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US orthodox view
Late 1940s - early 1960s
The US orthodox view argued that Stalin and the USSR was entirely to blame for the start of the Cold war. Bailey argued that the USSR was intent on world domination and that the USSR caused the Cold War to develop because after WW2 they expanded their control and influence in to Eastern Europe. Kennan argued that the USSR started its conflict with the USA because Stalin needed the US to be seen as a threatening enemy so that he could control the people and they would not rebel against his dictatorship. Feis argued that the USSR’s main aim was to spread communism around the world to the USA in particular, Truman had to respond e.g. Marshall Plan and Truman doctrine
This view was dominant in the US until the early 1960s and was strongly influenced by the fact that Kennan and Feis had worked as senior advisers to the US government at the start of the Cold War.
This view was also influenced by the period of a fear of communism called the “Red Scare” of the 1940s and 50s. The Red Scare was a period of extreme fear of a communist network developing in the US. Senator Joseph McCarthy exploited this fear when he claimed that communist spies were in key government and media organisations. This created a culture of fear and accusation
US revisionist view
Mid 1960s - Mid 1970s
This view argues that it was the USA that was to blame for the Cold War. These historians argued that orthodox historians had exaggerated or overplayed the Soviet threat and that they were too influenced by the Red Scare at the time.
These historians argued that the USA provoked the Cold War because they wanted to expand their economic dominance in to the European markets. These historians argue that the Marshall Plan was a way of stopping a global economic depression and also, helping American business links with Europe.
They argue that the main aim of the US was to spread capitalism and that they only helped countries who had a government that they could work with and a capitalist economy. They argue that Truman’s aggressive and though attitude made the USSR feel justifiably threatened and so it was unsurprising that the USSR was defensive
This view was heavily influenced by the events of the 1960s and 70s. Controversial events like the Cuban revolution and the Vietnam war undermined the claim that the US was protecting democracy and the freedom of the People. Events like the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the My Lai massacre in Vietnam and the use of civilian bombing in Laos and Cambodia undermined the idea of the US as the “leader of the free world”.
Post Revisionist View
Early 1970s - 1989
This interpretation argued that both sides had contributed to the Cold War. Both sides had misunderstood and misjudged on another leading to the tension between them. This view took the most relevant and plausible elements of the previous two interpretations. This most famous post revisionist historian was John Lewis Gaddis. Gaddis argued that the argument that the Cold War was caused solely by the US was not accurate and that actually, most of the responsibility lay with the USSR and Stalin in particular. He did accept that the US misunderstood the USSR’s intentions and that the overestimated the threat from the USSR.
Gaddis did not believe that the Cold War was inevitable. He said that the conflict was a result of fear, confusion and misunderstanding on both parts.
The post revisionist view was really influenced by the thawing of the Cold War in the 1970s. During the 1970s, the U S under President Nixon and Carter began to build better relations with the USSR and communist China. They agreed to limit arms through SALT and met at a summit on Human rights in Helsinki. This period known as détente led historians to avoid blaming either side and consider the Cold War to be more about misunderstandings between the two sides rather than aggression
Historians are divided (New cold war Historians)
1989 onwards
After the end of the Cold War, historians’ views changed again. The new Cold war historians were divided on which side was the most responsible for the development of the Cold War
Having access to sources from the old USSR archives, meant that Western historians had access to information that they had not been able to use before. This new Cold War Historians were divided. Some, like John Lewis Gaddis, argued that the USSR and Particularly, Stalin was most to blame and was aggressive in their early actions. Others like Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy Pipe argued that actions like the Marshall Plan pushed the USSR to be more hostile - Berlin Blockade - They agreed that the USSR was not innocent and that the USSR was heavily influenced by Stalin’s viewpoint but that the USA acted aggressively and cause da reaction from the USSR
Most historians found evidence in the archives that supported their existing view. Many orthodox historians agreed with President Ronald Reagan that the USSR had been an evil empire and found evidence to support the idea that the USSR and Stalin were responsible for the Cold War. Others agreed with the revisionist argument that the USA was responsible
This view was strongly influenced by the events of thee end of the cold war as new archives in Russia and East Germany were opened up to the Western historians and to historians who had been working in the USSR
Appeasement: Popular Majority
1937 - 8
This interpretation argues that Chamberlain had managed to keep out of the war with Germany as long as he could. Chamberlain’s policy was seen as a success and his popularity increased as it was seen as a heroic policy. This policy was influenced by the idea that the public did not want to go to war again after the first world war which had a detrimental impact on them. As well as that, most politicians wanted to avoid war at all costs. Chamberlain had seemed to get Hitler to agree to accept the Sudetenland but not anything more than this. This interpretation did not last long as the events at the start of the war undermined the idea that Chamberlain made a heroic choice
Appeasement: Popular and Political view
1939 - 48
This was the dominant view during the war. Appeasement was seen as cowardly and immoral act, and most politicians and members of the general public agreed with this view during the war. This view was spread by a group of Journalists called “Cato”. They argued that British policy in the 1930s was cowardly and that they should have stood up to the Japanese invasion in Manchuria, Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia and Hitler’s expansion. This interpretation was deeply critical of the policy of appeasement and criticised the British government for underestimating the dictators, and for failing to properly prepare for the war. It was influenced by the fact that the war was going badly in the first few months with Hitler ignoring the Munich agreement, and the Nazi invasion of Norway and France. People were afraid that the Germans might invade Britain and blamed Chamberlain and the policy of appeasement for the situation
Appeasement: Orthodox view
1948 - 60
This interpretation argued that appeasement was a mistake but that it was based on the right motives. It is less critical that the Guilty men interpretation, as Churchill argues that Chamberlain had good intentions and “moral courage”. As this interpretation was written by Churchill in 1948 it is heavily influenced by the fact that Churchill had lost the 1945 election and he wanted to improve his reputation. Churchill also wanted to send a strong message that appeasing expansionist dictators was not the best way to deal with them. He was trying to show that, as he said in his iron curtain speech, the biggest threat in the late 1940s was the USSR and that the allies needed to fight them rather than allow for Soviet Expansion
Appeasement: Academic Revisionist View
1960s - 1990s
This view questioned the idea that Chamberlain made a mistake and argued that he did the best he could in difficult circumstances as Chamberlain was not in a position to go to war in 1938. New sources released after the Public Records Act meant that these historians had a better idea of what Chamberlain was dealing with. They found that Britain was struggling economically and so couldn’t afford to go to war. Chamberlain had tried to increase the armed forced but was blocked by the treasury,. Furthermore, public opinion was not in favour of going to war, and even the military commanders of the British armed forces were not confident to to go to war against Germany in 1938, particularly as they did not know whether they would be able to count on USA to join the War.
Appeasement: Academic counter revisionists
Post 1990s
This interpretation argues that Chamberlain was part of the problem. It argues that his personality was an issue, and he did have options, however he chose not to explore them. This interpretation argues that this showed that he did not follow advice and that he underestimated Hitler because he overestimated his own abilities and importance. it argues that Chamberlain completely misunderstood Hitler because he was unable to change his way of viewing international relations. Furthermore, it argues that Chamberlain betrayed Czechoslovakia in 1938 and should be help accountable for this. This interpretation was influenced by new Soviet sources, which became available in the 1990s. Within these sources were German documents that the Soviets had taken when they captured Berlin at the end of WW2. These documents gave historians new insights into appeasement, particularly the dealings between Hitler and Chamberlain