poli 130 party IDs and essay

presidentialism vs parliamentarism

• definition

  • presidentialism - separately elected executive with fixed term

  • parliamentarism - executive emerges from legislature and depends on its confidence

• example: Brazil (presidential + fragmented parties > coalition strain) vs United Kingdom (parliamentary majority governments)

• institutional design shapes stability, accountability, and representation in democracies

vote of no confidence

• definition: legislative vote to remove a sitting government in parliamentary systems

• example: frequent cabinet turnover in Italy

• makes governments more accountable but can reduce stability

Lame Duck effect

• definition: period when an outgoing president has reduced influence

• End of US presidencies

• no reelection incentive means declining political leverage. fixed terms in presidentialism can weaken governance late in tenure

dual legitimacy

• definition: both executive and legislature claim democratic mandate

• example: 1973 conflict in Chile

• Linz says this is the core weakness of presidential systems: competing authority means institutional conflict which may encourage possible breakdown

electoral system

• definition: rules translating votes into seats

• PR in Israel vs plurality in United Kingdom

• one of the most powerful institutional choices in democracy, as it shapes party systems and representation

plurality/majoritarian vs proportional representation

• definition: plurality = winner-take-all districts; PR = seats proportional to vote share

• example: UK is plurality while the Netherlands is PR

• Plurality is fewer parties while PR is more parties, so the tradeoff is governability vs representation

district magnitude

• definition: number of representatives per district

• example: high in PR systems like Spain

• higher magnitude means more proportional outcomes, so its a key driver of party system size

Duverger’s Law

• single-member plurality systems lead to two-party systems

• example: United States

• mechanical + strategic effects eliminate small parties, so electoral rules are linked to party systems

strategic effect

• definition: voters/parties adjust behavior due to electoral rules

• example: voters avoid “wasting” votes in US elections

  • anticipation of outcomes leads to strategic voting, explaining why small parties struggle in plurality systems

mechanical effect

• how electoral rules convert votes to seats

• example: disproportional results in UK elections

• winner-take-all exaggerates seat shares, showing direct institutional bias shaping outcomes

alternative vote

• definition: ranked-choice voting system requiring majority support

• example: Australia

• preferences redistributed > majority winner. encourages moderation and cross-group appeal

political party

• group that fields candidates for public office

• exmaple: Law and Justice in Poland

• essential for democratic representation, mobilizes voters

descriptive representation

• representatives share characteristics with constituents

• example: gender/ethnic quotas in PR systems

  • shared identity > perceived legitimacy, enhances inclusion

substantive representation

• representatives advocate for constituents’ interests

• example: policy advocacy by mainstream parties

• core to democratic responsiveness - policy alignment leads to voter satisfaction

populist party

• definition: anti-elite, anti-establishment political party

• example: Law and Justice in Poland

• can erode democratic norms as it mobilizes dissatisfaction with mainstream parties

consociationalism

• definition: power-sharing among ethnic groups

• example: Lebanon

• can stabilize or entrench divisions, acts as institutionalized group representation

civil society

• non-state voluntary associations

• example: Northern Italy

• builds trust and participation, foundation of democratic engagement

social capital

• definition: trust, networks, norms enabling cooperation

• example: Italy North vs South

• explains variation in institutional performance

uncivil society

• groups undermining democratic values

• example: Nazi organizations in Germany, Weimar

• mobilizes exclusion and extremism, and can harm democracy

Weimar Republic

• german democracy 1919-1933

• example: collapse due to fragmentation and extremism

• challenges assumption that civil society is always beneficial - strong civil society + weak state = instability

Michels Iron Law of Oligarchy

• definition: organizations become dominated by elites

• example: party leadership centralization

• need for coordination leads to elite control, limiting internal democracy

Bridging vs Bonding Social Capital

• bridging = across groups, bonding = within groups

• example: Varshney’s India cities

• bridging reduces conflict while bonding may increase it. type of social capital matters

ethnic group

• group with shared identity/ancestry

• example: Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda

• identity shapes political mobilization. central to conflict and politics

nation and nationalism

• nation = group seeking political control; nationalism = ideology supporting it

• Example: breakup of Yugoslav

• identity > demand for sovereignty and can drive both state formation and conflict

Primordialism vs Constructivism

• definition - fixed vs socially constructed ethnicity

• example: Malawi vs Zambia ethnic relations

• institutions shape identity salience - ethnicity is not inevitable conflict

instrumentalism

• elites use ethnicity strategically

• example: Serbia/Yugoslavia

• mobilization for political gain; conflict often elite-driven

Hutu and tutsi

• politicized ethnic identities in Rwanda

• example: 1994 genocide

• colonial + political institutionalization of identity. ethnic categories can be constructed and weaponized

