 component 

• AKA: Pres has very little power → weak/vulnerable BUT expected to do big things 

Powers

• Veto Congress legislation (BUT cant create…)

• Appoint cabinet secretaries, fed judges/officials BUT require Senate approval 

• Pardon fed crimes 

• Vague authority to execute orders 

• State of union address → Recommend actions to congress

• Commander in chief + can declare war 

Informal power to persuade other part of govt → forced to bargain

• Last resort = command authority BUT failure → lose support

• Ex: Marshall Plan - Truman made Sec of State Marshall pub face → lose personal glory BUT worked out → support

Kernell

Going Public (build off Neaustadt idea Pres = weak)

• Incr polarization + tech adv → incr need to go public

• Publically pressure Congress to do smth

Going Public limitations

• Damages relations w/t Congress → last resort

• Cant change position once made

• Pub disagree → pres look weak + ineffective → lose credit w/t Congress AND public 

• Can only do occasionally or pub will be fatigued + see pres as problematic

Howell

Neusdat = right BUT outdated → modern pres = dif situations

•  Now pres = strong + “imperical” 

• Lack of formal power → desire to get more power 

  • Gridlock + polarization → cant negotiate anyway

Could expand informal powers bc…

• No collective action problem → quick unilateral actions before other branches can respond 

• Pres = chief executive  → claim powers using ambiguity 

• National crisis → commander in Chief → bypass congress 

Unilateral actions only succeed if checks/balances don't block/act + next pres doesn’t undo (ie: ACA)

Howell & Moe

Agree pres = too weak BUT also too powerful bc …

• Growing fed bureaucracy let pres expand power 

Bureaucracy treat R vs D dif

• Accept D goals vs hostile to R ones → D use less unilateral power vs R use more → R “strongman presidency”

Weber

Bureaucracy = highly effective + rational form of organization BUT dehumanizing for workers 

• High conformity cost for low transaction costs 

Core challenges

• Principle-agent problem - bureaucrats = unelected officials → should follow Congress directions NOT pursue own goals

Gailmard & Patty

Problems with Principle-agent prob

• Bureaucrats have dif incentives than Congress

  • Bureaucrats = zealots (passionately believe in cause) OR slackers 

• Malidistribution info: Bureaucrats have expertise in agency vs Congress doesn’t

Lowi

Congress vague delegation of power to the admin state gave lawmaking power to bureaucrats 

• Iron Triangle - alliance between congressional (sub)committee + specific bureaucracy + interests group

Everyone gets what they want - interest group gets policies, agency gets pol support + budget from committee, & committee member gets campaign contributions + electoral support from interest group

McCubbins & Schwartz

2 types congressional oversight:

Police-Patrol Oversight

• Direct, centralized, lots resources/time, proactive

• stop problems before get too big

  • Ex: regular hearings even if there is no scandal

Fire-Alarm Oversight

• Decentralized + reactive

• Respond to problems once they happen 

• Creates tools for citizens to report problems 

  • Admin Procedure Act (1964) - bureaucrats want to create new regulation → must publish in Fed register before implementing → feedback 

  • Whistleblower Protection Act (1989) - protect fed employees who report issues from retaliation 

McC + S prefer fire alarm

• more efficient/effective

• Create credit claiming opportunities 

• Tie to Mayhew (politicians = single minded seeker of reelection)

  • Congressman = heroic when they step in

Howell & Moe

Dual Principle problem

• Congress NOT only one controlling bureaucracy → also President 

• D + R abuse authority over bureaucracy

  • D overreach vs R sabotage

Scalia

Textualism/originalism

• Interpret Con + statues directly with no wiggle room

Bryer

Purpovism/Active Liberty

• Texts are driven by purpose so its a judges job to interpret them according to that purpose

Rosenberg

• Skeptical that courts can actually create meaningful social change 

• Court decisions follow social change and demand but do not actually create that change 

  • Ie: Brown v Board actually did very little (Voting Rights Act actually helped increase equality)

Balkin

ACA constitutional mandate got more and more insane 

Focus on role of conservative intellectuals, social movements/media, & role of repub party

bensel

Federal govt in the post civil war era was super weak and couldn’t impose any econ programs for the entire nation 

