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contractual licence
permission to do something on someone else’s land given as a part of a contractual arrangement between parties to a contract
revocation
power of licensor to revoke is inherent. may be qualified by contract (contractual duty not to revoke can be applied)
winter garden theatre v millenium productions
wg granted mp licence to use theatre. contract clause giving mp right to extend contract by 6 months. also contained clause giving mp right to terminate contract at by time by giving notice. no mention of wg right to terminate. question whether they could legitimately revoke licence
hol - licences can be revoked at any time (w reasonable notice) by licensor unless contract says otherwise
hurst v picture theatres
h bought cinema ticket and was contractually entitled to be there for film duration. managers mistakenly believed he didn’t have ticket and removed him from cinema. pt argued licence could be revoked at any time
licence could not be revoked for duration of performance and h not trespasser
hounslow v twickenham
in cases where licensor seeks to revoke license and evict licensee when licensee still remains contractually permitted to stay on land and remains present on land, courts will not order licensee to leave land
thompson v park
t and p had contractual agreement that they would run a school together t was p’s licensee. relationship breaks down and t sought to revoke license. p left school but forcibly reentered and refused to leave. court said that even if revoking license is in breach of contract, licensee loses right to reenter the land. court will not permit force to re enter land
verrall v great yarmouth bc
case where licensor wants to revoke license and prevent licensee from entering land while licensee remains contractually permitted to be on land but is not present on land, court may order licensor to permit licensee to enter the land through specific performance
orthodox position on whether b can bring action against x who interferes with b’s enjoyment of a’s land
a contractual licence is a personal right. therefore, usually not binding on third parties but there are some controversial attempts to give them proprietary effects
contractual licensee in exclusive possession can sue x in trespass/nuisance
national provincial bank v ainsworth
orthodox position - lord upjohn - in cases of trespass ‘at all material times was in exclusive occupation of the home… has dominion over the house and… could clearly bring proceedings against trespassers’
hunter v canary wharf
in cases of nuisance ‘an action in private nuisance will only lie at the suit of a person who has a right to the land effected, such as a freeholder or tenant in possession, or even a licensee with exclusive possession’
manchester airport plc v dutton and others
if you have a licence, can evict trespassers even if they’re not interfering with licensees (in this case, trespassers occupied land before licence was granted)
can also be done even if licensee isn’t in occupation or possession of land
reasoning for manchester v dutton decision
licence gives right to possession which may not be absolute power, but does encompass power against trespassers
necessary remedy to give effect to rights of occupation by contract
criticisms for manchester v dutton decision
criticism of fact that licensee wasn’t in possession - usually actual possession is basis for action against trespassers for licensees - goes against cases like hunter v canary wharf
a licence is a personal right - using it to remove trespassers who aren’t interfering with licensee’s use of land makes it seem to act more like a property right (numerus clausus concerns)
relativity of title analysis
a licensee in exclusive possession does not rely on their title (the licence) to bring an action in trespass (because it is only a personal right that cannot be enforced against strangers) and they rely on the fact of their occupation of the land instead.
therefore, machester v dutton should’ve failed as they weren’t in exclusive possession or occupation
swadling, ‘opening the numerus clausus’
decision in manchester v dutton violates privity of contract and numerus clausus principle by blurring line between personal and property rights
mayor of london v hall and others
approved decision in manchester v dutton in obiter.
modern law should develop to accommodate claim by anyone entitled to use/control land, effectively amounting to possession
king v david allen
orthodox position - successors in title not bound to contractual licensees, only between appellants and respondent
errington v errington
argues against orthodox position - ‘infusion of equity means that contractual licences now have a force and validity of their own and cannot be revoked in breach of the contract’
reasoning
if contractual licensor revokes licence in breach of contract, licensee will be granted certain equitable remedies to prevent licensor from evicting him
therefore, contractual licensee has equitable right to remain
therefore, a contractual licensee has a right that is capable of binding third parties
criticisms of errington v errington
the fact that contractual right can be specifically performed doesn’t matter - nature of right is important, not remedy which exists for enforcement
denning lj doesn’t cite any authority in support of conclusion
disregarded s4(1) lpa 1925
overall errington v errington was unsuccessful
binions v evans
special clause protecting contractual licence for occupation from successor in title. part of that meant successor in title paid reduced price in light of that. therefore, in equity, licence protected due to lower price paid
evans had contractual licence which gave rise to equitable property interest
evans couldn’t be evicted because, even if her licence was not proprietary, a court will impose a constructive trust for her benefit
ashburn anstalt v arnold
for binding successors in title - whether owner of the property has so conducted himself that it would be inequitable to allow him to deny the claimant an interest in the property