Arusha Accords

• 1993 peace agreement in Rwanda

• example: power-sharing attempt

• failed agreements can precede violence, as seen as integration of tutsis into institutions

ethnic security dilemma

• definition: defensive actions by one group trigger fear in others

• example: bosnia conflict

• mutual fear > escalation, explains spirals of violence

ethnic entreprenuer

• leader who mobilizes ethnic identity for gain

• Milosevic in Yugoslavia

• activates identity for political survival, key driver of ethnic conflict

effective number of parties

• measure of party system fragmentation

• high in PR systems like Israel

• electoral rules shape party competition, indicates governability vs fragmentation

intercommunal vs intracommunal civic associations

• cross group vs within group organizations

• Varshney - peaceful vs violent Indian cities

• intercommunal ties prevent riots, structure of civil society determines conflict outcomes

institutional design essay

• parliamentary systems are generally more stable than presidential systems because they avoid dual legitimacy and allow flexible removal of ineffective leaders, though institutional design can mititgate these risks in presidential system

• Linz: presidentialism > dual legitimacy + rigidity > breakdnwo. example: chile 1973 collapse

• parliamentarism: vote of no confidence > removes bad leaders quickly.

• design matters - Chile post-1990 more stable

• presidential system CAN provide stronger accountability and stability (eg US), especially with strong parties and institutions

electoral systems and democracy

• proportional representation improves representation and inclusion but often weakens accountability and can increase fragmentation, creating tradeoffs rather than clear superiority

• Lijphart: pr > inclusion. Netherlands and South Africa. Quentin Quade: PR > weak accountability. Italy and Israel.

• PR may actually stabilize divided societies by reducing exclusion and conflict

electoral systems in divided societies

• electoral systems that incentivize cross-group cooperation are most effective at reducing ethnic conflict, though power-sharing institutions can stabilize deeply divided societies in the short term

• Reilly: preferential voting leads to moderation, such as Australia

• Lijphart: consociationalism in Belgium and Lebanon

• Howard: ethnocracy trap, Bosnia

  • in highly divided society, forcing integration may increase conflict - powersharing may be necessary initially

civil society and democracy

• civil society strengthens democracy when it fosters crossgroup cooperation and trust, but can undermine democracy when it becomes fragmented or supports extremist mobilization

• Putnam: Italy >social capital = strong institutions

• Berman: Weimar Germany - civil society enabled Nazis

• India - interethnic networks prevent violence

• some scholars argue civil society is inherently beneficial, but this ignores “uncivil society”

causes of ethnic conflict

• ethnic conflict is best explained by political incentives and elite manipulation rather than ancient hatreds, though historical divisions can provide the raw material for mobilization

• Serbia > elites manufactured conflict

• India > violence depends on electoral incentive

• Rwanda> political construction of Hutu and Tutsi

• primordialists argue ethnic hatred is deeply rooted, but evidence shows identities are fluid and politically activated

political parties and democratic stability

• mainstream parties are weakening due to declining representation and voter trust, which opens space for populist challengers and threatens democratic stability

• France, Italy

• caused by policy convergence, economic anxiety, immigration

• populist parties can also increase participation and represent neglected voters

country cases

• Italy - North italy has better civil society than South. civil society can strengthen governance, but PR can trade representation for accountability. shows that social capital can make institutions work, but electoral fragmentation can still weaken clear accountability

• Weimar - 1933 democracy collpased, Nazis rose to power. very dense civil society, severe economic shocks, fragmented party system. civil society not automatically good. party fragmentation + crisis can destroy democracy

• India - communal riots vary widely across cities. cities differ in interethnic associations. electoral incetives: politicians incite or ignore violence when minorities don’t deliver votes

• intercommunal ties dampen riots

• violence is strategic, not spontaneous. bridging social capital prevents escalation

• Rwanda - 1994 genocide.

• ethnicity is politically constructed and weaponized. institutions can intensify or mitigate identity conflict. shows how state institutions can manufacture ethnic divisions and under elite mobilization turn them into violence

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• 1990s war, postwar Dayton system entrenches ethnic quotas

• powersharing can freeze conflict but also lock in division

Lebanon

• formal sectarian quotas

• inclusion vs efficiency tradeoff in divided socities

• shows consociationalism can prevent domination but often at the cost of effective, accountable governance

Netherlands

• long running PR + coalition model

• multiple parties, routine coalition bargainigng

• PR can work well with strong norms and institutions

australia

• preferential voting

• alternative vote for lower house

• need for transfers > braoder appeal > moderation

• design can engineer cooperation without quotas

chile

• 1973 democratic collapse, post-1990 more stable democracy

• pre-coup executive-legislative conflict; later institutional reforms and party coordination

• presidentialism’s risks are real but conditionl

• perils of presidentialism and importance of institutional and party system design