• Due to incompatibility of industrial north w/t antebellum south pol econs + issue w/t western expansion

*strictly material and structural explanation of civil rights divide 

• clash between pol econ + elite interests

Tocqueville

Discussed other factors contributing to civil war divide

• Euro immigrants had common roots

• Rejection of territorial aristocracy  → middle class 

Stark regional differences

Huntington

• Post Cold-War conflict = cultural, not ideological 

• Core culture forged by Christianity + protestant values 

  • Individualism + work ethic

• Immigrants = threat to culture 

  • Assimilation leads to success 

  • Warns against country made of two languages, cultures, and peoples

Menand

Critiques Huntington nativism/monoculturalism 

• Am = most patriotic nation + immigrants have strong US pride

• Democracy NOT static dogma but experiment that changes according to shifts in culture/society 

• Strongest societies are made of a bunch of dif components

Converse

• People don't have any consistent ideological belief system

  • Ex: people claim to be against abortion but support gay people (“R” value AND “D” value)

•  Others don't fully understand what a “liberal” or “conservative” is → cannot make any meaningful pattern 

Findings used as basis for pol scholars behaviors 

• Given pol ignorance, debate of how to understand pub opinion and how big of a problem ignorance is for democracy

  • 3 categories: arbitrary outcomes, elite theory, + heuristics

Achen and Bartel

Arbitrary outcomes

• Pub elections are meaningless and random

Blind retrospective voting

• Vote based on things unrelated to pub policy 

  • Ex: econ depression → blame president 

• No policy preferences → rely on party/social identity

Lenz

oters choose politician based on party THEN match their policy preferences to that of the candidate

• Party usually based on parents party 

• Influenced on pointless things (slogans, vibes, etc)

Mills

Elite Theory 

• Elites pass down ideas/problems → people think its their own thoughts 

US run by elites → control elections which are just a facade / illusion of freechoice

Gilens + Page

US is an oligarchy, not democracy 

Policiesrespond only to affluent

Popkin

Heuristics - informed shortcuts 

• Not as pessimistic about democracy 

• Says voters are uninformed BUT "heuristics" give some sort of informed rationalist 

• From afar, pub opinions = accurate, even if indi ones aren’t

  • EX; Gerald Ford ate tamale with husk → lost Mex Am voters 

    • Crazy to not vote based on food BUT on other hand showed he didn’t know their culture

Taul and Nyan

Motivated reasoning

• People want to believe a certain version of reality and contradictory version = threat → rejected 

• ALSO causes them to double down on OG belief 

Backfire effect

Bradley Effect

• People base responses based on who they are talking to

  • EX: if black person asking if you vote for black candidate → say yes BUT then you don’t

Gilens and Jardina

Relationship between race + pub opinion

• Gilins: White people often support racially associated programs 

• Jardina: white identity politics

  • Whites took dom status for granted → feel threatened 

  • Not white supremacy just “in-group favoritism) → oppose immigration, support trade protection, trump etc.

Downsian model of rational voting

benefits outweight the costs

Anzia

Interest groups often push to have races or referendums move to off-cycle years → more influence

• If going off heuristics → wait for good econ to start campaign 

• BUT heuristics also can neg impact campaign 

  • Ie: nicknames (Sleepy Joe)

Popkin

Campaigns are critical for “cognitive focal points”

• Help make connections with politicians and own life 

• Disagrees with Anzia that negatives from campaigns do anything

Abramowitz

Elections treated as existential crisis were Americans hate each other and our govt is super dysfunctional 

• Negative partisanship - voters motivated by hate of the other side more than love of their own 

AKA: at masslevel D + R are genuinelydifferent and hateeachother → polarization

Fiorina

Agree with Abramowitz about elite polarization BUT says on mass level most Am. are moderates 

• Polarization = “sorting” not clear cut differences (more distinct, not more extreme)

  • Liberal = Dem

  • Conserv = Repub 

Disagrees with Abramowitz about focus on party activists, news viewers, donors, and voters to make polarization claims 

• Dont represent avg american who are moderate 

AKA: masses are NOT different, just sorted into ideologies 

Concern about polarization is overblown 

• Feelings of hatred are not validly measured (people just pick the extremes - class example berkeley vs stanford)

Mason

Very little dif between Dem + Repub at mass level BUT they are effectively polarized 

• Ideological differences NOT necessary to divide people

AKA: not ideologically dif, just sorted 

more about perception (polarization just impacts how we view stuff = big dividing issue)

Pierson + Schickler

Agrees Abramowitz is right about mass polarization 

• voters are ideologically and effectively polarized because of themselves (ideological influences and culture) 

Focus on role of institutions driving polarization 

• Nationalization of mechanisms of politics (parities, media, etc)

• Now institutes are polarized tho

Madison's system (checks and balances prevent one group from being too powerful)

• BUT P&S say Affective polarization breaks from madison bc everything has become nationalized and partisan → no more moderates, people are polarized into D or R

Madison and Interest groups

• View interest groups as corruptive 

• Madison argue factions are dangerous bc they pursue selfish interests not public ones BUT eliminating them would eliminate liberty 

  • Solution: let factions rapidly grow → too many factions competing for one to be dominant 

Dahl —> Dahl x Truman

Pluralism

• Madison's idea of power being dispersed among competing groups → pub policy = result of bargaining + compromise 

Disturbance Theory (Dahl x Truman)

• Groups combine when interests align

Olson

Rational self interested individuals will NOT act to achieve group goals (free rider problem) 

→ small groups with centralized interest are easier to organize than big groups with dif interests 

• Social pressure = effective

Schattschneider

Criticises pluralism 

• Flaw: rich and powerful usually win 

To overcome freerider problem → selective incentives

• Special benefits for those who contribute

Hall and Deardroff

Interest groups have 2 strategies

• Insider tactics - rely on personal access to govt officials and mutually beneficial exchanges 

  • Legislators who are focussed on reelection>policy need lobbyist help → provide subsidies to reduce workload in exchange for $ + career advancement

  • H + D say they are NOT corrupt bc they have to tell the truth in order to keep benefiting 

    • Not an attempt to bride/persuade opponents

  • BUT still corrupt bc only rich can afford to subsidise allies

Hall and Wayman

Public sees money and campaign contributions as corrupt BUT most pol sci view it as buying access to Congressmen 

• Give advice → congress will support your issue 

  • Not directly bc that would be sus

Outsider tactic

• No personal contact –. Use implicit or explicit threats to alter politics 

• Mobilize pub opinions using protests, campaigns, demonstrations, etc

• Interest groups can encourage members to call members of congress

Pierson & Schickler

Madison system of moderating decentralized groups w/t local parties doesn't work

→ 

Replaced by nationalized/polarized interest groups

• Local roots + want access to both parties bc they are not ideologically sorted 

• Control parties by enforcing discipline + nationizing conflicts → cross-party compromises

Lukes

Criticise Dahl + pluralists for having superficial view of power (“A” tells “B” what to do)

• 3rd face = most powerful/important

  • Domination isn’t class based

Second Dimension of Power

Power is not just for winning votes, it decides WHO gets voted on

• Focus on agenda control + decision making 

Lukes argues its too committed to observable conflict + assumes that if there is no conflict  there is no general consensus

Third Dimension of Power

LUKES

“A” exercises power over “B” by influencing/determining “B’s” desires by controlling info, mass media, + socialization 

• Focus on shaping preferences to exercise power without observable conflict 

Critiques

• paternalism/elitism problem = concept of “real interest” lets academics (aka lukes) to say they know best for the group

• Empirical problem - how do you prove “latent conflict” exists if it is never seen 

Marxist critique - economic components of hegemony = important

Theofor Adorno

Culture Industry →  false needs 

• Pacifies masses w/t entertainment → dont see real issues 

• Ex: oh look! Shopping → but we are at war…

Noam Chomsky / Edward Herman

Manufacturing consent 

Propaganda model (ownership, advertising, sourcing, flak, ideology) → media filters out dissent + shapes public opinion to align with elite interests → manufacture consent (LUKES)

Edward Said

Orientalism - apply knowledge to production 

• Power works by controlling the representation of the other

• “A” controls “B” by defining who “B” is

Judith Butler

Gender performativity 

• 3rd dimension used on level of identity itself 

• Power doesn’t act on a subject but FORMS it 

• Ie: gender isn’t internal power but preformed